2009年，一場(chǎng)完美的金融風(fēng)暴！

貨幣戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)：奧巴馬夸下的刺激經(jīng)濟(jì)的?？谥辽傩枰?.5萬(wàn)億美元，拯救商業(yè)銀行至少需要2-3萬(wàn)億美元，總額將高達(dá)5萬(wàn)億美元左右。我們認(rèn)為這是一個(gè)不可能完成的任務(wù)。美國(guó)國(guó)債市場(chǎng)2009年存在著崩盤(pán)的危險(xiǎn)！隨之而來(lái)的要么是長(zhǎng)期利率飆升，要么是惡性通貨膨脹。美國(guó)要守住美元體系，就必然承受利率猛漲，從而導(dǎo)致利率火山爆發(fā)，進(jìn)入危機(jī)的第三階段。或者保住利率穩(wěn)定，則必須承受惡性通脹的后果，結(jié)果可能導(dǎo)致美元地位危機(jī)，從而直接進(jìn)入危機(jī)的第四階段,美元冰河期。天下沒(méi)有免費(fèi)的午餐，當(dāng)然如果美國(guó)使用戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)手段，情況可能會(huì)有所不同。

（譯者：大頭姍）

盡管一直在持續(xù)的銀行危機(jī)，全球政府終于將控制權(quán)掌握在手中是共同的主題。雖然程度深而且持續(xù)時(shí)間長(zhǎng)的經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退不可避免，但是蕭條看上去可以轉(zhuǎn)化。Roubinis如此說(shuō)。19世紀(jì)30年代的相同決策失誤已經(jīng)被重復(fù)了。美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)擴(kuò)張主義的政策已經(jīng)成功的顯著改變了收益率曲線。政府現(xiàn)在正在掌權(quán)，不是么？

昨日FT專(zhuān)欄Martin Wolf讓我們停下來(lái)思考。它舉了美國(guó)刺激計(jì)劃方案的問(wèn)題。
上周，總統(tǒng)當(dāng)選人奧巴馬正式宣布他的美國(guó)恢復(fù)計(jì)劃和再投資計(jì)劃。其標(biāo)題經(jīng)過(guò)了慎重選擇，令人吃驚的是，對(duì)于奧巴馬來(lái)叔，似乎其他國(guó)家政策對(duì)美國(guó)的命運(yùn)沒(méi)有任何的影響。他也說(shuō)，似乎一個(gè)大的財(cái)政刺激就足以恢復(fù)經(jīng)濟(jì)的繁榮。如果這就是他所認(rèn)為，那奧巴馬就會(huì)遇到打擊。他面臨的困難要比這些程度更深而且更全球性。
伊夫奧爾特史密斯總結(jié)Wolf的觀點(diǎn)說(shuō)
如果我有這個(gè)權(quán)利， “被需要”的刺激計(jì)劃是10 ％ （充分就業(yè)赤字+ 7 ％ ，或在未來(lái)兩年內(nèi)，每年17%。奧巴馬提供的未來(lái)兩年5 ％，或2.5 ％每年，加上基準(zhǔn)的8.3 ％ ，共計(jì)10.7 ％ 。 ）

因此，去獲得我們需要（如果您同意這類(lèi)計(jì)算邏輯）是一個(gè)額外的6.3 ％ ，即占國(guó)內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值的a ％ 。請(qǐng)記住，奧巴馬的計(jì)劃是大約2.5 ％的速度,6.3/2.5 = 2.5倍。
如果你相信數(shù)學(xué)，奧巴馬的計(jì)劃會(huì)需要2.5倍的多資本才能完成他的預(yù)算。這是在你進(jìn)入具體細(xì)節(jié)之前結(jié)果，如“減稅可能比其他措施的效果小” 。

一個(gè)更大的刺激計(jì)劃—即使注定是戲劇性的—在這點(diǎn)上依然可能。是可以獲得的。

OECD的主要指標(biāo)正指出中國(guó)GDP增長(zhǎng)出現(xiàn)一個(gè)完全而迅速的崩潰。愛(ài)德華制作了2個(gè)表，用了另一個(gè)不包含OECD計(jì)算方法的指標(biāo)---發(fā)電量。

發(fā)電量與GDP的關(guān)系：

如果中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)崩潰，或者放緩速度顯著，那其巨大外匯儲(chǔ)備存在的理由---好比一個(gè)抑制國(guó)內(nèi)通貨膨脹的防御措施---將會(huì)蒸發(fā)消失，同樣中國(guó)的美國(guó)財(cái)政部控股也會(huì)消失，或者中國(guó)人民幣可能貶值。

無(wú)論哪種情況出現(xiàn)，美國(guó)將陷入困境之中。國(guó)債價(jià)格可能崩潰（不過(guò)鑒于目前新的銀行倒閉的擔(dān)憂，它會(huì)在一個(gè)明顯反彈之后發(fā)生），如果這種情況發(fā)生，美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)量化寬松政策將給政府留下巨大爛攤子。任何刺激經(jīng)濟(jì)的方案也會(huì)如此。

可以想象這將帶來(lái)唯一核心的選擇：美元貶值。

中國(guó)為什么會(huì)讓其發(fā)生？

當(dāng)然，當(dāng)局者20世紀(jì)30年代已經(jīng)受到了教訓(xùn)，我們可以依靠他們做正確的事情？這要看代價(jià)是什么了。如果代價(jià)是推翻中國(guó)共產(chǎn)黨，那人民幣貶值毫無(wú)疑毫無(wú)疑問(wèn)。就如經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家近期指出的，經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家和銀行家懇求HOOVER總統(tǒng)不簽署1930年的斯幕特協(xié)議---霍利關(guān)稅法（譯者：《斯姆特－霍利關(guān)稅法》：即《Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act》，該法案旨在建立高關(guān)稅壁壘以保護(hù)美國(guó)市場(chǎng)，被后來(lái)的學(xué)者認(rèn)為是引發(fā)上世紀(jì)30年代全球經(jīng)濟(jì)大蕭條的導(dǎo)火索）

紐約時(shí)報(bào)：拯救銀行意味著國(guó)有化

Rescue of Banks Hints at Nationalization

http://currencywar.blog.hexun.com/28454948_d.html

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/16/business/16banking.html?pagewanted=1&_r=3&ref=business

貨幣戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)：鮑爾森方案是金錢(qián)換股份，伯南克方案是CDS置換。鮑爾森方案簡(jiǎn)單明了，但隨著花旗和美國(guó)銀行股價(jià)暴跌，實(shí)際上已不可行，即全部國(guó)有化銀行所注入的資金已不足挽救這兩大巨頭自有資本金的損失。伯南克方案抓住了CDS擔(dān)保失效是導(dǎo)致銀行資金短缺的要害，但代價(jià)是財(cái)政部將成為兩巨頭最大的CDS擔(dān)保者以置換對(duì)沖基金和保險(xiǎn)公司，其核心是拯救對(duì)沖基金而犧牲納稅人的利益。兩巨頭或者更多的5巨頭的總損失規(guī)模將在2-3萬(wàn)億美元之間，納稅人將成為主要買(mǎi)單者。超大規(guī)模的國(guó)債發(fā)行已不可避免，而美國(guó)國(guó)債持有人也將與美國(guó)納稅人一起承受?chē)?yán)重的購(gòu)買(mǎi)力縮水的損失。2009年下半年，美國(guó)國(guó)債市場(chǎng)將面臨一場(chǎng)嚴(yán)峻考驗(yàn)。

我國(guó)很多學(xué)者天真地認(rèn)為奧巴馬政府一旦全力拯救銀行，一切問(wèn)題都將迎刃而解，他們以為美國(guó)政府能夠隨意印錢(qián)，市場(chǎng)則會(huì)照單全收。2008年美國(guó)財(cái)政赤字高達(dá)4800億美元，而今年在不考慮商業(yè)銀行救助的情況下已達(dá)到驚世駭俗的1.2萬(wàn)億美元，如果把銀行損失所導(dǎo)致的政府救助加入，2009年美國(guó)國(guó)債發(fā)行量將達(dá)到3萬(wàn)億美元，這還不算每年的國(guó)債利息支出的5000億。這個(gè)數(shù)字是正常年份的5倍以上，美國(guó)總儲(chǔ)蓄率接近0，國(guó)內(nèi)金融機(jī)構(gòu)現(xiàn)金嚴(yán)重短缺，這就是銀行需要救助的主要原因，因此要消化如此驚人的國(guó)債只能依賴(lài)外國(guó)投資人，但目前的情況是各國(guó)都在減持美國(guó)國(guó)債，只有中國(guó)例外。即使中國(guó)出于種種原因想幫美國(guó)，但其胃口絕對(duì)消化不了這么大的量。最后只有美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)自己大量吃進(jìn)，而這就是超大規(guī)模基礎(chǔ)貨幣增發(fā)，惡性通脹將難以避免。

（譯者：大頭姍） 

華盛頓—去年夏天，在聯(lián)邦和財(cái)政部做出了一個(gè)又一個(gè)政府救助金融機(jī)構(gòu)的舉措后，他們承受巨大的痛苦來(lái)避免做任何影響銀行的國(guó)有化。

周二，在巴爾迪麼的法院外有抗議銀行無(wú)抵押權(quán)的拍賣(mài)行為。拍賣(mài)活動(dòng)發(fā)生在抗議之后。當(dāng)銀行開(kāi)始掙扎時(shí)，消費(fèi)者和房主也是如此。

他們或許無(wú)法在擁有奢侈品。當(dāng)國(guó)家2個(gè)最大的銀行屈服于即將到來(lái)的新一輪巨大損失時(shí)，奧巴馬的團(tuán)隊(duì)和美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)正在處理那些被稱(chēng)為“大到不能倒閉”的銀行的問(wèn)題，而且他們?nèi)缃褚蚪?jīng)濟(jì)下滑致使他們資本的破壞而無(wú)法正常發(fā)揮功能。

尤其是花旗銀行，它的損失非常大，以至于從數(shù)學(xué)角度來(lái)說(shuō)，只有通過(guò)政府注入足夠多的資金而獲得大部分股份或者至少取代現(xiàn)有的股東才能夠解救它。

奧巴馬對(duì)于7000億救世計(jì)劃的剩下那部分的使用方案中，要求政府在銀行重大事件中占據(jù)更加重要的地位，包括從他們支付給股東的分紅到支付給高級(jí)主管的獎(jiǎng)金。

蘇格蘭皇家銀行分析師說(shuō)：“美國(guó)還沒(méi)看到，從杰克遜關(guān)閉美國(guó)第二大國(guó)家銀行開(kāi)始，國(guó)家就已經(jīng)踏上了（銀行國(guó)家化）的道路，我們將回到政府控制銀行體系的時(shí)代。

周四，將近于1200億用來(lái)救助美國(guó)銀行的資金------包括注入資本和吸收損失-----同時(shí)，11月份的3000億的花旗銀行救助資金，都代表著用來(lái)為銀行提供資本的金融行動(dòng)并表現(xiàn)出現(xiàn)對(duì)銀行資本的控制。

財(cái)政部和美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)官員通過(guò)構(gòu)建與保險(xiǎn)計(jì)劃相當(dāng)大的的救助銀行最大毒性資產(chǎn)行動(dòng)來(lái)完成這個(gè)計(jì)謀。

政府并沒(méi)有像財(cái)政部門(mén)那樣通過(guò)資本注入，投資千億納稅人的資金來(lái)購(gòu)買(mǎi)銀行的優(yōu)先股去救助它們，而是在根本上將銀行從威脅資產(chǎn)中解放出來(lái)。

分析師說(shuō)新救助方法的問(wèn)題是，它很可能遮蓋住納稅人所承擔(dān)的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。如果政府擔(dān)保的證券變得一文不值，保險(xiǎn)金的成本可能比財(cái)政部第一時(shí)間以現(xiàn)金救助銀行所需要的花費(fèi)多得多。

另一分析師說(shuō)，此種方法掩蓋住了政府已經(jīng)為花旗銀行大股東的事實(shí)?！皼](méi)有其他任何人會(huì)投資他們，我們已經(jīng)擁有它們了”

博南克在周一概述了奧巴馬新管理團(tuán)隊(duì)對(duì)于救助銀行方案的幾點(diǎn)要素。

博南克警告說(shuō)，如果有任何恢復(fù)當(dāng)前癱瘓的信貸市場(chǎng)的希望，聯(lián)邦政府除了將更多的錢(qián)注入到銀行中或金融機(jī)構(gòu)，別無(wú)它選。

眾所周知，TARP救援計(jì)劃已經(jīng)激怒了兩黨的國(guó)會(huì)議員，這些人抱怨說(shuō)美國(guó)財(cái)政部長(zhǎng)鮑爾森已經(jīng)向小型銀行注入資金而不要求義務(wù)性的回報(bào)。奧巴馬和它的高級(jí)經(jīng)濟(jì)顧問(wèn)確信的說(shuō)：對(duì)于阻止更大的金融崩潰，支撐銀行非常重要，而且提供書(shū)面保證會(huì)解決議員們的最大抱怨。

但是博南克提出了一系列的在今后幾個(gè)月中處理銀行問(wèn)題的選擇，所有這些選擇都體現(xiàn)出從布什政府最初設(shè)想的重要轉(zhuǎn)變。

鮑爾森堅(jiān)持認(rèn)為政府只能投資在健康的銀行中，也許這些銀行有些會(huì)接管其競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手。財(cái)政部將投資納稅人的錢(qián)來(lái)?yè)Q取優(yōu)先股，這將支付定期股息并獲得認(rèn)證股權(quán)，而政府可以通過(guò)股價(jià)的上漲賺取利潤(rùn)。

相比之下，博南克提出了各種“剝離問(wèn)題資產(chǎn)“的方法，這些問(wèn)題資產(chǎn)包從不良貸款到住房抵押貸款證券，是人們不會(huì)在任何價(jià)格購(gòu)買(mǎi)的。

博南克的做法包括保護(hù)銀行資產(chǎn)，是在美國(guó)銀行和花旗銀行救助計(jì)劃中核心的問(wèn)題。11月份花旗銀行獲得了救助計(jì)劃，但是上周五的報(bào)告預(yù)計(jì)，它的損失可能突破100億美元。

在這兩項(xiàng)交易中，聯(lián)邦政府設(shè)立了一個(gè)能限制銀行損失其數(shù)十億美元最差資產(chǎn)的復(fù)雜安排。

花期集團(tuán)在11月份的交易中獲得了3000億美元的資產(chǎn)。花期集團(tuán)同意承擔(dān)首個(gè)290億美元的損失。美國(guó)財(cái)政部同意承擔(dān)新一輪的高達(dá)50億美元的損失，而聯(lián)邦儲(chǔ)蓄保險(xiǎn)公司同意承擔(dān)第三輪高達(dá)100億美元的損失。美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)則同意以低利率借給花旗銀行錢(qián)。

作為第二個(gè)選擇。博南克和其他聯(lián)邦官員提出將銀行的受損資產(chǎn)放入一個(gè)新的獨(dú)立的“壞銀行“之中。其影響可能與政府提供保證相同：政府可能將自己從撥出更多的損失準(zhǔn)備金的需要中解脫出來(lái)。

政府“包裹”和政府支持的“壞銀行”具有保護(hù)銀行普通股股東被政府取代的優(yōu)點(diǎn)。

相比之下，不是政府最先的銀行重新資本化方法----注資來(lái)?yè)Q取優(yōu)先股股東和可轉(zhuǎn)換為普通股的認(rèn)股權(quán)證------有排擠普通股的效應(yīng)。這是因?yàn)?，在銀行能夠在停止支付優(yōu)先股股息之前，任何損失都將首先消除普通股股東。

“TARP的一個(gè)問(wèn)題是政府不希望擁有銀行，如果你受損失，普通股就變少。我們所作的是希望保護(hù)一些資產(chǎn)，這是防止普通股股東的消失并提高普通股股價(jià)的方法。

但是越來(lái)越多的分析師警告說(shuō)，此做法可能過(guò)于聰明，因其為決策者提供了太多掩飾銀行真正問(wèn)題和風(fēng)險(xiǎn)方法。

“我們所擁有的是一個(gè)奇怪的，影子下的國(guó)有化進(jìn)程。政府并不能也不應(yīng)該想擁有銀行所有權(quán)。但是如果他們不得不陷入這個(gè)局面，他們必須解決這個(gè)情況。于此，你所擁有的是一個(gè)被公認(rèn)的具有巨大的多元化的金融服務(wù)行業(yè)損失，并面臨在經(jīng)營(yíng)過(guò)程中的每個(gè)方面都存在損的情況。解決這個(gè)問(wèn)題沒(méi)有任何簡(jiǎn)單的方法?！?/p>

The perfect storm

Posted by Sam Jones on Jan 15 16:28.

This entry was posted by Sam Jones on Thursday, January 15th, 2009 at 16:28 and is filed under Capital markets. Tagged with china, Fed, Treasuries, Yuan.

紐約時(shí)報(bào)：拯救銀行意味著國(guó)有化

Rescue of Banks Hints at Nationalization

WASHINGTON — Last fall, as Federal Reserve and Treasury Department officials rode to the rescue of one financial institution after another, they took great pains to avoid doing anything that smacked of nationalizing banks.

They may no longer have that luxury. With two of the nation’s largest banks buckling under yet another round of huge losses, the incoming administration of Barack Obama and the Federal Reserve are suddenly dealing with banks that are “too big to fail” and yet unable to function as the sinking economy erodes their capital.

Particularly in the case of Citigroup, the losses have become so large that they make it almost mathematically impossible for the government to inject enough capital without taking a majority stake or at least squeezing out existing shareholders.

And the new ground rules laid down by Mr. Obama’s top economic advisers for the second half of the $700 billion bailout fund, as explained in a letter submitted to Congress on Thursday, call for the government to play an increasing role in the major activities of the banks, from the dividends they pay to shareholders to the amount they can pay executives.

“We are down a path that this country has not seen since Andrew Jackson shut down the Second National Bank of the United States,” said Gerard Cassidy, a banking analyst at RBC Capital Markets. “We are going to go back to a time when the government controlled the banking system.”

The approximately $120 billion aid package on Thursday for Bank of America — including injections of capital and absorbed losses — as well as a $300 billion package in November for Citigroup both represented displays of financial gymnastics aimed at providing capital without appearing to take commanding equity stakes.

Treasury and Fed officials accomplished that trick by structuring the deals like insurance programs for big bundles of the banks’ most toxic assets.

Instead of investing tens of billions of taxpayer dollars in exchange for preferred shares in the banks, which has been the Treasury Department’s approach so far with its capital infusions, the government essentially liberated the banks from some of their most threatening assets.

The trouble with the new approach, analysts say, is that it is likely to conceal the amount of risk that taxpayers are taking on. If the government-guaranteed securities turn out to be worthless, the cost of the insurance would be much higher than if the Treasury Department had simply bailed out the banks with cash in the first place.

Christopher Whalen, a managing partner at Institutional Risk Analytics, said the approach also covers up the underlying reality that the government is already essentially the majority shareholder in Citigroup.

“There’s nobody else out there to invest in them,” Mr. Whalen said. “We already own them.”

Ben S. Bernanke, chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, outlined the elements of what could become the Obama administration’s new approach to bank rescues in a speech on Monday.

Speaking to the London School of Economics, but addressing American audiences as much as European ones, Mr. Bernanke warned that the federal government had no choice but to put more money into banks and other financial institutions if it had any hope of reviving the paralyzed credit markets.

Known officially as the Troubled Asset Relief Program, or TARP, the rescue program has infuriated lawmakers in both parties, who complain that Treasury Secretary Henry M. Paulson Jr. has doled out money to banks without demanding accountability in return. Mr. Obama and his top economic advisers convinced enough lawmakers that shoring up the banks was essential to preventing a broader financial collapse, and offered written assurances that they would address the lawmakers’ biggest complaints.

But Mr. Bernanke proposed an array of alternative approaches to dealing with the banks in the months ahead, and all of those options reflected a fundamental shift from the original assumptions of the Bush administration.

Mr. Paulson had insisted that the government would be investing only in healthy banks, some of which might take over sicker rivals. The Treasury would invest taxpayer dollars in exchange for preferred shares, which would pay a regular dividend and come with warrants that would allow the government to profit from increases in company stock prices.

By contrast, Mr. Bernanke proposed various ways to fence off the troubled assets, from nonperforming loans to mortgage-backed securities that investors had stopped buying at almost any price.

Mr. Bernanke’s options included guarantees for bank assets, which was at the heart of the rescue packages for Bank of America and Citigroup. Citigroup received its rescue package in November, but it is expected to report additional losses on Friday that could top $10 billion.

In both of those deals, the federal government set up a complicated arrangement that would limit the banks’ losses on hundreds of billions of dollars worth of their worst assets.

Citigroup’s deal in November covered $300 billion in assets. Citigroup agreed to absorb the first $29 billion in losses. The Treasury agreed to take a second round of losses up to $5 billion, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation agreed to take a third round of losses of up to $10 billion. The Federal Reserve then agreed to lend Citigroup money at low interest rates for the value of the remaining assets.

As a second option, Mr. Bernanke and other Fed officials have proposed putting a bank’s impaired assets into a separate new “bad bank.” The effect would be much the same as providing a federal guarantee: the bank would be able to free itself from the need to set aside reserves for extra losses.

Both the idea of a government “wrap” and a government-backed “bad bank” have the virtue of protecting the bank’s common stockholders from being wiped out by the government.

By contrast, the Bush administration’s original approach to recapitalizing banks — injecting capital in exchange for preferred shares with warrants to convert to common stock — had the effect of squeezing out the common shares. That was because any losses would have to first wipe out common stockholders before the bank could stop paying dividends on preferred shares.

“One of the problems with TARP has been a result of the government not wanting to own the banks,” said Fred Cannon, chief equity strategist at Keefe, Bruyette & Woods. “If you get losses, there is less common stock. What we are hopefully moving toward, to the extent that the government guarantees some of the assets, is a structure that protects common shareholders and allows the company to go out and raise common shares through the market.”

But a growing number of analysts warned that the approach may be too clever, because it gives policy makers too many ways to conceal true problems at banks and true risks to taxpayers.

“What we have is a weird, shadow nationalization,” said Karen Shaw Petrou, managing partner at Federal Financial Analytics, a consulting firm in Washington. “The government does not want to and should not want to own banks. But if they get forced into that situation, they should resolve that situation. Here, what you have is a huge diversified financial services industry with recognized losses and looming losses in every aspect of its operations. There’s nothing straightforward about it.”