中國資本主義的發(fā)展和階級斗爭　　

　 　

　 　

CAPITALIST DEVELOPMENT AND CLASS STRUGGLES IN 　　CHINA　　　　

　 　

清華大學留美學者 李民騏 　　

美國馬薩諸塞大學經(jīng)濟學博士，　　

　 　

曾任加拿大約克大學政治學系助教授，　　

　 　

現(xiàn)任美國猶他大學經(jīng)濟系助教授　　

　 　

　 　

沃勒斯坦和大衛(wèi)科茲之中國弟子　　

聯(lián)系方法：http://www.econ.utah.edu/~mli/　　

　 　

目錄　　

導言　　

第一章 資本主義生產(chǎn)關系在中國的發(fā)展　　

（一）什么是資本主義生產(chǎn)關系，它與（改革前）中國國有企業(yè)的生產(chǎn)關系有什么不同？　　

（二）為什么要“改革”？　　

（三）資本主義生產(chǎn)關系的發(fā)展　　

（四）論產(chǎn)權問題　　

第二章 社會主義，資本主義，和階級斗爭　　

（一）文化大革命　　

（二）官僚資產(chǎn)階級和私人資產(chǎn)階級　　

（三）1989年革命　　

（四）工人階級反對“砸三鐵”的斗爭　　

（五）中產(chǎn)階級　　

第三章 從合作化到小農經(jīng)濟　　

（一）合作化時期　　

（二）回到小農經(jīng)濟　　

（三）小農經(jīng)濟和農業(yè)停滯　　

（四）資本主義和小農經(jīng)濟　　

第四章 資本主義經(jīng)濟發(fā)展　　

（一）中國經(jīng)濟發(fā)展的物質基礎　　

（二）資本主義生產(chǎn)關系的確立　　

（三）中國的新無產(chǎn)階級　　

（四）資本主義和人民貧困化　　

（五）依附性發(fā)展　　

（六）國家和中國的資本主義經(jīng)濟發(fā)展　　

（七）跨國公司和中國的資本主義經(jīng)濟發(fā)展　　

第五章 資本主義和民主　　

（一）新權威主義還是民主主義　　

（二）資本主義民主小史　　

（三）依附性發(fā)展和民主　　

（四）腐敗問題和社會動亂　　

第六章 中國革命的前途　　

附：自由派知識分子論市場經(jīng)濟、民主和革命　　

第七章 市場，計劃，和社會主義革命　　

（一）對市場社會主義的批判　　

（二）信息問題、激勵問題和社會主義社會關系　　

（三）革命中國的經(jīng)驗　　

（四）社會主義計劃經(jīng)濟可行嗎？　　

（五）阿列克·諾夫對馬克思主義的批判；對阿列克·諾夫的批判　　

附錄一 我怎樣成為一個馬克思主義者？　　

附錄二 大學生與革命　　

參考文獻　　

注:〔1〕本書作者李民騏原系北京大學經(jīng)濟管理系87級學生，在1989年以后，在政治上與思想上開始與自由主義反對派分道揚鑣，并逐步轉變?yōu)橐粋€馬克思主義者。為了方便讀者了解作者的思想形成過程和背景，書后附有作者的兩篇文章－“我怎樣成為一個馬克思主義者”和“大學生與革命”。　　

〔2〕各章的注解，起補充論證的作用，用〔數(shù)字〕標出，注解內容安排在各章正文后面?！　?/p>

　 　

導言　　

    按照現(xiàn)在流行的資產(chǎn)階級自由主義意識形態(tài)，資本主義和民主總是并肩同步發(fā)展的。但是中國資本主義的勝利卻正是建立在民主失敗的基礎上。1989年的革命，不僅是關系著民主和獨裁之間的抉擇，而且還關系著中國資本主義的命運。在1989年6月4日，不僅是中國的民主運動遭到了失敗，而且也是中國的工人階級遭到了失敗。中國的工人階級遭到了失敗，是因為他們沒有能夠成為一支能夠為他們自身的解放而戰(zhàn)斗的獨立的政治力量，而是在政治上追隨自由派知識分子的領導，因而也就為自由派知識分子的政治利益而不是他們自己的政治利益而戰(zhàn)?！　?/p>

    1989年5月20日，反動政府派軍隊進入北京市執(zhí)行臭名昭著的所謂“戒嚴令”，這就等于統(tǒng)治階級公然向人民宣戰(zhàn)。在這個時候，民主力量沒有別的選擇，或者向統(tǒng)治者投降，或者以公開的人民起義回答統(tǒng)治者的挑釁。工人階級是準備響應起義的號召的。統(tǒng)治階級一時間還處于驚惶失措之中，并且陷于嚴重的內部分裂。起義成功的可能性是存在的。但是，自由派知識分子拒絕利用這個機會。革命因而失敗。　　

    我是從1988年開始參加學生民主運動的。那個時候，象絕大多數(shù)的中國大學生一樣，我也接受了資產(chǎn)階級自由主義的意識形態(tài)。也就是說，一方面，我贊同西方式多黨民主政治，另一方面，我擁護徹底的市場化和私有化和建立資本主義的經(jīng)濟制度。但是正是在1989年革命中，我的思想開始發(fā)生轉變。在革命的最關鍵時刻，十分清楚，革命的成敗取決于反對派是否愿意以及是否能夠把城市工人階級充分發(fā)動起來，投入爭取民主的斗爭。這里我們立即碰到了一個問題。任何頭腦清醒的人都可以看出，自由主義反對派所持的意識形態(tài)與工人階級的利益之間存在著尖銳的沖突和矛盾。那些象我這樣擁護私有化和資本主義的人非常清楚，如果我們所主張的經(jīng)濟政策付諸實踐的話，工人階級是要蒙受慘重損失的。在“正常”時期，這個問題完全可以撇在一邊，作為社會進步的不可避免的代價。但是，在革命進行過程中，那就完全是另一回事了。一方面，你要求工人階級為了你自己奪取權力而流血犧牲，另一方面，如果你這一幫人上了臺，作為對工人階級的貢獻的回報，你馬上就要把工人階級推到嚴重的社會經(jīng)濟災難當中去。一個革命者，矢志致力于爭取社會正義和人民大眾的自由解放的斗爭，在這種情況下，怎么能不對他所信奉的意識形態(tài)提出疑問呢？　　

    1989年革命失敗后不久，我開始拋棄資產(chǎn)階級自由主義并轉向馬克思主義。正象今天世界上所有的馬克思主義者一樣，我也面臨著一系列的問題：20世紀的社會主義革命為什么沒有能夠建立起真正的社會主義社會？社會主義革命的失敗為什么最后導致了資本主義發(fā)展？一個沒有剝削、沒有壓迫、沒有異化的社會能不能存在？有沒有這樣一種經(jīng)濟制度－這種經(jīng)濟制度不僅在經(jīng)濟上是有效率的和有創(chuàng)造性的，而且也符合一個社會主義社會的要求？起初，我或者不能夠回答這些問題，或者沒有什么清楚的想法。我還沒有從資產(chǎn)階級自由主義的影響中完全解放出來。作為一個中產(chǎn)階級知識分子，我對社會的認識還在很大程度上受著我從中而來的那個社會集團的狹隘眼界的限制。在很長一段時間里，象自由派知識分子一樣，我把毛澤東時代的中國完全看作是一個“極權主義社會”，對中國的社會進步?jīng)]有什么貢獻。同樣是在很長一段時間里，我試圖從市場社會主義當中尋找解決社會主義經(jīng)濟問題的辦法。但是隨著時間的推移，隨著我逐漸地超越中產(chǎn)階級知識分子的狹隘眼界，超越資產(chǎn)階級自由主義，我就能夠比較明確、比較有把握的回答上述問題了。　　

    這里，有一個革命的社會理論和科學的社會理論之間的關系的問題。在一個壓迫社會中，社會分裂為壓迫階級和被壓迫階級，在這種情況下，如果我們從壓迫階級的立場或者其他不同程度上有特權的階級和社會集團（比如，知識分子）的立場出發(fā)，是不可能達到對社會的客觀的和科學的認識的。因為壓迫階級和其他特權階級和社會集團在現(xiàn)存社會中是有既得利益的。在一個壓迫社會中，只有從在現(xiàn)存社會中完全沒有任何利益的被壓迫人民的觀點看問題，才可能達到對社會的科學的認識。所以，只要社會還分裂為壓迫者和被壓迫者，科學的社會理論就必須同時是從被壓迫人民的立場看問題，也就是說，同時是革命的社會理論。　　

    中國的社會主義革命（由于客觀的和主觀的原因）沒有能夠建立起一個真正的社會主義社會。但是，革命還是給勞動人民的物質的和精神的生活狀況帶來了重大的進步。在革命的中國，在這個按照自由派知識分子和資產(chǎn)階級的思想辯護士的說法，人民沒有任何自由和權利的“極權主義社會”，勞動人民享有廣泛的社會權利（比如就業(yè)權－“鐵飯碗”、公費醫(yī)療、廉價住房和其他基本需要的保障），這些權利是資本主義社會中的勞動者所無法想象的。　　

    新的社會因而面臨著一個基本的矛盾。一方面，由于推翻了舊的壓迫制度和剝削制度，并且勞動人民贏得了廣泛的社會權利，就不可能再按照與“正常的”壓迫社會一樣的方式去發(fā)展生產(chǎn)力了。另一方面，革命又沒有能夠建立起一個勞動人民掌握社會和經(jīng)濟權力的真正的社會主義社會。一個新的統(tǒng)治階級逐漸形成了。如果這個矛盾解決不了，生產(chǎn)力的發(fā)展就沒有保證，新的社會也就不能夠存在下去?！　?/p>

    這個矛盾既可以通過進一步發(fā)展革命，摧毀正在形成中的新的壓迫階級，使勞動人民掌握社會和經(jīng)濟權力來解決，也可以通過剝奪勞動人民在革命中贏得的廣泛的社會權利，回到壓迫社會的“正?！睜顟B(tài)來解決。到底是用第一種方式還是用第二種方式來解決，取決于歷史上各階級之間的實際斗爭。在中國，這一斗爭集中表現(xiàn)為文化大革命?！　?/p>

    在官方經(jīng)濟學中，這一矛盾則反映為“計劃”和“市場”之爭。官方經(jīng)濟學認為，市場是現(xiàn)代條件下唯一合理的和可行的經(jīng)濟體制，“市場導向改革”是解決毛澤東時代后期經(jīng)濟矛盾的唯一可行辦法。但是，沒有任何一種經(jīng)濟體制不是在一定的社會關系中運行的。所以，脫離開一定的社會關系來談論一種經(jīng)濟體制的合理性和可行性是毫無意義的。例如，給定資本主義的社會關系，要使生產(chǎn)力發(fā)展，就必須允許資本家剝削工人，因而也只有允許資本家剝削工人的經(jīng)濟體制才是“合理的和可行的”。這當然不等于說對資本主義來說是“合理的和可行的”對其它任何社會也是“合理的和可行的”。正相反，資本主義剝削，由于壓制了絕大多數(shù)勞動人民的創(chuàng)造力，是生產(chǎn)力發(fā)展的嚴重障礙?！　?/p>

    只是在文化大革命失敗以后，革命社會主義的政治力量和思想力量被打敗，官僚統(tǒng)治階級的統(tǒng)治得以鞏固，“市場導向改革”才在政治上和社會上成為解決中國經(jīng)濟問題的唯一“可行的”辦法。官方經(jīng)濟學在社會關系的問題上保持沉默，卻在實際上把現(xiàn)存的社會關系當作他們研究問題的既定的出發(fā)點，也就是把壓迫階級對被壓迫人民的統(tǒng)治當作他們既定的出發(fā)點?！　?/p>

    但是，統(tǒng)治階級和被壓迫人民之間的斗爭并沒有因為文化大革命的失敗而停止。正相反，統(tǒng)治階級要把資本主義的壓迫和剝削制度強加到勞動人民頭上，不經(jīng)過嚴重的斗爭是不可能的。這些斗爭在1989年革命中達到了高潮?！　?/p>

    1989年革命的失敗證明，由自由派知識分子來充當中國民主運動的領導是完全不合格的。跟隨他們，中國的勞動人民是什么也得不到的。中國勞動人民必須從統(tǒng)治階級和自由派知識分子的思想統(tǒng)治下解放出來，并成為一支獨立的政治力量，也就是說，革命社會主義的力量。在這個意義上，在中國爭取民主的斗爭必須同時是爭取社會主義的斗爭?！　?/p>

    另一方面，1989年革命的失敗為中國資本主義的發(fā)展掃清了道路。1989年以后，中國資本主義進入了一個新的擴張階段，伴隨著外國資本的大量流入。毫無疑問，統(tǒng)治階級的統(tǒng)治又一次得到了鞏固，中國資本主義目前仍然處在新興的和上升的階段。但是，這決不等于說，現(xiàn)存社會的矛盾已經(jīng)消失，或者不會進一步發(fā)展和激化了。資本主義制度，無論在社會上還是在經(jīng)濟上都是不合理的、充滿了矛盾的制度。正是資本主義發(fā)展的成功準備了它走向失敗和沒落的條件。　　

    就中國來說，資本主義發(fā)展采取了出口導向型依附性發(fā)展的特殊形式。也就是說，一方面，中國的資本主義經(jīng)濟越來越依賴于外國的技術和先進設備，另一方面，為了有外匯用于進口這些技術和設備，中國經(jīng)濟嚴重依賴于靠廉價勞動力在世界市場是競爭的出口部門。中國資本主義的發(fā)展因而是建立在殘酷剝削億萬“廉價勞動力”的基礎上的，或者說，建立在絕大多數(shù)人民苦難和貧困化的基礎上的。但是，任何社會制度要能夠長期存在下去，它必須至少能得到絕大多數(shù)人的默許。中國資本主義因而面臨著不可解脫的矛盾：它要維持自己的經(jīng)濟合理性，就不得不破壞自己的社會合法性；而要維持自己的社會合法性，就不能維持自己的經(jīng)濟合理性。不能夠同時維持自己的經(jīng)濟合理性和社會合法性，中國資本主義就使自己的存在成了問題?！　?/p>

    另一方面，中國的勞動人民，是進行過偉大的社會主義革命的，是曾經(jīng)親眼看到被壓迫人民一旦起來，就能夠打倒壓迫者和剝削者，就能夠使世界發(fā)生翻天覆地的變化的。中國的勞動人民，所以是決不會長期忍受現(xiàn)存的壓迫秩序而無所作為的。或遲或早，中國的勞動人民必然起來，奪回他們失去的權利，并且在新的起點上開始建設一個嶄新的社會?！　?/p>

    1990年6月15日，我因為一次反政府演說而被逮捕，后來被當局以“反革命宣傳煽動罪”判處有期徒刑兩年。我從1992年6月出獄后一直致力于革命社會主義活動。我起初是在北京和西安的由自由派知識分子主導的反對派圈子中做宣傳工作，其中一些人后來成了我的同志。在與自由派知識分子的論戰(zhàn)中，越來越有必要對統(tǒng)治階級和自由派知識分子的意識形態(tài)做一個系統(tǒng)的、全面的批判?！　?/p>

    我是在1993年，在我對深圳工人狀況做個人調查時開始創(chuàng)作這本書的。后來我移到北京以便查閱北京圖書館的文獻，但不久又轉移到西安以避免警察機關的騷擾（1992年6月以后，我又曾三次被捕）。所以，本書的中文部分大部分是在西安完成的。后來在譯成英文時，我又用英文添加和修改了一些章節(jié)。這樣，在本書的最后定稿中，第一、第二、第五章，第三、第四和第六章的一部分是先用中文完成又譯成英文的，而第七章和第三、第四和第六章的其余部分則是直接用英文寫成的?！　?/p>

    在第一章中，我試圖回答下面的問題：中國是不是走上了資本主義的發(fā)展道路？如果是，為什么？我首先通過比較中國的國有企業(yè)和資本主義企業(yè)，分析了革命后的中國的生產(chǎn)關系的矛盾。我認為這種矛盾既可以通過進一步發(fā)展社會主義革命來克服，也可以通過恢復資本主義的壓迫、剝削制度來克服。由于中國的具體的歷史條件，資本主義發(fā)展成了這一矛盾的實際的歷史的解決辦法?！　?/p>

    在第一章說明了資本主義發(fā)展成為革命后社會經(jīng)濟矛盾的實際的歷史的解決辦法以后，第二章則探討這一解決辦法是怎樣由歷史上實際的階級斗爭來決定的。我集中討論了文化大革命和1989年革命。另外各有一節(jié)論述官僚和私人資本家階級以及中產(chǎn)階級?！　?/p>

    第三章討論中華人民共和國建立以后農業(yè)生產(chǎn)關系的演變。雖然農業(yè)合作化沒有能夠給中國農村帶來真正的社會主義改造，在合作化時期，中國還是在農業(yè)生產(chǎn)力發(fā)展方面取得了巨大的進步。雖然中國農業(yè)在“改革”初期曾經(jīng)一度高速增長，但是由于“改革”中國農業(yè)回到了小農經(jīng)濟的狀態(tài)，并從此進入了長期停滯?！　?/p>

    在第四章中，我試圖分析中國資本主義的經(jīng)濟發(fā)展成功的條件。一方面，毛澤東時期為后來的經(jīng)濟發(fā)展奠定了物質基礎，另一方面，沒有正常的和穩(wěn)定的生產(chǎn)關系，無論是社會主義的還是資本主義的，快速的經(jīng)濟發(fā)展是不可能的。中國能夠成功地完成向資本主義過渡，主要是由于中國有著（與前蘇聯(lián)和東歐相比）相對落后的經(jīng)濟結構，因而相對落后的階級結構。由于有靠剝削來自農村的億萬“剩余勞動力”發(fā)展起來的資本主義經(jīng)濟部門，中國的統(tǒng)治階級事實上得以繞過國有企業(yè)工人階級的抵抗，從而保證了資本主義“改革”的勝利。在這一章中，我還指出，由于中國的特定環(huán)境，資本主義發(fā)展采取出口導向型依附性發(fā)展的形式，如果中國不能夠擺脫依附性發(fā)展的狀態(tài)，則中國資本主義發(fā)展在長期能否維持下去，存在著嚴重的問題?！　?/p>

    第五章討論資本主義發(fā)展和政治民主之間的關系。我對發(fā)達資本主義國家的政治民主的發(fā)展做了簡單的介紹，指出資本主義發(fā)展決不會自動帶來民主，現(xiàn)代民主只是由于工人階級反對資本家階級的斗爭才得以確立的。然后我指出，在欠發(fā)達資本主義國家，由于社會矛盾和經(jīng)濟矛盾更加尖銳，資本主義和民主就更加難以相容。在這一章中，我還分析了八十年代后期在兩派自由派知識分子－“新權威派”和“民主派”之間的論戰(zhàn)，認為這次論戰(zhàn)反映了資本主義發(fā)展和政治民主之間的內在矛盾?！　?/p>

    在第六章中，我總結了1989年以來中國的社會政治形勢，認為資本主義發(fā)展的內在矛盾或遲或早將要導致重大的社會經(jīng)濟危機，導致現(xiàn)存社會矛盾全面激化，為新的社會主義革命創(chuàng)造可能性?！　?/p>

    第七章討論當代世界社會主義運動的最重要的問題之一－能不能有一種經(jīng)濟制度，不僅在經(jīng)濟上是合理的和可行的，而且還能擺脫一切形式的壓迫和剝削？我首先批判了形形色色的市場社會主義學說，指出市場社會主義解決不了其自身的悖論－既要在市場條件下發(fā)展生產(chǎn)力，又要防止向資本主義蛻變。然后我分析了資產(chǎn)階級經(jīng)濟學家和市場社會主義者對社會主義計劃經(jīng)濟的批判，他們認為計劃經(jīng)濟解決不了信息問題和激勵問題，因而不能夠成為一個合理的經(jīng)濟制度。我指出，只要有了社會主義社會關系，沒有理由認為社會主義計劃經(jīng)濟解決不了信息問題和激勵問題，資產(chǎn)階級經(jīng)濟學家和市場社會主義者的論點是站不住腳的。另一方面，社會主義社會關系能否建立起來，則一方面，取決于一般的生產(chǎn)力發(fā)展水平，另一方面，取決于歷史上的實際的階級斗爭?！　?/p>

　 　

第一章 資本主義生產(chǎn)關系在中國的發(fā)展　　

　 　

    馬克思說，統(tǒng)治階級的意識形態(tài)，也是一個社會占統(tǒng)治地位的意識形態(tài)。中國社會現(xiàn)在占統(tǒng)治地位的意識形態(tài)就是“改革”。　　

    什么是改革？改革要達到什么目的？改革符合誰的利益？按照官方的說法，改革是要建立“社會主義市場經(jīng)濟”，是社會主義的自我完善，不是要改掉社會主義。“計劃多一點，還是市場多一點，不是社會主義與資本主義的本質區(qū)別。計劃經(jīng)濟不等于社會主義，資本主義也有計劃；市場經(jīng)濟不等于資本主義，社會主義也有市場，計劃和市場都是經(jīng)濟手段。”（鄧小平，373）　　

    什么是市場經(jīng)濟？市場經(jīng)濟不是專門為了發(fā)展生產(chǎn)力發(fā)明出來的什么“經(jīng)濟手段”，而是一整套社會關系。這一套社會關系決定了，貧者愈貧，富者愈富，兩極分化。貧者最終淪為一無所有的無產(chǎn)者，被迫出賣勞動力為生；富者最終上升為靠剝削雇傭勞動發(fā)財致富的資本家，從而產(chǎn)生資本主義。這些都不是教條，甚至也不是理論，全是歷史事實，是常識。所以，發(fā)展市場經(jīng)濟就是發(fā)展資本主義。世界上從來沒有，也不可能有什么“社會主義市場經(jīng)濟”?！?〕　　

    那么，什么是資本主義呢？中國為什么要走資本主義的發(fā)展道路，又是由于什么樣的歷史條件才能夠走上資本主義的發(fā)展道路呢？按照官方的說法，實行市場經(jīng)濟，是為了發(fā)展生產(chǎn)力。那就讓我們先看看資本主義是怎樣發(fā)展生產(chǎn)力的吧？　　

　 　

（一）什么是資本主義生產(chǎn)關系？它與（改革前）中國國有企業(yè)的生產(chǎn)關系有什么不同？　　

    資本主義的基本矛盾是，勞動者不占有生產(chǎn)資料，而生產(chǎn)資料占有者不勞動。所以，資本主義生產(chǎn)的前提條件是資本家向工人購買“勞動”?！　?/p>

    馬克思主義理論認為，工人賣給資本家的不是“勞動”而是“勞動力”，這是不是咬文嚼字呢？根本不是。早在十八世紀就有人指出：“你可以迫使一些人為了一定的工資勞動若干小時，但是你無法迫使他們認真工作?！泵绹罡叻ㄔ涸?898年侯頓訴哈丁一案的判決中指出：“企業(yè)主和勞動者的地位是不平等的，他們的利益在某種程度上是相沖突的。前者必然希望能從雇員那里獲得盡可能多的勞動，而后者由于害怕解雇被迫服從（前者的）規(guī)章制度。這些規(guī)章制度，按照后者的正當意見，對后者不利。......也就是說，企業(yè)主制定規(guī)則，而勞動者實際上被迫遵守這些規(guī)則?！?Perelman,1991,59,98)　　

    如果勞動可以被買賣，為什么還要制定規(guī)章制度以“獲得盡可能多的勞動”呢？所以，買賣的不是勞動，而是勞動力，工人得到的不是勞動的報酬，而是勞動力的價格。如果工人不得不“盡可能多的勞動”，那么工人就會被剝削。但是，資本家是不是真的能剝削工人，剝削多少，這都不是在買賣“勞動”的過程中能決定的，而只有通過工人與資本家在生產(chǎn)領域的實際斗爭才能決定?！　?/p>

    馬克思曾經(jīng)指出：　　

（資本家）必須親眼看見工作進行的一切正常.井井有條，看見他想要的使用價值確實順利地從生產(chǎn)過程中生產(chǎn)出來。在這個問題上，資本家的監(jiān)督能力和執(zhí)行紀律能力是決定性的。而且，他必須要保證生產(chǎn)過程連續(xù)不斷.不受干擾，并且確實在特定勞動過程及其客觀條件所允許的時間范圍內把產(chǎn)品生產(chǎn)出來?！?Perelman,1991,60)　　

    所以，資本家為了保證工人能高效率地勞動.負責地勞動.正確地勞動，必須建立一套強制性的管理制度。因為工人作為被雇傭者，也是被剝削者，不會自動按照資本家所期望的方式進行勞動。M.賴希指出：　　

一旦接受了雇傭關系，工人就不僅向資本家放棄了怎樣做工作的決定權，而且還放棄了幾乎全部的作為國家公民的政治權利和公民權利。他們一走進工廠和辦公室，就成了資本家的私人財產(chǎn)，權利法案所規(guī)定的人權保障就都不起作用了。言論和集會自由，無罪推定，法律面前人人平等，和其他保護公民免受國家侵犯的權利，統(tǒng)統(tǒng)不起作用了。(Perelman,1991,98)　　

    資本家只有靠強制才能使工人接受剝削。但是強制本身并不能保證資本家能有效率地剝削工人。因為，資本家必須依靠工人才能完成生產(chǎn)過程，因此關于生產(chǎn)過程的信息很大部分就掌握在工人手里。資本家不了解生產(chǎn)過程呢關鍵信息，也就不可能有效地剝削工人。所以，隨著資本主義生產(chǎn)關系的發(fā)展，資本家不斷按照自己的需要改組生產(chǎn)過程，把生產(chǎn)過程的關鍵信息掌握在自己手里，使工人失去對生產(chǎn)過程的控制能力?！　?/p>

這可以用數(shù)控機床自動切削金屬以制造機器來加以說明。這些機床的運轉不是由靠體力操縱的熟練機工來進行的，而是由磁帶上的程序自動控制的。它們可以在不影響機工的控制和技術的發(fā)揮的條件下，提高他的效能。因為編制程序所需要的金屬切削知識是機工所掌握的技術的一部分，......但是在資本主義關系中，這一過程為破壞熟練技術從而壓低所分解成的許多小工序的勞動力價格提供了機會，而這正是資方夢寐以求的。（阿羅諾維奇，397〕　　

    資本主義的技術發(fā)展過程，同時也是勞動者精神和智力退化的過程。勞動者越來越喪失關于生產(chǎn)過程的知識，越來越退化為只能從事簡單的重復性勞動的機器體系的輔助人員。在資本主義的先進機器體系中凝聚了最現(xiàn)代的科學技術知識，但是絕大多數(shù)人民卻被剝奪了智力發(fā)展的機會。但是，從長期來說，人的全面發(fā)展的生產(chǎn)力，人對世界的理解是比凝聚了先進技術的物質財富更重要的生產(chǎn)力?！　?/p>

    資本主義生產(chǎn)關系因而實際上也就是資產(chǎn)階級和無產(chǎn)階級之間剝削和被剝削.統(tǒng)治和被統(tǒng)治.壓迫和被壓迫的關系，資本主義生產(chǎn)力的發(fā)展是建立在人的異化的基礎上的。但是工人畢竟是人，是活生生的社會主體?！叭绻と烁械奖粍兿?，他們就要想辦法找回心理平衡?！睋?jù)美國司法部統(tǒng)計，有三分之二以上的美國工人都參與過破壞生產(chǎn)的活動。在抽樣調查中，有三分之一的被調查者承認曾盜竊過雇主的財物?！霸谛》秶闃又?，通過深入交談發(fā)現(xiàn)，工人這樣做是因為他們感到被剝削，而不是由于緊迫的經(jīng)濟需要?！?Perelman,1991,114)　　

    資本主義生產(chǎn)關系既然造成人的異化，就不得不尋求辦法以緩解異化對于生產(chǎn)力的破壞作用。F.M.舍雷爾發(fā)現(xiàn)，大企業(yè)往往支付高工資，以彌補大企業(yè)工人較強烈的異化感。(Perelman,1991,113)但是，單純靠高工資肯定不能抵銷異化的破壞作用。要盡可能減少工人對生產(chǎn)的破壞，還必須依靠社會強制。　　

    資本主義的社會強制制度有兩種類型：（1）企業(yè)內強制。資本主義企業(yè)通過規(guī)定勞動紀律.設置監(jiān)督人員和懲罰性措施直接強制工人按照資本家的要求勞動。比如，美國非農業(yè)領域監(jiān)督工人與生產(chǎn)工人的比例從1948年的13.7%上升到1966年的20.0%，又上升到1979年的22.4%。(Perelman,1991,94)企業(yè)內強制有一定的限度，因為工人可以通過退出企業(yè)逃避資本家的統(tǒng)治。所以，企業(yè)內強制必須有企業(yè)外強制配合才能充分起作用。（2）企業(yè)外強制。首先，資本主義通過經(jīng)常保持一支失業(yè)隊伍為資本家提供勞動后備軍，而工人因為害怕失業(yè)只有忍受資本家的壓迫。其次，為了防止工人造反，資本主義國家建立了社會福利制度。但是社會福利并不能保證工人過上社會公認的正常生活水平，從而迫使工人為了過正常水平的生活必須出賣勞動力，為資本家干活。所以，資本主義生產(chǎn)關系的正常運轉，離不開企業(yè)內外的社會強制制度?！　?/p>

    現(xiàn)在我們來把（改革前）中國國有企業(yè)的生產(chǎn)關系  資本主義生產(chǎn)關系做一個比較。在中國國有企業(yè)中，工人占有生產(chǎn)資料嗎？不占有。工人能支配自己的勞動成果嗎？不能。如果沒有懲罰和監(jiān)督，工人會自覺努力生產(chǎn)嗎？不會。所以，中國的國有企業(yè)與資本主義企業(yè)一樣，也是一種壓迫性.剝削性的生產(chǎn)關系。　　

    但是，中國的國有企業(yè)并非就是資本主義生產(chǎn)關系的翻版。相反，國有企業(yè)是革命的產(chǎn)物，是被壓迫人民起來反抗壓迫者的斗爭成果。從歷史上看，國有企業(yè)是對資本主義的否定，是對工人階級歷史性勝利的承認。國有企業(yè)本身是與工人階級因為革命勝利而贏得的社會經(jīng)濟權利聯(lián)系在一起的。　　

    首先，國有企業(yè)工人的就業(yè)權利是不可剝奪的。工人的勞動力不是賣給國有企業(yè)的，而是國有企業(yè)必須接受的?！　?/p>

    第二，國有企業(yè)必須為工人提供低租金住房.公費醫(yī)療和退休金。因此，工人只要不違法亂紀，就有權享受社會公認的正常生活水平，不論企業(yè)盈虧狀況如何，也不論勞動力供求狀況如何?！　?/p>

    第三，革命給被壓迫人民帶來了精神上的極大解放。官方學者抱怨說：“在我國流行的說法是：工人是企業(yè)的主人，干部是人民的公仆，現(xiàn)在工人對這句話產(chǎn)生很大的誤解，有的工人說：哪有仆人管主人的？哪有主人做不了仆人主的？”（李強，178）國有企業(yè)不可能象資本主義企業(yè)那樣輕易就使工人接受剝削和壓迫?！　?/p>

　 　

（二）為什么要“改革”？　　

    統(tǒng)治階級為什么要改革呢？改革能解決哪些問題呢？一方面，國有企業(yè)與資本主義企業(yè)一樣，實質上是統(tǒng)治階級與工人階級之間剝削和被剝削.統(tǒng)治和被統(tǒng)治.壓迫和被壓迫的關系，從而造成人的異化。另一方面，國有企業(yè)又與資本主義企業(yè)不同。首先，中國的生產(chǎn)力水平不允許象發(fā)達資本主義國家那樣用高工資來緩和工人階級的不滿，這就是說國有企業(yè)的正常運轉比發(fā)達資本主義國家更加依賴于有效的社會強制制度。但是，由于承認工人階級的充分就業(yè)權利，由于實行廣泛的社會福利制度，根本不存在資本主義社會中的企業(yè)外強制。由于革命使勞動人民普遍覺醒，企業(yè)內強制也不能順利實行?！　?/p>

    官方學者認為：　　

我國國有大中型企業(yè)的經(jīng)營不善，主要是體制問題，......這突出地表現(xiàn)在所謂“三鐵”的問題上。所謂三鐵指：鐵飯碗.鐵工資.鐵交椅。......表面看來，這種體制是使職工生活.就業(yè)得到保障的美好制度，擔實際上，這種體制的實施將國有職工養(yǎng)懶了.養(yǎng)散了，養(yǎng)出了依賴性。（李強，150）　　

他們主張建立“有限失業(yè)和就業(yè)競爭”的制度：　　

有限失業(yè)和就業(yè)競爭為企業(yè)進行合理化經(jīng)營提供了保障條件。企業(yè)可以解雇多余人員，提高生產(chǎn)效率，......失業(yè)的壓力，迫使勞動者努力工作，......不至于成為企業(yè)的多余人員......”（趙效民和賈履讓，330）　　

    什么是“合理化經(jīng)營”？歷史上從來沒有什么超越一切歷史時代的.放之四海而皆準的“合理化”。在一種生產(chǎn)關系范圍內是最合理，在另一種生產(chǎn)關系范圍內可以是最不合理。如果說國有企業(yè)把職工“養(yǎng)懶了.養(yǎng)散了，養(yǎng)出了依賴性”，中國經(jīng)濟早就該停滯不前了。但是，中國的生產(chǎn)力不僅沒有停滯，反而高速發(fā)展。1952－1978年，中國人均國民收入年平均增長3.9%。(PRC,1985)在世界資本主義長期繁榮階段，1950－1973年，在全部85個人口超過100萬的發(fā)展中國家中，只有12個能超過這個發(fā)展速度，其中4個是石油輸出國（利比亞.沙特阿拉伯.伊朗.伊拉克)，4個是世界上人均接受美援最多的國家???????（以色列.臺灣.韓國.希臘），波多黎各是美國殖民地，沒有任何一個國家人口超過3000萬。（威爾伯，198）美國歷史學家邁斯納指出：“50年代初期，中國從比比利時還要弱小的工業(yè)起步，到毛澤東時代結束時，長期以來被恥笑為‘東亞病夫’的中國已經(jīng)躋身于世界前6位最大的工業(yè)國家之列?！?Meisner,1986)　　

    這不是不合邏輯嗎？這不是違反經(jīng)濟科學的原理嗎？怎么能依靠把人“養(yǎng)懶”.“養(yǎng)散”的制度發(fā)展經(jīng)濟呢？問題就在于，“三鐵”也好，充分就業(yè)也好，社會福利也好，本身并不構成生產(chǎn)力發(fā)展的障礙，相反的，要使絕大多數(shù)人有機會發(fā)揮自己的創(chuàng)造性才能，這是最起碼的條件。社會強制制度之所以成為資本主義生產(chǎn)關系正常運轉必不可少的要素，是因為資本主義是一種異化的.壓迫性的制度。那么，在一種沒有異化或者異化大大減輕的社會中，失業(yè).競爭.“監(jiān)督”.“執(zhí)行紀律”等資本主義繁榮的秘訣.資本主義生產(chǎn)力的源泉，就不僅僅是多余的，而且是社會進步的桎梏?！　?/p>

    所以，充分就業(yè).“三鐵”能夠相當長時期在中國行之有效，不是偶然的，而是決定于一定歷史條件的。這個條件就是，在1927－1949年的中國革命中，被壓迫人民終于能夠打倒內外壓迫者，終于第一次成為創(chuàng)造歷史的主體，在精神上和物質上都獲得極大解放。所以，從革命中誕生的中國是一個比資本主義更少異化.更加解放的社會，這就使中國工人階級有條件享受比資本主義國家的工人階級廣泛得多的社會經(jīng)濟權利。〔2〕但是，這只是暫時的社會力量平衡的結果，這個平衡是決不可能持久的?；蛘撸瑒趧尤嗣衲軌虬l(fā)展他們已經(jīng)爭得的權利，真正把社會權力掌握在自己手里，使生產(chǎn)力的發(fā)展建立在普遍解放的基礎上?；蛘?，生產(chǎn)力的發(fā)展仍然以人的異化為前提，那么就必須與資本主義一樣，建立壓迫性的社會強制制度?！　?/p>

    在下一章中，我們將詳細討論在1949年中國革命勝利以后，勞動人民和新興的官僚統(tǒng)治階級圍繞著進一步發(fā)展革命.還是使革命流產(chǎn)，是徹底推翻.還是保存壓迫制度所進行的斗爭?！　?/p>

    勞動人民沒有能夠推翻壓迫制度，壓迫制度成了一個既成事實；但是，這個壓迫制度與資本主義比起來，缺少壓迫手段，顯得軟弱無力。這就是“改革”的歷史條件。所以，“改革”必然是發(fā)展資本主義生產(chǎn)關系，用資本主義的壓迫手段來鞏固現(xiàn)存的壓迫秩序?！　?/p>

　 　

（三）資本主義生產(chǎn)關系的發(fā)展　　

    資本主義生產(chǎn)關系的發(fā)展首先表現(xiàn)在資本主義或半資本主義的經(jīng)濟部門的發(fā)展速度超過了國有企業(yè)部門的發(fā)展速度。首先，外國在華直接投資，將資本主義生產(chǎn)關系直接引進中國。其次，出現(xiàn)了一大批私營企業(yè)和個體企業(yè)，實際上是官方承認的資本主義經(jīng)濟成分。第三，也是最主要的，是鄉(xiāng)鎮(zhèn)企業(yè)的巨大發(fā)展。　　

    按照官方統(tǒng)計，鄉(xiāng)鎮(zhèn)企業(yè)屬于“集體所有制”。但是，據(jù)中國社會科學院調查，1990年登記在冊的鄉(xiāng)鎮(zhèn)企業(yè)實質上50％是私營企業(yè)。（韓明希，97）另據(jù)世界銀行估計，1985年鄉(xiāng)鎮(zhèn)企業(yè)工業(yè)總產(chǎn)值中的17％實際上是由私營企業(yè)提供的，1986年這個數(shù)字猛增到24％，在廣東省是30％，四川省是43％。(Smith,1993,87)即使確實屬于鄉(xiāng)鎮(zhèn)政府所有的企業(yè)，“典型的經(jīng)營方式是把企業(yè)出租給經(jīng)理，經(jīng)理的報酬主要與企業(yè)效益聯(lián)系在一起?！边@與私營企業(yè)大同小異。(Lippit,1992)據(jù)世界銀行估計，在“集體”所有的鄉(xiāng)鎮(zhèn)企業(yè)中，60％的工人不享受企業(yè)分配的住房或住房補貼，41％不享受公費醫(yī)療，52％沒有就業(yè)保障，60％沒有退休金，58％不能讓子女頂替工作。(Smith,1993,88)顯然，鄉(xiāng)鎮(zhèn)企業(yè)遠比國有企業(yè)更象資本主義企業(yè)?！　?/p>

    由表1.1可見，在“改革”時期，資本主義和半資本主義的經(jīng)濟部門的發(fā)展速度大大超過國有企業(yè)部門。到1991年，在生產(chǎn)領域，前者已經(jīng)與后者勢均力敵；在流通領域，前者壓倒了后者。在資本主義和半資本主義經(jīng)濟部門中，資本主義成分又發(fā)展最快?！　?/p>

表1.1   各類所有制占全國工業(yè)總產(chǎn)值和零售商業(yè)銷售額的百分比　　

                            1979年        1991年　　

工業(yè)     全民所有制          78.5          52.9　　

         集體所有制*         21.5          35.8　　

         其他經(jīng)濟類型**       0            11.3　　

商業(yè)     國營                54.6          40.2　　

         集體                43.3          30.0　　

         個體和私人           2.1          29.8　　

*1990年集體所有制工業(yè)總產(chǎn)值中93％來自鄉(xiāng)鎮(zhèn)企業(yè).　　

**“其他經(jīng)濟類型”包括城鄉(xiāng)私營.個體企業(yè),"三資"企業(yè)和少量有全民所有制和集體所有制成分的股份制企業(yè).　　

資料來源:<中國經(jīng)濟問題>1993年第一期,3頁.　　

    資本主義生產(chǎn)關系的發(fā)展還表現(xiàn)在國有企業(yè)本身的資本主義化上。首先，“新增工人普遍實行勞動合同制。......勞動合同制最重要的一點就是打破了終身制和‘鐵飯碗’，職工就業(yè)后依然存在著失業(yè)的危險，這就迫使工人各司其職，勤奮工作?！保ㄚw效民和賈履讓，330）　　

    其次，推行住房.醫(yī)療.養(yǎng)老保險制度改革，“使職工福利貨幣化.使職工本人和子女服務社會化”。（李強，152）“福利貨幣化”.“服務社會化”實際上是把國有企業(yè)工人推向與鄉(xiāng)鎮(zhèn)企業(yè).私營企業(yè)工人競爭的勞動力市場。競爭的結果，必然是國有企業(yè)工人勞動力價格大大下降，從而“福利”"服務"統(tǒng)統(tǒng)喪失殆盡?！　?/p>

    第三，強化企業(yè)內強制，官方學者承認：“80年代以來，我國企業(yè)管理中奉行一種較為嚴格的帶有懲罰性的管理體制，用罰款做為管理基本手段的現(xiàn)象比較普遍?！保ɡ顝姡?73）全國總工會在調查中發(fā)現(xiàn)：　　

鄭州一單位制定124條規(guī)定，其中有4條是獎勵條例，其余120條均為罰款條例。該單位還規(guī)定車間干部.班長等每人每月必須逮住三至五起違紀事件。組長每人必須逮住一件，逮不住罰款，少逮了扣獎。......陜西一個織布車間對各崗位工人制定的罰款條文有三萬多字。山西.丹東.上海.南昌.鄭州.浙江等地一些企業(yè)的職工反映，廠里和規(guī)定看病扣錢，休病假.公傷扣錢，有病假未經(jīng)領導批準就休病假算曠工，重罰。（李強，171）　　

    官方學者認為：“80年代以來的較為嚴格.嚴厲的管理制度，確實對于恢復企業(yè)生產(chǎn)秩序起了重要作用?！保ɡ顝?，173）按照資產(chǎn)階級經(jīng)濟學的邏輯，勞動者是天生懶惰的，要讓勞動者勞動，必須提供懶惰的成本，用失業(yè).競爭.罰款強迫勞動者干活。但是，勞動者既然是活生生的人，他就不可能任人擺布，而要拼命顯示自己作為人的存在：　　

　 　

有的工人說：“你罰吧，別的權利我沒有，消極怠工權.浪費權我有”，“你罰我五元，我讓你十倍.百倍地償還”。......工人情緒低落，積極性受到挫傷，工作沒勁頭，有的甚至消極怠工，給企業(yè)生產(chǎn)帶來不利影響。山西陽泉煤礦原來出勤和生產(chǎn)狀況很好，由于扣罰過多，曾造成該礦出勤下降，事故上升，產(chǎn)量下跌。（李強，174）　　

    即使是資本主義生產(chǎn)關系，也不能不依賴于勞動者最低限度的參與。如果勞動者沒有一點對工作的責任心，任何強制手段也不能使資本主義的生產(chǎn)力發(fā)展。但是，正是資本主義生產(chǎn)關系本身排斥了勞動者對生產(chǎn)資料的占有.對勞動成果的支配，把勞動過程變成了勞動者退化的過程。因此，在資本主義生產(chǎn)關系中，勞動者只是一個純粹被動的被支配的“物”，只有在資本主義制度的強制下，他們才會干活。這必然導致階級對抗，破壞生產(chǎn)力?！　?/p>

    官方學者認為：“懲罰的方式在有些情況下是必要的，因為對于最低道德水平或無道德水平的人來說，其他方式均不起作用?！敝圃臁白畹偷赖滤健钡恼琴Y本主義生產(chǎn)關系。在這種生產(chǎn)關系中，人不算作人，而僅僅是商品，是在生產(chǎn)過程這要努力節(jié)約的成本?！　?/p>

　 　

（四）論產(chǎn)權問題　　

    1979年以前，中國社會的基本矛盾是：一方面，社會主義革命沒有從根本上解決壓迫社會固有的矛盾，沒有消滅壓迫社會本身，而不過是以一個新的壓迫社會代替一個舊的壓迫社會；另一方面，革命又沒有簡單地把權力從一個統(tǒng)治階級手中轉到另一個統(tǒng)治階級手中，而是使相當一部分權力暫時落到人民手中。因此，一方面，這仍然是一個壓迫社會，另一方面，它又喪失了維持壓迫所必要的壓迫手段。這個矛盾特別明顯地表現(xiàn)在這樣的事實上，這個壓迫社會竟不得不用馬克思主義－這個被壓迫人民的解放學說，因而也是一個從根本上危害一切統(tǒng)治階級命脈的學說－來充當自己的官方意識形態(tài).居于統(tǒng)治地位的辯護理論。　　

    這個觀念上的矛盾，只有在現(xiàn)實本身的矛盾還被掩蓋著的時候，只有在勞動人民還把這個社會看做自己的社會的時候，才不至于完全暴露出來，才不至于尖銳化，才不至于把自身碾得粉碎。但是，只要資本主義生產(chǎn)關系一經(jīng)發(fā)展，只要現(xiàn)實本身的矛盾已經(jīng)暴露，觀念上的矛盾便不能不解決。怎么能一面發(fā)展剝削，一面又譴責剝削，又不得不論證剝削竟是為了被剝削者的利益呢？怎么能一面與資本主義調情，一面又宣布資本主義必然滅亡呢？或者是以觀念否決現(xiàn)實，或者是以現(xiàn)實否決觀念。資本主義生產(chǎn)關系的發(fā)展客觀上要求有服從于他的辯護理論，要求科學地說明資本主義的永恒性.合理性.不可替代性，要求科學地說明與之相對立的一切社會經(jīng)濟制度都是荒謬的.不合理的，要求科學地說明任何企圖推翻資本主義制度及其經(jīng)濟規(guī)律的嘗試都是違反人類歷史趨勢的.違反人性的.短命的.注定要失敗的。只有有了這樣的科學，上述矛盾，從統(tǒng)治階級的觀點看，才算是有了徹底的解決。　　

    官方學說的御用性表現(xiàn)在，它的理論總是落后于它為之服務的那個階級的實踐。只有當現(xiàn)實生產(chǎn)關系的對抗性.統(tǒng)治階級和勞動人民的對抗性明白不可否認的時候，它才承認“社會主義”經(jīng)濟是商品經(jīng)濟，盡管這根本違反它所宣稱依據(jù)的那種理論的邏輯；只是當這種對抗性已經(jīng)尖銳化，因此不徹底剝奪勞動人民在革命中爭得的權利就根本不可能解決的時候，它才宣布根本問題在于“產(chǎn)權問題”，盡管這就是從根本上推翻它所宣稱依據(jù)的那種理論。無論如何，一經(jīng)提出“產(chǎn)權問題”，官方經(jīng)濟學也就終于比較誠實地，雖然仍然披著最后一層遮羞布，宣布自己就是資產(chǎn)階級經(jīng)濟學，同時宣布改革的目的就是發(fā)展“有中國特色的資本主義”。　　

    官方學者認為，公有制的“根本性問題”是“產(chǎn)權虛置”：　　

　 　

首先，企業(yè)的生產(chǎn)資料基本上是社會無償賜給的，好象接受生日禮物那樣不用付費，而社會對生產(chǎn)資料的所有權僅僅體現(xiàn)我把它們分配給企業(yè)使用。其次，企業(yè)對生產(chǎn)資料只有支配權，無所有權，由于支配權來得容易，并且是與所有權相分離的，因此也就不珍惜它，也沒有誰真正為它承擔什么責任。工人在使用生產(chǎn)資料時好象這是他們自己的，但又并不愛護它，這又好象是別人的，造成財產(chǎn)界定模糊。......這些矛盾和問題是產(chǎn)權界定不清和責職不明的集中表現(xiàn)?！叭巳硕际巧a(chǎn)資料的主人，但誰也不對它負責?！北闶沁@種矛盾的現(xiàn)實寫照。企業(yè)行為扭曲的原因蓋出于此。產(chǎn)權是微觀經(jīng)濟運行的基礎.企業(yè)行為合理化的必要條件，這個問題解決不妥，改革就難深化，企業(yè)行為的扭曲.經(jīng)濟的紊亂和低效便難以避免了。（宋源和龔金國，95）　　

　 　

    官方學者根本無視.蓄意抹殺這樣一個事實：“人人都是生產(chǎn)資料的主人”不過是官方法律語言，現(xiàn)實卻是勞動者與生產(chǎn)資料相分離，生產(chǎn)資料不是被勞動者用來實現(xiàn)自己的目的，而是被“社會”用來充作壓迫勞動者的手段。　　

    所謂“所有權”，其實就是壟斷排他權，即財產(chǎn)所有者有不允許他人為了社會的利益而使用其財產(chǎn)的權利?！八袡嗯c支配權相結合”，也就是允許財產(chǎn)所有者為了私利而濫用社會財富。在發(fā)達資本主義社會，壟斷資本家為了謀取超額利潤，可以讓很大一部分生產(chǎn)設備閑置，而不管社會上有多少人失業(yè).社會損失多少生產(chǎn)力。（見表1.2）在拉丁美洲，“占有大部分可耕地的大地產(chǎn)并未得到有效耕種。......大農場的許多土地都任其閑置。1960年，哥倫比亞的一份研究報告表明，......擁有70％可耕地的大農場主，只耕種其土地的6％。據(jù)估計，整個拉丁美洲22億英畝的可耕地中只有2.7億英畝土地被充分利用。這種過時的土地所有制，再加上極高的人口增長率，導致人均農業(yè)產(chǎn)量下降?！?Stavrianos,1981)從這個意義上講，只有在一個社會拆除了其內部所有的“所有權”藩籬以后，生產(chǎn)力才能得到最自由的發(fā)展。在這個意義上，“生產(chǎn)資料基本上是社會賜給的”，不是公有制的缺點.弱點，而是它的優(yōu)越性所在?！　?/p>

　 　

表1.2   美國壟斷資本主義對生產(chǎn)力的浪費 　　

        制造業(yè)設備利用率(%) 失業(yè)率(%)　　

1950-59     83.6              4.4　　

1960-69     84.9              4.7　　

1970-79     80.8              6.1　　

1980-86     77.4              7.8　　

資料來源:陳寶森,367.　　

　 　

    “這些矛盾和問題是產(chǎn)權界定不清和責職不明的集中表現(xiàn)?！痹鯓硬拍茏龅健爱a(chǎn)權界定清楚”呢？現(xiàn)代社會化大生產(chǎn)，客觀上要求許多勞動者共同使用生產(chǎn)資料。在這種情況下，能做到每一個勞動者使用的每一件生產(chǎn)資料都屬于使用者本人嗎？如果做不到這一點，又如何避免“責職不明”呢？　　

    官方學者說“產(chǎn)權虛置”是公有制的“根本性問題”。官方學者大約以為資本主義私有制的產(chǎn)權是非常實在的，是“產(chǎn)權界定清楚”的。資本家當然很關心他的私人財產(chǎn)。但是，在現(xiàn)代社會化大生產(chǎn)條件下，他只有把生產(chǎn)資料交給很多工人共同使用才能使他的財產(chǎn)發(fā)揮作用.帶來收益。問題在于，生產(chǎn)資料的實際使用者－工人又有什么理由關心資本家的私人財產(chǎn)呢？當然資本家可以實行監(jiān)督。但是，監(jiān)督者不也是雇傭勞動者嗎，他們又有什么理由象資本家一樣關心資本家的私人財產(chǎn)呢？　　

    資本主義私有制雖然“產(chǎn)權界定模糊”，但是它的生產(chǎn)力比“產(chǎn)權界定清楚”的小私有制勝過千萬倍。要是現(xiàn)代社會到處都滿足了“企業(yè)行為合理化的必要條件”，早就沒有什么現(xiàn)代生產(chǎn)了。在現(xiàn)代社會化大生產(chǎn)條件下，“產(chǎn)權”完全是個虛幻的概念。在我們進一步討論這個問題之前，讓我們先看看自由派知識分子的見解?！　?/p>

    厲以寧教授的嫡傳弟子金立揚在自由派知識分子的刊物上撰文說：　　

　 　

公有產(chǎn)權當然有它的缺點。第一便是搭便車。公有制下形成大鍋飯，人人都希望別人去努力，自己坐享其成，結果是大家都不努力。一個和尚跳水吃，三個和尚沒水吃。要解決這個問題，就要大家達成一項協(xié)議，商定如何測量每個人的貢獻，又如何按貢獻分配收益。這是一項很費時間和精力的工作，做這項工作的人本身也要別人費時間和精力來監(jiān)督，由此產(chǎn)生出來一大堆交易費用。第二是公有產(chǎn)權要對外交易的時候，內部先要統(tǒng)一意見，協(xié)調（短期和長期的利益〕費用相當高。第三，如威廉姆森所說，私人比較注意協(xié)調短期和長期的利益，念念不忘給子孫留下一份遺產(chǎn)，但公有產(chǎn)權中，這一代人往往不顧下一代人，造成短期行為。第四是資源枯竭，公家的東西不拿白不拿，不用白不用。海洋中的魚，不撈白不撈，結果就是過度捕撈，漁業(yè)資源枯竭。（<邊緣>，14－15）　　

　 　

    現(xiàn)代社會化大生產(chǎn)，客觀上要求許多勞動者聯(lián)合起來共同勞動，只有這樣才能駕馭規(guī)模巨大的現(xiàn)代生產(chǎn)資料，才能發(fā)揮集體的協(xié)作的生產(chǎn)力，才能充分發(fā)展和利用社會分工。既然現(xiàn)代生產(chǎn)是集體勞動.聯(lián)合勞動，那么無論“私有產(chǎn)權”還是“公有產(chǎn)權”，不是都需要解決“如何測量每個人的貢獻，又如何按貢獻分配收益”的問題嗎？不是都需要“費時間和精力來監(jiān)督”嗎？美國學者薩繆爾.波利斯通過研究發(fā)現(xiàn)，美國非農業(yè)領域監(jiān)督工人與生產(chǎn)工人的比例，1948年是13.7%，1966年上升到20％，1979年又上升到22.4%。不僅如此，資本主義監(jiān)督要起作用，還必須維持一支龐大的勞動后備軍，從而對在業(yè)工人起威懾作用。五.六十年代，美國的失業(yè)率一般在4－5％，七十年代上升到6％，八十年代又上升到7－8％。僅此兩項，就浪費社會勞動的四分之一！這還不是“一大堆交易費用”嗎？　　

    付出了這樣一大堆交易費用，是不是就解決了“搭便車”的問題呢？R.克萊本在評論一部勞動經(jīng)濟學著作時說：　　

　 　

（美國）工人從他們的切身經(jīng)驗中深知，如果發(fā)揮了他們在提高生產(chǎn)方面的創(chuàng)造力，這很可能意味著多做工作而報酬卻依然如舊，或甚至更少些。三十五年之前，我曾在一家鋼鐵廠工作過，在那里工作的我所認識的大部分機工能操作得比資方的工序時間測定員所規(guī)定的時間快百分之十五到百分之三十。但是，他們不愿作傻瓜，他們保持這一秘密，他們不去增加軍火生產(chǎn)，而是為自己在工作時間里安排了更多的空閑休息時間......在美國工人中蘊藏著巨大的智慧和創(chuàng)造力量，對此，私營企業(yè)的經(jīng)理人員無法把這股力量挖掘出來。（<外國歷史哲學經(jīng)濟摘譯>總22期，“在漫長的勞動日中消磨一生”）　　

　 　

經(jīng)濟學家們熱衷于批評蘇聯(lián)式中央計劃經(jīng)濟，說計劃當局不可能收集到充分的.準確的信息。殊不知，資本主義企業(yè)面臨的困境是一樣的。資本家要靠工人進行生產(chǎn)，所以在有關生產(chǎn)的信息上也只好依賴工人。但是工人是被雇傭的，他有什么必要向資本家提供充分的.準確的信息呢？他為什么不努力歪曲真相使自己得到好處呢？既然如此，“私有產(chǎn)權”又怎么能解決“搭便車”問題呢？　　

    “第二是公有產(chǎn)權要對外交易的時候，內部先要統(tǒng)一意見，協(xié)調費用相當高。”土地私有者如果要轉賣土地，自然不需要與這塊土地上的居民“協(xié)調”。如果把居民區(qū)改做商業(yè)區(qū)，致使這塊土地上的居民流離失所，這些損失自然也不需要土地私有者花費分文。如果資本家開除工人，使之生計無著，自然也不需要任何“協(xié)調費用”。說到“公有產(chǎn)權”，那么今日中國在大炒特炒房地產(chǎn)的時候，又何需為當?shù)鼐用窀冻鋈魏巍皡f(xié)調費用”呢？“私有產(chǎn)權”不必事先付出協(xié)調費用，就是說，這種費用要轉嫁給別人，就是說，這種費用要采取社會沖突的形式?！　?/p>

    “第三，......私人比較注意短期和長期的利益，念念不忘給子孫們留下一份遺產(chǎn)，但公有產(chǎn)權中，這一代人往往不顧下一代人，造成短期行為?！边@一條是頗有些顛倒黑白了。為什么在資本主義高度發(fā)達的今天，各國的教育.科學.文化事業(yè)也往往要由國家來承辦呢？還有道路.機場.港口.通信.水利.電力事業(yè)等周期長.利潤薄的事業(yè)，不也有賴于國家投資嗎？不就是因為私人企業(yè)唯利是圖的“短期行為”嗎？如果說私人充其量能給子孫保留一筆遺產(chǎn)，那么只有社會才能考慮給整個社會的后代留些什么，只有社會才能從不僅是下一代人.而且是下幾代人的眼光考慮這個問題?！　?/p>

    “第四是資源耗竭，公家的東西不拿白不拿，不用白不用。海洋中的魚，不撈白不撈，結果就是過度捕撈，漁業(yè)資源耗竭。”這一條與“搭便車”實質上是同一個問題。歸咎于“公有產(chǎn)權”卻是有失公允的?！皾O業(yè)資源耗竭”難道不正是私人生產(chǎn)者一味追逐利潤的結果嗎？　　

    金立揚認為：　　

　 　

有人把國有企業(yè)產(chǎn)權構造的缺陷視為產(chǎn)權不清晰，其實不對。國有企業(yè)的產(chǎn)權屬于全體公民，產(chǎn)權主體不是很清晰嘛！關鍵的問題是委托－代理?！　?/p>

　 　

金立揚要標榜一下他與一般官方學者不同的獨到見解！　　

　 　

共同擁有國有企業(yè)產(chǎn)權的全體公民，不可能人人事必躬親，只能作為委托人，把企業(yè)交給具體的代理人去經(jīng)營.管理和運作。......我看有必要認清我國國有企業(yè)存在三層委托－代理關系。第一層是由全體人民委托給政府，具體地講，是委托給政府職員；第二層是政府委托給企業(yè)的廠長經(jīng)理；第三層是廠長經(jīng)理再把具體業(yè)務委托給工人。其中每一層都需要監(jiān)督。例如第一層中，委托人本身就比較模糊。全國十二億人，人人都是委托人，都是國有產(chǎn)權的主體，都有權分享國有產(chǎn)權的收益，人人都會存在搭便車的動機，暗中希望別人去為國有產(chǎn)權操心，自己來坐享其成。這也是公有產(chǎn)權的通病。......再則，以布坎南為首的公共選擇學派指出，政府不是神，政府是由有血有肉的人組成的，政府的職員不會自覺地，全心全意地為人民服務，他們也是經(jīng)濟人，需要監(jiān)督。在第二層委托－代理關系中，政府職員作為委托人，需要獲知廠長經(jīng)理經(jīng)營行為的信息，以  次  為依據(jù)來獎懲。但委托人總不可能整天跟在廠長經(jīng)理旁邊，虎視眈眈，看代理人努力不努力。企業(yè)的經(jīng)營業(yè)績，比如銷售額.利潤率倒是看到見的，堪作為廠長經(jīng)理努力程度的標準。但是，有時企業(yè)利潤率下跌，并非廠長經(jīng)理的過錯，而是由于整個市場都不景氣，或者政府橫加干預的結果......第三層的委托－代理關系常被一些經(jīng)濟學家所忽略，以為只是個企業(yè)內部管理的問題。其實，在中國國有企業(yè)中，廠長經(jīng)理本身不是產(chǎn)權的所有者，又沒有得到有力的監(jiān)督，大有與工人相串謀.坑害國家的可能。中國國有企業(yè)短期化行為泛濫，國有資產(chǎn)流失嚴重，便是明證。政府對此顯得無能為力，一個政府要對付十一萬家國有企業(yè)，太困難了。上有政策，下總有對策。　　

　 　

“廠長經(jīng)理”在階級斗爭中不得不與工人相妥協(xié)被官方學者和自由派知識分子謂為“與工人相串謀”。金立揚繼續(xù)說：　　

　 　

國有企業(yè)的委托－代理在今天的條件下，確實困難。結果是，國有企業(yè)的產(chǎn)權得不到切實的維護，效率低下，虧損嚴重，有人據(jù)此提出，國有企業(yè)的產(chǎn)權比重太高了。......高不高應該由市場來裁決。......應該讓國有產(chǎn)權與私有產(chǎn)權在市場上公平的競爭，讓各種形式的企業(yè)有相同的稅負，相同的貸款條件，得到相同程度的法律保護?！　?/p>

　 　

但是，一方面不敢侵犯工人的就業(yè)權，另一方面卻可以隨便侵犯這個權利；一方面必須負擔工人的醫(yī)療.養(yǎng)老費用，另一方面根本無須負擔這類費用；一方面實行八小時工作日.節(jié)假日休息，另一方面卻總是把勞動時間延長到最大限度.從來沒有什么節(jié)假日；一方面還不敢侵犯那些起碼的勞動保護條件，另一方面卻決不吝惜工人的生命和健康以謀取利潤......所以，根據(jù)市場的標準，那   個制度更人道，哪個制度的勞動力成本就較高，因而效率較差。金立揚最后的結論是：“應當允許國有企業(yè)被私營或集體企業(yè)吞并”，就是說，私有化。（<邊緣>，16－17）　　

    金立揚說，“關鍵的問題是委托－代理”。但是，國有企業(yè)的廠長經(jīng)理是因為工人委托才有權管理企業(yè)的嗎？國家是因為十二億人民的委托才成為國有企業(yè)的主人嗎？什么時候發(fā)生過這樣的事呢？“共同擁有國有企業(yè)產(chǎn)權的全體公民，不可能人人事必躬親，只能作為委托人，把企業(yè)交給具體的代理人去經(jīng)營.管理和運作?！边@就是說，勞動者作為集體的資本家與自身相對立，作為集體的資本家任命“政府職員”做自己的總經(jīng)理，又任命“廠長經(jīng)理”做自己的部門經(jīng)理或者分公司經(jīng)理，為的是剝削作為雇傭勞動者的自己?！笆|人”一方面是資本家，并且僅僅作為資本家，僅僅關心自己的股本.股票的價格；另一方面，又是雇傭勞動者，并且僅僅作為雇傭勞動者，一心想的就是多掙錢.少出力。只有那種滿腦袋充斥了資產(chǎn)階級民法觀念的人才能想象出這種雙重人格.精神分裂。這種人，由于想象力貧乏，除了現(xiàn)代資本主義的產(chǎn)權形式－生產(chǎn)資料所有者與勞動者相分離.相對抗的產(chǎn)權形式以外，再也想象不出其它的產(chǎn)權形式，似乎生產(chǎn)資料與勞動者必須永遠處于分離狀態(tài)，即使它們在法律上合一了，也必須在事實上分離開來。　　

    或者，國家不過是本來意義上的國家，因而問題也根本不在于“人人都是委托人，都是國有產(chǎn)權的主體”，而在于絕大多數(shù)人民根本不是“國有產(chǎn)權的主體”?；蛘?，國家就是社會，國家所有制就是社會所有制，因而委托人就是被委托人自己，因而也就根本不存在什么“委托－代理問題”?！　?/p>

    官方學者和自由派知識分子總是從這樣的邏輯出發(fā)：勞動者是注定要偷懶的，注定不愛惜財產(chǎn)的。要防止他們偷懶，防止他們?yōu)E用財產(chǎn)，只有實行監(jiān)督。但是，只有有了充分的信息，才能有效地進行監(jiān)督。而官僚機構發(fā)現(xiàn)自己總是得不到充分的信息。于是，官方學者和自由派知識分子就掉進了死胡同?！　?/p>

    既然如此，那么把“公有產(chǎn)權”換成“私有產(chǎn)權”，把官僚機構換成資本家，就解決不了任何問題，而不過是改變問題的當事人罷了?！八接挟a(chǎn)權”，就是說根本沒有解決“企業(yè)”和勞動者之間的對抗性關系，因而也就根本沒有解決勞動者“搭便車”的問題；“私有產(chǎn)權”，就是說在社會范圍內成萬倍.成十萬倍地復制國有企業(yè)與國家的關系。過去是十幾萬家企業(yè)共同向一個政府隱瞞信息，現(xiàn)在是十幾萬家企業(yè)相互隱瞞信息。過去企業(yè)“搭便車”是損害國家的利益，現(xiàn)在企業(yè)“搭便車”是損害其他企業(yè)的利益（在資產(chǎn)階級經(jīng)濟學中，這就是所謂“外部性”問題）?！　?/p>

    所以，問題根本不在于抽象意義上的“公有產(chǎn)權”或“私有產(chǎn)權”。問題僅僅在于.完全在于，一切生產(chǎn)活動的永恒主體－勞動者對生產(chǎn).對生產(chǎn)資料的態(tài)度如何。如果生產(chǎn)關系是壓迫性的生產(chǎn)關系，因而生產(chǎn)過程也就是工人受壓迫的過程，生產(chǎn)資料也就是壓迫工人的手段，那么，“少出力.多掙錢”不就是工人應當采取的最正常.最合乎情理的對于生產(chǎn)的態(tài)度嗎？對于生產(chǎn)資料，工人又有什么必要“珍惜它”.“愛護它”.“為它承擔責任”呢？如果生產(chǎn)過程只不過是工人實現(xiàn)自身目的的過程，生產(chǎn)資料只不過是工人實現(xiàn)自身目的的手段，工人對生產(chǎn).對生產(chǎn)資料的態(tài)度就必然和壓迫性生產(chǎn)關系中截然不同，這不是最順理成章的事嗎？　　

    只有在這個基礎上，才可能理解“搭便車”問題。在資本主義制度.官僚制度下，“搭便車”無非是勞動者保護自己免受剝削的一種合理行為罷了。離開了這個前提，“搭便車”就純粹是個荒謬的問題.無法理解的問題?！　?/p>

    首先，說“人人都希望別人去努力，自己坐享其成，結果是大家都不努力?！边@完全是小生產(chǎn)者的邏輯。因為在現(xiàn)代社會化大生產(chǎn)條件下，大家都不努力的結果，便是都不能享其成。那么，與其都不能享其成，為什么人們不選擇“大家都努力，都享受勞動成果”呢？“一個和尚挑水吃，三個和尚沒水吃”畢竟只是個寓言故事。真到三個和尚沒水吃的地步，難道他們直到渴死也想不出一個挑水的辦法嗎？經(jīng)濟學不是處處假設理性的人嗎？“搭便車”的結果是都不能享其成，顯然是非理性的。為什么唯獨在這個地方，理性的人就不存在了呢？　　

    其次，在資本主義制度.官僚制度下，不可能通過監(jiān)督來解決“搭便車”的問題，因為沒有充分的信息，就不可能實行有效的監(jiān)督，而這些信息只能由被監(jiān)督者來提供，所以監(jiān)督者永遠得不到充分的信息。但是，在勞動者自己掌握生產(chǎn)事業(yè)的情況下，被監(jiān)督者就幾乎沒有什么可以向監(jiān)督者隱瞞的，因為監(jiān)督者就是被監(jiān)督者本身。至少，每個勞動者絕對反對其他人坐享其成，因而盡一切努力使其他人受到有效監(jiān)督；勞動者從他自己的切身經(jīng)驗中，不難知道別人“搭便車”的動機.“搭便車”的條件，因而不難發(fā)現(xiàn)監(jiān)督的漏洞，不難制定有效的監(jiān)督規(guī)則。在資本主義制度.官僚制度下，監(jiān)督要“付出一大堆交易費用”；而在勞動者自己掌握生產(chǎn)事業(yè)的情況下，勞動者也就是監(jiān)督者，勞動過程也就是監(jiān)督過程，因而監(jiān)督不需要專門的花費?！　?/p>

    什么是“產(chǎn)權問題”呢？一方面，在現(xiàn)代社會化大生產(chǎn)條件下，生產(chǎn)資料必須交給許多勞動者共同使用，勞動者個人不能占有生產(chǎn)資料；另一方面，勞動者又沒有共同占有生產(chǎn)資料，因而勞動者與生產(chǎn)資料相分離.為別人而不是為自己勞動，因而不可能對生產(chǎn)事業(yè)抱負責的態(tài)度。這就是讓一切現(xiàn)代社會統(tǒng)治者為之煩惱的所謂“產(chǎn)權問題”?！　?/p>

　 　

　 　

　 　

　 　

〔1〕官方學者認為：“價值規(guī)律的作用會使資源秉賦豐厚的人愈來愈富有.資源秉賦貧乏的人愈來愈貧困。但是，實踐證明，只要做到：第一，注意初始分配的平等；第二，一方面采用累進所得稅.高額遺產(chǎn)稅等稅收措施，另一方面采取對低收入階層的福利措施，收入的兩極分化是可以防止的?！保▍蔷喘I，172）官方學者認為，只要憑籍一些行政.法律手段，就能夠消滅一種經(jīng)濟規(guī)律。但是，既然生產(chǎn)是私人生產(chǎn)，而“累進所得稅.高額遺產(chǎn)稅等稅收措施”和“對低收入階層的福利措施”無非是對私人占有制度的侵犯，那么，“稅收措施”和“福利措施”就必然破壞生產(chǎn)力。而一個社會充其量只能在有限的范圍內承受這種破壞。所謂“實踐證明”，無非是指大蕭條以來，西方發(fā)達國家的貧富懸殊狀況有所緩和。但是，第一，整個世界的兩極分化不僅沒有緩和，反而愈演愈烈；并且，發(fā)達國家內部收入分配狀況的改善某種程度上正是以整個世界的收入分配狀況的惡化為前提的。第二，即使就發(fā)達國家而言，七十年代以來，“福利國家”也已經(jīng)難以為繼，以至于資產(chǎn)階級經(jīng)濟學家不得不大談“公平”與“效率”的悖論?！　?/p>

〔2〕我在西安曾經(jīng)多次和一些國有企業(yè)工人座談。有不少老工人告訴我，五十年代工人的干勁和現(xiàn)在大不一樣，不需要物質刺激，也不用上級督促，有困難工人自己會想辦法克服。這是事實，不是官方宣傳?，F(xiàn)在的經(jīng)濟學家對此根本不能理解，他們認為這是由于什么“強有力的集體主義意識形態(tài)”，完全是偶然的，是不能持久的。但是，他們不能夠解釋，為什么這樣一種“意識形態(tài)”在那個時候就能夠起作用，而后來卻不能夠起作用了。實際上，工人決不會無緣無故地熱情勞動。工人告訴我，五十年代的干部關心工人，真正是吃苦在前.享受在后，“黨員就是黨員”，這才是工人生產(chǎn)積極性高漲的真正原因。這些模糊的語言，當然缺乏資產(chǎn)階級社會科學最   獎金   的“精確性”，但它是工人的真情實感，說明當時中國的的確確存在一種與現(xiàn)在根本不同的生產(chǎn)關系。　　

　 　

第二章 社會主義，資本主義，和階級斗爭　　

　 　

    要理解毛澤東時代的中國，必須充分認識到這是一個誕生于被壓迫人民的偉大解放運動的時代，是一個深深打上了革命烙印的時代?！　?/p>

    資產(chǎn)階級的政治自由概念只承認個人作為“公民”的權利。但是，占個人活動時間絕大部分的生產(chǎn)活動卻被視為個人的私事。正是在資本主義社會中，絕大多數(shù)人民由于不占有生產(chǎn)資料，不得不把自己生命的大部分時間交給少數(shù)有產(chǎn)者去支配。在這個時候，所謂“公民”的權利不過是有在饑餓與放棄自由之間選擇的權利罷了。社會主義革命最偉大的功績之一就是確認了充分就業(yè)是工人階級在革命后的社會中不可剝奪的權利。充分就業(yè)的意義決不僅僅在于它使工人有了“鐵飯碗”，更主要的，它使工人取得了對勞動過程的一部分控制權。也就是說，與資本家不同，國有企業(yè)的廠長經(jīng)理不敢隨意延長工人勞動時間.增加工人勞動強度。因為他無權解雇工人，他要完成生產(chǎn)任務比資本家更有賴于工人的合作。據(jù)1986年中國科技發(fā)展研究中心調查，中國國有企業(yè)職工每周有效工時為19.2－28.8小時，僅為制度工時的40－60％。（鐘朋容，292）〔1〕這就是說，國有企業(yè)工人在很大程度上可以自己決定勞動時間.勞動強度和勞動報酬。這是資本主義社會的勞動人民永遠無法比擬的自由！對于幾千萬城市工人階級來說,勞動的自由遠比言論.出版.集會.結社這些往往只有知識分子才能真正享受的自由要重要得多.實在得多。社會主義革命即使沒有實現(xiàn)它的預定目標，但是從革命中誕生的社會，并不是一個沒有絲毫自由可言的極權社會，而是壓迫性與民主性并存，甚至可以說，對于絕大多數(shù)勞動人民來說，它是非常民主的社會。　　

    另一方面，在舊的剝削者和壓迫者喪失了生產(chǎn)資料所有權以后，勞動人民當時還沒有力量把社會生產(chǎn)直接掌握在自己手中。對社會生產(chǎn)資料的控制于是落到了歷史最悠久的壓迫機關－國家手中。于是產(chǎn)生了一個新的統(tǒng)治階級－國家官僚階級。它代替了舊的統(tǒng)治階級，成為新的壓迫者和剝削者?！　?/p>

    為什么社會總是分裂為統(tǒng)治階級和被統(tǒng)治階級？這是不是也和月亮繞地球旋轉一樣是不可更改的自然規(guī)律呢？在這個問題上，馬克思主義是怎樣看的呢？恩格斯說：　　

　 　

社會分裂為剝削階級和被剝削階級.統(tǒng)治階級和被壓迫階級，是以前生產(chǎn)不大發(fā)展的結果。當社會總勞動所提供的產(chǎn)品除了滿足社會全體成員最起碼的生活需要以外只有少量剩余，因而勞動還占去社會大多數(shù)成員的全部或幾乎全部時間的時候，這個社會就必然劃分為階級。在這個完全委身于勞動的大多數(shù)人之旁，形成了一個脫離直接生產(chǎn)勞動的階級，它從事于社會的共同事物：勞動管理.政務.司法.科學.藝術等等。因此，分工的規(guī)律就是階級劃分的基礎。但是這并不妨礙階級的這種劃分曾經(jīng)通過暴力和掠奪.狡詐和欺騙來實現(xiàn)，這也不妨礙統(tǒng)治階級一旦掌握政權就犧牲勞動階級來鞏固自己的統(tǒng)治，并把對社會的領導變成對群眾的剝削。但是，即使階級的劃分根據(jù)上面所說據(jù)有某種歷史的理由，那么也只是對一定的時期.一定的社會條件才是這樣。這種劃分是以生產(chǎn)的不足為基礎的，它將被現(xiàn)代生產(chǎn)力的充分發(fā)展所消滅。(Engels,1978,714)　　

　 　

    所以，根據(jù)恩格斯的意見，只有在生產(chǎn)力充分發(fā)展的基礎上，絕大多數(shù)人才可能基本上從直接生產(chǎn)勞動中解放出來，從而得以參與“社會的共同事務”，并消滅階級差別。但是，當中國共產(chǎn)黨奪取政權時，他們從國民黨政權繼承下來的是一個極端落后的.半封建半殖民地的.幾乎沒有任何現(xiàn)代工業(yè)的國民經(jīng)濟。在這種情況下，就存在著產(chǎn)生新的壓迫階級的客觀條件。但是，這并不等于說中國的社會主義革命從一開始就注定是要失敗的。與之相反，革命的成敗歸根到底要由實際的歷史斗爭來決定?！　?/p>

    一方面，國家官僚階級想要鞏固其對社會的統(tǒng)治，建立一個比較象樣的壓迫社會。另一方面，被壓迫人民則不能容忍壓迫秩序穩(wěn)定下來。不僅要捍衛(wèi)革命的既得利益，而且還要發(fā)揚革命的光榮傳統(tǒng)，革命到底，打倒一切壓迫者！這是兩種截然對立的要求。這兩種要求，決不能和平共處，只能以戰(zhàn)斗來決定誰勝誰負。文化大革命，就是毛澤東時代社會矛盾的總爆發(fā).國家官僚階級和被壓迫人民之間的總決戰(zhàn)！　　

　 　

（一）文化大革命　　

    歷史向來是當代史。站在不同階級的立場上，為了不同的政治目的服務，對歷史的解釋是截然不同的。按照官方的說法，文化大革命是十年浩劫，是全民族的災難。自由派知識分子雖然與官方共同語言不多，但在兩個根本問題上例外，一個是“改革”，一個就是“文化大革命”。自由派知識分子認為：　　

　 　

“文化大革命”是一場為了錯誤的目的.用錯誤的方法發(fā)動的錯誤的運動。......“文化大革命”的發(fā)生，其根源深藏于“文化大革命”前中國所形成的經(jīng)濟政治體制以及中國的傳統(tǒng)文化之中。　　

　 　

對毛澤東個人來說，他之所以在晚年發(fā)動“文化大革命”，也同他不善于處理中國共產(chǎn)黨黨內的矛盾，同他個人專斷作風的發(fā)展有密切關系......毛澤東把不贊成他的主張的好意見，一概當作“右傾”.“走資本主義道路”.“反黨”來批斗，從而造成了中國歷史上“史無前例”的十年大動亂?！　?/p>

　 　

一九六五年，毛澤東（與埃德加.斯諾談話時）認為，當時需要有更多的個人崇拜，也就是更多的對毛澤東本人的崇拜。......毛澤東說，......許多權力（各個省,各個地方黨委內，特別是北京市黨委內的宣傳工作的權力）他都管不了了。......毛澤東決定，劉少奇必須下臺。（高皋和嚴家其，序，1－2）　　

　 　

    在自由派知識分子看來，文化大革命完全是毛澤東個人權力欲無限膨脹的結果。為了實現(xiàn)無限的獨裁權力，毛澤東設計了一個大陰謀。這個陰謀所以能得逞，根子在“傳統(tǒng)文化”，即獨裁體制下人民群眾普遍的忠君意識和盲從心理?！　?/p>

    讓我們先提兩個問題。第一，如果毛澤東純粹是為了個人權力，為什么要發(fā)動群眾砸爛整個國家機器？沒有國家機器，談何權力，談何獨裁？　　

    第二，自由派知識分子和官方學者都沒有回答，是什么使幾億人民在一夜之間全部神經(jīng)錯亂.喪失理智？用全民大瘋狂來解釋歷史上如此重要的事件，不是神話又是什么？　　

    自由派知識分子認為，文化大革命是獨裁者為了獨裁的目的.用獨裁的方法發(fā)動的法西斯主義運動，人民群眾只不過是一群沒有頭腦.任人擺布的玩物。但是，如果群眾是這樣的沒有頭腦，這樣的容易擺布，為什么統(tǒng)治集團，憑著整個黨和國家官僚機器的幫助，都沒有能夠擺布他們呢？比如，那些黨的官僚們完全可以說他們一向是緊跟毛主席革命路線的，而那些反對他們的人都是反對毛主席的?！　?/p>

    當然，毛澤東憑著他的個人權力，或許可以不花什么力氣就把幾個黨的高級干部趕下臺。但是，如果不是客觀上存在著人民大眾和官僚階級之間的矛盾，他怎么可能使整個統(tǒng)治階級都受到打擊呢？在當時那種情況下，每一個人都聲稱自己和毛主席站在一起，并且還要動用一切可以動用的物質的和精神的手段來說服別人或者強迫別人相信自己所聲稱的東西。在這種情況下，實際上是由人們自己來判斷到底誰是“真正地”和毛主席站在一起，由人們自己來決定與誰一起戰(zhàn)斗，和對誰進行戰(zhàn)斗。所以，不管毛澤東個人的意圖是怎樣的，文化大革命是通過發(fā)動廣大人民群眾來進行的，這一事實本身，就決定了它必然要反映廣大人民群眾的思想感情，他們的愿望和要求，和他們的客觀生活狀況?！　?/p>

    把“傳統(tǒng)文化”扯進來是無補于事的。首先，從來沒有一個皇帝對老百姓說：“造反有理！”其次，即使在古代，中國人民也決不是僅僅知道忠君和盲從的。中國人民是敢于造反的，他們起來造反，是有原因.有道理的?！　?/p>

    自由派知識分子和官方學者所諱言的，他們極力想掩蓋的是，在文化大革命前，一個脫離人民群眾.凌駕于人民群眾之上的官僚統(tǒng)治階級已經(jīng)形成?！?〕這個統(tǒng)治階級和歷史上一切統(tǒng)治階級一樣，壓迫人們。剝削人民是其不可更改的本性，這是中國社會一切矛盾的總根源。離開了這個根源，就根本無法理解當代中國的歷史。在這個根本問題上噤若寒蟬，必然有意無意地歪曲歷史?！　?/p>

    毛澤東正確地指出：“官僚主義者階級與工人階級和貧下中農是兩個尖銳對立的階級。這些人是已經(jīng)變成或者正在變成吸工人血的資產(chǎn)階級分子。他們怎么會   認識  足呢？這些人是斗爭對象.革命對象?！?Meisner,1986,271)毛澤東并且指出了斗爭的方法－“無產(chǎn)階級大民主”：　　

　 　

現(xiàn)在再搞大民主，我也贊成。你們怕群眾上街，我不怕，來他幾十萬也不怕?！吧岬靡簧韯?，敢把皇帝拉下馬?！?.....無產(chǎn)階級發(fā)動的大民主是對付階級敵人的。......大民主也可以用來對付官僚主義者，......有些人活得不耐煩了，搞官僚主義，見了群眾一句好話也沒有，就是罵人，群眾有問題不去解決，那就一定要被打倒。......如果脫離群眾，不去解決群眾的問題，農民就要打扁擔，工人就要上街示威，學生就要鬧事。凡是出了這類事，第一要說是好事，我就是這樣看的。（Mao,1977a,344)　　

    文化大革命一開始，就徹底打碎了舊的國家機器。上至國家主席.各省市自治區(qū)的封疆大吏，下至廠長.經(jīng)理.基層黨委，幾乎官僚國家的全部權力機構，一概被革命群眾打倒.推翻。邁斯納在<毛澤東的中國及后毛澤東的中國－人民共和國史>一書中描述了上海的官僚政權是怎樣被工人階級推翻的：　　

　 　

到1966年秋天，反對現(xiàn)存秩序的造反已經(jīng)從學校蔓延到了工廠。無產(chǎn)階級自己終于登上了無產(chǎn)階級文化大革命的舞臺。......文化大革命，使不滿現(xiàn)狀的工人和其他的社會階層，在人民共和國的歷史上第一次能夠自由地表達他們對社會的不滿，自由地建立他們自己的組織，而不必受到黨在組織上和思想上所施加的種種約束的妨礙。于是就冒出了一大批多種多樣的群眾造反組織。所有這些組織，都宣稱忠于毛主席和毛澤東思想，但是卻根據(jù)他們自己的特殊利益來解釋這些思想。十一月初，幾個造反組織形成了一個松散的聯(lián)盟，即上海工人革命造反總司令部（工總司）。它的領袖就是王洪文，一個紡織工人和黨的中層干部。工總司是上海工人自己的創(chuàng)造，與來自北京的指示毫無關系......11月8日，工總司向上海市委提出要求，明確提出要以新的人民政權機關來代替舊的官僚機構......在工總司取得了十一月中旬的勝利以后，上海黨和政府的權力迅速地分崩離析了。各造反組織自由地在市內串連，組織工人和其他市民。群眾運動迅猛地向前發(fā)展著......（上海市委的）垮臺，也就是后來所說的一月革命，則是新年以后頭一個星期的事。1月5日，與工總司為首的十幾個造反組織（在中央文革小組的支持和幫助下）發(fā)表了<告全市人民書>......號召工人.學生.知識分子和干部團結起來。這個號召在次日得到了熱烈的響應。1月6日，上百萬市民在市中心廣場舉行群眾大會，數(shù)百萬人觀看了電視轉播。曹市長和其他黨的高級干部被批判.撤職，并被勒令當眾坦白他們的政治罪行。在以后幾天里，一些職位較低的官吏和干部也受到了類似的批判，并被迫掛牌子.戴高帽子游街。舊政權垮臺了。(Meisner,1986,343)　　

　 　

    人民群眾親眼目睹那些平日威風凜凜的官僚老爺們如今在人民革命面前被打得落花流水，怎能不心花怒放！這是多么偉大的精神解放??！　　

    文化大革命嚴重破壞了舊的生產(chǎn)關系：　　

　 　

在文化革命中，原來的干部體系（當權派）基本上被群眾運動摧垮了，群眾處于一種放任自流的狀態(tài)。工廠里，原有的規(guī)章.制度都被推翻了，......工人不服從干部管理的現(xiàn)象十分普遍。......生產(chǎn)失去控制，甚至走向癱瘓，......由于干部沒有真正的權威，很多企業(yè)的生產(chǎn)和經(jīng)營都處于放任自流的狀態(tài)。（李強，162）　　

　 　

    在舊的生產(chǎn)關系被破壞以后，必須及時建立起新的生產(chǎn)關系，否則就會嚴重破壞生產(chǎn)力的發(fā)展。事實上，在文化大革命當中，一些新生產(chǎn)關系的萌芽已經(jīng)開始出現(xiàn)了。下面幾個段落分別引自法國經(jīng)濟學家貝特蘭在北京針織總廠的調查報告和北京市北郊木材廠“改革不合理規(guī)章制度”的調查報告?！　?/p>

　 　

在文化大革命中，......（群眾）要求遵照鞍山憲法參加管理?！　?/p>

　 　

執(zhí)行鞍山憲法，就是說永遠政治掛帥，加強黨的領導，大搞生動活潑的群眾運動，逐步實行干部參加生產(chǎn)勞動和工人參加管理，改革不合理規(guī)章制度，實現(xiàn)工人.干部和技術人員的緊密結合，和積極開展技術革命。(Bettelheim,1974,17)　　

　 　

    什么是不合理規(guī)章制度呢？不合理規(guī)章制度是“舊的管理階層強加在工人頭上的”“有關勞動組織.勞動紀律的規(guī)章制度”，“不信任工人的首創(chuàng)精神”，“有利于保留資本主義關系”。(Bettelheim,1974,22)　　

　 　

過去的規(guī)章制度貫穿了“專家治廠”的路線，對工人群眾實行管.卡.扣.罰......規(guī)定了這個權是這個長的，那個權是哪個主任的，就是沒有什么權是工人的，工人有的只是被管的權。（<無產(chǎn)階級文化大革命的偉大勝利萬歲>，以下簡作<萬歲>，675）　　

　 　

    怎樣改革“不合理規(guī)章制度”呢？　　

　 　

每一條款都交給群眾討論。......取消了一大批規(guī)定，這樣就有可能大大減少工廠行政管理人員。(Bettelheim,1974,22)　　

　 　

過去管理機構臃腫，人浮于事。......為了互相制約，把人與人.科與科的關系，用一大堆煩瑣的規(guī)章制度規(guī)定下來。有一個科的規(guī)章制度里，這樣寫著：“科長因事外出，一切事務由副科長負責；如副科長外出，一切事務由正科長負責。”......革委會成立后，精簡了機構，......沒有閑人就沒有那么多煩瑣的規(guī)章制度，......人少,事多,但解決問題快。......過去許多繁雜的規(guī)章制度造成生產(chǎn)車間為科室服務，精兵簡政后，生產(chǎn)組和行政服務人員經(jīng)常到車間解決問題，深受工人群眾歡迎。（<萬歲>，677）　　

　 　

過去的產(chǎn)品質量檢驗制度，對工人群眾不信任。......強調依靠少數(shù)檢驗人員“監(jiān)督工人”，造成生產(chǎn)工與檢驗工之間的矛盾。工人同志說：不依靠群眾，就是一個工人后面跟上一個檢驗員，也提高不了質量。......現(xiàn)在，......建立了“無產(chǎn)階級政治掛帥，人人負責，互相幫助，班長檢查，小組講評......”的新的檢驗制度，......保證了質量穩(wěn)步提高。（<萬歲>，679）　　

　 　

（工人管理）小組負責的問題包括改進產(chǎn)品質量，......實行的是自我監(jiān)督的制度，每個班組監(jiān)督自己的工作。隨便發(fā)生什么問題，工人都會盡力想辦法解決。(Bettelheim,1974,25)　　

　 　

以往是少數(shù)人訂計劃.管計劃，脫離無產(chǎn)階級政治.脫離群眾.脫離實際，是形而上學的.機械的。......用計劃指標去卡生產(chǎn)，嚴重限制了工人群眾的生產(chǎn)積極性，造成窩工浪費。......現(xiàn)在，......生產(chǎn)任務交給全廠工人討論，建立了依靠群眾.上下結合訂計劃的制度。......計劃比較符合實際，......領導和群眾心往一處想，勁往一處使，到處出現(xiàn)了共產(chǎn)主義協(xié)作的好風尚，......工人同志說：“過去是上面說了算，工人只管干?，F(xiàn)在是，計劃大家訂，措施大家找，生產(chǎn)一塊干，任務提前完。（<萬歲>，679）　　

　 　

計劃制定前反復征求工人意見。計劃方案經(jīng)過詳細分析，使每個車間.每個班組都了解計劃對自己的要求。為此，工人們分成小組，以便充分表達自己的意見，討論計劃的意義，計劃對每一個工人的要求，在產(chǎn)量.質量.產(chǎn)品品種等方面可以有哪些改進，討論結果在工人和管理部門之間反復交流，......因此，全面的計劃經(jīng)過了反復的審查，最后制定的計劃是許多班組和車間共同努力的結果。(Bettelheim,1974,25)　　

    　　

    邁斯納認為：　　

　 　

像70年代初許多外國訪問者在報道中提出的那樣，中國工廠的特點是集體主義精神和普通工人在一定程度上參加了工廠的管理。......經(jīng)過了文化大革命的批判和羞辱的行政管理干部暫時地拋棄了獨斷專行的行為和官僚主義習氣，......他們如今有事會更經(jīng)常地與工人進行有實際意義的商量。(Meisner,1986,385)　　

　 　

    正如邁斯納所說：“群眾民主已經(jīng)成為這個時代的官方要求了?！边@是新型的生產(chǎn)關系的萌芽。這是要從根本上解決過去一切生產(chǎn)關系都解決不了的矛盾－壓迫者和被壓迫者的矛盾。盡管這種新型的生產(chǎn)關系在文化大革命中從來沒有超出過萌芽的階段，它畢竟是為當時中國社會的矛盾提供了一個解決辦法，一個勞動人民的解決辦法，因而也是根本的解決辦法，因而也是唯一真正的解決辦法?！　?/p>

    但是，要建設新的生產(chǎn)關系，并最終做到新的生產(chǎn)關系代替舊的生產(chǎn)關系，僅僅有廣泛的自發(fā)的群眾運動，還是不夠的。只有在群眾運動基礎上，創(chuàng)建一個新的革命政黨，從統(tǒng)治階級手中奪取政治權力，生產(chǎn)關系的改造才有政治保障，才能夠進行下去。沒有這樣一個新的革命政黨，是文化大革命的一個致命的弱點。　　

    由于沒有一個新的革命政黨，人民就不可能奪取政治權力，被打碎的國家機器就得以復原。而統(tǒng)治階級一旦奪回了政治權力，必然就要利用這個權力來奪回自己在革命中失去的一切?！　?/p>

　 　

在70年代初期，逐步恢復了許多在文化大革命中被廢除了的工廠原有的規(guī)章制度，越來越強調專家管理和技術標準，......經(jīng)歷了動亂的工廠開始重建勞動紀律。......廠長依然還是廠長，他最終是對雇傭他的黨和國家機構負責而不是對他所指揮的工人負責。(Meisner,1986,384)　　

　 　

    但是，要想完全恢復文化大革命以前的狀態(tài)，已經(jīng)不可能了?！　?/p>

　 　

象八十年代中國許多別的問題一樣，工作效率低也是文化大革命的后果之一。十多年來，中國的工人不聽工廠黨委的指示，不照看他們的機器，而是花不少時間在打牌上面，或者溜出車間去打籃球。......甚至在華國鋒掌權兩年以后，在中國投資的西方公司仍然發(fā)現(xiàn)中國工人拒絕服從那些他們不喜歡的指令。......工作效率低的根本原因卻在于管理人員缺乏權力。......國營企業(yè)要解雇一個工人幾乎是不可能的。......一位中國官員相當為難地向記者解釋：“你應當明白，我們不能夠強迫他們干活?！保ǔ啥伎萍即髮W出版社，<巨龍復蘇－改革前后備忘錄>，69－70）　　

　 　

    他們不能夠強迫我們干活，這就是革命給被壓迫人民帶來的實實在在的好處。資產(chǎn)階級學者在咒罵“工作效率低”時沒有想到，這也是民主。選舉議員，這是幾年才輪到一次的事情。在報刊.廣播.電視上發(fā)表言論，著書立說，都不是普通老百姓能做的。組織政黨，更是精英分子的專利。勞動，卻是絕大多數(shù)人每天都要參加的最重要的一項活動，能自由控制自己的勞動也是對于絕大多數(shù)人最重要的一項自由權利。革命給普通老百姓帶來的好處是怎么估計也不過分的。　　

    新的生產(chǎn)關系流產(chǎn)了，舊的生產(chǎn)關系越來越不起作用了。人民沒有得到發(fā)號施令的權力，但是舊的權威卻不敢發(fā)號施令了。統(tǒng)治階級不能夠照舊統(tǒng)治下去了，“改革”成了當務之急?！　?/p>

　 　

（二）官僚資產(chǎn)階級和私人資產(chǎn)階級　　

    資本主義生產(chǎn)關系的發(fā)展，既不是人民自由選擇的產(chǎn)物，也不是對經(jīng)濟規(guī)律的科學認識的結果，而是統(tǒng)治階級意志的體現(xiàn)。文化大革命的終結暫時給1949年以來被壓迫人民反抗國家官僚階級的斗爭劃上了一個句號。統(tǒng)治階級取得了勝利，人民力量被打垮，這就為統(tǒng)治階級按照自己的意志改組生產(chǎn)關系創(chuàng)造了條件?！　?/p>

    統(tǒng)治階級中的“改革派”認為：“‘客觀經(jīng)濟規(guī)律’......要求根據(jù)贏利的標準來經(jīng)營經(jīng)濟企業(yè)，按照先進的資本主義國家所產(chǎn)生的‘科學的’方法來加強管理的權威。”(Meisner,1986,466)離開了一定的歷史條件，“客觀經(jīng)濟規(guī)律”既不客觀，也不科學。改革的歷史條件就是，統(tǒng)治階級有能力按照自己的意愿.為了自己的利益來改組生產(chǎn)關系，因而由壓迫引起的矛盾只能通過加強壓迫手段來解決。正是從壓迫者的眼光看，資本主義的管理秩序比中國的國有企業(yè)要先進得多.科學得多?！　?/p>

    隨著資本主義生產(chǎn)關系的發(fā)展，統(tǒng)治階級的統(tǒng)治越來越建立在以資本主義方式對勞動人民進行剝削和壓迫的基礎上。國家官僚階級因而逐步地轉變?yōu)楣倭刨Y產(chǎn)階級。　　

    由于中國的特定歷史條件，統(tǒng)治階級對生產(chǎn)資料的占有在法律上采取了國家所有制和“集體所有制”的形式。但是，中國的經(jīng)驗已經(jīng)證明，單純法律意義上的國家所有制和“集體所有制”是完全可以和資本主義生產(chǎn)關系的發(fā)展相容的。在這個問題上，要緊的不是所有權的法律形式，而是各個階級之間，以及統(tǒng)治階級內部不同集團之間的實際的社會關系。另一方面，雖然資本主義生產(chǎn)關系的發(fā)展并不必然要求將國家所有制和“集體所有制”轉變?yōu)楣_的私有制，這決不妨礙統(tǒng)治階級的個人成員在資本主義發(fā)展過程中通過盜竊國庫來積聚私人財富?！　?/p>

    統(tǒng)治階級盜竊國庫的主要手段有：　　

（1）“官倒”。據(jù)官方學者計算，全國每年由價差.利差.匯差和其他雜項形成的“租金”（即可以憑壟斷權力攫取的非生產(chǎn)性利潤）總額有4000多億元，“其中的40％落入與權力有千絲萬縷聯(lián)系的尋租者手中。”（<新華文摘>1992年第二期，56）　　

    （2）“官炒”?！肮俪础背吹牟皇且话愕纳唐?，而是房地產(chǎn)和股票。股票是虛擬資本，它的價值可以超過它所代表的生產(chǎn)資料的價值幾倍.幾十倍。炒房地產(chǎn)主要是炒土地，土地本身無價，但其市場價值可以百萬.億萬計。所以“官炒”積聚財富的速度和規(guī)模超過了“官倒”?！　?/p>

張某是一位副市長的兒子，前幾年順應潮流，從經(jīng)委機關跳入“?！敝校k起了一個名為國營實為私營的貿易公司。其父主管建筑系統(tǒng)，他自然以做建材為主。不必他求人，也不必他父親開口，“懂味”的建筑公司總是到他這里買建材，而且從不還價。僅僅兩年多時間，就賺了近200萬。1992年，這位張總在一個星期之內，就登記成立了一家房地產(chǎn)公司，然后，他向一家銀行送去一輛進口轎車，三部“大哥大”電話，要求貸款800萬元，......張用這800萬元在海南買了25畝地，4個月后又以1900萬賣出......”（<經(jīng)濟潮>總第三期，32）　　

    1992年，全國批租土地總數(shù)220平方公里，總收入525億元，中央財政只拿到26.25億元。在北海市，最好的土地從政府轉讓出去僅9.7萬元/畝，市面上最高炒到176萬元/畝。“炒地遠比開發(fā)賺錢，實業(yè)更比不上?！焙？谑凶罘比A地段，從政府轉讓出去是每平方米150元，建好的商品房賣到每平方米3000－4000元。有的城市每平方米只有5元，還有分文不取的。（<中國房地產(chǎn)導報>1993年第20期，18－20）　　

    我們無從知道炒股票導致多少國有財產(chǎn)流失。但從幾個具體的例子中業(yè)可見一斑：　　

　 　

上海有個“楊百萬”，專做股票生意。去年三月間，一次拋出6800股“電真空”股券，每股價差近50元，一下子就獲利34萬元。（<中國勞動科學>1992年第三期，15）　　

　 　

某報記者的關系網(wǎng)四通八達，......搞到一批法人股后，他就找到迫切需要購買的單位，轉手“批發(fā)”出去，“批發(fā)費”100％。自然，由于股票上市以后價格總要翻上幾番，......100％的“批發(fā)費”雖然高得驚人，但還是有大利可圖，......幾次折騰下來，這位記者就成了一個“百萬元戶”了。（<經(jīng)濟潮>總第三期，54）　　

　 　

    （3）官僚機構自辦經(jīng)濟實體，攫取巨額壟斷利潤。1992年，全國新增公司22萬戶，公司總數(shù)比1991年增長88.9％?！斑@些新增的公司大多是機關辦的經(jīng)濟實體?！薄叭珖?0％以上的機關創(chuàng)辦了經(jīng)濟實體?！保?lt;經(jīng)濟潮>總第三期，25）“甚至中國人民解放軍，......也開辦了一批豪華飯店，軍辦工廠為市場生產(chǎn)電冰箱.鋼琴.電視機和民用客機。有400個軍辦工廠在深圳經(jīng)濟特區(qū)設立了銷售代理。”(Smith,1993,97)　　

    官僚機構自辦的經(jīng)濟實體，除了有條件搞“官倒”.“官炒”以外，憑籍官僚機構的壟斷權力，可以得到遠非正常利潤可比的壟斷利潤?！　?/p>

　 　

一家物資公司千辛萬苦弄到一批鋼材，急需1000萬元貸款，找到某工商銀行，行長說：“最近資金比較緊張，心有余而力不足。不過，我們行自辦的實體昨天剛批去了1000萬元貸款，目前還沒有提走，我看你們可以和他們聯(lián)系，合起來做?！庇谑?，以物資公司名義要的貸款最后落到了銀行自辦的實體手中，銀行的實體不費吹灰之力得了一半的利潤。（<經(jīng)濟潮>總第三期，26）　　

　 　

    （4）統(tǒng)治階級上層直接與外國資本勾結，幫助外國資本剝削中國人民，再從外國資本取得的巨額利潤中分一塊贓。外國資本要通過剝削中國人民取得高額利潤，需要逃避進出口管制，逃避中國政府對外資的種種限制，少交或不交利潤稅，盡量取得廉價或無價的土地......所有這些都需要身居高位的統(tǒng)治階級成員幫助才行。所以，外國資本需要一部分統(tǒng)治階級上層人物充當這樣的買辦資本家：　　

　 　

大批革命領導人的子女在美國和歐洲的最大的銀行和跨國公司（在華辦事處）這充任職員。......其中絕大多數(shù)人當然會為他們的老板服務，......“買辦”就是指這些人。(Hinton,1993,96)　　

　 　

袁先生，45歲，共產(chǎn)黨員，......一張名片上寫著他是廣東省東莞市（東莞是外國在廣東投資的熱點之一）副市長。另一張名片上寫著他是香港Fook Man發(fā)展有限公司總經(jīng)理，有幾百萬銀行存款。袁還是另外三家香港公司的董事，是洛杉磯一家有500間客房的飯店的部分所有者，他還計劃把自己的勢力發(fā)展到新加坡和法蘭克福。中國人把這種人叫做“假洋鬼子”。這是19世紀對從事鴉片貿易的中國買辦的讠虐稱。袁對此欣然接受。他說：“我們在賺錢......”(Smith,1993,98)　　

　 　

    統(tǒng)治階級大規(guī)模盜竊國庫，巨額國家財產(chǎn)轉化為統(tǒng)治階級成員的個人財產(chǎn)，導致國家財政入不敷出，陷入財政危機。為了克服財政危機，就要開源節(jié)流。開源，主要是提高消費品價格；節(jié)流，主要是削減社會福利?！　?/p>

    以“價格改革”為名，消費品價格連年大幅度上漲。（見表2.1）　　

　 　

表2.1   中國的財政赤字和通貨膨脹　　

                        1981-85    1986-90　　

年均財政赤字(億元)        122        475　　

財政赤字占國民收入比重(%)  1.8        3.5　　

城鎮(zhèn)消費品價格　　

年平均增長率(%)           4.2       13.1*　　

*系1986-89年　　

資料來源:馬賓;<經(jīng)濟社會體制比較>1992年第四期,21　　

　 　

    官方經(jīng)濟學家說，通貨膨脹不能歸咎于改革，在改革以前，城市長期存在消費品短缺，短缺實際上是“隱蔽的通貨膨脹”。資產(chǎn)階級經(jīng)濟學家只有比一切社會現(xiàn)象都看做是資本主義道路社會現(xiàn)象，才能理解資本主義以外的社會。“短缺”經(jīng)濟和“通貨膨脹”經(jīng)濟是兩種本質上不同的社會關系。“短缺”意味著根據(jù)貨幣以外的標準分配社會財富。這種標準可以是政治權力.社會特權，也可以是基于社會平等，或者優(yōu)先照顧弱者。而“通貨膨脹”無非是這樣一種社會的特有現(xiàn)象，在這種社會中，誰有錢誰就是老大?！　?/p>

    貝特蘭在70年代訪問中國后曾經(jīng)這樣介紹當時中國的價格制度：　　

　 　

消費品的銷售價格取決于不同的政策?！　?/p>

1.必需品貿易利潤；必要的話國家還會給予補貼。比方說糧食，是國家?？匚镔Y，從農民收購的價格實際上等于零售價。也就是說國家要負擔銷售.運輸?shù)软棾杀尽?.....總的來說，幾種基本食品的銷售價格近年來降低了，但是從人民公社收購的價格并沒有下降。例如，每50公斤大米的銷售價從1950年的17.63元下降到1970年的16.40元。同樣，在不提高消費品銷售價格的情況下，也可以提高從人民公社收購的價格......　　

2.對人民健康必需的商品按成本價銷售，也就是銷售中不得利潤。比如，藥品價格隨著成本下降而下降。20萬單位盤尼西林的價格，從1953年的2.10元降到1970年的1.23元......　　

3.日常必需品價格也是便宜的，但要加上一定的利潤。例如，每50公斤煤塊的價格，從1950年到1970年，由2.80元下降到2.50元?！　?/p>

4.至于非必需品（半導體收音機.照相機等），一般固定在“歷史形成的價格”上。這些產(chǎn)品成本價格的任何下降，都用來增加社會積累基金。　　

主要是要理解，中國的價格體制不僅關系到政策，而且體現(xiàn)著政治－取決于政治和社會的考慮。(Bettelheim,1974,64)　　

　 　

    所以，通貨膨脹.物價上漲，決不僅僅是一般地由于社會總供求之間的不平衡，它實際上是國家既定政策的產(chǎn)物。在“價格改革”的旗號下，把一大部分產(chǎn)品的價格交給自由市場支配，實際上是犧牲廣大下層勞動人民的利益。到1991年，絕大多數(shù)社會產(chǎn)品都由市場自由調節(jié)，這就為物價飛漲掃清了障礙。〔3〕　　

    削減社會福利：據(jù)全國總工會測算，各地實行的養(yǎng)老保險.醫(yī)療保險.住房三項改革，職工須承受部分占其生活費支出的6－7.5％?！　?/p>

    通過掠奪國庫，而歸根結底是通過掠奪廣大人民群眾，在少數(shù)人手中積聚起了巨額財富。“大陸人口的3％（約合三千萬人），屬于富有者階層。他們的私人存款占全國居民儲蓄存款的40％，即人均1.5萬元左右?！保?lt;北京青年報>1993年12月28日）1992年，中國居民金融資產(chǎn)總額達到了18000億元，照那“40％”推算，“富有者階層”擁有的個人金融資產(chǎn)總額應在7000億元以上。這7000億元從哪里來呢？　　

    如果我們假設，從1986年到1993年每年有1000億元國家財產(chǎn)被轉化為統(tǒng)治階級成員的個人財產(chǎn)，那么，在這期間他們便一共積聚了8000億元財富。顯然，所謂“富有者階層”絕大多數(shù)都是統(tǒng)治階級的成員?！　?/p>

    在資本主義生產(chǎn)關系的發(fā)展過程中，中國也出現(xiàn)了一個小小的私人資產(chǎn)階級。私人資產(chǎn)階級不是統(tǒng)治階級，它不依靠政治壟斷權力，而依靠剝削雇傭勞動發(fā)財。私人資產(chǎn)階級與官僚資產(chǎn)階級的矛盾會不會使它成為一支民主力量？它能不能領導未來中國的民主運動？　　

    在一份官方學術刊物上居然出現(xiàn)了這樣一段奇文：　　

　 　

一個社會的主體，不只決定于某階級人數(shù)是否最眾，同時還決定于該階級的財產(chǎn)數(shù)量，即須用財產(chǎn)加權......從無產(chǎn)階級中“先富起來”而脫胎形成的有產(chǎn)階級，正以其日益增多的人數(shù)和日益積累的資本，成為社會成份的主流，成為社會主體，這是一個好的變化......經(jīng)濟利益的增長，必然促使有產(chǎn)階級尋求政治發(fā)言權，并力求通過各種立法途徑，干預政府決策。它意味著原有憲法的過時，意味著政治結構的改組......有產(chǎn)階級不會再從中國歷史上消失，它將影響未來一千年，主宰未來一百年。（孤聞）　　

　 　

    誰說中國沒有言論自由呢？資產(chǎn)階級民主.資產(chǎn)階級專政呼之欲出啦！作者拐彎抹角地發(fā)明了一個“有產(chǎn)階級”的概念。誰是有產(chǎn)階級呢？是官僚資產(chǎn)階級嗎？官僚資產(chǎn)階級本身就是統(tǒng)治階級，還何須“尋求政治發(fā)言權”？所謂“有產(chǎn)階級”無非是指私人資產(chǎn)階級。那么，私人資產(chǎn)階級能不能“影響未來一千年，主宰未來一百年”呢？純屬幻想?！　?/p>

    首先，私人資產(chǎn)階級實力非常弱小。根據(jù)官方統(tǒng)計，1990年中國私營企業(yè)共有98000萬戶，注冊資金總計45億元，平均每戶不到5萬元。（韓明希，前言）即使考慮到官方統(tǒng)計有低估的成分，私人資產(chǎn)階級的實力也決不到官僚資產(chǎn)階級的一個零頭，竟想“以其日益增多的人數(shù)和日益積累的資本，成為社會成份的主流，成為社會主體，”正無異癡人說夢?！　?/p>

    無疑，官僚資產(chǎn)階級有其寄生性的一面，對私人資本主義的發(fā)展有妨礙的一面。從這個角度說，私人資產(chǎn)階級也有爭取民主的要求。但是，與專制政權帶給私人資產(chǎn)階級的利益比起來，專制政權的禍害只能算是一點回扣。私人資產(chǎn)階級和官僚資產(chǎn)階級一樣，都是剝削階級，都靠壓迫.剝削勞動人民發(fā)財。對于資本家來說，工人的工資越低越好，福利越少越好。工人越是缺乏斗爭力量，資本家的這些愿望就越容易實現(xiàn)。而工人越是沒有政治權利，工人就越是缺乏斗爭力量。私人資產(chǎn)階級自己當然也渴望得到政治權利。但是，如果為了自身得到政治權利，必須讓工人階級也得到政治權利的話，這個買賣未必劃得來。私人資產(chǎn)階級關心的是，如果實現(xiàn)了民主，我能得到比目前更高的利潤率嗎？如果不能，私人資產(chǎn)階級當然對民主不感興趣。如果實現(xiàn)民主以后情況與現(xiàn)在差不多，或者極不確定，那又何必為此折騰上十來年.鬧個天翻地覆，甚至冒革命的風險呢？　　

　 　

（三）1989年革命　　

    任何一個壓迫社會，要把它的壓迫強加到絕大多數(shù)人頭上，都不能不經(jīng)過多次重大的斗爭，都必須付出流血的代價。資本主義也不例外?！　?/p>

    中國的勞動人民在文化大革命中遭到了歷史性的失敗，因而當時也就不再有用革命社會主義方式來解決中國社會矛盾的歷史可能性。但是，這并不等于說資本主義“改革”可以一帆風順地進行下去了。恰恰相反，中國的勞動人民決不會不經(jīng)過嚴重的戰(zhàn)斗就放棄他們在社會主義革命中爭得的廣泛的社會經(jīng)濟權利、就聽任統(tǒng)治階級把一個“正?！钡膲浩戎贫葟娂釉谒麄冾^上。隨著資本主義“改革”的發(fā)展，在整個八十年代，統(tǒng)治階級和勞動人民之間的矛盾，特別是統(tǒng)治階級和城市工人階級之間的矛盾，越來越增長，越來越激化了?！　?/p>

    這個矛盾因為即將來臨的資本主義經(jīng)濟危機而進一步尖銳化了。根據(jù)官方統(tǒng)計，1988年職工貨幣平均工資比上年增長19.7％，而全國職工生活費用價格指數(shù)上升了20.7％。（<中國經(jīng)濟年鑒>1988年卷）就是說，即使根據(jù)官方統(tǒng)計，職工實際平均工資也下降了。這是在“改革”時期，勞動人民生活水平第一次絕對下降。中國已經(jīng)到了革命的邊緣?！　?/p>

    一個成功的革命，必須有一個科學的和成熟的革命理論，和一套清晰明確的、前后一貫的革命綱領。這個理論和這套綱領，必須能夠反映絕大多數(shù)人民的利益和愿望，必須能夠充分地動員絕大多數(shù)人民參加革命斗爭。而1989年革命恰恰沒有這樣一個理論和這樣一套綱領?！　?/p>

    1989年，在意識形態(tài)領域幾乎是自由派知識分子的一統(tǒng)天下，所以，自由派知識分子理所當然地掌握了革命的領導權。為什么在1989年沒有出現(xiàn)一支由革命社會主義知識分子領導的左翼民主力量呢？　　

    1979年，北京發(fā)生了“西單民主墻”運動。當時，幾乎所有的持不同政見者都不反對社會主義。他們認為，中國社會的根本問題不在于社會主義，而在于沒有民主，在于沒有真正的社會主義。這次運動最后被鎮(zhèn)壓下去了。1982年，理論界發(fā)生了關于“人道主義和異化問題”的論戰(zhàn)。一些知識分子從馬克思主義觀點出發(fā)，影射和批判現(xiàn)實的中國社會仍然是一個異化社會。官方宣布這種觀點是“資產(chǎn)階級自由化”，實際上就是宣布這種觀點非法?！　?/p>

    一個自稱為社會主義的國家竟然宣布馬克思主義觀點非法，似乎不可思議，卻又是很合乎邏輯的。資本主義生產(chǎn)關系的發(fā)展要求統(tǒng)治階級樹立新的意識形態(tài)、新的辯護理論。這種辯護理論不應該幫助人民看清壓迫社會的本來面目，更不許煽動人民造反，它必須能證明壓迫有理、剝削有功。只有西方資產(chǎn)階級社會才有這樣一整套現(xiàn)成的辯護學說。所以，統(tǒng)治階級起初是默許，后來是鼓勵，再后來就積極參與用西方資產(chǎn)階級的社會科學篡改、偽造馬克思主義，或者干脆取而代之?！　?/p>

    統(tǒng)治階級一方面把馬克思主義觀點說成是“資產(chǎn)階級自由化”，另一方面在官方理論中卻大搞資產(chǎn)階級自由化。當然，統(tǒng)治階級并不想“全盤西化”，而是“取其精華，去其糟粕”，是有選擇的，根據(jù)的是“中國國情”。經(jīng)濟學在“自由化”方面邁得步子最大，因為這個領域直接關系到生產(chǎn)關系，卻并不直接威脅統(tǒng)治階級的統(tǒng)治地位。政治學、法學相形之下就比較“保守”。這兩個領域進展慢一些，并不妨礙資本主義生產(chǎn)關系的發(fā)展，而進展得太快，倒是有引進西方民主思想、危害一黨專政的危險。但是，原地踏步是絕對不行的，也沒有必要。如果說，在經(jīng)濟學領域不存在“階級”概念了，在政治學、法學上又哪里來的“階級專政”呢？另一方面，統(tǒng)治階級也發(fā)現(xiàn)，資產(chǎn)階級理論既然能證明“剝削有理”，未嘗不能用來證明“獨裁有理”，新權威主義即是一例。在統(tǒng)治階級的縱容、慫恿下，中國形成了一批資產(chǎn)階級社會科學家，即自由派知識分子。他們當中的絕大部分人都是官方學者，有不少人還在統(tǒng)治階級的咨詢機構中充任要職，扮演所謂“智囊”的角色。　　

    另一方面，七十年代末、八十年代初左翼民主力量在政治上和學術上先后被鎮(zhèn)壓。要重新組織革命社會主義知識分子的隊伍，就要發(fā)展新的革命理論，要反思以往社會主義革命的經(jīng)驗，又要迎接自由派知識分子的新的挑戰(zhàn)。新的革命力量還需要新的革命戰(zhàn)略和戰(zhàn)術。要完成這些工作，需要一段比較長的時間。當1989年革命來臨時，新的革命社會主義力量還沒有能夠形成?！　?/p>

    自由派知識分子吹噓說，1989年革命是他們的“十年思想啟蒙”的結果。所謂“十年思想啟蒙”，就是把西方資產(chǎn)階級社會科學五花八門的貨色成批地販賣到中國來。事實上，他們的所謂思想啟蒙運動，其影響從來沒有越出大學校墻之外。確有一大批大學生在思想上和政治上追隨自由派知識分子。在1989年以前，在各主要大學曾多次爆發(fā)學潮。但是，1989年以前的歷次學潮都沒有得到工人階級的響應。而1989年的運動卻超越了狹隘的學生運動而上升為有廣大勞動人民參加的人民革命。這個事實，當然不能用什么思想啟蒙運動來解釋，而必須用客觀上日趨激化的社會矛盾來解釋?！　?/p>

    1989年4月，學潮爆發(fā)了。在整個八十年代，大學生都是一個激進的社會集團。資本主義發(fā)展到這個時候為止還沒有給中產(chǎn)階級（知識分子，技術管理人員等）帶來多少物質利益，也沒有為中產(chǎn)階級的成員增加多少上升為統(tǒng)治階級成員的機會。大學生是中產(chǎn)階級的一部分。那些在社會競爭中失敗的大學生，與上流社會無緣，又不甘心回到勞動人民中去，感到前途暗淡無光，強烈地渴望發(fā)泄對社會的不滿。這些人是學潮的基本主體。　　

    學潮得到了城市各界人民群眾的擁護，但是，在一個月的時間內，始終沒有發(fā)展為普遍的群眾性革命運動。學潮起起伏伏。直到5月17日，北京市百萬群眾示威聲援絕食學生，才掀起了革命的高潮，超越了學生運動，發(fā)展  我  包括工人、市民、學生等各界群眾的人民革命?！?〕工人階級參加了革命，但僅僅是自發(fā)地和本能地參加了革命。在既沒有明確的政治目的，也沒有工人階級自己的政治領導力量的情況下，工人階級還不能夠成為一個有組織的、獨立的政治力量，因而也就不能夠追求自己的獨立的政治利益?！　?/p>

    與前蘇聯(lián)和東歐不同，中國的絕大多數(shù)人口不是城市工人階級，而是農民。農民就其潛在可能性來說，必然成為一個革命的階級。但是，在1989年，在那個具體的歷史時刻，它偏偏不是一個革命的階級?！　?/p>

    1979年，鄧小平統(tǒng)治集團剛剛上臺，為了鞏固自己的社會基礎，一方面推行農業(yè)改革，一方面大幅度提高農產(chǎn)品收購價格。1979－1984年，農產(chǎn)品收購平均提價24.8％，包括18類180個品種。（詹宏松，119）實際上，這就是中國歷代統(tǒng)治者慣用的所謂“輕徭薄賦”的讓步政策。由于提高農產(chǎn)品收購價格，加上農業(yè)產(chǎn)量增加，農民收入大幅度增長。城鄉(xiāng)消費水平之比由1978年的2.9:1降到1985年的2.2:1。（李強，113）我們知道，在資本主義發(fā)展條件下，在長期，城鄉(xiāng)差距是趨于擴大而不是趨于縮小的。事實上，在1985年以后，城鄉(xiāng)消費差距就開始重新擴大了，但是直到1989年仍然沒有恢復到1978年的水平。這說明，在當時，資本主義發(fā)展的矛盾在農村還沒有充分表現(xiàn)出來。因此，在1989年革命的關鍵時刻，農民被中立化了，不能發(fā)揮一支革命力量的作用?！　?/p>

    沒有農民的支持，城市工人階級就成了革命可以依靠的唯一一支力量。革命要成功，就必須充分地和徹底地把城市工人階級動員起來。當時在北京、上海等大城市出現(xiàn)了少數(shù)工人組織的“工自聯(lián)”。但是，這些“工自聯(lián)”在工人中沒有多少群眾基礎，而且很快被自由派知識分子控制，甚至成為他們爭權奪利的籌碼，因而并不能真正地代表工人和把工人發(fā)動起來?！　?/p>

    但是，在工人階級中的確蘊藏著巨大的革命潛力。　　

    國有企業(yè)的“改革”，不僅沒有消除壓迫制度，反而是用更嚴厲的壓迫手段來加強壓迫制度，是要剝奪工人階級在革命中爭得的廣泛的社會經(jīng)濟權利。所以，“改革”不僅解決不了舊的矛盾，而且，還會激化舊的矛盾，并不斷產(chǎn)生新的矛盾。1986年，全國總工會在一次對45萬工人的調查中發(fā)現(xiàn)，有38.56％的工人認為“改革以來工人和干部的關系”比以前壞，31.58％認為沒有變化，只有26.37％認為比以前好。在這次調查中，有的工人說：“毛澤東時代的干部實行終身制，干部還能以身作則、大公無私、嚴于律己、為民辦事，現(xiàn)在實行干部聘任制，結果干部上臺就急于撈。”還有的工人說：“干活掙的錢，都讓當官的拿去了。現(xiàn)在官是官，民是民，搞不到一起了。”（李強，161，165，167）這說明，“改革”以來，統(tǒng)治階級和工人階級的關系已經(jīng)惡化了，在工人階級中蓄積著對現(xiàn)存社會秩序的巨大的不滿。要把這種不滿轉化成巨大的革命能量是完全可能的。這就必須形成一套完整的、明確的革命綱領，把工人階級的愿望有力地表達出來，從而在最廣大的工人群眾中引起共鳴?！　?/p>

    但是，這樣做與自由派知識分子的立場是根本不相容的。在這個問題上，自由派知識分子實際上與統(tǒng)治階級站在一個立場上。很多自由派知識分子直接參與了統(tǒng)治階級策劃“改革”的過程，可以說，自由派知識分子為整個“經(jīng)濟改革”奠定了理論基礎。自由派知識分子既不會主張“改革”不得侵犯工人階級的利益，更不會主張否定“改革”，相反，他們最主張把“改革”進行到底。　　

    1989年，自由派知識分子中的絕大部分人已經(jīng)接受了“私有化”的主張。當時在《世界經(jīng)濟導報》上連篇累牘地發(fā)表了大量討論經(jīng)濟改革的文章。總的結論是：國有制也好，公有制也好，全都不可救藥，只有實行私有化。分歧僅僅在于私有化的步驟和方法。有的主張通過股份制逐步實現(xiàn)私有化，有的主張“一跳過河實現(xiàn)民營化”。這種主張即使不馬上引起工人階級的懷疑和警惕，也決不可能得到工人階級的積極響應?！　?/p>

    自由派知識分子沒有能力把工人階級發(fā)動起來，可以說他們甚至害怕這么做。自由派知識分子實際上一直不想推翻政府。從革命發(fā)生前一些著名反對派人士的言論來看，他們欣賞“臺灣模式”，即利用學生運動向政府施加壓力，要求政府開放言論、出版自由，下一步再開放“黨禁”，最后逐步過渡到多黨自由選舉。他們得不到農民的支持，又不敢發(fā)動工人階級，所以他們全力依靠統(tǒng)治階級的“改革派”。在他們看來，只要“改革派”戰(zhàn)勝“保守派”，獨攬大權，革命的任務就算完成了?！　?/p>

    所謂“改革派”和“保守派”，并沒有進步和落后之分，不過是統(tǒng)治階級中爭權奪利的兩個集團罷了。實際上，“改革派”很可能與官僚資產(chǎn)階級中帶有寄生性、買辦性的那一部分有比較密切的關系。他們通過盜竊國庫而發(fā)財致富，是資本主義“改革”的最大受益者。由于這個原因，“改革派”更堅決地主張推行“改革”，并且在一定條件下，愿意與自由派知識分子達成某種妥協(xié)，以共同對付工人階級。　　

    “改革派”的力量本來比“保守派”強大。但是“改革派”自身在如何對付革命這個問題上又發(fā)生分歧。趙紫陽集團在洶涌澎湃的革命浪潮面前被嚇倒，準備與自由派知識分子達成妥協(xié)。而“改革派”的領袖鄧小平卻更清醒地看到，革命有讓統(tǒng)治階級徹底覆滅的危險。特別是人民群眾已經(jīng)明確提出“打倒官倒”的口號，直接威脅到了統(tǒng)治階級“改革派”的根本利益。鄧小平很清楚，鎮(zhèn)壓革命決不會導致統(tǒng)治階級與中產(chǎn)階級和自由派知識分子聯(lián)盟的破裂。在教訓了中產(chǎn)階級和自由派知識分子以后，他們只會更緊密地依附于統(tǒng)治階級。事實證明，鄧小平是正確的。1992年春，鄧小平“南巡”以后，自由派知識分子立刻出版《歷史的潮流》、《防“左”備忘錄》、《中國“左”禍》等書，搖旗吶喊，擂鼓助威，積極響應?！　?/p>

    當革命到了千鈞一發(fā)的緊要關頭，正是統(tǒng)治階級中的“改革派”把自由派知識分子出賣了。趙紫陽集團沒有進行任何抵抗就交出了權力。在這樣的關鍵時刻，雙方都再無退路可言，只有你死我活、一決雌雄。但是，到了這種最后關頭，自由派知識分子仍然對改革派抱有幻想。他們始終堅持所謂“和平、理性、非暴力”的原則，這就是說，不許人民群眾造反，只能對政府“施加壓力”，把希望完全寄托在“改革派”身上。五·二零戒嚴以后，反對派把主要口號調整為“打倒李鵬”，始終不曾攻擊鄧小平。在那樣的革命與反革命決戰(zhàn)的時刻，他們不去組織革命力量，不準備殊死的決戰(zhàn)，反而熱衷于發(fā)動人大常委簽名，要求召開什么人大緊急會議，簡直形同兒戲！〔5〕自由派知識分子的懦弱和愚蠢在這次革命中暴露無疑?！　?/p>

    1989年革命的失敗證明，資本主義，作為一種壓迫性的社會制度，就其本性而言，是與民主不相容的。只有用暴力的手段，經(jīng)過殘酷的、流血的斗爭，才能把資本主義壓迫秩序強加在勞動人民頭上，才能為資本主義發(fā)展掃清道路。　　

　 　

（四）工人階級反對“砸三鐵”的斗爭　　

    在1989年革命失敗后，統(tǒng)治階級在對城市工人階級的斗爭中還沒有取得完全的、徹底的勝利，資本主義生產(chǎn)關系也還沒有在國有企業(yè)中完全確立起來。1992年，統(tǒng)治階級企圖通過所謂“砸三鐵”一舉完成國有企業(yè)的資本主義改造，結果遭到工人階級的頑強抵抗，以徹底失敗而告終?！　?/p>

1992年初，這種要求“砸三鐵”的呼聲得到了中國大陸報界、新聞界的支持。一時間，全國上下一片破三鐵、改體制的宣傳。然而，未隔多久，一系列棘手的問題便層出不窮。最激烈的反應來自被解雇的工人群體。國有工廠工人由于長期以來形成了靠工廠、依賴于工廠、隸屬于工廠的心理和觀念，因此當突然宣布他們被解雇時，他們驚呆了。一些工人做出了激進的反應。例如，1992年3月，天津某廠因虧損嚴重，被迫解雇了上千員工，結果該廠的二千余名工人及家屬集結在天津一座立體交叉橋上，迫使天津環(huán)線分路陷入癱瘓。1992年春，中國東北地區(qū)國有大中型企業(yè)大力推行“砸三鐵”，大批工人面臨失業(yè)的危機，不少工人因不適應辭退、待聘、減薪、救濟的狀況而爆發(fā)嚴重不滿情緒，有些工人甚至采取極端的暴力行為報復工廠的領導人。此外，在錦州市、秦皇島市、合肥市等也相繼發(fā)生了工人因被砸了鐵飯碗而報復廠長、領導的事件。在這種形勢的壓力下，破三鐵的活動終于偃旗息鼓、不了了之。（李強，150）　　

工人階級贏得了反對“砸三鐵”斗爭的勝利。但是，正如1989年革命的經(jīng)驗所表明的，沒有一個由科學的革命理論所指導的成熟的革命社會主義政黨，工人階級僅憑自己是不能成為一支獨立的政治力量、不能贏得爭取解放的斗爭的勝利的。由于沒有這樣一個革命政黨，工人階級在反對資本主義壓迫和剝削的斗爭中只能處于防御的和被動的地位。而統(tǒng)治階級，由于始終掌握著斗爭的主動權，就能夠緩慢地，但是不斷地推進資本主義“改革”，逐步地蠶食工人階級的社會主義權利。要扭轉這種趨勢，要把目前這種分散的和單純被動防御的斗爭轉變?yōu)榻y(tǒng)一有組織的、積極主動的革命運動，就必須盡快形成一個有正確理論指導的革命社會主義政黨?！　?/p>

　 　

（五）中產(chǎn)階級　　

    中產(chǎn)階級中國政治生活中一支重要的力量。　　

   馬克思說：“一個統(tǒng)治階級越能把被統(tǒng)治階級中的最杰出的人物吸收進來，它的統(tǒng)治就越鞏固、越險惡。”(Marx,1967,101)任何歷史時代的統(tǒng)治階級都不免被它自身的生活方式腐化。如果僅從本階級的后代中選拔統(tǒng)治階級的接班人，統(tǒng)治階級的統(tǒng)治能力就不可避免地會趨于退化。只有經(jīng)常從被壓迫階級中選拔優(yōu)秀分子來補充自己的隊伍，統(tǒng)治階級才能保持生命力?！　?/p>

    現(xiàn)代學校教育使現(xiàn)代的統(tǒng)治階級能夠以系統(tǒng)的方式從被壓迫階級中選拔杰出人物，這些選拔出來的杰出人物，組成為現(xiàn)代社會的中產(chǎn)階級。他們通過參加現(xiàn)代社會的管理，培養(yǎng)統(tǒng)治社會的能力。所以，中產(chǎn)階級既是下層社會向上進入上層社會的階梯，又是統(tǒng)治階級的后備軍。據(jù)官方統(tǒng)計，1990年中國有“一般干部”1091萬人。如按大學文化程度計算，1987年，中國有知識分子659萬人。（李強，279）中國中產(chǎn)階級的實際規(guī)模當在兩者之間?！　?/p>

    中產(chǎn)階級不同于城市小資產(chǎn)階級。小資產(chǎn)階級有自己的生產(chǎn)資料，主要靠家庭勞動力或雇傭少量工人謀生或謀取薄利。城市小資產(chǎn)階級也就是小業(yè)主，通稱為個體戶。1990年，城鎮(zhèn)個體經(jīng)營者總數(shù)為671萬人。（李強，322）中產(chǎn)階級沒有生產(chǎn)資料，屬于所謂“工薪階層”，靠出賣勞動力獲得收入。與無產(chǎn)階級不同。中產(chǎn)階級出賣的不是一般的勞動力，而是凝結了科學技術和知識的勞動力。這種特殊地位，使中產(chǎn)階級能夠脫離絕大多數(shù)勞動人民，而進入特權階級的行列。小資產(chǎn)階級的個別成員也許會上升為私人資產(chǎn)階級，但是小資產(chǎn)階級不可能成為統(tǒng)治階級的后備軍?，F(xiàn)代社會的管理需要專門的科學知識，只有經(jīng)過正規(guī)學校教育的中產(chǎn)階級成員才能勝任。　　

    官方學者不承認中產(chǎn)階級是一個享有特權的階級。八十年代，所謂“腦體倒掛”的問題曾經(jīng)喧囂一時。即使根據(jù)官方學者計算，1988年，“腦力勞動者”平均工資收入也僅比“體力勞動者”低5.8％。這是北京市的數(shù)字，不包括農民，也不考慮中產(chǎn)階級的各種物質特權（如較大面積的住房、出國機會等）。官方學者公然拋棄了恩格斯的觀點，即“在按社會主義原則組織起來的社會里，這種費用（訓練有學識的勞動者的費用）是由社會來負擔的，所以復雜勞動所創(chuàng)造的成果，即比較大的價值也歸社會所有?！彼麄儽I用勞動價值論，說什么“知識勞動或復雜勞動可以創(chuàng)造出比簡單勞動更大的價值，因而知識勞動力的價格應由它所創(chuàng)造出的價值決定。”（李強，266）　　

    官方學者不懂得，沒有什么抽象存在的價值，只有與一定社會關系、一定歷史條件聯(lián)系在一起的價值。離開了價值由以產(chǎn)生的歷史條件，勞動價值論對社會的說明力就等于0。在資產(chǎn)階級社會，勞動力價格是  與  供求決定的。而中產(chǎn)階級的勞動力，如前所述，是凝聚了科學技術和知識的勞動力，是特殊的勞動力。它不象其它勞動力那樣只要在普通勞動人民的家庭中就能生產(chǎn)出來，它必須經(jīng)過正規(guī)學校教育才能生產(chǎn)出來。而在資產(chǎn)階級社會，能夠受高等教育，是一項社會特權。中產(chǎn)階級由于有了這項特權，就在很大程度上壟斷了社會的科學、藝術和文化，壟斷了“知識勞動力”這種特殊勞動力的供給。就象地主憑著私人土地所有權能索取地租一樣，中產(chǎn)階級憑著私人占有的知識也能獲取壟斷收入。但是，所有這一切只不過是和資產(chǎn)階級社會聯(lián)系在一起的，絲毫沒有什么科學的“合理性”?！　?/p>

    實際上，在“改革”時期，由于資本主義生產(chǎn)關系的發(fā)展，不可能發(fā)動全體勞動群眾共同參加管理和推動技術進步，統(tǒng)治階級越來越依賴于中產(chǎn)階級來完成專門的管理和技術職能。所以，中產(chǎn)階級不僅享有社會特權，而且在收入上也逐漸向上層社會靠攏，到九十年代初，所謂“腦體倒掛”已經(jīng)顛倒過來了。（見表2.2）　　

　 　

表2.2   1992年7月中國國有企業(yè)職工月收入(元)　　

服務人員                    193.5　　

輔助生產(chǎn)工人                224.5　　

直接生產(chǎn)工人                226.3　　

一般管理干部                237.3　　

中層管理干部                237.3　　

高級管理干部                278.0　　

技術人員                    281.0　　

資料來源:李強,262.  　　

　 　

    中產(chǎn)階級雖然不是統(tǒng)治階級，但是作為統(tǒng)治階級的后備軍，卻常常以未來的統(tǒng)治階級、候選的統(tǒng)治階級的眼光看問題。自由派知識分子在理論上和政治上代表了中產(chǎn)階級的這種眼光。另一方面，在資本主義社會中，中產(chǎn)階級的地位又是矛盾的、動蕩不定的，它擺脫不了社會競爭，而競爭就不免產(chǎn)生失敗者。有一個在深圳打工的朋友有一次給筆者來信說：　　

昨天有一個來我這里登記住房的客人，他畢業(yè)于華南理工大學管理系，是西威廠的主管，他和我一談就是幾個小時。他說，有時候真想到死，死是最好的解脫方式。他管理100多人，工資是令人羨慕的三千多塊錢一個月，然而一年三百六十五天從來沒有星期天，每天上班12小時，下了班也沒有知心朋友。他的同學都發(fā)達了，他也不想去找他們，會感到自慚形穢。他說，感覺早已麻木。深圳人都是在戴著假面具生活。比如，為了公司，他不得不陪人唱卡拉OK，逢場作戲，為了管好工人，不得不嚴肅......　　

資本主義永遠無法做到讓所有的中產(chǎn)階級成員都實現(xiàn)自己的人生價值（在一個壓迫社會中，人生價值是用能否進入統(tǒng)治階級來衡量的）。　　

　 　

〔1〕官方經(jīng)濟學家追隨西方資產(chǎn)階級經(jīng)濟學家杜撰了一個“隱性失業(yè)”的概念，說國有企業(yè)中所有未得到充分利用的工時都可以折算為“隱性失業(yè)”。這里充滿了資產(chǎn)階級的偏見。從資產(chǎn)階級的觀點看，工人自由的增加純屬一種浪費。從工人的觀點看，“隱性失業(yè)”根本不是失業(yè)。否則為什么前社會主義國家都不敢索性把“隱性失業(yè)”都變成“顯性失業(yè)”呢？　　

〔2〕陜西省的老爺們?yōu)榱藵M足個人享樂......不惜花費國家大量的人力、物力，特別是國家困難時期，大肆揮霍勞動人民的血汗......丈八溝高干招待所......名為療養(yǎng)院，實際是省級干部的休息、游玩、享樂的地方，占地數(shù)百畝，有高級洋房、亭臺、樓閣，富麗堂皇，還設有游船、樹木、假山、餐廳、舞廳、禮堂、名貴樹木、奇花異草等，......在西安地區(qū)，夏天才能游泳，可是，我們的老爺們有改天換地精神，冬天也游泳，在他們的創(chuàng)造發(fā)明下，動員工人同志在丈八溝這個“安樂窩”里修筑了個“暖水游泳池”。......這個游泳池燒一次水，光用煤就一、二十噸，價值幾百元，有時個別領導干部星期天帶著老婆孩子來游泳，工人同志就得專門燒一次水。......記得我們西北工業(yè)大學同學去年在寶雞參加農村社教時，......有一戶貧農一家?guī)卓谌耍扇业募耶斁瓦B五元錢都不值，這就是我們貧下中農的生活呀！然而這般老爺游泳一次就花幾百元！......這個“暖水游泳池”里裝的真是水嗎？我看不是，完全不是，而是裝了一池勞動人民的血汗呀?。ā杜谵Z陜西省委、火燒西北局，誓死保衛(wèi)黨中央、誓死保衛(wèi)毛主席材料匯編（第一集）》，7－9）　　

〔3〕1991年各類產(chǎn)品國家定價的比重，農副產(chǎn)品是22％，全社會商品零售總額是21％，生產(chǎn)資料銷售總額是36.6％。（《中國經(jīng)濟問題》1993年第一期，5）　　

〔4〕據(jù)我的個人意見，在學運領導和自由派知識分子決定發(fā)動絕食時，并沒有預料到后來的事態(tài)發(fā)展。他們當時恐怕至多是想通過絕食對政府施加一點“道德上的”壓力。所以，當人民真的走上街頭，民主運動真的發(fā)展為一場革命時，他們完全不知道該怎么辦（如果不是被嚇倒了的話）。他們不知道怎樣，或者根本不想去利用群眾所表現(xiàn)出來的巨大的革命能量?！　?/p>

〔5〕天曉得這樣一次“人大緊急會議”，即便召開了，能解決什么問題。不必說人大在中國的政治體制內沒有任何實際權力，就是在人大里面，即使在革命最高潮時，反對派恐怕連簡單多數(shù)也湊不到?！　?/p>

　 　

第三章 從合作化到小農經(jīng)濟　　

　 　

    在這一章中我們討論中華人民共和國建立以后農業(yè)部門生產(chǎn)關系的演變。革命后的中國經(jīng)濟仍然是二元經(jīng)濟，由一個現(xiàn)代部門和一個前現(xiàn)代的農業(yè)部門組成。但是，由于完成了土地改革，由于消滅了前資本主義的剝削階級，在中國就已經(jīng)具備了現(xiàn)代經(jīng)濟發(fā)展的條件，因而現(xiàn)代部門就開始在中國經(jīng)濟中越來越起主導的作用。另一方面，農業(yè)的生產(chǎn)力和生產(chǎn)關系的任何進一步發(fā)展都有賴于現(xiàn)代部門所提供的物質條件。所以，從這個時候起，現(xiàn)代經(jīng)濟部門，以及從階級斗爭上來講，現(xiàn)代經(jīng)濟部門中統(tǒng)治階級和工人階級的斗爭就開始對中國社會發(fā)展起決定性的作用。我們正是在這個背景下來分析和認識中國農業(yè)生產(chǎn)關系的演變?！　?/p>

　 　

（一）合作化時期　　

（1）為什么要搞合作化？　　

    早在1943年毛澤東就指出：　　

　 　

在農民群眾方面，幾千年來都是個體經(jīng)濟，一家一戶就是一個生產(chǎn)單位，這種分散的個體生產(chǎn)，就是封建統(tǒng)治的經(jīng)濟基礎，而使農民自己陷于永遠的窮苦?？朔@種狀況的唯一辦法，就是逐漸地集體化，而達到集體化的唯一道路，依據(jù)列寧所說，就是經(jīng)過合作社。(Selden,1993,71)　　

　 　

所以，毛澤東認為，只要中國農業(yè)基本上仍然是小農經(jīng)濟，農民群眾就不可能擺脫“永遠的窮苦”和各種形式的壓迫、統(tǒng)治?！　?/p>

    五十年代中期，在關于農業(yè)合作化的論戰(zhàn)中，毛澤東提出了下列論點。首先，毛澤東指出，只有通過合作化，才能使中國農業(yè)擺脫一家一戶的個體生產(chǎn)，才能有效地與自然災害做斗爭，才能充分利用現(xiàn)代農業(yè)技術，才能使生產(chǎn)力水平發(fā)生質的飛躍?！　?/p>

　 　

這些同志不知道社會主義工業(yè)化是不能離開農業(yè)合作化而孤立地進行的。首先，大家知道，我國的商品糧食和工業(yè)原料的生產(chǎn)水平，現(xiàn)在是很低的，而國家對于這些物資的需要卻是一年一年地增大，這是一個尖銳的矛盾。如果我們不能在大約三個五年計劃的時期內基本上   階級  農業(yè)合作化的問題，即農業(yè)由使用畜力農具的小規(guī)模的經(jīng)營躍進到使用機器的大規(guī)模的經(jīng)營......我們就不能解決年年增長的商品糧食和工業(yè)原料的需要同現(xiàn)時主要農作物一般產(chǎn)量很低之間的矛盾，我們的社會主義工業(yè)化事業(yè)就會遇到絕大的困難，我們就不可能完成社會主義工業(yè)化。(Mao,1977a,196)　　

　 　

    其次，毛澤東指出：　　

　 　

現(xiàn)在農村中存在的是富農的資本主義所有制和象汪洋大海一樣的個體農民的所有制。大家已經(jīng)看見，在最近幾年中間，農村中的資本主義自發(fā)勢力一天一天地在發(fā)展，新富農已經(jīng)到處出現(xiàn)，許多富裕中農力求把自己變?yōu)楦晦r。許多貧農，則因為生產(chǎn)資料不足，仍然處于貧困地位，有些人欠了債，有些人出賣土地，或者出租土地。這種情況如果讓它發(fā)展下去，農村中向兩極分化的現(xiàn)象必然一天一天地嚴重起來。......這個問題，只有在新的基礎之上才能獲得解決。這就是在逐步地實現(xiàn)社會主義工業(yè)化和逐步地實現(xiàn)對于手工業(yè)、對于資本主義工商業(yè)的社會主義改造的同時，逐步地實現(xiàn)對于整個農業(yè)的社會主義的改造，即實行合作化，在農村中消滅富農經(jīng)濟制度和個體經(jīng)濟制度，使全體農村人民共同富裕起來。(Mao,1977a,201)　　

　 　

    所以，在土地改革以后，在農村中又產(chǎn)生了新的矛盾。一方面，社會主義工業(yè)化要求農業(yè)提供越來越多的農產(chǎn)品，但是在傳統(tǒng)的小農經(jīng)濟范圍內農業(yè)生產(chǎn)已經(jīng)不可能再有任何質的進步了。另一方面，資本主義社會關系和社會兩極分化也開始在農村發(fā)展起來。要同時解決這兩個矛盾，農業(yè)合作化是唯一的辦法。問題是，當時是不是存在成功地進行社會主義農業(yè)合作化的歷史條件呢？　　

　 　

（2）合作化的失敗　　

    在官方學者看來，合作農業(yè)根本上就是荒謬的，是違反人性的，是不符合經(jīng)濟科學的原理的，所以必須完全否定：　　

　 　

生產(chǎn)隊經(jīng)營的特點是：“出工一窩蜂，干活大呼隆，分配全拉平?！边@種勞動和分配的形式，天然地鼓勵勞動者偷懶。......人是異質的，每個人的時間偏好并不一樣，對勞動的態(tài)度也不可能一樣，即使依靠某種信念或因一時之需，建立起同舟共濟的合作關系，也不能長久。因此，集體勞動需要監(jiān)督，而監(jiān)督又是需要費用的。監(jiān)督的費用如果過于昂貴，監(jiān)督便成為一種奢侈，就需要放棄監(jiān)督，采取一種模糊產(chǎn)權的方式以節(jié)約這種費用，而放棄監(jiān)督又會產(chǎn)生勞動積極性下降、“免費搭車”行為競生的現(xiàn)象，同樣也會造成生產(chǎn)的損失。農業(yè)是一種分散在廣闊地域上進行勞動的產(chǎn)業(yè)，其對勞動的監(jiān)督是很困難的，或者說監(jiān)督費用高昂......即使有規(guī)模經(jīng)濟的潛在可能，也被激勵的不足所抵銷。（蔡日方，14，97）　　

　 　

    是啊，人是異質的。但是問題根本不在這里。問題在于，現(xiàn)代農業(yè)生產(chǎn)客觀上要求許多勞動者，不管他們是“異質的”還是“同質的”，在一起以集體的和合作的方式勞動。在資本主義農業(yè)中，工人和資本家的關系不僅是“異質的”，而且是對抗性的。資本主義農業(yè)當然需要監(jiān)督，并且由于工人是被壓迫、被剝削的，決不會為資本家積極地和負責地勞動，“監(jiān)督費用”當然是“高昂”的，但是盡管如此，盡管“農業(yè)是一種分散在廣闊地域上進行勞動的產(chǎn)業(yè)”，資本主義農業(yè)仍然是無可爭辯地優(yōu)越于小農經(jīng)濟?！　?/p>

    這就提出了一個問題：如果說，在社會主義合作農業(yè)中，勞動者通過組成集體把生產(chǎn)控制在自己手中，因而為了自己的利益而勞動，而不是在資本家的剝削下勞動，那么，他們自然會比資本主義農業(yè)中的工人更加積極、更加負責地勞動，那么，社會主義合作農業(yè)自然需要比資本主義農業(yè)少得多的“監(jiān)督費用”，那么，既然資本主義農業(yè)，盡管它的“監(jiān)督費用高昂”，仍然從根本上優(yōu)越于小農經(jīng)濟，為什么社會主義合作農業(yè)就不可行、不是大大地優(yōu)越于小農經(jīng)濟呢？　　

    這說明，社會主義合作農業(yè)的成功有賴于兩個條件：第一，合作農業(yè)必須建立在真正的社會主義生產(chǎn)關系的基礎上，也就是，勞動人民把生產(chǎn)控制在自己手中。第二，合作農業(yè)必須建立在現(xiàn)代農業(yè)技術和裝備的基礎上，這是合作農業(yè)優(yōu)越于小農經(jīng)濟的物質基礎?！　?/p>

    關于第一個條件，我們知道，在五十年代中國還不具備消滅腦力勞動和體力勞動的分工的條件，因而還不具備確立社會主義社會關系所需要的物質基礎。因此，一個新的官僚統(tǒng)治階級逐漸產(chǎn)生了。在這種情況下，農業(yè)合作化，雖然對于防止農村的資本主義發(fā)展和社會兩極分化是必要的，只能按照官僚主義的方式自上而下地進行，而不是農民群眾自己的主動性和創(chuàng)造性?！　?/p>

    另一方面，盡管由于農業(yè)合作化，中國的農業(yè)生產(chǎn)力的確取得了質的進步，這些進步在傳統(tǒng)的小農經(jīng)濟條件下是根本不可能的，到毛澤東時代結束時，中國還沒有完成農業(yè)的現(xiàn)代化，中國的農業(yè)部門在很大程度上仍然是一個前現(xiàn)代的經(jīng)濟部門?！　?/p>

    在這種情況下，農業(yè)合作化和中國農村的社會主義改造的命運就不取決于農村本身的政治、經(jīng)濟和社會狀況，而是取決于整個社會的生產(chǎn)關系演變和階級斗爭的總趨勢，而這個總趨勢，又是由中國的現(xiàn)代經(jīng)濟部門，即比較先進的和逐步占統(tǒng)治地位的經(jīng)濟部門中的生產(chǎn)關系演變和階級斗爭的趨勢來決定的。只是在文化大革命失敗之后，官僚主義者階級的統(tǒng)治得以鞏固，而以革命社會主義方式來解決中國社會的矛盾已經(jīng)不可能了，只是在這時，建設真正的社會主義合作農業(yè)的可能性才完全不存在了?！　?/p>

　 　

（3）合作化的遺產(chǎn)　　

    按照官方學者和資產(chǎn)階級經(jīng)濟學家的意見，中國的合作農業(yè)是徹頭徹尾的失敗，作為一種農業(yè)發(fā)展戰(zhàn)略必須完全拋棄?！霸谧罨镜募Z食消費中，二十五年的集體農業(yè)并沒有任何進步。”“直到七十年代中期，人均糧食生產(chǎn)才達到集體化之前的水平；直到一九八零年，人均營養(yǎng)才稍微超過五十年代中期的水平。”(Selden,1993,16)　　

    他們說合作化沒有能夠提高人均糧食產(chǎn)量，但是他們沒有提到在這期間，中國人口增加了三億，而耕地卻減少了一半還多。在這種情況下，中國能夠以世界上7％的耕地養(yǎng)活了世界上22％的人口，這一事實本身，就是一個了不起的成就。1976年，中國的糧食單產(chǎn)是491斤，同一年，美國是417斤，加拿大是303斤，法國是452斤，意大利是434斤，都比中國低。日本糧食單產(chǎn)788.6斤，是世界第一。但是，中國15億畝耕地中，11億畝種糧食，其中有5億畝都是在別的國家沒人種的低產(chǎn)田，包括5000萬畝鹽堿地、8000萬畝澇洼地和3億畝山坡薄地。日本的糧食單產(chǎn)788。6斤是在4440萬畝耕地面積上獲得的，而當年中國有197個縣在6858。4萬畝大面積上糧食單產(chǎn)超千斤。七十年代來中國訪問的美國農學家諾曼·布勞格也說：“中國人民創(chuàng)造了世界上已知的最驚人的變革之一。”（方原，52）　　

    合作化時代，并非如官方學者所說，是一團漆黑?！　?/p>

    評價一種生產(chǎn)關系是不是先進，不僅要看它能不能在短期內提高生產(chǎn)力的量，而且要看它能不能創(chuàng)造一種本質上完全不同的嶄新的生產(chǎn)力。官僚主義的農業(yè)合作化，雖然造成了莫大的犧牲，付出了重大的代價，但是它畢竟超越了小農經(jīng)濟的狹隘界限，從而使中國農業(yè)的生產(chǎn)力發(fā)展水平發(fā)生了質的革命?！　?/p>

    孟繁琪（少數(shù)同情農業(yè)合作化的官方學者之一）認為，正是在1958－1978年，中國農業(yè)進入了“向現(xiàn)代農業(yè)轉換階段”，在這個時期，農業(yè)資本積累和基本建設有了空前絕后的大發(fā)展：(1)機械化有了長足進步。1958－1978年，農機總動力平均每年增加24.34％。(2)治理了大江大河，興建大型灌區(qū)，發(fā)展井灌、機電排灌。1952－1971年，灌溉面積從占全部耕地的20％增加到78％，復種指數(shù)從130增加到185。(3)培育和大面積推廣優(yōu)良品種，建立了龐大、完整的農業(yè)科學技術推廣體系。一些西方專家在親身實地到中國考察以后發(fā)現(xiàn)：“農民堅定不移的看法是，如果沒有這種大面積耕作的新形式（公社），他們將永遠對付不了發(fā)生自然災害時的緊急情況。”(Stavrianos,　　

1981,607)“今日，中國農業(yè)受氣候所左右的影響比過去少得多，這并不是中央政府對大型水利工程進行大量投資的結果，而是公社在生產(chǎn)淡季通過動員剩余的勞動力進行許多小型水利工程所累積的作用?！保ㄍ柌?，332）如果沒有合作化時期在農業(yè)領域積累的巨額投資，那么在“改革”時期，就根本不會有什么“農業(yè)奇跡”?！　?/p>

    到七十年代末，在一些合作化搞得比較成功的地方，農業(yè)的現(xiàn)代化已經(jīng)初露端倪了。1978年，韓丁回到他非常熟悉的山西省長治市的張村時發(fā)現(xiàn)：　　

　 　

張村的老百姓已經(jīng)開始在近200畝糧田上實現(xiàn)機械化，他們的設備，有的是重新修繕的，有的是自制的。翻耕撒肥、播種、除草、收割、烘干和脫粒，所有這些活都用機器。由十二人組成的機械隊是勞動生產(chǎn)率提高到過去的十五倍，糧食生產(chǎn)成本減少了一半。(Hinton,1990,15)　　

　 　

　 　

　 　

　 　

（二）回到小農經(jīng)濟　　

    在前蘇聯(lián)和東歐，集體農業(yè)已經(jīng)基本上建立在現(xiàn)代農業(yè)技術的基礎上了。所以，在這些國家，農業(yè)私有化遭到農民和農業(yè)工人的堅決抵制。另一方面，當鄧小平政權開始“經(jīng)濟改革”時，中國農業(yè)基本上仍然是一個前現(xiàn)代的經(jīng)濟部門。由于這種前現(xiàn)代的技術條件，又由于官僚主義者階級的統(tǒng)治，因而勞動人民沒有控制生產(chǎn)的權力，（事實上的）私有化成為解決中國農業(yè)問題的唯一辦法?！　?/p>

    與前蘇聯(lián)和東歐不同，在中國，農業(yè)私有化在一定程度上得到了農民的歡迎（盡管在一些合作化搞得比較好的地方也受到了抵制）。但是這并不能改變整個“改革”的性質。由于“改革”，中國農業(yè)回到了小農經(jīng)濟的狀態(tài)。小農經(jīng)濟，作為一種前現(xiàn)代的生產(chǎn)方式，它的發(fā)展方向，是要由中國的現(xiàn)代經(jīng)濟部門的發(fā)展方向來決定的。所以，決定整個“改革”的性質的，和對農民群眾的長期生活狀況（區(qū)別于“農業(yè)改革”的眼前的、直接的效果）起決定性影響的，是城市“改革”或工業(yè)“改革”，而不是農業(yè)“改革”?！　?/p>

　 　

　 　

　 　

　 　

（三）小農經(jīng)濟和農業(yè)停滯　　

    “農業(yè)改革”在最初幾年確實取得了驕人的成績。1978－1984年，中國農業(yè)總產(chǎn)值年平均增長7.62％，糧食產(chǎn)量年平均增長4.95％，特別是1984年人均糧食產(chǎn)量達到390公斤，第一次接近世界平均水平，長期糧食緊張的狀況緩和了?！　?/p>

    官方學者認為，中國農業(yè)的“超常規(guī)增長”主要歸功于“改革”?！稗r業(yè)改革對1978－1984年的產(chǎn)出增長有顯著貢獻，各項改革所致的生產(chǎn)率變化構成產(chǎn)出增長的48.64％（林毅夫，95）?！痹诠俜綄W者看來，“農業(yè)改革”的成功證明：　　

　 　

家庭經(jīng)營是最適合于農業(yè)這種規(guī)模經(jīng)濟不顯著的產(chǎn)業(yè)的經(jīng)營形式......以農戶的勞動力為主，土地、資本在家庭內部作基本的微觀配置，直接生產(chǎn)者與決策者合而為一這樣一種資產(chǎn)運作層次，在農業(yè)中是典型的。在這一資產(chǎn)運作層次上，農業(yè)經(jīng)濟可以發(fā)揮出極大的經(jīng)濟效率?！　?/p>

　 　

在官方學者看來，“家庭經(jīng)營”可以說是“產(chǎn)權明晰”的完美典型，所以，他們對“家庭經(jīng)營”的迷信簡直到了無以復加的地步，不承認農業(yè)中存在規(guī)模經(jīng)濟：　　

　 　

在農業(yè)中......土地是可分的，各種流動的投入物如化肥、農藥、種子是可分的，就連拖拉機也可以通過制造較小的型號、匹配較小的馬力而實現(xiàn)其可分性......所以農業(yè)中生產(chǎn)要素具有假不可分性的特點，規(guī)模經(jīng)濟不顯著。（蔡方，97，101，108）　　

　 　

但是，化肥、農藥、良種要發(fā)揮作用，往往要求有良好的灌溉，這就要求進行農田水利基本建設，而這是在“家庭經(jīng)營”這一“資產(chǎn)運作層次”上辦不到的。至于使拖拉機“實現(xiàn)其可分性”，官方學者忘了說明，這樣做，（相對于作業(yè)能力）的生產(chǎn)成本肯定是要大大增加的?！　?/p>

    官方學者舉出日本和臺灣為例，作為在家庭經(jīng)營基礎上也可以取得農業(yè)現(xiàn)代化的證明。實際上，日本和臺灣的經(jīng)驗，與其說是證明了家庭經(jīng)營的成功，倒不如說是證明了家庭經(jīng)營的失敗。日本和臺灣的農業(yè)效率極其低下，沒有政府的巨額補貼根本不能生存。1970年以前臺灣95％的農產(chǎn)品可以自給，1970年以后自給率下降到90％；日本政府每年花1萬億日元（折合800億元人民幣）補貼水稻生產(chǎn)，盡管如此，農產(chǎn)品自給率還是從1955年的87％下降到1980年的72％。（孟繁琪）　　

    孟繁琪認為，在蘇南稻麥兩熟耕作區(qū)，土地經(jīng)營的最小經(jīng)濟規(guī)模是500畝；在華北小麥玉米兩熟耕作區(qū)，土地經(jīng)營的最小經(jīng)濟規(guī)模是1000畝。他指出：　　

　 　

若農業(yè)經(jīng)營主體選擇不當，即使經(jīng)濟發(fā)展水平相當高，由于受過小經(jīng)營規(guī)模容納生產(chǎn)技術要素能力的局限，很難采用較高性能的勞動資料實現(xiàn)生產(chǎn)要素的優(yōu)化組合，難以獲得相應的技術效益和規(guī)模報酬。在活勞動機會成本一定的條件下......畝均作業(yè)總成本隨經(jīng)營規(guī)模的擴大而下降，呈顯著的負相關，實質是勞動資料性能的不斷提高和生產(chǎn)要素組合結構比例不斷優(yōu)化的過程。（孟繁琪，57）　　

　 　

所以，農業(yè)也和其它產(chǎn)業(yè)部門一樣，存在顯著的規(guī)模經(jīng)濟。小農經(jīng)濟不是象官方學者所說的那樣，“在資產(chǎn)運作層次上，農業(yè)經(jīng)濟可以發(fā)揮出極大的經(jīng)濟效率”，而是有很大的局限性，“難以獲得相應的技術效益和規(guī)模報酬?！薄　?/p>

    我們有必要仔細分析一下1978－1984年農業(yè)“超常規(guī)增長”的原因，看看“改革”到底發(fā)揮了怎樣的功效。這方面缺乏全面的資料，但是通過分析幾個具體的案例，還是能看出一些問題的。安徽省鳳陽縣是最早搞“包產(chǎn)到戶”的縣之一。這個縣1977年糧食產(chǎn)量18.29萬噸，這是“改革”前糧食產(chǎn)量最高的一年。19  89  年搞包產(chǎn)到組，糧食產(chǎn)量增加到22.35萬噸，1980年搞包產(chǎn)到戶，又增加到25.5萬噸。當?shù)剞r民說：“在合作化的時候，我們整天干活，天天干，一年到頭地干，但是我們實際上什么也沒干。干一會兒，歇一會兒，再干一會兒，再歇一會兒，大伙兒都覺得沒勁，生產(chǎn)搞不好，表面上我們在干活，實際上是敷衍了事。現(xiàn)在，我們一分鐘都不浪費，多勞多得，我們的生活好起來了，時間掌握在自己手里，我們有的是時間?！边@說明，在合作農業(yè)搞得不好的地方，承包制確實激發(fā)了農民的生產(chǎn)積極性〔1〕　　

。但是，農業(yè)生產(chǎn)和其它生產(chǎn)部門一樣，只有生產(chǎn)積極性還不行，要把生產(chǎn)搞好，還必須具備一定的物質生產(chǎn)條件。鳳陽縣以種植水稻為主，所以需要大量的灌溉用水。有一半的水來自當?shù)氐囊粋€大水庫，這個水庫是五十年代發(fā)動群眾建起來的。如果沒有這個水庫，稻田得不到灌溉，也就不能應用良種，生產(chǎn)技術與合作化以前比沒有什么發(fā)展，農民生產(chǎn)積極性再高，生產(chǎn)水平也不會比合作化前有很大提高?！　?/p>

(Hinton,1990,53,58)　　

    鳳陽縣的情況是有普遍意義的?，F(xiàn)在全國絕大多數(shù)水利工程都是在合作化時代搞起來的。正是合作化時代進行的大規(guī)模資本積累和基本建設，才使“改革”初期農業(yè)有可能“超常規(guī)增長”?！案母铩钡墓冢徊贿^是由于發(fā)揮了農民的積極性，把這些基本建設的生產(chǎn)潛力充分發(fā)揮出來了。從這個意義上說，“超常規(guī)增長”不僅不說明“家庭經(jīng)營”優(yōu)越，反而證明了集體經(jīng)濟的優(yōu)越性。既然“超常規(guī)增長”是合作化時代大規(guī)模資本積累和基本建設的結果，那么要把農業(yè)發(fā)展的勢頭保持下去，就必須進行新的資本積累和基本建設。但是，“改革”使中國回到了小農經(jīng)濟汪洋大海的狀態(tài)，不僅不能積累和發(fā)展生產(chǎn)力，反而導致生產(chǎn)力退化。（見表3.1）　　

　 　

表3.1   "改革"時期中國農業(yè)生產(chǎn)力的退化　　

                    1979        1987　　

(百萬公頃)　　

有效灌溉面積       45.003      44.403　　

機灌面積           25.321      24.825　　

機耕面積           42.219      38.393　　

資料來源:Liu,1988,38.　　

　 　

    合作社解散以后，農田水利基本建設幾乎停止；農業(yè)技術推廣部門面對數(shù)量極多、規(guī)模極小、戶自為戰(zhàn)的“經(jīng)營主體”，很難有所作為，加上小農經(jīng)濟自給性強，吸收新技術愿望低，農業(yè)技術推廣陷入“網(wǎng)破、線斷、人散”的癱瘓狀態(tài)。（孟繁琪，57）　　

    另一方面，“改革”使農業(yè)機械化受到了嚴重挫折。在山西省長治市的張村，在合作農業(yè)下，曾經(jīng)在農業(yè)機械化方面取得顯著成就。　　

　 　

但是現(xiàn)在改革了，所有村民都分到一份口糧田，余下的土地承包給農民，土地被分成數(shù)不清的小地塊，機械化變得毫無意義，只好讓位于分散耕種。農民別無選擇，只好放棄大部分先進設備，重新?lián)炱鸢易印ｃy行要張村還貸款，村長告訴銀行：“把機器拿走吧。”但是銀行一直找不到買主。所以直到現(xiàn)在，那些施肥機、碎土機、噴霧器、機灌設備、收割機和烘干機還扔在機器場上，任憑日曬雨淋，無聲地訴說著一個已經(jīng)過去的時代......(Hinton,1990,15)　　

　 　

黑龍江省的一萬個村莊中，只有181個保留了對農機的集體所有和集體  和  管理。有20％的村莊把機器承包給個人，另外80％則干脆按犧牲價格把機器賣給了有內線的人，比如隊干部，他們的親友等。平均來說，賣價只相當于機器原價的三分之一，或者假設這些機器已經(jīng)折舊了三分之一，那么這些機器就是按半價賣掉的。無論怎樣計算，都是集體財產(chǎn)的重大流失。那些買到機器的人，因為得來的便宜，也就不愿意花錢做大的修理。他們的機器，主要是拖拉機、犁和少量的收割機，都是用到需要修理時為止，然后就扔掉了?！　?/p>

　 　

改革以后，大部分機器都不能象原來那樣發(fā)揮其全部功能。機器賣了以后，破壞了各種設備之間的配套關系，新的所有人不能用機器完成任何完整的工作，也不能進行農田連續(xù)作業(yè)，（我所到之處）差不多都是這樣。(Hinton,1990,103-104)　　

　 　

    土地家庭承包以后，由于農村人口持續(xù)增長，出現(xiàn)了土地無限細分的趨勢。1986年全國農戶戶均耕地9.2畝，每戶地塊平均8.49塊，平均每塊耕地只有1.02畝，與1960年部分亞非國家農戶平均土地規(guī)模相比，中國只有后者的14.23％。（蔡方，99，102）1991年，全國農戶戶均耕地比1986年又減少了13％。（《中國農村經(jīng)濟》1993年第5期，6）耕地如此細分，不要說不能滿足現(xiàn)代化農業(yè)的規(guī)模經(jīng)營要求，就是傳統(tǒng)的勞動密集型精耕細作都無法實現(xiàn)合理經(jīng)營?！　?/p>

    小農經(jīng)濟在本質上是一種原始的、落后的生產(chǎn)方式，它不能進行大規(guī)模資本積累和基本建設，也不能容納現(xiàn)代生產(chǎn)力。在短期，小農經(jīng)濟在一定程度上有助于克服官僚主義集體農業(yè)的一些問題，能在量上提高生產(chǎn)力，但是這種量的提高是建立在集體經(jīng)濟所創(chuàng)造的本質上更高的生產(chǎn)力的基礎上的。在長期，小農經(jīng)濟不僅不能進一步發(fā)展生產(chǎn)力，而且不能再生產(chǎn)合作化時代遺留下來的本質上比較優(yōu)越的生產(chǎn)力，在把合作化時代遺留下來的生產(chǎn)能力消耗完以后，中國農業(yè)只能無可挽回地衰落下去?！　?/p>

    1985年，中國糧食減產(chǎn)3000萬噸。1984－1993年，中國糧食產(chǎn)量的年平均增長率只有1.3％，人均糧食產(chǎn)量則從390公斤減少到380公斤。（《中國農業(yè)經(jīng)濟統(tǒng)計資料1991》，32－33；《北京日報》1994年2月7日）“超常規(guī)增長”一去不復返了，中國農業(yè)進入了長期停滯?！　?/p>

　 　

　 　

　 　

　 　

（四）資本主義和小農經(jīng)濟　　

    與資本主義對工人階級的剝削不同，資本主義對農民的剝削，主要不是在生產(chǎn)領域，而是在流通領域。　　

    在資本主義生產(chǎn)關系占統(tǒng)治地位的社會中，如果小農經(jīng)濟在農業(yè)中占統(tǒng)治地位，那么就會存在工農產(chǎn)品剪刀差，也就是說，工農產(chǎn)品交換，總是工業(yè)得益，農業(yè)吃虧。這是因為，工業(yè)品是由資本主義部門生產(chǎn)的，是按價值出售的，而農業(yè)品是由小農生產(chǎn)的，只能按勞動力價值出售。如果小農的收入高于勞動力價值，勞動力就會由資本主義部門向農業(yè)部門倒流，直到把小農的收入壓低到與勞動力價值相等為止。所以，農民出售農產(chǎn)品，總是得不到自己產(chǎn)品的全部價值。通過工農產(chǎn)品剪刀差，資本家階級就不僅能剝削自己直接雇傭的不占有生產(chǎn)資料的無產(chǎn)階級，而且還能剝削表面上占有生產(chǎn)資料的農民?！　?/p>

    但是，資本主義對農民的這種剝削方式，與資本主義經(jīng)濟發(fā)展的需要之間存在著矛盾。首先，資本主義經(jīng)濟發(fā)展要求農業(yè)勞動生產(chǎn)率不斷提高，這與小農經(jīng)濟妨礙農業(yè)勞動生產(chǎn)率的提高之間存在著矛盾?！　?/p>

    我們用下面兩個公式來分別代表資本主義部門和小農經(jīng)濟的農業(yè)部門：　　

　 　

    P=PK+P"K"+L　　

    P"=WL"　　

　 　

P是一單位資本主義產(chǎn)品的價格，K是由資本主義部門生產(chǎn)的生產(chǎn)一單位資本主義產(chǎn)品所需要的生產(chǎn)資料，K"是由農業(yè)部門生產(chǎn)的生產(chǎn)一單位資本主義產(chǎn)品所需要的生產(chǎn)資料，L是生產(chǎn)一單位資本主義產(chǎn)品所要投入的勞動力，P"是一單位農產(chǎn)品的價格，W是一單位勞動力的工資，L"是生產(chǎn)一單位農產(chǎn)品所要投入的勞動力。為了簡單起見，我們假設農業(yè)生產(chǎn)不需要任何生產(chǎn)資料?！　?/p>

    如果我們用R來表示資本主義部門的利潤率，則：　　

　 　

            P　　

    1+R=----------　　

        PK+P"K"+WL　　

              WL"K"+L　　

              -------　　

                1-K　　

       =-------------------　　

        (WL"K"+L)K　　

        ----------+WL"K"+WL　　

           1-K 　　

             WK"+L/L"　　

             -------　　

               1-K　　

       =------------------　　

         WK" K+W(1-K)　　

        ---+--------(L/L")　　

        1-K    1-K　　

　 　

    如果我們假設W不變，即假設剩余價值率不變，并且如果K、K"是常數(shù)，那么由于資本主義部門的勞動生產(chǎn)率增加得比小農經(jīng)濟的農業(yè)部門快，在長期，隨著L趨近于0，L/L"也趨近于0，從而1+R趨近于1，也就是說，R趨近于0?！　?/p>

    所以，在長期，如果農業(yè)部門的勞動生產(chǎn)率增長得比資本主義部門慢，資本主義部門的利潤率就會逐漸下降，這就會嚴重地妨礙資本主義積累。　　

    其次，資本主義經(jīng)濟發(fā)展對農產(chǎn)品的絕對需要量不斷增加與中國農業(yè)長期供給能力有限之間存在著矛盾?！　?/p>

    小農經(jīng)濟作為一種個體生產(chǎn)方式，無力進行大規(guī)模資本積累。另一方面，在小農經(jīng)濟占統(tǒng)治地位的情況下，勞動力價值規(guī)定著農產(chǎn)品價格的上限，農業(yè)投資無利可圖，導致國家和“集體”投資“向非農產(chǎn)業(yè)傾斜”。1979年農業(yè)基本建設投資占國家基本建設投資總額的11.1％，1993年下降到2.8％。1990年農業(yè)固定資產(chǎn)投資占農村集體固定資產(chǎn)投資總額的17％，1993年下降到6.9％?！皳?jù)有關資料測算，中國各個時期的農業(yè)基礎投資份額和農業(yè)基建資金再投入的比重均低于理想值。因此，可以說中國農業(yè)資金供給不足幾乎貫穿著農業(yè)發(fā)展的全過程?！保ā毒G皮書》，234）　　

    另一方面，資本主義經(jīng)濟發(fā)展要求無限地增加對自然資源的消費，而資本主義生產(chǎn)本身卻不能再生產(chǎn)自然資源。由于農業(yè)是高度依賴自然資源的經(jīng)濟部門，因此，資本主義經(jīng)濟發(fā)展本身就會破壞農業(yè)生產(chǎn)的基礎。這突出地表現(xiàn)在耕地不斷減少和環(huán)境污染的問題上：　　

　 　

全國鄉(xiāng)鎮(zhèn)企業(yè)在吸納九千多萬勞動力的同時，也占去耕地一億畝。......在比較發(fā)達的地區(qū)，鄉(xiāng)鎮(zhèn)企業(yè)正不惜占用著大量的優(yōu)質農田。（厲以寧等，164）　　

　 　

（1992年）僅各地興建、擴建各種開發(fā)區(qū)，即占去耕地2400多萬畝，幾乎相當于中國現(xiàn)有耕地面積的2％。（《參考消息》1993年1月7日）　　

　 　

另外，據(jù)有關部門估計，八十年代后期，全國受工礦企業(yè)排放“三廢”污染的農田多達1億畝，每年減產(chǎn)糧食50－100億公斤?！　?/p>

    一方面，投資長期不足，另一方面，耕地又不斷減少，這就從根本上限制了中國農業(yè)的長期生產(chǎn)能力。　　

    在小農經(jīng)濟范圍內，顯然是無法解決上述問題的。在現(xiàn)存社會制度范圍內，唯一的出路是在盡可能短的時間內把中國農業(yè)改造為資本主義農業(yè)。但是，第一，雖然八十年代初的“農業(yè)改革”，使中國農業(yè)回到了小農經(jīng)濟的狀態(tài)，確立了事實上的土地私有制，但是法律上的土地私有制還沒有建立起來，中國也還不具備徹底實現(xiàn)土地私有化的社會條件。第二，即使完全實現(xiàn)了土地私有化，在小農經(jīng)濟條件下，土地仍不能完全具備可以自由買賣的商品性質，因為對于農民，土地還起著儲蓄和保險的功能。即使農民外出務工，在多數(shù)情況下他們還是保留土地而不是把它賣掉。在這種情況下，土地的流通和集中只能十分緩慢地進行，對資本主義農業(yè)的發(fā)展構成嚴重的障礙?！　?/p>

　 　

　 　

　 　

　 　

〔1〕不是在所有的地方，在合作農業(yè)下，農民都沒有生產(chǎn)積極性。比如山西省有個王公莊村，學習張村的榜樣，搞了機械化?！案母铩遍_始時，大家都不愿意分田。每次縣領導來到這個村子，村干部就躲起來。這樣過了一兩年，等承包風過去了，合作社也就留下來了。在王公莊村，農業(yè)生產(chǎn)堅持“四個統(tǒng)一”，即“統(tǒng)一計劃、統(tǒng)一核算、統(tǒng)一經(jīng)營、統(tǒng)一耕作”。農民把所有的小麥、豆子種在一起，由村里統(tǒng)一負責采購種子、化肥，由集體所有的機械隊統(tǒng)一犁地、耙地、施肥、播種和灌溉。1984年，小麥單產(chǎn)比1978年提高了160％。(Hinton,1990,99)　　

　 　

　 　

　 　

　 　

　 　

　 　

　 　

　 　

第四章 資本主義經(jīng)濟發(fā)展　　

　 　

（一）中國經(jīng)濟發(fā)展的物質基礎　　

    1979－1993年，中國經(jīng)濟年平均增長9.3％(PRC,1994)。中國現(xiàn)在是世界上經(jīng)濟增長最快的國家之一。世界銀行也預測，到下個世紀初，中國經(jīng)濟的總產(chǎn)值將成為世界第一(The Economist,October 1994,4)。官方學者認為，中國的高速經(jīng)濟增長顯示了“社會主義市場經(jīng)濟體制”的巨大威力：　　

　 　

新中國成立初期建立高度集中的、以行政指令為主的計劃經(jīng)濟體制......這種體制自始就排斥社會主義商品經(jīng)濟的發(fā)展，愈來愈把適合生產(chǎn)社會化的要求......大大延緩了生產(chǎn)建設、綜合國力和人民生活提高的進程，妨礙了社會主義制度優(yōu)越性的有效、充分發(fā)揮。黨的十一界三中全會以后，鄧小平同志系統(tǒng)地提出了建設有中國特色的社會主義的理論，在這個科學理論指導下，我國經(jīng)濟體制改革逐步走上了建立社會主義市場經(jīng)濟體制的正確軌道。......在經(jīng)濟體制改革推動下，1979年以來，我國的生產(chǎn)建設、綜合國力和人民生活都上了一個新臺階。......1979－1991年年平均增長速度為8.6％，顯著高于1953－1978年6.1％的速度......初步顯示了正在建立過程中的社會主義市場經(jīng)濟體制的巨大威力。（汪海波，220－223）　　

　 　

    在官方學者的論述中包含著局部真理。首先，發(fā)展生產(chǎn)力是資本主義的天然的歷史使命，是資產(chǎn)階級在歷史上存在的根據(jù)。正是在這一點上，資本主義勝過以往一起壓迫社會。但是，這并不能改變以下的事實：資本主義生產(chǎn)力的發(fā)展永遠要以犧牲絕大多數(shù)人民的基本利益為代價；在資本主義條件下，只有摧殘最根本的生產(chǎn)力－人的生產(chǎn)力，才能發(fā)展物質的生產(chǎn)力?！　?/p>

    其次，官方學者的觀點割裂了歷史。從統(tǒng)計上看，1979－1993年的經(jīng)濟增長速度比1953－1978年高三個百分點。但是，僅僅這個數(shù)據(jù)本身并不能說明任何問題。錢納里根據(jù)世界銀行的數(shù)據(jù)發(fā)現(xiàn)，隨著發(fā)展中國家的經(jīng)濟發(fā)展水平逐步提高，經(jīng)濟發(fā)展也漸趨加速，只是到了相當?shù)慕?jīng)濟發(fā)展水平以后，經(jīng)濟發(fā)展速度才有所放慢。（見表4.1）這是因為，經(jīng)濟發(fā)展不僅引起國民收入的量的增加，而且同時還引起國民經(jīng)濟的質的進步，因而改善經(jīng)濟發(fā)展的一般條件。所以，較后階段的經(jīng)濟發(fā)展通常在各方面都具有比較前階段更為有利的發(fā)展條件，經(jīng)濟發(fā)展速度也就相應比較快。1980年，中國人均國民生產(chǎn)總值304美元（《中國統(tǒng)計年鑒》1991年卷）。大體上處于錢納里“標準模式”中280－560美元這一階段。因為七十年代末中國的人均國民生產(chǎn)總值接近五十年代初的三倍，五十年代初中國大約處于錢納里“標準模式”中的100－140美元這一階段。照此看來，1979年以后的平均經(jīng)濟增長速度超過1979以前三個百分點，本不足為奇?！　?/p>

　 　

表4.1   錢納里的經(jīng)濟發(fā)展"標準模式"　　

人均國民生產(chǎn)總值    經(jīng)濟增長率(%)    人均經(jīng)濟增長率(%)　　

100-140                3.81                1.26　　

140-280                4.80                2.02　　

280-560                5.67                3.17　　

560-1120               6.30                4.10　　

1120-2100              6.58                4.58　　

2100-3360              6.21                4.71　　

3360-5040              5.60                4.60　　

資料來源:劉世錦和江小娟.　　

　 　

    正是新中國前三十年的經(jīng)濟建設為1979年以后的經(jīng)濟發(fā)展奠定了物質基礎：　　

    （1）首先，從經(jīng)濟發(fā)展的一般物質條件看，八十年代遠遠勝過五十年代。例如，1949年，中國只有鐵路2.17萬公里，公路約8萬公里。到1980年，鐵路增加到了5.2萬公里，公路增加到了87.6萬公里，分別是1949年的2.4倍和11倍。（《世界經(jīng)濟年鑒》1981年卷）　　

    （2）中國作為一個經(jīng)濟、技術落后的發(fā)展中國家，農業(yè)生產(chǎn)的好壞直接制約著整個經(jīng)濟發(fā)展的好壞。由表4.2可以看出八十年代末以前農業(yè)的增長速度直接關系著整個中國經(jīng)濟的增長速度。1979年以后中國經(jīng)濟的高速增長，首先是由于農業(yè)的高速增長。如果不是因為農業(yè)生產(chǎn)已經(jīng)達到了遠遠高于五十年代的水平，因而能夠為城市提供充足的剩余產(chǎn)品，1979年以后的高速經(jīng)濟增長是不可能的?！　?/p>

　 　

表4.2   中國農業(yè)總產(chǎn)值和國民收入年平均增長率(%)　　

            農業(yè)總產(chǎn)值    國民收入　　

1952-1958      4.19        10.57　　

1958-1965      1.01         0.08　　

1965-1978      3.05         6.61　　

1978-1988      6.63         9.23　　

資料來源:PRC 1985;馮海發(fā),115.　　

　 　

    那么，為什么八十年代的中國農業(yè)能達到遠遠高于五十年代的水平呢？從生產(chǎn)關系看，八十年代初的改革不過使中國農業(yè)回到了小農經(jīng)濟的狀態(tài)，與五十年代并無根本不同。但是，八十年代的小農經(jīng)濟并非就是五十年代的小農經(jīng)濟的簡單重復。經(jīng)過合作化時代二十多年的建設，中國農民已經(jīng)在全新的生產(chǎn)條件下進行農業(yè)生產(chǎn)了。（見表4.3）如果沒有合作化時代積累起來的巨大生產(chǎn)能力，中國農業(yè)只能停留在五十年代那種原始的農業(yè)生產(chǎn)水平上。很難想象，在這樣的農業(yè)基礎上能夠創(chuàng)造出八十年代的經(jīng)濟奇跡?！　?/p>

　 　

表4.3   中國農業(yè)生產(chǎn)力的發(fā)展　　

                            1952    1979　　

農機總動力(萬馬力)           25    18191　　

每公頃耕地化肥施用量(公斤)   0.7   109.2　　

農村用電量(億度)             0.5   284.1　　

灌溉面積(萬公頃)           1995.9  4500.3　　

資料來源:《世界經(jīng)濟年鑒》1981年卷，56。　　

　 　

    （3）1949－1979年，中國始終奉行優(yōu)先發(fā)展重工業(yè)的經(jīng)濟發(fā)展戰(zhàn)略。這一戰(zhàn)略盡管現(xiàn)在遭到非議，但是畢竟，到七十年代末，“中國工業(yè)已經(jīng)改變了歷史遺留下來的技術落后和畸形發(fā)展的狀況，建立起門類比較齊全、布局趨向合理的生產(chǎn)體系?！保ā妒澜缃?jīng)濟年鑒》1981年卷，54）1979年以后的經(jīng)濟高速增長與新中國前三十年形成的重工業(yè)基礎同樣是分不開的?！　?/p>

    以鄉(xiāng)鎮(zhèn)企業(yè)為例，“鄉(xiāng)鎮(zhèn)企業(yè)的裝備基本上是城市工業(yè)提供的”，“1987年僅鄉(xiāng)村兩級企業(yè)凈增固定資產(chǎn)總值達280億元......而其所消耗的國營工業(yè)產(chǎn)品就占到70％?！保▍栆詫幍?，166）如果1979年以前中國沒有形成相當?shù)闹毓I(yè)基礎，這些工業(yè)設備就必須進口。1988年，鄉(xiāng)鎮(zhèn)企業(yè)累計固定資產(chǎn)原值約3600億元。假設這3600億元在1980－1988年平均分配，分別依當年匯率計算，那么累計需外匯1500多億美元。如果用增加出口的辦法來換取這筆外匯，同期中國出口收入就必須增加60％；如果用借外債的辦法來籌集這筆外匯，八十年代中國借入的長期外債就得增加三倍以上。顯然，這兩種辦法，或者完全不現(xiàn)實，或者實現(xiàn)起來有很大困難。因此，如果沒有本國的重工業(yè)基礎，鄉(xiāng)鎮(zhèn)企業(yè)恐怕就不能實現(xiàn)八十年代的飛速發(fā)展了?！　?/p>

    （4）但是，中國革命最偉大、最深遠的成就卻在于絕大多數(shù)人的發(fā)展，在于形成了巨大的人的生產(chǎn)力?！　?/p>

    這表現(xiàn)在絕大多數(shù)人民的體力和智力的發(fā)展上。　　

    體力：人均預期壽命從解放前的35歲提高到七十年代末的68歲?！　?/p>

    智力：在舊中國，全國80％以上的人口是文盲，學齡兒童入學率只有20％。到七十年代末，學齡兒童入學率達到93％。（《世界經(jīng)濟年鑒》1981年卷，73）據(jù)1982年全國人口普查，男女成人識字率分別達到81％和55％?！　?/p>

    中國人民在身體上和精神上發(fā)生的巨變是長期經(jīng)濟發(fā)展中真正有決定性的因素，其作用是不可估量的。　　

    有必要指出，所有這些條件，大多是在市場經(jīng)濟或資本主義條件下辦不到的。如果不是在合作化時期，大搞農田水利基本建設，推廣農業(yè)新技術，發(fā)展農業(yè)機械化，怎么能夠在八十年代奠定農業(yè)起飛的物質基礎呢？如果不是實行計劃經(jīng)濟，推行重工業(yè)優(yōu)先的經(jīng)濟發(fā)展戰(zhàn)略，又怎么能夠為后來的工業(yè)高速增長創(chuàng)造條件？特別是，只有經(jīng)歷了社會主義革命的國家，才能為絕大多數(shù)人的發(fā)展創(chuàng)造最有利的條件。將中國與另外幾個人口一億以上的發(fā)展中大國相比較，中國的人均國民生產(chǎn)總值僅超過印度，不如印度尼西亞，僅相當于巴西的六分之一。但是，中國的人均預期壽命是這幾個國家中最高的，成人識字率與印度尼西亞相當，與巴西相比差距也不大。（見表4.4）　　

　 　

表4.4   人口一億以上的發(fā)展中大國社會發(fā)展水平比較　　

                        中國    印度    印度尼西亞    巴西　　

人均預期壽命(歲)*　　

                    男   66      50         46         60　　

                    女   69      49         49         64　　

成人識字率(%)**　　

                    男   81      51         77         76　　

                    女   55      28         57         73　　

人均國民生產(chǎn)總值(美元)***　　

                        304     183        369        1793　　

*中國是1981年數(shù)據(jù),其它國家是1975-1980年數(shù)據(jù).　　

**中國是1982年數(shù)據(jù),其它國家是1980年數(shù)據(jù).　　

***中國是1980年數(shù)據(jù),印度、巴西是1979年數(shù)據(jù),印度尼西亞是1978年數(shù)據(jù).　　

資料來源:<國際經(jīng)濟和社會統(tǒng)計提要(一九八五年)>,12,211;<世界經(jīng)濟年鑒>1981年卷.　　

　 　

    因此，新中國前三十年的經(jīng)濟建設從物質方面為1979年以后的經(jīng)濟高速增長準備了條件。有了這些條件，只要有了適當?shù)纳a(chǎn)關系，生產(chǎn)力便能夠迅猛發(fā)展。這種生產(chǎn)關系既可以是壓迫性的生產(chǎn)關系，也可以是解放性的生產(chǎn)關系，區(qū)別只不過在于，在前一種情況下，生產(chǎn)力的發(fā)展總是以犧牲人的發(fā)展（就絕大多數(shù)人而言），而在后一種情況下，生產(chǎn)力的發(fā)展成為人的發(fā)展的條件，并且以人的發(fā)展為前提?！　?/p>

　 　

（二）資本主義生產(chǎn)關系的確立　　

    中國到底選擇哪一種生產(chǎn)關系，不取決于經(jīng)濟學家的計算和推理，而是取決于階級斗爭的實際進程，取決于統(tǒng)治階級和被壓迫人民之間的力量對比。一方面，在八十年代，中國勞動人民尚并具備必要的物質力量和理論力量以按照自身的意志決定社會發(fā)展的方向。另一方面，前蘇聯(lián)和東歐的經(jīng)驗證明，統(tǒng)治階級要完全征服被壓迫人民的意志，完全按照自己的意愿決定社會發(fā)展的方向并非輕而易舉，甚至可能遇到無法逾越的障礙?！　?/p>

    勞動人民不經(jīng)過嚴重的斗爭，決不會放棄他們在革命中爭得的社會主義權利，聽任資本主義壓迫秩序的擺布，這是資本主義生產(chǎn)關系發(fā)展過程中最大的、起決定性作用的障礙。在這一點上，中國與前蘇聯(lián)和東歐并無不同。但是，前蘇聯(lián)和東歐在所謂“改革”過程中陷入了空前可怕的經(jīng)濟危機，事實上，資本主義復辟在前蘇聯(lián)能否成功到現(xiàn)在還是個問題，而中國卻顯然已經(jīng)成功地完成了向資本主義過渡。從馬克思主義觀點看，這必須用中國與前蘇聯(lián)和東歐不同的階級結構，因而不同的階級斗爭條件來解釋?！　?/p>

    在中國，就象在前蘇聯(lián)和東歐一樣，有一個城市工人階級，也就是國有企業(yè)工人階級，這個階級在反對資本主義“改革”的斗爭中起著主要的作用。但是與前蘇聯(lián)和東歐不同，中國的城市工人階級并不占勞動人民的大多數(shù)。當中國開始向資本主義過渡時，中國農業(yè)仍然基本上建立在前現(xiàn)代的技術條件上，并且仍然有一個占人口絕大多數(shù)的農民階級。這里我們不來討論毛澤東時期城市和農村之間的不平衡發(fā)展，我們只須指出，一方面，在農業(yè)私有化之后，農業(yè)部門回到了小農經(jīng)濟的狀態(tài)，農民因而也成為“自由”的勞動力；另一方面，工業(yè)和農業(yè)之間的不平等交換不僅繼續(xù)存在而且在1984年以后出現(xiàn)了對農民越來越不利的局面。于是，一個龐大的、總數(shù)在一億以上的“剩余勞動力”隊伍在中國農村出現(xiàn)了。這些“剩余勞動力”準備按照資本主義的標準來出賣他們的勞動力，成為中國的新無產(chǎn)階級。我把他們稱之為中國的“新無產(chǎn)階級”是因為，這些人與國有企業(yè)的工人階級不同，他們不受“鐵飯碗”等社會主義權利的保護，而是不得不在純粹自由市場資本主義的條件下聽任資本家的剝削。由于存在著新無產(chǎn)階級，就可以在國有企業(yè)部門旁邊，另外發(fā)展起一個龐大的資本主義的或半資本主義的經(jīng)濟部門（在中國，這個部門包括鄉(xiāng)鎮(zhèn)企業(yè)、各式各樣的“集體企業(yè)”、私營企業(yè)和“三資”企業(yè)），并在其中建立起基本上正常的資本主義生產(chǎn)關系。通過這種方式，中國的統(tǒng)治階級就在實際上繞過了國有企業(yè)工人階級的抵抗，在新無產(chǎn)階級的基礎上直接建立起資本主義生產(chǎn)關系。資本主義“改革”的勝利由此就確定了。　　

　 　

（三）中國的新無產(chǎn)階級　　

    直到1978年，農業(yè)勞動力占中國社會勞動力的比重仍然高達71.4%，官方學者認為，其中三分之一到二分之一是“剩余勞動力”。（厲以寧等，151）1979年以后，農業(yè)勞動力開始大量向工業(yè)、商業(yè)和服務業(yè)轉移，到1988年，農業(yè)勞動力比重下降到57.9％。（厲以寧等，155）這些離開農業(yè)的勞動力絕大多數(shù)被鄉(xiāng)鎮(zhèn)企業(yè)、私營企業(yè)和三資企業(yè)吸收。到1989年，全國鄉(xiāng)鎮(zhèn)企業(yè)職工總數(shù)達到9366.3萬人，全國個體、私營企業(yè)雇工約700－800萬人，另外全國離土離鄉(xiāng)的民工約2000萬人，其中僅廣東省就有400萬人，三資企業(yè)工人主要來自這部分民工。（李強，98）這樣，到1989年，以上三部分人加起來有大約12000萬人。這些離開農業(yè)的勞動力的共同特點是，沒有生產(chǎn)資料，靠出賣勞動力為生，他們是中國的新無產(chǎn)階級?！　?/p>

    下面是在深圳打工的一個普通工人創(chuàng)作的一首詩，生動地描述了中國新無產(chǎn)階級的生活狀況：　　

　 　

    隆隆的機聲已經(jīng)響起，　　

    時間又逼我起了早床。　　

　 　

    坐在機器面前，　　

    老板似乎又來到身邊?！　?/p>

    那威逼的眼神，　　

    就象綠色的鈔票在閃耀?！　?/p>

　 　

    于是　　

    我們又低下了頭，　　

    圓滿著自己的未來?！　?/p>

　 　

    即使因一時的激動，　　

            丟了手腳?！　?/p>

    但在金錢面前　　

    我們卻露出了笑臉?！　?/p>

    ......　　

　 　

    當領去薪資的時候，　　

    身后傳來的卻是　　

    神秘的微笑?！　?/p>

        因為　　

    我們得到的　　

    僅僅是遺棄的　　

          面包。　　

　 　

    中國的新無產(chǎn)階級生活在極其悲慘的狀況中，但是從資本主義的觀點看，這是好得不能再好的、極有效率的經(jīng)濟制度。在“改革”時期，正是靠吸收農業(yè)轉移勞動力發(fā)展起來的鄉(xiāng)鎮(zhèn)企業(yè)、私營企業(yè)和三資企業(yè)發(fā)展最快。1979－1990年，這三類企業(yè)占了中國工業(yè)產(chǎn)值增長額的51.9％（郭克莎，178）。更重要的是，這三類企業(yè)又特別集中在對中國經(jīng)濟發(fā)展有決定性意義的出口部門。1993年，鄉(xiāng)鎮(zhèn)企業(yè)出口商品交貨額占全國外貿出口商品收購總額的45％，外資企業(yè)出口占全國出口的27％（《人民日報》1993年12月14日）。所以，鄉(xiāng)鎮(zhèn)企業(yè)、私營企業(yè)和三資企業(yè)是中國經(jīng)濟增長主要的動力和源泉。　　

    現(xiàn)在讓我們來看看資本家是用什么魔法把生產(chǎn)力從地下呼喚出來的吧。　　

　 　

（1）延長勞動時間。據(jù)中國社會科學院搞的百家私營企業(yè)調查，有53家私營企業(yè)工人每天勞動8小時以上，其中18家工人每天勞動超過10小時，66家在節(jié)假日、星期天從來不讓工人休息。（韓明希，94）廣東省的三資企業(yè)、私營企業(yè)工人每天勞動普遍在10小時以上。廣東省惠州市惠城區(qū)總工會對27家企業(yè)調查發(fā)現(xiàn)，有26家每月加班超過48小時，有的超過近一倍，很多情況下要晝夜加班，星期天和節(jié)假日都被占用。（安子，152）　　

　 　

（2）增加勞動強度。在這方面沒有直接的統(tǒng)計資料，但是可以用間接估計的辦法了解一些情況。1987年城市工業(yè)企業(yè)人均固定資產(chǎn)原值約1.88萬元，是1988年鄉(xiāng)鎮(zhèn)企業(yè)人均固定資產(chǎn)原值的5倍。（厲以寧等，157）但是，前者的勞動生產(chǎn)率只有后者的3倍多。為什么城市工業(yè)企業(yè)的技術裝備水平是鄉(xiāng)鎮(zhèn)企業(yè)的5倍，但是勞動生產(chǎn)率只有鄉(xiāng)鎮(zhèn)企業(yè)的3倍多呢？官方的“勞動生產(chǎn)率”是按職工人數(shù)統(tǒng)計的。所以，如果鄉(xiāng)鎮(zhèn)企業(yè)工人勞動時間長，雖然實際上勞動效率沒有提高，但是在官方統(tǒng)計中，就表現(xiàn)為較高的“勞動生產(chǎn)率”。但是，僅僅是勞動時間較長還解釋不了全部差距，余下的差距只能解釋為鄉(xiāng)鎮(zhèn)企業(yè)工人勞動強度較大。比如，山西原平縣7家鄉(xiāng)鎮(zhèn)煤礦，1985年每工產(chǎn)煤2.2噸，而1984年全國重點煤礦每工產(chǎn)煤只有0.903噸（社科院經(jīng)濟所）。鄉(xiāng)鎮(zhèn)煤礦的裝備水平遠遠比不上全國重點煤礦，每工產(chǎn)煤竟然多出一倍多，說明勞動強度非常大。深圳市的國有企業(yè)、合資企業(yè)、外商獨資企業(yè)生產(chǎn)技術水平?jīng)]有很大差距，但是1987年國有企業(yè)勞動生產(chǎn)率31999元，合資企業(yè)是87787元，而外商獨資企業(yè)是94141元（劉志庚，40）。這說明，三資企業(yè)工人的勞動強度遠遠大于國有企業(yè)工人?！　?/p>

　 　

（3）壓低勞動力價格。壓低、克扣工資是資本家發(fā)財致富的慣用伎倆。在這方面，深圳可謂是最善于學習資本主義的“先進經(jīng)驗”，走在時代的前面。僅在1990年下半年，深圳市寶安區(qū)就有19家工廠拖欠工人工資總計72萬元。（安子，151）有一個手袋廠，原加工一打手袋給0.25元，已屬偏低，工人加班加點拼命干，月工資超過標準工資后，老板反而說單價定高了，將單價降到0.085元。深圳市平湖鎮(zhèn)某鹽制品廠，其包裝部的34名工人，月工資在200元至300元之間的僅5人，其余29人均不到200元，最低只有119.73元。（《深圳人》總3期，25）　　

　 　

（4）雇傭女工、童工。在深圳的工業(yè)區(qū)，經(jīng)?？梢钥吹綇S房上披掛著巨大橫幅：“本廠急需幾百名女工?！辟Y本家為什么喜歡雇傭女工、童工呢？據(jù)說，一是因為他們聽話、不鬧事，二是因為工資低廉，很多在私營企業(yè)做工的女工、童工月工資只有40－60元（韓明希，94）。據(jù)美國《商業(yè)周刊》報道，香港最大的玩具制造商－卡德爾有限公司，在深圳蛇口的工廠有12000名工人，這些工人每天勞動14小時，沒有星期天，月工資約合21美元。工人中大多數(shù)是17－25歲的女青年，還有很多是童工，最小的只有12歲?？ǖ聽柟镜慕?jīng)理說：“我們可以讓這些女孩子一天到晚不停地干活，在香港就不行。即使我們愿意接受香港的工資水平，我們也得不到這樣的勞動力?！毕愀蹐蠹垐蟮勒f，在珠江流域的14000家企業(yè)中，廣泛使用童工，每周工作96小時都是司空見慣的。有的調查者在深圳發(fā)現(xiàn)，在所調查的200家企業(yè)中，有40家雇傭童工，她們是10－12的女孩，每天勞動15小時，月工資折合10美元，廠方為了節(jié)省宿舍，讓她們兩三個人擠在一張床上休息。(Smith,1993,95)　　

　 　

（5）敲詐勒索。廣東省的三資企業(yè)流行一種押金制度，工人新進廠，必須交100元至500元不等的押金，說是合同期滿后還給工人。但是，廠方往往找借口開除工人，或者百般欺侮工人，逼工人“自動”離職，廠方自然把押金吞沒。比如海南必遠鞋業(yè)公司，兩年中炒掉2000多工人，侵吞押金20多萬元（《工人日報》1993年12月10日）?！　?/p>

    資本家還有一個高招叫罰款。深圳海特制衣廠工人在廠里上廁所要交費，每人每次1角，廁所每堵塞一次，全廠200多人，不論男女，每人罰款5元。有時廁所一天堵兩次，工人苦不堪言。（安子，13）深圳市南頭添利廠規(guī)定，上班時間工人如講話罰款5元，有一次連續(xù)工作了12小時的工人已經(jīng)完成當日任務，提前10分鐘出來排隊打卡，被管理人員發(fā)現(xiàn)，18個臨時工每人被罰款50港幣。深圳市平湖鎮(zhèn)一家工廠，1990年4月，全廠227人，有74人受罰，6月全廠215人，有124人受罰，最高罰款78元。（《深圳人》總3期，25）　　

　 　

（6）節(jié)約工人的生命。資本家關心的不僅是剩余價值的絕對量，而且還關心剩余價值與資本的比例，即利潤率。通過節(jié)約生產(chǎn)資料，可以提高利潤率。在發(fā)達資本主義國家，節(jié)約生產(chǎn)資料主要是靠技術進步。但是中國的鄉(xiāng)鎮(zhèn)企業(yè)、私營企業(yè)和三資企業(yè)設備陳舊、技術落后，對于它們，節(jié)約對于維護工人生命和健康必不可少的設備和材料是節(jié)約生產(chǎn)資料的一個重要方法?！　?/p>

    《工人日報》（1993年12月11日）發(fā)表的一封讀者來信披露：“一些縣鄉(xiāng)企業(yè)片面追求經(jīng)濟效益，忽視了勞動保護設施建設及職工的身體健康......豐潤縣一家水泥廠的破碎車間粉塵超過標準四百二十七倍。職工的身體健康在那里根本無法保障?！薄　?/p>

    深圳市寶安區(qū)僅1989－1992年，三資企業(yè)就發(fā)生重大工傷事故30起，死亡25人。有一個工程師因超時加班、身體疲勞，檢查機器時無名指、小指被打掉，中指被打斷，食指被打至指背裂開8厘米。事故發(fā)生后，經(jīng)理竟不屑一顧，說什么：“殘廢算什么，死人也不算什么，你可以告去，我不怕。”（《深圳人》總4期，20）陜西省長安縣有一個服裝廠女工，被機器軋斷右手，廠方只給她500元就把她辭退了。（韓明希，327）筆者在深圳也聽說過類似的事件，不同的是廠方只給20多元就把傷殘工人打發(fā)了?！　?/p>

    陜西省韓城市1986年有212家小煤礦，其中私營66家，占31.1％。當年發(fā)生事故39起，死44人，傷22人，其中私營煤礦發(fā)生事故23起，死23人，傷22人，分別占59％、52.3％和100％。1987年1－7月，私營煤礦發(fā)生事故16起，死17人，分別占全部小煤礦事故次數(shù)和死亡人數(shù)的84％和87％。（韓明希，327）　　

    1991年5月30日夜，位于廣東省東莞市境內的興亞雨衣廠發(fā)生火災，80名青年女工被燒死，40人重傷。R·史密斯評論說：“令人遺憾的是，這一類悲劇在華南出口加工工業(yè)中太常見了。在那里，資本家享受廣泛的權力和自由，而中國政府卻不許工人有權力和自由?！睆V東省消防局的報告說，僅在珠江流域，1990年就發(fā)生了1700起工業(yè)火災和爆炸。(Smith,1993,95)在這種情況下，1993年深圳大爆炸和11·19火災燒死82個打工妹的慘劇，也就不足為奇了。〔1〕《人民日報》（1993年12月15日）也不得不發(fā)表評論：“悲劇何以一演再演？......主要是企業(yè)主忽視防火和安全生產(chǎn)，沒有把職工的人身安全放在心上......”　　

　 　

    有人恐怕要問：工人的權益受到侵犯，他們?yōu)槭裁床粚で蠓傻谋Ｗo呢？深圳是中國資本主義最發(fā)達的地方，也是為現(xiàn)代資本主義服務的各種官方法律最完備的地方。1993年5月28日，深圳市人大常委會通過了《深圳經(jīng)濟特區(qū)勞務工條例》。《條例》模仿發(fā)達資本主義國家的勞動法規(guī)，規(guī)定了一些保護勞動者免受資本家過度剝削的條款：用人單位招用勞務工，應與勞務工訂立勞動合同；勞務工有權參加和組織工會；嚴禁招用未滿16周歲的童工；用人單位招用勞務工，不得收取報名費及押金；如勞務工患病或因工負傷，醫(yī)療期間用人單位不得解除勞務合同，醫(yī)療期滿未痊愈者，用人單位如解除勞動合同須提前一個月通知對方，并付與勞務工相當于一個月工資的補助費；每周正常工作時間不得超過48小時，每人每月加班時間不得超過48小時，加班須按正常工資的150－200％發(fā)加班工資。　　

    但是，《深圳經(jīng)濟特區(qū)勞務工條例》也和現(xiàn)代資本主義法律一樣，到處標榜自由、平等，實際上浸透著階級偏見。《條例》一方面企圖約束資本家的過度剝削，另一方面，卻本著維護資本家特權的立場，不許工人反抗?！稐l例》規(guī)定：勞務工如果辭職須提前一個月通知用人單位，否則要向用人單位支付相當于一個月工資的補償金；如果勞務工經(jīng)常遲到、早退、曠工、消極怠工，或者故意損壞設備、工具、浪費原材料、能源，用人單位有權無條件將其辭退。這實際上使資本家可以隨便找借口開除那些敢于斗爭的工人?！　?/p>

    如果說，《條例》還不得不在紙面上標榜一點平等，那么官僚執(zhí)法機構就完全沒有必要標榜任何東西。筆者曾跟隨6個打工妹打過一場官司。這6個打工妹是深圳市華僑城盛隆服裝公司的工人。這個公司的工人每天要勞動14小時以上，經(jīng)常通宵加班，從來沒有節(jié)假日，甚至大年初一還要工人通宵加班，廠方從來不給加班費。這6個打工妹不堪忍受這樣惡劣的勞動條件，決意辭工，并且提前一個月通知公司方面。但是，一個月后，公司方面扣住她們的押金不還，還不發(fā)給最后一個月的工資（該公司向來要拖欠一個月才發(fā)給工人上月工資）。工人告到勞動局，勞動局官員一開始不分青紅皂白，就說工人無理取鬧，要工人回去。這6個打工妹堅持不走，反復申辯，勞動局官員才開了一紙公文，讓廠方調查處理。廠方當然不予理睬。工人又到勞動局告狀。這次勞動局官員有了些耐心，教導工人不要只從單方面著想，要想到她們辭工給廠方帶來損失，說什么：“如果都說走就走，工廠還開不開？”然后他又恐嚇工人：“你們都是三無人員（無身份證、無邊境證、無暫住證），屬深圳市清理對象?！庇终f什么即使資本家違反《條例》，也不許工人違反勞動紀律，工人只有反映問題的權利。在6個打工妹反復要求以后，勞動局官員才同意處理此事。他把廠方代表找來協(xié)商，但是廠方代表矢口否認工人曾提前一個月提出辭工，要工人拿出書面證據(jù)，工人當然沒有什么書面證據(jù)。這樣糾纏當然解決不了任何問題。最后一次，有一個勞動局的科長，算是對工人比較有同情心，聽了雙方陳述以后，要求廠方把押金、最后一個月工資都退還給工人。公司方面口頭上答應照辦，回去以后對工人說，最后一個月工資可以給她們，但是她們的產(chǎn)品質量差，還曠工，所以要罰款，還要賠償廠方損失，七扣八扣，最后每個工人只拿到幾塊錢。這官司還能打嗎？要說明的是，盛隆公司在華僑城，距離深圳市區(qū)有一個多小時的路程。從華僑城到勞動局往返車費大約是每人8塊錢。到了勞動局要排隊，要介紹情況，與廠方代表對質，所以實際上一去就是一整天。每人每天損失工資10－20元。再加上到市區(qū)吃飯，每人每頓至少10塊錢（如在工廠附近只要兩、三塊錢）。這6個打工妹為了打這場公司去市勞動局5次，仍然沒有解決問題。從這里我們可以看出，普通勞動者要按照資產(chǎn)階級的法律打一場官司，要耗費多少他們耗費不起的東西，他們想討得一點公正有多么困難！　　

    這個事例說明，千萬不要迷信法律！很多知識分子呼吁要實行“法治”，認為只要在法律上寫上“人權”，就可以消滅丑惡的社會現(xiàn)象。但是，實際上根本沒有什么離開“人治”的“法治”，  “法治”無非是有錢人的“人治”罷了。在深圳，有上百萬打工者，上萬家企業(yè)，勞動局處理日常糾紛的只有十來個人，怎么可能管理得過來呢？其結果，就是凡是《條例》上對資本家有利的條款，都能得到執(zhí)行，凡是對工人有利的條款都得不到執(zhí)行?！　?/p>

    從來就沒有什么救世主，也不靠神仙皇帝。要創(chuàng)造人類的幸福，全靠我們自己。事實證明，中國的新無產(chǎn)階級只有自己起來斗爭，才能捍衛(wèi)自己的權益，除次以外別無他法。據(jù)統(tǒng)計，1990年僅在深圳市就發(fā)生停工、罷工69起，有9677名工人參加（安子，151）。但是，由于大批勞動力不斷從農村外出謀生，形成了一支巨大的勞動后備軍。所以，資本家有恃無恐。聽說有一次，深圳蓮塘工業(yè)區(qū)一家工廠，一條生產(chǎn)線上全部女工都停工，結果資本家把她們全部炒掉。有時候，資本家通過對工人稍作讓步，然后把領頭的開除的辦法，既平息了罷工，又清除了工人的領導力量。所以，新無產(chǎn)階級為改善自身處境而斗爭的條件是非常惡劣的。他們是從極困難的起點開始自己的斗爭的，在最不利的情況下，往往只能采取盜竊、破壞、怠工等原始的反抗方式。另一方面，統(tǒng)治階級也不遺余力地毒化無產(chǎn)階級的思想。有一個打工妹曾對我談起這樣一件事。一個技術工人因對資本家不滿，故意搞了一個錯誤設計，然后逃走了，資本家因此損失了幾萬元。這個打工妹認為，這個技術工人素質太差，“老板對工人不好有時也是以外工人素質不高?！薄按蚬ふ叩臋嗬S護，老板的權利也要維護?！庇终f，“打工者不受尊重主要是廠方不會管理，其實老板還不錯，主要是管理人員不講道理?！毕蟆八刭|”、“權利”、“管理”這些時髦詞匯當然都是電視、廣播、報紙每天在灌輸?shù)摹！　?/p>

    但是，絕大多數(shù)工人從樸素的經(jīng)驗出發(fā)，深深感覺到自己是受剝削的，所以他們本能地要反抗這種剝削。不管這種“反抗”素質如何，當工人要反抗的時候，資本家就不再是溫文爾雅、知書達禮的了，而是象瘋狗一樣地亂咬起來。　　

    福州市臺商永騏鞋業(yè)有限公司，有一個女工拿了該廠兩雙鞋，被發(fā)現(xiàn)后，兩個臺灣人伙同大陸保安人員把她捆住毒打，然后把鞋子掛在她脖子上示眾。示眾以后，又把她關進狗籠子，與兩只狼狗“同籠”兩小時之久。臺灣經(jīng)理公然對女工說：“我把你們當狗看！”該廠女工一上班，大門就緊鎖，停電也不讓女工出廠。晚上下班時，女工要排成隊，一個個接受搜身。（《報刊文摘》1993年12月9日）自由派知識分子說什么“資本主義的天然邏輯導致政治民主”。（《邊緣》，5）中國的新無產(chǎn)階級不要說公民權利，連人身權利都無從保障，還侈談什么“政治民主”。實際上，直接的暴力壓迫向來都是資本家一個重要的“管理方法”。廣州海豐鞋業(yè)有限公司，有一個男工釘鞋釘?shù)貌灰?guī)范，被廠長打得遍體鱗傷，這還不算完，廠長又命令這個男工所在的整條流水線近百名工人站在中午的烈日下曝曬一小時之久，有的工人因中暑當場暈倒?！　?/p>

    這才是資本家最歡迎的。資本家最講實際，不象知識分子那樣喜歡講一些漂亮的抽象原則。資本家只關心利潤。在龐大的勞動后備軍的壓力下，新無產(chǎn)階級不得不接受極其低廉的工資、非人的生活待遇和勞動條件，而且無力組織起來進行捍衛(wèi)自己的斗爭，只有聽憑資本家任意驅使、奴役，因而創(chuàng)造出巨大的剩余價值。資本主義的積累機器就這樣被發(fā)動起來了，中國資本主義的“經(jīng)濟奇跡”就這樣用億萬打工者的血淚鑄成了。　　

　 　

（四）資本主義和人民貧困化　　

    資本主義發(fā)展必然導致社會兩極分化，絕大多數(shù)人民相對和絕對貧困化?！　?/p>

    資本主義競爭迫使資本家最大限度地以資本代替勞動，提高資本有機構成（不變資本與可變資本之比，或生產(chǎn)資料價值與勞動力價值之比），以提高勞動生產(chǎn)率，這是資本主義積累的絕對規(guī)律。一方面，資本有機構成提高直接減少了一定量資本所需雇傭的工人人數(shù)。另一方面，由于資本有機構成提高，一部分在業(yè)工人變?yōu)槭I(yè)工人，重建了勞動后備軍，從而使資本與勞動之間的力量對比發(fā)生有利于資本的變化，進而壓低社會平均工資。這兩方面作用，共同導致工人階級在國民收入中占有的份額下降，即導致絕大多數(shù)人民相對貧困化?！　?/p>

    以鄉(xiāng)鎮(zhèn)企業(yè)為例，1984－1987年，鄉(xiāng)鎮(zhèn)企業(yè)人均固定資產(chǎn)原值年平均增長4.8％，1988－1992年，猛增到25％，其中1992年竟達到56％。1984－1987年，鄉(xiāng)鎮(zhèn)企業(yè)每增加產(chǎn)值6700元，即可吸納一人就業(yè)，1988－1992年，則須增加產(chǎn)值73000元，才能吸納一人就業(yè)。（馬賓和孫尚清，29）　　

    一方面，社會勞動力總數(shù)趨于自然增長，另一方面，社會資本吸收勞動力的能力卻逐漸縮小，其結果，便是社會剩余勞動力的增長。在現(xiàn)有農業(yè)生產(chǎn)力水平下，一個農業(yè)勞動力可以耕種農田10畝以上。中國現(xiàn)有農業(yè)勞動力約3.4億人，勞均耕地約5畝。（馬賓和孫尚清，28）據(jù)此計算，中國農村剩余勞動力約有1.7億人?！　?/p>

    龐大的剩余勞動力隊伍，一方面使新無產(chǎn)階級在資本剝削面前軟弱無力，另一方面在社會對農產(chǎn)品的需求趨于相對下降的情況下，使農業(yè)勞動力不能轉化為工業(yè)或其它產(chǎn)業(yè)的勞動力。通過這兩個方面的作用，便促成了構成中國人口絕大多數(shù)的兩個階級－新無產(chǎn)階級和農民階級的貧困化。　　

    有必要指出，社會剩余勞動力的增長決不是經(jīng)濟發(fā)展本身的必然結果。在社會主義條件下，社會勞動生產(chǎn)率的提高可以一部分轉化為人民物質生活水平的提高，一部分轉化為人民群眾可支配的自由時間的增長，從而使普通群眾都能夠自由地發(fā)展他們在體力和智力上的潛能、表現(xiàn)他們豐富的個性。只是在資本主義發(fā)展中，社會生產(chǎn)力的進步才導致大規(guī)模失業(yè)和絕大多數(shù)人民貧困化?！　?/p>

    在中國，大體上可以用“農民人均純收入”這個指標來說明新無產(chǎn)階級和農民階級的生活狀況。在官方統(tǒng)計中，“農民”指農村戶口的居民，大體上相當于新無產(chǎn)階級和農民階級的總和。如果我們把城鎮(zhèn)居民人均生活費收入作為100，那么“農民人均純收入”的指數(shù)從1984年的58.9下降到了1993年的39.4。如果我們把1985年時的“農民人均純收入”與人均國民收入之比當作100，那么1992年這個比例下降到了69.7。（馬賓和孫尚清，26）　　

    資本主義積累不僅必然導致絕大多數(shù)人民相對貧困化，在一定條件下，還導致絕大多數(shù)人民絕對貧困化。1989年，在整個經(jīng)濟增長4％的情況下，“農民人均純收入”竟然下降了7.4％。1993年，在經(jīng)濟增長速度高達13.4％的情況下，農民人均生活消費支出卻下降了0.9％。（馬賓和孫尚清，26，266）　　

    所以，資本主義經(jīng)濟發(fā)展必然犧牲絕大多數(shù)人的利益，必然要建立在絕大多數(shù)人民相對和絕對貧困化的基礎上。但是，如果經(jīng)濟發(fā)展不是為了絕大多數(shù)人的利益，這種發(fā)展又有什么意義呢？　　

　 　

（五）依附性發(fā)展　　

    由于確立了正常的資本主義生產(chǎn)關系，中國就開始走上了資本主義經(jīng)濟發(fā)展的道路。1979－1993年，中國經(jīng)濟年平均增長9.3％。1994年和1995年中國經(jīng)濟繼續(xù)以10％以上的奇跡般地速度增長，使中國成為世界上經(jīng)濟增長最快的資本主義國家?！　?/p>

    怎樣來解釋中國的“經(jīng)濟奇跡”呢？一方面，在官僚資產(chǎn)階級獨裁政治的壓迫下，在沒有有組織的革命社會主義力量的情況下，勞動人民不能有效地進行反抗資本主義壓迫和剝削的斗爭，數(shù)以億計的勞動者為了謀取生計因而不得不按照極其低廉的價格出賣他們的勞動力。另一方面，作為一個新興的發(fā)展中國家，中國可以通過從發(fā)達資本主義國家進口的辦法直接采用先進的技術設備。一方面剝削廉價勞動力，一方面采用先進技術，或者用馬克思主義的術語說，通過同時剝削絕對剩余價值和相對剩余價值，資本家就能夠賺取超額剩余價值和超額利潤，這就為資本主義積累提供了強大的推動力?！　?/p>

    但是要進口外國的技術設備，就要有一個在世界市場上有競爭力的出口部門，通過出口來賺取外匯。在“改革”時期，中國的出口增長超過了整個經(jīng)濟的增長。1980－1994年，中國的商品貿易額從181億美元增加到1210億美元，或者說增加了6倍。（PRC 1994；《人民日報》1995年3月2日）與此同時，大量外資涌入中國，到1995年底中國總計實際利用外資1334億美元。（《人民日報》1996年2月1日）　　

    所以，可以說，中國經(jīng)濟已經(jīng)和世界資本主義經(jīng)濟緊密地結合在一起了。中國的商品貿易額現(xiàn)在占國民生產(chǎn)總值的40％左右。與此同時，中國經(jīng)濟也按照資本主義國際分工的需要在結構上進行了改組。一方面，勞動密集型產(chǎn)業(yè)和低檔機電工業(yè)，也就是那些中國在世界市場上憑廉價勞動力有“比較優(yōu)勢”的產(chǎn)業(yè)，發(fā)展十分迅速。另一方面，中國經(jīng)濟也越來越依賴于外國的技術設備。這反映在中國機電產(chǎn)品對外貿易的模式中：　　

　 　

中國機電產(chǎn)品的對外貿易存在著下列問題：第一，進多出少，貿易逆差迅速擴大。1980年機電產(chǎn)品貿易逆差42.6億美元，1993年增加到了267.6億美元，其中機械產(chǎn)品貿易逆差占90％，電子產(chǎn)品貿易逆差占10％。第二，高進低出，多數(shù)主要工業(yè)設備和關鍵產(chǎn)品依靠進口。1993年有12種產(chǎn)品進口值超過10億美元。另一方面，中國出口的機電產(chǎn)品主要是低附加價值的消費品。第三，在市場競爭中，中國機電產(chǎn)品的國內市場份額逐年下降。例如，1980年中國的機床工業(yè)占有國內市場的95％，1990年下降到了70％，1993年進一步下降到了44％。（《世界日報》1995年11月14日，轉引自北京出版的《金融時報》引用中國機械工業(yè)部有關部門透露的信息所做的報道，這里是根據(jù)英譯轉譯，非原文）　　

　 　

    對私人資本（在中國，外資企業(yè)、私營企業(yè)、鄉(xiāng)鎮(zhèn)企業(yè)和國有企業(yè)都是私人資本的具體形式）來說，在那些中國在世界市場上有“比較優(yōu)勢”的產(chǎn)業(yè)投資可以得到很高的利潤率，并且銷售市場也在迅速擴大。另一方面，如果是在先進的資本品工業(yè)或其它高技術產(chǎn)業(yè)投資，他們無力與發(fā)達資本主義國家的資本競爭，或者根本就沒有力量在這些產(chǎn)業(yè)投資和承擔相應的風險。在這種情況下，私人資本，為了追逐最大的利潤，為什么要在高技術產(chǎn)業(yè)投資而不是在那些在世界市場上前景良好的產(chǎn)業(yè)投資呢？所以，按照私人資本的邏輯，中國不可避免地要走上一方面片面發(fā)展勞動密集型產(chǎn)業(yè)和低檔機電工業(yè)，另一方面嚴重依賴外國的技術設備的道路。在這種情況下，中國的資本主義經(jīng)濟發(fā)展實際上就是依附性發(fā)展。　　

    依附性發(fā)展的模式還可以通過中國計算機工業(yè)的發(fā)展狀況來說明：　　

　 　

中國的目標......是要成為國內和世界市場上低檔個人電腦和附件，比如打印機、終端和接線板等。通過大規(guī)模出口這些產(chǎn)品，中國可以掙得外匯以進口支持計算機工業(yè)發(fā)展所需要的高檔產(chǎn)品和技術?！　?/p>

　 　

中國的集成電路生產(chǎn)能力十分低下，并且僅限于生產(chǎn)消費品，如電視機、電冰箱等所用集成電路。因此，中國不得不進口發(fā)展計算機工業(yè)所需的幾乎全部集成電路。(Hui and Mcknown,1995,17)　　

　 　

    中國政府官員承認，在技術方面，中國的集成電路工業(yè)比國際水平落后15年。雖然估計到2000年中國的集成電路產(chǎn)量可以達到10億塊，國內需求預計屆時將達到20－30億塊，因而有10－20億塊需依靠進口?！　?/p>

    在資本主義國際分工中中國經(jīng)濟目前還處于相對有利的位置。但是，從長遠來說，中國的資本主義經(jīng)濟發(fā)展要成功，就必須有能力實行獨立的經(jīng)濟政策，特別是有效地保護國內工業(yè)免受世界市場競爭的壓力。作為一個欠發(fā)達國家，中國如果采用自由貿易的體制，使本國經(jīng)濟完全暴露在國際競爭的壓力下，那么絕大多數(shù)中國企業(yè)在與發(fā)達資本主義國家的競爭中都是無法生存下來的。但是，隨著中國經(jīng)濟越來越依賴于外國的技術設備，中國的經(jīng)濟增長也就越來越依賴于發(fā)達資本主義國家所提供的出口市場。發(fā)達資本主義國家因而就可以通過貿易保護等手段迫使中國奉行與發(fā)達資本主義國家利益相一致的經(jīng)濟政策。在這種情況下，中國就越來越難以采取獨立的經(jīng)濟政策了。事實上，在關于中國加入世界貿易組織的談判中，中國已經(jīng)受到發(fā)達資本主義國家要中國開放國內市場和做出其它重大讓步的強大壓力了?！　?/p>

    另一方面，資本主義技術進步的歷史趨勢是以資本代替勞動，以資本和技術密集型的產(chǎn)業(yè)和產(chǎn)品代替勞動密集型的產(chǎn)業(yè)和產(chǎn)品。所以，從長期來看，資本主義技術進步傾向于削弱乃至完全消除廉價勞動力在資本主義生產(chǎn)中的重要性。如果中國不能發(fā)展本國的高技術產(chǎn)業(yè)，那么在長期，中國的出口部門將會在世界市場上逐漸喪失競爭力，而依附性發(fā)展也就很難再維持下去了?！　?/p>

　 　

　 　

　 　

　 　

（六）國家和中國的資本主義經(jīng)濟發(fā)展　　

    我們已經(jīng)看到，按照私人資本主義的邏輯，中國是不能夠發(fā)展本國的高技術產(chǎn)業(yè)的。在資本主義條件下，只有國家才有可能超越私人資本的狹隘眼界，推行反映民族發(fā)展長遠利益的經(jīng)濟戰(zhàn)略和政策。但是，在資本主義社會，國家通常并不在資本積累中起主導的作用。只是在特殊的歷史條件下，在私人資本相對于國家十分弱小的情況下，國家才在一段時間內，在資本積累中發(fā)揮重要作用?！　?/p>

    在“改革”初期，中國的統(tǒng)治階級曾經(jīng)從毛澤東時期繼承下來一個龐大的國有經(jīng)濟部門。但是，一方面，資本主義“改革”在國有企業(yè)中遭到了工人階級的頑強抵抗，使得國有企業(yè)無法進行正常的資本主義積累；另一方面，鄉(xiāng)鎮(zhèn)企業(yè)、私營企業(yè)和外資企業(yè)等組成的資本主義經(jīng)濟部門卻靠剝削新無產(chǎn)階級而迅速發(fā)展起來。到九十年代初，資本主義經(jīng)濟部門已經(jīng)占中國工業(yè)產(chǎn)值的50％以上?！　?/p>

    資本主義經(jīng)濟部門的崛起一方面使統(tǒng)治階級能夠順利地完成向資本主義的過渡，另一方面也從根本上改變了統(tǒng)治階級內部不同集團之間的力量對比。由于資本主義經(jīng)濟部門的興起，社會積累主要不再是由國家，而是由私人資本來進行了。社會資源的分配因而也按照統(tǒng)治階級內部新的力量對比關系而發(fā)生了變化。國家財政收入占國民生產(chǎn)總值的比重，從1978年的31.2％下降到1993年的16.3。在同一時期，中央政府財政收入占國家財政收入的份額從60％下降到34％。在全社會固定資產(chǎn)投資中，“不僅國家直接投資的比重已很小，而且可有效控制的部分也不大，社會總投資中絕大多數(shù)已經(jīng)轉變?yōu)橹醒氩荒苤苯诱{控或難以調控的自籌投資?！保ü松?，173－174）表4.5說明，到九十年代初，中國的國家所掌握的社會資源，按占國民生產(chǎn)總值的比重來說，不僅低于大多數(shù)發(fā)達資本主義國家，而且低于很多欠發(fā)達的資本主義國家。　　

　 　

表4.5   中央政府財政收入占國內生產(chǎn)總值的比重　　

            年份        百分比　　

中國*       1992        17.27　　

美國        1990        19.63　　

日本        1990        14.38　　

德國        1991        30.80　　

英國        1991        37.05　　

法國        1992        40.63　　

加拿大      1989        20.12　　

澳大利亞    1991        27.11　　

印度        1991        14.74　　

印度尼西亞  1991        18.16　　

泰國        1990        20.41　　

馬來西亞    1991        28.53　　

新加坡      1991        32.80　　

緬甸        1990        10.70　　

韓國        1992        18.45　　

埃及        1990        18.58　　

墨西哥      1990        14.05　　

巴西        1991        25.92　　

阿根廷      1989        9.85　　

*國家財政收入占國民生產(chǎn)總值比重.　　

資料來源:PRC 1994.　　

　 　

    在這種情況下，國家只能在社會積累中起次要的作用，私人資本的邏輯就不可避免地要占主導地位。表4.6顯示，中國用于研究開發(fā)的經(jīng)費無論在絕對數(shù)量上還是在占國民生產(chǎn)總值的比例上都遠遠落后于發(fā)達資本主義國家，甚至低于一些資本主義發(fā)展中國家。這說明，私人資本，為了追求最大的私人利潤，不愿意投資于研究開發(fā)活動和無利可圖、風險大、需要巨額投資的高技術產(chǎn)業(yè)。另一方面，這也說明，國家由于沒有足夠的財政資源，無力為高技術產(chǎn)業(yè)的發(fā)展提供必要的幫助。　　

　 　

表4.6   中國和若干其它國家的研究開發(fā)支出　　

         年份  研究開發(fā)支出(億美元)  占國民生產(chǎn)總值的百分比　　

中國     1993            34                   0.6　　

美國     1988          1400                   2.9　　

日本     1986           417                   2.8　　

聯(lián)邦德國 1987           228                   2.8　　

英國     1986           157                   2.4　　

法國     1987           164                   2.4　　

印度     1988            缺                   0.9　　

新加坡   1987            缺                   0.9　　

土耳其   1985            缺                   0.7　　

韓國     1988            缺                   1.9　　

資料來源:PRC 1994;Economic Report of President 1990,113.　　

　 　

（七）跨國公司和中國的資本主義經(jīng)濟發(fā)展　　

    盡管私人資本不愿意投資于高技術產(chǎn)業(yè)，而國家又無力在財政上提供幫助，中國政府最近還是宣布了一個雄心勃勃的發(fā)展“高新技術產(chǎn)業(yè)”的計劃。按照這個計劃，到2005年，“高新技術產(chǎn)業(yè)”占國民生產(chǎn)總值的比重要從1993年的10％增加到15％，占全部工業(yè)附加值的比重要增加到20－25％，占工業(yè)制成品出口的比重要從1994年的6.3％增加到15％。我們不知道所謂“高新技術產(chǎn)業(yè)”是怎樣定義的。不過，據(jù)說，如果中國能夠實現(xiàn)上述計劃，那么到下個世紀初，中國就可以達到與東亞新興工業(yè)化國家九十年代初同樣的發(fā)展水平。（《人民日報》1995年8月10日）所以，即使上述計劃能夠實現(xiàn)，中國仍然還落后東亞新興工業(yè)化國家大約10年，就更不必說發(fā)達資本主義國家了?！　?/p>

    為了實現(xiàn)上述計劃，中國政府把絕大部分希望寄托在跨國公司的投資上。在北京、上海、天津、山東、江蘇和陜西等地建起了一個又一個“高新技術產(chǎn)業(yè)開發(fā)區(qū)”，給予外資種種優(yōu)惠，希望跨國公司能夠投資于中國的高技術產(chǎn)業(yè)?！　?/p>

    1979年以來已有大量外資涌入中國。但是其中絕大部分是來自東亞新興工業(yè)化國家和地區(qū)，特別是香港、澳門和臺灣，而不是來自發(fā)達資本主義國家（見表4.7）。為了應付他們本國、本地區(qū)日益上升的勞動成本和日益深化的經(jīng)濟危機，東亞新興工業(yè)化國家和地區(qū)的資本家企圖靠把勞動密集型產(chǎn)業(yè)轉移到中國、剝削中國的廉價勞動力的辦法渡過危機。這種外商直接投資當然對中國的高技術產(chǎn)業(yè)的發(fā)展沒有什么幫助?！　?/p>

　 　

表4.7    按國家、地區(qū)區(qū)分的外商直接投資(億美元)　　

           1992      1993      1994　　

總計        113       278       338　　

其中:　　

港澳         79       180       202　　

臺灣         11        31        33　　

日本          7        14        21　　

美國          5        21        25　　

新加坡        1         5        12　　

韓國          1         4         7　　

資料來源:PRC 1994.　　

　 　

    但是，1992年以來，以發(fā)達資本主義國家為基地的跨國公司對中國的投資開始迅速增加。來自發(fā)達資本主義國家的跨國公司的投資有以下特點：第一，投資規(guī)模大。在中國的外商直接投資的項目平均規(guī)模是100－200萬美元，而來自發(fā)達資本主義國家的跨國公司的投資項目平均規(guī)模大約為2000萬美元。第二，它們主要是投資于高技術產(chǎn)業(yè)和資本密集型產(chǎn)業(yè)而不是勞動密集型產(chǎn)業(yè)，并且使用的是最新一代的技術而不是過時技術。（《人民日報》1995年10月18日；Shaw and Meier,1994）　　

    跨國公司為什么要在中國投資，特別是投資于高技術產(chǎn)業(yè)呢？中國的基礎設施和科技水平落后，廉價勞動力在高技術產(chǎn)業(yè)中相對又不重要，所以，這些跨國公司在中國投資不是因為中國是從事高技術產(chǎn)業(yè)的最有效率的地點，而主要是為了占領正在迅速擴大的中國國內市場。(Shaw and Meier,1994)這一類型的外國直接投資不同于東亞新興工業(yè)化國家和東南亞國家那種為了剝削廉價勞動力和追求出口導向型發(fā)展的外國直接投資，倒是很類似于拉丁美洲國家追求進口替代工業(yè)化時外國資本在拉丁美洲所做的直接投資。在后一種情況下，外國直接投資看中的不是廉價勞動力，而是拉丁美洲國家的國內市場。鮑恩歇爾和奇思－杜恩認為，在這種情況下，雖然在短期外資有助于加速經(jīng)濟增長，但是在長期妨礙了本地的資本主義發(fā)展，加劇了社會不平等，導致國內市場萎縮和經(jīng)濟停滯。(Bornschier and Chase-Dunn,　　

1985)　　

    中國政府的策略是用國內市場來換取外國投資和技術。中國政府希望靠這種方式來發(fā)展中國的高技術產(chǎn)業(yè)。這個策略要成功，就必須在有關工業(yè)設置有效的貿易壁壘，從而使跨國公司不在中國投資就不能進入中國的市場。但是，雖然貿易壁壘對在中國投資的跨國公司有利，它與發(fā)達資本主義國家資本家的總的利益是相違背的。由于中國越來越與世界資本主義體系結合在一起，并且日益在技術、資本和出口市場上依賴于發(fā)達資本主義國家，中國不得不在貿易政策和體制方面對發(fā)達資本主義國家做出越來越多的讓步。最近，中國政府在貿易自由化方面又采取了一個重大步驟，將關稅水平平均降低30％。但是這仍然沒有能夠使中國加入世界貿易組織，而加入這個組織對于中國出口的進一步增長是至關重要的。在這種情況下，中國至多只能在高技術產(chǎn)業(yè)“進口替代”方面取得有限的成功，并且仍然要嚴重依賴進口的技術設備?！　?/p>

    在短期，迅速擴大的中國市場仍然可以吸收大量的跨國公司的投資，這會進一步增強中國經(jīng)濟的增長勢頭。但是在長期，由于跨國公司有較高的生產(chǎn)率和技術水平，它們將在若干產(chǎn)業(yè)中成為中國市場上的主要生產(chǎn)者。在它們在中國市場上確立了壟斷地位以后，它們就可以通過設定壟斷價格的辦法來謀求壟斷利潤。在這種情況下，如果市場需求增加，它們只需采取提高價格的辦法，而不必進一步增加投資。另一方面，中國的企業(yè)由于無力與跨國公司競爭，則沒有能力進行積累。不僅如此，由于跨國公司多采用資本密集型技術，導致失業(yè)增長和社會不平等擴大，從而縮小了勞動人民的購買力，導致國內市場萎縮，這就使資本家更加不愿意增加投資了。所以，正如鮑恩歇爾和奇思－杜恩所說，在長期，這一類型的外國直接投資在大量吸收這類投資的國家造成投資不振、經(jīng)濟停滯。　　

　 　

〔1〕1993年11月19日，深圳市龍崗區(qū)葵涌鎮(zhèn)港商致麗工藝玩具廠發(fā)生特大火災，燒死82人，燒傷41人。事后調查發(fā)現(xiàn)，該廠為了防盜，竟然把4扇供人出入的大門鎖閉了3扇，出事時根本無法逃生。工廠附近   美元   消防龍頭，連水池都沒有。（《工人日報》1993年12月4日）　　

　 　

第五章 資本主義和民主　　

　 　

（一）新權威主義還是民主主義　　

    1989年初，在自由派知識分子的隊伍中爆發(fā)了一場論戰(zhàn)，論戰(zhàn)雙方分別是新權威派和所謂“民主派”。新權威派認為：“在目前條件下由一些強有力的領導人物強制性地推進現(xiàn)代化，比馬上實行徹底的民主更為可行。......當務之急是使社會生活兩重化，即經(jīng)濟上實行自由企業(yè)制，政治上實行集權制?！泵裰髋蓜t認為：“中國目前根本不具備‘新權威主義’賴以存在和發(fā)揮對經(jīng)濟自由化的促進作用的社會條件，......盲目地加強政治集權和政治對經(jīng)濟的干預，只能導致政治的腐敗和經(jīng)濟的萎縮?！薄敖?jīng)過經(jīng)濟改革的鍛煉和近幾年的民主啟蒙，......要求政治改革的呼聲日益高漲?！薄吧鐣裰骰呀?jīng)成為當代不可阻擋的社會潮流。”（《新華文摘》1989年第4期，1－8）　　

    為什么在這個時候會爆發(fā)這么一場論戰(zhàn)呢？1989年，“改革”發(fā)展到了所謂“危機”階段，很大一部分勞動群眾對于現(xiàn)狀已經(jīng)到了忍耐的極限。自由派知識分子認識到：“改革的風險日積愈重?！痹谶@種背景下，一部分自由派知識分子提出：中國需要“具有一定現(xiàn)代化意識及行為導向的政治、軍事強人，采取強有力的鐵腕手段，自上而下地推行其權威政治，從而穩(wěn)定社會秩序?！痹谧杂膳芍R分子看來，“歷史的進步是要付出代價的，從農業(yè)社會走向工業(yè)社會的進程，必定會伴隨著一個霉變、腐爛、死亡、新生的過程，不符合現(xiàn)代化要求的一切舊的社會存在，終將被拋棄。”（《新華文摘》1989年第4期，6）自由派知識分子儼然站在歷史進步的立場上，熱烈地呼喚朝氣蓬勃的“現(xiàn)代化”力量，無情地掃蕩一切腐朽齷齪的舊勢力?！　?/p>

    所謂“現(xiàn)代化”，無非是“資本主義化”，也就是向資本主義生產(chǎn)關系過渡。在英國，是靠了專制君主的血腥法令，才迫使英國的下層勞動人民逐漸屈服于資本主義的“現(xiàn)代化要求”。在中國，正如R·史密斯所說：　　

　 　

資本主義社會財產(chǎn)關系今天要在中國取得統(tǒng)治地位，就必須剝奪工人的就業(yè)保障權、子女頂替權、住房權、醫(yī)療保險權，還必須取消維持工人生活必不可少的補貼－一句話，打破“鐵飯碗”。只有打破“鐵飯碗”，才能使工人聽從資本主義剝削的擺布。(Smith,1993,99)　　

　 　

所以，資本主義生產(chǎn)關系的發(fā)展必然地、不可避免地要遇到一億城市工人階級的堅決抵制，只有經(jīng)過重大的和殘酷的斗爭，直至斗爭的一方被完全打垮，才能決定到底是誰“終將被拋棄”。所謂“議會民主制”顯然難以完成如此重大的斗爭任務。新權威派指出：“掌握在軟弱無能者手中的民主制度，在維持秩序、維持正常生活和經(jīng)濟繁榮方面，往往缺乏能力?！保ā缎氯A文摘》1989年第4期，2）英國的資產(chǎn)階級只有借助“血腥法令”才能使無產(chǎn)階級聽從資本主義剝削的擺布。任何一個國家，在向資本主義生產(chǎn)關系過渡的過程中，都只有用暴力摧毀無產(chǎn)階級和其他勞動人民的抵抗，才能掃清資本主義發(fā)展的障礙。哈耶克說，市場經(jīng)濟是自發(fā)形成的，而計劃經(jīng)濟是人為設計的。事實恰恰相反，“現(xiàn)代市場經(jīng)濟”在它誕生的每一個地方都是靠人為的力量創(chuàng)造出來的，而且每次都是借助于暴力無情地踐踏絕大多數(shù)人的基本權利。自由派知識分子為之心潮澎湃的所謂“霉變、腐爛、死亡、新生的過程”，無非是一個以暴力踐踏絕大多數(shù)人基本權利的過程。這就是這幫知識分子老爺們所謂的“進步”、所謂的“自由”。　　

    自由派知識分子一方面認識到，在所謂“現(xiàn)代化早期階段”，“中產(chǎn)階級力量脆弱”、“民主意識貧乏”，“現(xiàn)代化發(fā)展不得不求助于強大的國家力量：通過強人政治的有效統(tǒng)治，來維持整個社會發(fā)展的發(fā)育、壯大，創(chuàng)造一個比較穩(wěn)定的社會環(huán)境?！保ㄟ@里，“中產(chǎn)階級”應讀作“資產(chǎn)階級”）另一方面，又顧慮重重，唯恐新權威主義“退回到更為保守落后的傳統(tǒng)主義”：　　

　 　

在意識形態(tài)上，新權威主義往往借助傳統(tǒng)的價值體系，以作為凝聚社會精神的支撐點。而傳統(tǒng)的價值體系，在思維及心理上具有強烈的專制導向的暗示性，它暗示著權力的集中與個人崇拜。其次，新權威主義強調強權政治，追求權力的個人化而又缺乏有力的監(jiān)督，由此產(chǎn)生的便是權力與政治的腐化。（《新華文摘》1989年第4期，2－3）　　

　 　

    對于中產(chǎn)階級來說，向資本主義生產(chǎn)關系過渡，對它意味著直接的、重大的物質利益（知識升值）。所以它傾向于支持有利于資本主義發(fā)展的一切政治制度，包括“強人政治”。但是，中產(chǎn)階級作為統(tǒng)治階級的后備軍，又要求統(tǒng)治階級在選拔自己的接班人時能實行一種比較“公平”的競爭制度，為中產(chǎn)階級創(chuàng)造更多的進入統(tǒng)治階級的機會。所以，他們又非常害怕“權力的個人化”會把自己排斥在政治權力之外，“強人政治對知識分子有一種本能的反感與冷淡”。新權威派與民主派的論戰(zhàn)，正是反映了在中國社會向資本主義過渡導致社會矛盾全面激化這一重大危機關頭，中產(chǎn)階級及其在政治上的代表－自由派知識分子進退維谷、無所適從的尷尬處境?！　?/p>

　 　

（二）資本主義民主小史　　

    資產(chǎn)階級學者經(jīng)常向人們灌輸一個神話：資本主義和民主是天生的一對雙胞胎。“資本主義的天然邏輯導致政治民主，因為沒有政治自由的經(jīng)濟自由從本質上講是不鞏固的。經(jīng)濟上獲得自由的公民很快就要求有政治自由和政治民主?！保ā哆吘墶?，5）　　

    如果說，“經(jīng)濟自由”導致“政治自由”，那么如果社會財富集中在少數(shù)人手中，合乎邏輯的結論便是，只有這少數(shù)人才有“經(jīng)濟自由”，因而才有“政治自由”，而大多數(shù)人只能是既沒有“經(jīng)濟自由”也沒有“政治自由”?！　?/p>

    所以，早在啟蒙時代，當時的資產(chǎn)階級思想家就認識到，民主制度決不是資本主義理想的政治制度。孟德斯鳩認為，共和政體容易導致“極端平等”，甚至會形成許多造反的“小暴君”，權力主要應由貴族和資產(chǎn)階級來掌握，社會地位低微的人不應享有選舉權，因為“人民是完全不適宜于討論事情的”。美國聯(lián)邦黨人漢密爾頓認為，人民群眾是“沒有判斷力的”，“強橫的和反復無常的”，終日受人欺騙，常犯錯誤，是不可信、不可靠的；而富人和出自名門的人，雖然是少數(shù)，卻富有知識才能，只有這些人在政治上享受特殊的永久地位，才能“遏制民主政治的輕舉妄動”。（何汝璧和伊承哲，207，231）　　

    1787年美國憲法完全是根據(jù)聯(lián)邦黨人的思想制定的，查爾斯·A·比爾德在分析這部憲法時認為：　　

　 　

他們的主要思想就是要從根基上，也就是在政府各部門的政治權力的來源上，分散侵犯的力量......借以抗衡麥迪遜所謂的“利益一致的壓倒的多數(shù)”......在政府各主要部門里，沒有兩個部門是出自同一來源的。眾議院是從各州認為可以享有公民權的人民大眾產(chǎn)生的。參議院則由各州的議會選舉－在1787年，各州議會幾乎一律定有財產(chǎn)的限制，惟參眾兩院議員的限制有所區(qū)別。總統(tǒng)由依照選舉議員的方法產(chǎn)生出來的總統(tǒng)選舉人選舉，并不由一般的選民直接選舉。法官由總統(tǒng)和參議院委任......政府各部門的任期截然不同，因而不能一舉而完全改組政府。眾議院任期兩年；參議院任期六年，但每兩年要改選三分之一?？偨y(tǒng)任期四年，最高法院的法官終身任職。因而十八世紀的法學家所謂的“人民的猖狂”不但受到了限制，不能夠憑直接選舉為所欲為，而且就算他們能夠沖破總統(tǒng)和參院的間接選舉的障礙，......他們也得經(jīng)過六年的期間。最后，這里還有一種司法的鉗制，這種力量只有憑借需要時間的委任權力或經(jīng)過麻煩的修正制度的手續(xù)，才能夠加以操縱。實際上，整個結構的關鍵就在于司法的鉗制制度－這可說是美國人的政治天才對于政治學所提供的最卓越的貢獻。......授予最高法院裁定國會立法是否符合憲法的權力，......《聯(lián)邦黨人文集》的作者無疑是持有這種主張，而且認為這是一個高超的原則......(Beard,1960,161)〔1〕　　

　 　

自由派知識分子一說起民主，似乎就是美國式的民主，三權分立、兩院制等似乎都是民主必不可少的組成部分。實際上，美國憲法之所以規(guī)定三權分立、兩院制，根本不是為了民主，恰恰是為了限制民主。比爾德指出：“這種制度的經(jīng)濟意義是：有產(chǎn)者利益集團憑其卓越的力量和知識，可以在必要時獲得有利的立法，同時又可不受國會里的多數(shù)的控制?！比绻姓J一切權力屬于人民，那么為什么由人民代表組成的議會，還要受其它權力的制約呢？有必要指出，1787年在美國，有四個占人口絕大多數(shù)的社會集團被剝奪了公民權：（1）奴隸；（2）契約仆役；（3）根據(jù)州憲法和法律規(guī)定的財產(chǎn)標準而無投票資格的多數(shù)男子；（4）被剝奪公民權而遭受法律歧視的婦女。據(jù)比爾德估計，當時只有不到六分之一的成年男子投票贊成憲法，美國憲法根本不象資產(chǎn)階級學者所說的是什么“全民的創(chuàng)造”。(Beard,1960,24,　　

161,250)　　

    資本主義的天然邏輯決不是導致民主。作為一種少數(shù)人壓迫多數(shù)人的社會制度，壓迫者怎么能不害怕被壓迫者起來造反呢？，又怎么能不鎮(zhèn)壓被壓迫者的造反呢？如果沒有其它力量的妨礙，如果聽憑資本主義的邏輯不受限制地自由發(fā)展，只能導致少數(shù)上層精英對絕大多數(shù)人民的專政?！　?/p>

    英國資產(chǎn)階級革命給英國資本主義的發(fā)展開辟了道路，但是卻沒有給絕大多數(shù)人民帶來民主權力。在這次革命中，代表廣大人民群眾利益的平等派主張廢除由貴族組成的上議院，建立由人民普選產(chǎn)生的、沒有財產(chǎn)資格限制的一院制議會共和國。結果，克倫威爾鎮(zhèn)壓了平等派，建立了個人獨裁政權。1688年光榮革命后，直到1885年實行男子普選權，在長達200年的時間里，英國始終是少數(shù)上層精英專政，廣大人民群眾根本沒有民主權力。1832年議會改革以前，有選舉權的公民只占總人口的三十二分之一。1832年議會改革使選民人數(shù)由50萬人增加到87.3萬人，也只占總人口的二十二分之一?！　?/p>

    英國廣大人民群眾從來沒有停止過爭取民主的斗爭。工業(yè)革命以后，工人階級的隊伍不斷壯大。工人階級參加民主斗爭以后，民主力量才得以不斷發(fā)展。1819年，曼徹斯特工人集會，要求政治改革，政府派兵鎮(zhèn)壓，打死打傷數(shù)百人。1838年5月，英國工人階級憲章運動開始，各地工人群眾紛紛集會、游行，要求普選權。1839年5月，憲章派向國會遞交有125萬人簽名的請愿書。7月，國會否決了請愿書，政府下令禁止群眾集會，逮捕憲章派領袖。1841年5月，憲章派再次向國會遞交有330萬人簽名的請愿書，又被否決。全國工人舉行大罷工，政府大舉鎮(zhèn)壓，逮捕1500人。1848年5月，憲章派在倫敦召開全國代表大會，向國會遞交有500多萬人簽名的請愿書。國會以“許多簽名系偽造”為由否決了請愿書，政府逮捕了憲章派領袖。在工人階級長期斗爭的壓力下，1867年英國實行第二次議會改革，選民人數(shù)由135.9萬人增加到245.5萬人，當時英國有成年居民1600萬人，仍有1300多萬人被剝奪了選舉權。直到1885年，才實行男子普選權，又過了60多年，到1948年英國婦女才獲得選舉權。（劉宗緒，218－219，299，333－334）　　

    英國的政治史說明，資本主義決不可能自動帶來民主，相反，資本主義恰恰要求壓制絕大多數(shù)人民的民主要求，維護少數(shù)上層精英的專政。只有經(jīng)過無產(chǎn)階級和其他被壓迫人民持久的、頑強的斗爭之后，資本主義才不得不接受現(xiàn)代意義上的民主制度。其它西方國家的政治史也完全能證明這一點。法國在1793年大革命時期就宣布了普選權的原則。拿破侖上臺以后實行軍事專制，廢除了議會民主制度。1815年波旁王朝復辟，實行金融貴族專政，整個法國只有三十萬人有選舉權。1848年二月革命以后，在工人階級的壓力下，第二共和國實行普選制。1850年5月，制憲議會為防止工人階級和小資產(chǎn)階級執(zhí)政，取消普選權。直到第三共和國時期，法國才確立了男子普選權。直到1944年，法國婦女才得到選舉權。意大利1870年實行君主立憲制，1919年才實行男子普選權，1945年婦女才得到選舉權。瑞典1814年就有了第一部憲法，到本世紀初才實行男子普選權。（楊祖功和顧俊禮，58，66－67）　　

    西方資本主義國家的政治史說明，在歷史上，現(xiàn)代民主根本不是資本主義發(fā)展的內在要求，而是無產(chǎn)階級和其他被壓迫人民與資本主義壓迫勢力長期斗爭贏得的成果。因此，民主本身就是階級斗爭的產(chǎn)物。民主能不能存在，能不能鞏固，因而也只能取決于階級斗爭的客觀形勢。現(xiàn)代資本主義民主，不過是以往階級力量對比的反映，它不是，也不可能是民主發(fā)展的頂峰，而只能是如列寧所說的，“殘缺不全的民主”?！?〕　　

　 　

　 　

　 　

　 　

（三）依附性發(fā)展和民主　　

    資本主義既然是一種壓迫制度，那么在資本主義條件下，民主就只能在十分狹窄的范圍內存在。一方面，被壓迫人民的力量要足夠強大，使統(tǒng)治階級不得不接受某種形式的民主；另一方面，被壓迫人民的力量又不能太強大，以至于超出了資本主義可以容納的界限。那么，在依附性資本主義條件下，民主存在的界限就更狹窄，民主存在的基礎也更脆弱。　　

    依附性資本主義的發(fā)展建立在向世界資本主義提供充足的廉價勞動力的基礎上。但是，單純憑自由市場的自發(fā)作用，顯然不能長期把勞動力價格壓低到依附性資本主義積累所必要的水平。只有借助政治暴力，系統(tǒng)地摧毀工人階級的戰(zhàn)斗力，才能持久地壓低勞動力價格，維持一支數(shù)量充足、價格低廉的勞動力隊伍，依附性資本主義才可能發(fā)展。托馬斯·韋斯科普夫指出：　　

　 　

外國資本家和本國資本家都往往把強大的獨裁政權視為今天外圍地區(qū)政治和經(jīng)濟穩(wěn)定的最大希望所在。第三世界許多地區(qū)的工人戰(zhàn)斗性不斷加強，公眾對于擴大分配經(jīng)濟利益的要求與日俱增，以及革命運動開始形成和活躍起來。在這種背景下，政治鎮(zhèn)壓看來往往是保證勞動力愿意在保障投資獲得高額利潤的工資水平下馴服地干活的最可靠手段。在資本主義中心國家，資產(chǎn)階級民主可以起重要的合法作用而對資本主義的經(jīng)濟利益并無嚴重威脅。但是，在資本主義外圍國家，民主往往阻礙資本積累的過程。（韋斯科普夫，“帝國主義和第三世界的經(jīng)濟發(fā)展”，見威爾伯）　　

　 　

    八十年代，在第三世界一些國家，出現(xiàn)了所謂“民主化”浪潮。一些自由派知識分子據(jù)此認為：“搞強權政治、新權威主義是行不通的。......時代不同了，現(xiàn)在不是30年代，也不是50年代，現(xiàn)在的趨勢是民主。”（《經(jīng)濟學動態(tài)》1993年第7期，45）自由派知識分子認為，資本主義的發(fā)展，必然導致資產(chǎn)階級和知識分子的力量發(fā)展壯大，他們在經(jīng)濟上取得統(tǒng)治地位以后，必然不滿足于政治上的無權狀態(tài)，從而要求政治上有相應的統(tǒng)治地位，從而最終走上民主化的道路?！　?/p>

    在依附性資本主義社會，一方面，中產(chǎn)階級（有時還有私人資產(chǎn)階級）作為政治上無權的特權階級，必然要求有與其社會經(jīng)濟地位相稱的政治權力，要求與統(tǒng)治階級分享統(tǒng)治權，在這個意義上，他們可以成為一支民主力量。但是，中產(chǎn)階級和私人資產(chǎn)階級，作為依附性資本主義的特權階級、既得利益者，又必然要求維護依附性資本主義的壓迫秩序，因而必然要求鎮(zhèn)壓被壓迫人民的反抗。在這個意義上，中產(chǎn)階級和私人資產(chǎn)階級就是反民主力量。所以，資本主義的發(fā)展，決不是象自由派知識分子想象的那樣，只須經(jīng)過一番簡單推導，就得出民主化的結論。實際情況要復雜得多，，取決于統(tǒng)治階級、中產(chǎn)階級、被壓迫人民三者之間錯綜復雜的關系。（見表5.1）　　

　 　

表5.1 依附性資本主義社會的階級力量對比和政治類型的關系示意表　　

    被壓迫人民*  中產(chǎn)階級*  統(tǒng)治階級*  政治類型　　

I       強          強         弱          ?　　

案例:"人民聯(lián)盟"政府時期的智利;現(xiàn)在的前蘇聯(lián)、東歐.　　

II      強          弱         強      資本主義獨裁　　

案例:八十年代中期以前的韓國、拉丁美洲;1979年以來的中國　　

III     強          弱         強      社會主義革命　　

案例:俄國、中國、古巴革命.　　

IV      弱          強         強          ?　　

案例:1911-1924年的中國.　　

V       弱          強         弱      資本主義民主　　

案例:八十年代中期以來的臺灣、韓國和拉丁美洲.　　

VI      弱          弱         強      資本主義獨裁　　

案例:八十年代中期以前的臺灣.　　

*被壓迫人民,一般是無產(chǎn)階級和農民;中產(chǎn)階級,有時也可以是中產(chǎn)階級和私人資產(chǎn)階級的聯(lián)盟;統(tǒng)治階級,一般是官僚資產(chǎn)階級,有時也有私人資產(chǎn)階級參加.　　

　 　

    如果被壓迫人民的力量強大到依附性資本主義的積累無法進行的地步，那么社會的發(fā)展方向，就首先取決于統(tǒng)治階級和被壓迫人民之間的力量對比，依二者力量對比之不同，分別出現(xiàn)情形II或情形III。也就是說，在這種情況下，或者統(tǒng)治階級以獨裁統(tǒng)治打垮被壓迫人民的反抗力量，或者被壓迫人民以革命打倒統(tǒng)治階級，沒有別的出路。情形I必然是過渡性的。如果被壓迫人民的力量  以及  強大到依附性資本主義積累無法正常進行的地步，卻沒有強大到足以按照自己的意志決定社會發(fā)展的方向，而統(tǒng)治階級又無力恢復“秩序”，這時就出現(xiàn)情形I，而中產(chǎn)階級也就成了一支舉足輕重的力量〔3〕，社會發(fā)展的前途捉摸不定，取決于階級斗爭的最后結局?！　?/p>

    如果被壓迫人民的力量不足以對依附性資本主義積累構成威脅，那么社會的政治類型就取決于統(tǒng)治階級和中產(chǎn)階級之間的力量對比，依這一對比的變化分別出現(xiàn)情形IV－VI。當中產(chǎn)階級占優(yōu)勢的時候，統(tǒng)治階級又無法照舊統(tǒng)治下去了，就具備了“資本主義民主”的條件。八十年代第三世界一些國家的“民主化”便屬于這種情況。其中，臺灣的資本主義長期順利發(fā)展，因而私人資產(chǎn)階級和中產(chǎn)階級的實力日益壯大，最終迫使統(tǒng)治階級不得不實行“民主”，讓出一部分統(tǒng)治權。這是經(jīng)典的資產(chǎn)階級革命的模式，也正是自由派知識分子所設想的那種“民主化”道路。但是，這條道路對于情形V中的大多數(shù)國家，特別是拉丁美洲并不適用（韓國介于拉丁美洲和臺灣之間）。拉丁美洲的“民主化”并不是建立在資本主義順利發(fā)展的基礎上，而是由于依附性資本主義積累陷入了嚴重危機，統(tǒng)治階級在政治上幾乎完全破產(chǎn)，嚴重喪失合法性，被迫改變統(tǒng)治形式?！　?/p>

    但是，拉丁美洲為什么沒有走向情形III或情形I，而是走向情形V呢？顯然，如果沒有過去二十多年的軍事獨裁統(tǒng)治，就不能嚴重地削弱被壓迫人民的力量，而如果不是嚴重地削弱了被壓迫人民的力量，依附性資本主義就克服不了如此深刻的危機，在資本主義范圍內也就談不上什么民主化了。〔4〕可以毫不夸張地說，沒有過去的獨裁統(tǒng)治，就沒有今天拉丁美洲的“民主化”，今天的“民主化”正是獨裁的產(chǎn)物。因此，這種“民主化”必然是極其脆弱的，它沒有內在的生命力，自己不能保障自己的生存。既然它現(xiàn)在的生存條件是獨裁統(tǒng)治創(chuàng)造的，那么一旦這種條件失去的時候，它除了重新求助于獨裁統(tǒng)治以外，還有什么別的辦法可想呢？　　

    綜上所述，“民主”并非如自由派知識分子所說是依附性資本主義發(fā)展的一種“趨勢”，而充其量不過是六種可能情形中之一種罷了。最主要的是要看到，片面的政治“民主”解決不了依附性資本主義社會任何一個根本問題，尤其解決不了依靠廉價勞動力發(fā)展資本積累這個根本問題。各個依附性資本主義國家在世界市場上競爭的結果，必然導致爭相壓低勞動力價格，如前所述，這就必須借助政治暴力。否則，坐等市場調節(jié)，只能在競爭中被動挨打。既然依附性資本主義的一般規(guī)律沒有因“民主化”而發(fā)生任何變化，那么“民主化”賴以存在的條件顯然只能是偶然的、暫時的。所以，“民主化”沒有、也不可能消滅新的獨裁統(tǒng)治的危險。相反，這種“民主化”，由于它堅持依附性資本主義的壓迫秩序，也就為新的獨裁統(tǒng)治準備了條件，同時也就為新的革命準備了條件?！　?/p>

　 　

（四）腐敗問題和社會動亂　　

    有些自由派知識分子認為，沒有政治民主，中國就不能發(fā)展資本主義。他們說：“政治體制改革應當與經(jīng)濟體制改革同步進行......當經(jīng)濟體制改革進展到一定階段時，政治體制改革必須跟上，否則將成為經(jīng)濟體制改革的障礙......”（《經(jīng)濟學動態(tài)》1993年第7期，45）　　

　 　

有人以所謂的“四小龍”為范例，認為單純的經(jīng)濟改革是可行的，殊不知“四小龍”本來就是私有制和市場經(jīng)濟，經(jīng)濟起飛并無體制方面的阻力。而中國大陸首先碰到的是經(jīng)濟體制改革問題。在經(jīng)濟體制轉型的過程中，如果沒有政治上的民主，政權和官員受不到廣大人民和獨立輿論的監(jiān)督，必然“官倒”猖獗，腐敗成風，社會矛盾必然日益激化，以致不可收拾。英國歷史學家阿克頓，早在100多年前就說過：“權力趨向腐敗，絕對權力絕對腐敗?！边@是歷史的鐵律，誰也逃脫不了。不受人民監(jiān)督的政權，必然腐敗；而腐敗和官倒是人民無法容忍的，它們是社會動亂的根源和催化劑?！保ㄔS良英）　　

　 　

    消滅腐敗，并不等于鏟除壓迫。腐敗，在一個壓迫社會中，只不過是說它違反了壓迫社會本身的壓迫規(guī)則。對于廣大被壓迫人民來說，一個沒有腐敗的壓迫社會決不比一個腐敗的壓迫社會更人道。但是，難道能夠設想，一個置絕大多數(shù)人民于被壓迫地位的社會，能讓它的官僚機器受到廣大人民的有效監(jiān)督嗎？難道能夠設想，一個允許少數(shù)人依法掠奪多數(shù)人的社會，竟能有效地防止某些人不按法律程序進行掠奪嗎？　　

    自由派知識分子的可愛之處，在于他們既想要資本主義，又不想要與資本主義聯(lián)系在一起的禍害。一個壓迫社會，不論它采取怎樣的政治形式，都不可能真正解決腐敗問題，專制政體如此，民主政體也如此。1993年意大利的政治丑聞可以充分說明這一點。實際上，意大利的政治腐敗，早已是婦孺皆知，時至今日才曝光，而且牽涉整個統(tǒng)治集團，足見“民主”解決腐敗問題的功效了?！　?/p>

    新權威派抨擊民主派浪漫天真，認為過早實行民主會導致腐敗泛濫、經(jīng)濟停滯；民主派又抨擊新權威派富于幻想，認為搞新權威主義“只能導致政治的腐敗和經(jīng)濟的萎縮”。實際上，通觀世界上的依附性資本主義國家，無論實行專制政體還是民主政體，有哪個比較好地解決了腐敗問題，或者哪怕是發(fā)現(xiàn)了一條行之有效的解決辦法呢？　　

    有沒有解決腐敗問題的辦法呢？有的，那就是自由派知識分子最害怕的“多數(shù)暴政”。只有靠“多數(shù)”，才能夠解決問題。只有通過人民大革命，打倒壓迫階級的統(tǒng)治，才能使人民群眾的政治積極性真正地高漲起來，才談得上對政府進行有效的監(jiān)督?！　?/p>

    照自由派知識分子的邏輯，只要壓迫者按照規(guī)則進行壓迫，實行Fair Play，被壓迫人民就會安然接受壓迫，“經(jīng)濟體制改革”就可以順利進行，“社會矛盾”也就不會激化、不會“不可收拾”，壓迫社會也就平安無事了。有腐敗也罷，沒有腐敗也罷，資本主義的發(fā)展客觀上要求在短時期內在少數(shù)人手中積聚巨額財富，這就必然要求少數(shù)人掠奪多數(shù)人。獨立戰(zhàn)爭以后，杰弗遜目睹多數(shù)少數(shù)人發(fā)財致富、大批小生產(chǎn)者破產(chǎn)失業(yè)的社會狀況，遣責資本主義是“把社會上大多數(shù)人變成貧窮的自動機器”。（何汝璧和伊承哲，207）為了反抗資本主義原始積累，在美國，有杰弗遜為首的民主派和漢密爾頓為首的反民主派（聯(lián)邦黨人）之間的斗爭；在英國，有平等派和長老派、獨立派之間的斗爭，民主派、平等派都是代表大多數(shù)人民群眾的利益，奮起反抗資本主義的壓迫勢力。資本主義要發(fā)展，要掠奪多數(shù)人，就必須粉碎這些反抗力量，這只有靠暴力、靠專制，而不是靠民主。中國要發(fā)展資本主義，也不可能回避這個問題，既要掠奪人民大眾，又要人民大眾自由地、民主地接受掠奪，這可能嗎？　　

    “六四”事件，鎮(zhèn)壓了人民的反抗力量，從政治上為中國走上依附性資本主義的發(fā)展道路準備了條件。但是，依附性資本主義建立在殘酷剝削、壓榨中國的新無產(chǎn)階級的基礎上，又建立在廣大農民貧困化的基礎上，因而就建立在絕大多數(shù)中國人民貧困化的基礎上。然而，在一個曾經(jīng)進行了社會主義革命的國家，在一個人人平等的觀念、剝削壓迫可恥的觀念深入人心的國家，人民就更加無法容忍被壓迫的命運，就更加敢于起來與一切形式的壓迫做斗爭。這才是真正的“社會動亂的根源和催化劑”?！　?/p>

    新權威主義認識到，中國要發(fā)展資本主義，特別是依附性資本主義，決不可能一帆風順，必然遭到絕大多數(shù)人民的反抗，只有用政治暴力才能給資本主義的發(fā)展開辟道路。從這點來說，新權威派比民主派更高明，也更誠實。值得注意的是，向來標榜與新權威主義勢不兩立的杜鋼建先生〔5〕最近也撰文宣稱：“中國的政治改革只能一步一步走。一個連法治局面都未實現(xiàn)的國家當然不能對之寄予過高的希求?！倍配摻ㄏ壬J為，要注意“區(qū)別自由和民主”，不要“將自由問題混同于民主問題對待”。在他看來，新權威主義的過錯不是“不要民主”，而是“不僅不要民主，而且不要自由”。有意思的是，“不要民主”的“自由”是什么樣的“自由”呢？杜鋼建先生認為，自由派知識分子的困境在于“在理論上只看到民治和專制，在現(xiàn)實中又必須面對立憲需要”，結果，“要末選擇民主政治，要末選擇集權專制?！比欢?，“民治”，“不能對之寄予過高的希求”；“專制”，“結果是經(jīng)濟落后，文化貧困，國民素質下降，出路只能是‘第三種選擇’：變換一個角度，抓住自由人權不放，將自由人權作為憲政的核心任務。”（《邊緣》，10－12）“不要民主”的“憲政”，“不要民主”的“自由人權”，這不是新權威主義的“開明專制”又是什么？　　

    “不能對之寄予過高的希求”的當然不是中國人民，而是資本主義。一個國家要發(fā)展，歸根到底，靠的是人民群眾的積極性、主動性和首創(chuàng)精神。所以，一個民主的社會，一個絕大多數(shù)人民掌握了自己命運的社會，可以喚起人民群眾幾乎無窮的智慧和能量。民主，只要不是那種專門用來掩飾壓迫社會瘡疤的“民主”，就決不是發(fā)展的障礙，而是發(fā)展最有力的推動力?！　?/p>

　 　

　 　

　 　

　 　

〔1〕“司法鉗制”的原則如何“高超”可以用一些案例來說明。比如，美國國會曾經(jīng)通過《反托拉斯法》以遏制壟斷勢力發(fā)展。有一個壟斷公司控制了一種產(chǎn)品市場的95％，最高法院裁定這不算“壟斷”。首次應用《反托拉斯法》是針對工會，最高法院裁定工人組織工會是“壟斷”行為，違反了《反托拉斯法》。另一個重要案例是羅斯福實行新政期間，最高法院裁定有關新政的法律違憲，導致羅斯福第一次“百日新政”失敗?！　?/p>

〔2〕這種“殘缺不全的民主”尤其表現(xiàn)在以下幾個方面：（1）立法機關是唯一一個由人民選舉產(chǎn)生的政府部門，行政部門、司法部門都是按照官僚制方式自上而下委任的。（2）政府官員、議員、法官按照職位高低享受程度不等的物質特權。（3）現(xiàn)代世界著名的法學家凱爾森曾經(jīng)指出：“議會在法律上相對獨立于人民意味著，民主原則在某種程度上被分工原則所取代。為了隱匿這個從一種原則向另一種原則的轉換，于是就利用了議會‘代表’人民這一虛構。......假若在經(jīng)濟和文化都比較發(fā)達的大國不可能實現(xiàn)直接民主，那末就需要努力確立公意和必要的人民代表制之間最和諧最密切的聯(lián)系。......運用一個......立法機構系統(tǒng)取代一個單一的議會，這些立法機構互相監(jiān)督、互相制約，......它們必須不僅限于制定法律......而且必須對法律的實施負責，......因而公民將成為行政的主體，而不是行政的客體。(Della Volpe,1979,54)　　

〔3〕比如，1973年在智利，正是由于中產(chǎn)階級的默許，皮諾切特才得以發(fā)動政變，建立法西斯統(tǒng)治?！　?/p>

〔4〕1973年9月智利軍政府上臺后，”智利工人首當其沖。工會要么被取締，要么被嚴密控制起來。工人政黨被取締，工人領袖被殺害。實際工資銳減，工人無能為力。（據(jù)不同統(tǒng)計，實際工資在1972年到1975年下降了44％到60％，以后又進一步下降，如以1975年1月的指數(shù)為100，那么1976年3月就是77.5。1977年以后，實際工資多少穩(wěn)定了一段時間，直到1982年經(jīng)濟大衰退。）(Johnson,1985,187)　　

〔5〕中國人民大學法律系副教授?！　?/p>

　 　

第六章 中國革命的前途　　

　 　

    從1989年革命的失敗中可以得出什么教訓呢？　　

第一，由自由派知識分子來充當中國民主運動的領導是完全不合格的。在自由派知識分子的領導下，中國勞動人民是什么也得不到的?！　?/p>

    第二，資本主義，作為一種壓迫性的社會經(jīng)濟制度，是違背絕大多數(shù)人民利益的，因而就其本性而言，就民主意味著人民大眾的權力而言，是與民主不相容的。在1989年革命時，即當向資本主義過渡遭到了工人階級的頑強抵抗時是這樣；而今天，當中國資本主義經(jīng)濟不得不依賴于廉價勞動力在世界市場上競爭，而只有靠一個極端壓迫性的政治制度才能維持一支廉價、馴服的勞動力隊伍時，也是這樣。因此，爭取中國民主的斗爭，如果按照其自身邏輯所要求的發(fā)展下去，就必須同時是爭取社會主義的斗爭。　　

    第三，勞動人民，由于他們被剝削、被壓迫的狀況，難以超越他們個人生活經(jīng)驗的狹隘視野，達到對于社會的科學的和整體的認識，因而僅僅憑他們自己，也就不能夠成為一支獨立的政治力量和贏得爭取解放的斗爭。在這種情況下，建設一支由科學的革命理論所指導的、能夠和勞動人民一起為反抗壓迫和剝削而斗爭的革命社會主義的知識分子隊伍，就是新的社會主義革命的首要條件?！　?/p>

    1989年革命的失敗從政治上為資本主義發(fā)展掃清了障礙。統(tǒng)治階級渡過了風雨飄搖的階段，鞏固了它的統(tǒng)治地位，重新得到了國際資本的支持，并恢復了和主要資本主義國家的關系。正常的資本主義生產(chǎn)關系在中國得以確立，資本主義經(jīng)濟進入了一個新的高漲階段?！　?/p>

    另一方面，1989年以后，自由派知識分子在政治上一蹶不振。他們在國外的流亡政黨瀕于瓦解，在國內也不再有有組織的政治力量。在沒有任何比較廣泛的群眾基礎的情況下，要不是憑著在中美兩國統(tǒng)治階級的外交斗爭中充當一枚籌碼，他們在政治上還能否存在下去恐怕都成問題?！　?/p>

    但是，所有的社會矛盾都不僅存在著，而且還在不斷發(fā)展著。資本主義作為一種社會制度，需要得到絕大多數(shù)人民的擁護，至少是默許，才可能存在下去。但是，在依附性發(fā)展的條件下，中國的資本主義經(jīng)濟只有憑剝削億萬廉價勞動力才能在世界市場上占有一席之地，也就是說，中國的資本主義經(jīng)濟發(fā)展必須建立在絕大多數(shù)人民貧困化的基礎上，這就必然招致絕大多數(shù)人民的反抗。要維持資本積累，中國資本主義就不能不破壞自己的社會基礎；而要維持自己的社會基礎，中國資本主義就不能不破壞資本積累的條件。要維持自己的經(jīng)濟合理性，它就不能不破壞自己的社會合法性；而要維持自己的社會合法性，它就不能不破壞自己的經(jīng)濟合理性。中國資本主義不能夠同時維持自己的社會合法性和經(jīng)濟合理性，因而陷入不可解脫的矛盾之中?！　?/p>

    的確，從表面上看來，中國資本主義現(xiàn)在好象是很有力量、很有前途。資本主義積累從來沒有象現(xiàn)在這樣強勁，一派蓬勃發(fā)展的氣象。中國經(jīng)濟的高速增長已經(jīng)持續(xù)了十多年了，并且看起來再持續(xù)一個十年也沒有什么問題。這在世界上大多數(shù)資本主義國家陷于經(jīng)濟停滯、社會矛盾重重而難于自拔的情況下，不能不說是一個顯著的例外。統(tǒng)治階級在面向未來時充滿著自信，百年以來的富強之夢似乎就要變?yōu)楝F(xiàn)實了。但是，所有這一切，決不是說資本主義已經(jīng)擺脫了它的一切內在矛盾，決不是說資本主義經(jīng)濟從此可以一帆風順地發(fā)展下去了。正相反，要在資本主義條件下實現(xiàn)持續(xù)、穩(wěn)定的經(jīng)濟增長，根本就是術語的矛盾。　　

    從馬克思主義觀點看，資本主義經(jīng)濟從根本上是不合理的和充滿矛盾的。在資本主義積累的高漲中就準備了它日后崩潰的條件。這里，我們不能夠詳細討論馬克思主義關于資本主義積累的理論，只須指出，根據(jù)馬克思主義理論，資本主義積累包含著下面的矛盾：　　

    首先，在激烈競爭的壓力下，資本家不得不不斷追求技術進步，以資本（機器設備）代替勞動，以提高勞動生產(chǎn)率。按照馬克思主義理論，這就導致資本有機構成（不變資本對可變資本之比，或者生產(chǎn)資料價值對勞動力價值之比）上升。這樣，如果剩余價值率（剩余價值對勞動力價值之比）不變，資本有機構成上升就會導致利潤率（剩余價值對全部資本－即不變資本與可變資本之和－之比）下降?！?〕用馬克思的話說，如果利潤率下降到了一定點以下：　　

　 　

生產(chǎn)的熾烈的火焰就會熄滅。生產(chǎn)就會陷入到睡眠狀態(tài)中。利潤率是資本主義生產(chǎn)的推動力；只有那種在生產(chǎn)上有利潤可得并且實際會提供利潤的東西方才會被生產(chǎn)出來。......使李嘉圖不安的事是：利潤率，資本主義生產(chǎn)的刺激，積累的條件和推動力，將會由生產(chǎn)自身的發(fā)展受到危險。(Marx,1967,259)　　

　 　

    要扭轉利潤率下降的趨勢，資本家階級就必須努力提高剩余價值率。但是，正是在資本主義經(jīng)濟迅速發(fā)展的階段，工人階級的力量不僅在數(shù)量上而且也在質量上加強了。由于資本主義積累在快速擴張過程中要吸收越來越多的勞動力，這就逐漸縮小了由失業(yè)人口組成的產(chǎn)業(yè)后備軍。產(chǎn)業(yè)后備軍的縮小加劇了資本家之間的相互競爭而減輕了工人之間相互競爭的壓力。這就改變了資本家階級和工人階級之間的力量對比，使之有利于工人階級而不利于資本家階級。與此同時，資本主義發(fā)展導致資本日趨集中，因而也就便利了工人的集中和組織，促進了工人的階級覺悟和斗爭精神的發(fā)展。工人階級力量的增強有效地防止了剩余價值率的上升?！　?/p>

    正是由于資本主義制度決沒有辦法擺脫這些矛盾，任何一次資本主義經(jīng)濟的長期擴張或遲或早要被長期衰退所代替。在歷史上，每隔幾十年世界資本主義經(jīng)濟就要陷入一次長期衰退。在長期衰退中，資本主義經(jīng)濟的一切經(jīng)濟矛盾和社會矛盾都會嚴重激化，從而為重大社會變革提供了可能性。根據(jù)比利時馬克思主義者厄內斯特·曼德爾的觀點，僅僅依靠單純的經(jīng)濟調節(jié)，資本主義經(jīng)濟是無法走出長期衰退的。因為要擺脫長期衰退，就要大幅度地提高利潤率，而這又要求大幅度地提高剩余價值率。但是，資本家階級想要大幅度提高剩余價值率，就必須與工人階級進行一場重大的政治斗爭和社會斗爭，沒有什么東西能夠事先保證資本家階級能夠贏得斗爭的勝利。(Mandel,1995)〔2〕　　

    這對中國資本主義的發(fā)展意味著什么呢？從馬克思主義觀點看，目前中國資本主義經(jīng)濟的迅速增長只有用不同尋常的高利潤率來解釋。這種不同尋常的高利潤率，一方面來自對億萬“廉價勞動力”的殘酷剝削，另一方面，則建立在進口外國先進技術、設備的基礎上。但是，正如我們已經(jīng)看到的，資本主義積累，按照其自身的內在邏輯，必然導致利潤率下降。或遲或早，利潤率會下降到資本主義積累無法正常進行的地步。　　

    除了一切資本主義經(jīng)濟所共有的一般矛盾以外，中國資本主義經(jīng)濟還有其自身的特殊矛盾。首先，在第四章中我們已經(jīng)指出，中國的資本主義經(jīng)濟發(fā)展在本質上是依附性發(fā)展，是建立在進口外國技術、設備的基礎上的。中國能夠進口這些技術、設備，是因為中國的出口部門能夠憑著廉價勞動力在世界市場上競爭。但是，資本主義技術進步的歷史趨勢是以資本代替勞動，也就是趨于不斷削弱乃至完全消除廉價勞動力的競爭優(yōu)勢，因而從長期來說，將從根本上動搖依附性發(fā)展的基礎?！　?/p>

    其次，資本主義積累要進行下去，就不僅要能夠生產(chǎn)剩余價值，而且還必須能夠在市場上實現(xiàn)剩余價值。但是，資本主義依附性發(fā)展建立在對億萬“廉價勞動力”殘酷剝削的基礎上，因而也就是建立在絕大多數(shù)人民貧困化的基礎上。絕大多數(shù)人民購買力的增長因而趕不上生產(chǎn)的增長。當然，只要中國還能夠在世界市場上迅速擴大出口，一個相對狹窄的國內市場就不會對資本主義積累構成嚴重障礙。但是，在整個世界經(jīng)濟緩慢增長的情況下，中國出口的高速增長遲早要不能持續(xù)下去，而中國的資本主義經(jīng)濟也就要面臨著一個越來越嚴重的“實現(xiàn)”問題（一個日益相對萎縮的國內市場），從而使資本主義積累面臨著難以逾越的障礙?！　?/p>

    所有這些矛盾共同構成了中國資本主義發(fā)展的不可逾越的障礙。雖然我們不能夠精確地預測中國資本主義在什么時候會陷入重大的危機，根據(jù)世界資本主義的歷史經(jīng)驗，可以比較有把握地說，從資本主義積累開始進入擴張階段到長期衰退階段開始，一般需要二、三十年的時間。所以，大約經(jīng)過這樣一段時間，中國的資本主義經(jīng)濟也不可避免地要進入一個長期衰退階段。到時候，所有現(xiàn)存的社會矛盾和經(jīng)濟矛盾都會嚴重激化。中國資本主義能不能從長期衰退中走出來，將取決于一系列重大的社會斗爭和政治斗爭的結果?！　?/p>

    在這方面，下列因素將對斗爭的結果起著決定性的影響：　　

    首先，與發(fā)達資本主義國家不同，中國資本主義實行的是公開獨裁的政治制度。因此，中國的統(tǒng)治階級在政治合法性方面遠遠不如西方發(fā)達資本主義國家的統(tǒng)治階級，因而在遇到重大政治社會危機的情況下，在政治上就處于極端脆弱的地位?！　?/p>

    其次，與發(fā)達資本主義國家不同，中國資本主義是建立在對億萬“廉價勞動力”殘酷剝削的基礎上，沒有通過階級妥協(xié)，比如，通過建立“福利國家”，來緩和階級矛盾的余地。在這種情況下，統(tǒng)治階級和被壓迫人民的矛盾只有完全地、徹底地表現(xiàn)出來，因而也就必須完全地、徹底地予以解決。改良主義的辦法是行不通的?！　?/p>

    第三，與大多數(shù)欠發(fā)達的資本主義國家不同，中國的勞動人民是經(jīng)歷過社會主義革命的，是曾經(jīng)打倒過壓迫者、掌握過自己命運的，是在此以后又受到過多次革命洗禮的。中國勞動人民的思想覺悟、精神狀態(tài)是那些沒有經(jīng)歷過這樣一場革命的國家的勞動人民所無法比擬的。對中國勞動人民來說，剝削、壓迫、統(tǒng)治再也不是天經(jīng)地義的事了。他們在革命中爭得的權利，統(tǒng)治階級不經(jīng)過殊死的斗爭是決不能奪去的；他們既然經(jīng)歷過革命，就決不害怕再以新的革命奪回自己的權利、捍衛(wèi)自己的權利、擴大和發(fā)展自己的權利?！　?/p>

    對于中國革命的前途，我們是沒有任何理由悲觀的。資本主義制度是建立在對絕大多數(shù)人民剝削和壓迫的基礎上的，是從根本上不合理和充滿了矛盾的。正是資本主義發(fā)展本身，按照其自身的邏輯，為社會危機和社會革命鋪平了道路。另一方面，曾經(jīng)以一場偉大的社會主義革命對人類進步做出了偉大貢獻的中國勞動人民，也決不會長期忍受現(xiàn)在的壓迫秩序而無所作為的。我們有理由相信，下一次的中國社會主義革命將不是發(fā)生在遙遠不可及的未來，進行這場即將來臨的偉大斗爭的責任將落到我們這一代人身上。這里，不妨借用馬克思在1848年革命失敗后評論當時法國的革命形勢時所做的預言：“新的革命，只有在新的危機之后才有可能。但是新的革命的來臨，象新的危機的來臨一樣，是不可避免的。”(Marx,1977,297)　　

　 　

附：自由派知識分子論市場經(jīng)濟、民主和革命　　

    誰有資格提出解決中國社會矛盾的方案呢？第一個看起來有資格提出解決矛盾的方案的，是自由派知識分子。自由派知識分子是正式的反對派、唯一的反對派、民主的象征、王位覬覦者。所以，它不僅承認我們這個社會存在著矛盾，而且認為那是在現(xiàn)存社會范圍內不可解決的矛盾，并因而提出了它的社會改造方案。　　

    自由派知識分子認為：　　

　 　

對私產(chǎn)與經(jīng)濟自由的剝奪則封閉了市場，保護了特權，偏袒了懶惰，禁錮了創(chuàng)造力，從而帶來了普遍的貧困和落后，使富國發(fā)窮，窮國更窮。而出路只有一條：市場經(jīng)濟，加上民主政治。（《邊緣》，5）　　

　 　

    人民為什么貧困？自由派知識分子說，這不是階級壓迫的結果，而是革命的結果，是革命剝奪了“私產(chǎn)與經(jīng)濟自由”，才帶來了“普遍的貧困和落后”。解決這個矛盾的方案便是“市場經(jīng)濟，加上民主政治”?！　?/p>

    在自由派知識分子看來，問題不在于“市場經(jīng)濟”（資本主義）本身，而在于沒有“民主政治”。只要有了“民主政治”，資本主義社會的矛盾即使不能迎刃而解，也決不至于發(fā)展到不可收拾的地步。民主政治能不能解決資本主義社會的矛盾呢？如果民主政治能夠成為被壓迫人民手中的武器，用以從根本上推翻資本主義社會秩序，那么就可以成為解決資本主義社會矛盾的手段。這顯然并非自由派知識分子的本意。　　

    “市場經(jīng)濟”為什么要加上“民主政治”呢？自由派知識分子認為：　　

　 　

資本主義的天然邏輯導致政治民主，因為沒有政治自由的經(jīng)濟自由從本質上講是不穩(wěn)固的。......財產(chǎn)權和自由市場還必須有政治上的保障，否則就會被統(tǒng)治者的濫權所踐踏。（《邊緣》，4－5）　　

　 　

所以，在自由派知識分子看來，“民主政治”就是保障“財產(chǎn)權和自由市場”。但是，統(tǒng)治階級的“財產(chǎn)權”難道不正是建立在絕大多數(shù)人民貧困化的基礎上嗎？所以，保障“財產(chǎn)權”不就是對絕大多數(shù)人民實行政治壓迫嗎？　　

    自由派知識分子意識到了這個矛盾，意識到了民主政治的充分發(fā)展必然意味著侵犯財產(chǎn)。所以，他們才擔心“民主政治會釋放暴民心理，蛻變成無政府狀態(tài)，最終又以專制告終。所以，民主政治在戰(zhàn)勝個人專制后又面臨著一種新的專制的威脅，即多數(shù)的專制，特別是道德多數(shù)的專制?！保ā哆吘墶?，6）什么是“多數(shù)專制”？抽象地談論“多數(shù)專制”是沒有意義的。只有理解了“多數(shù)”是什么，“少數(shù)”是什么，“多數(shù)”和“少數(shù)”的關系是怎樣的，才可能理解“多數(shù)專制”本身的性質。當“少數(shù)”壓迫著“多數(shù)”，因而實行著“少數(shù)專制”的時候，“多數(shù)專制”無非是指被壓迫人民奮起反抗壓迫者的統(tǒng)治。說它是“專制”，就是說它違背一切壓迫者的意愿；說它是“多數(shù)專制”，就是說它符合一切被壓迫人民的意愿?！　?/p>

    所以，說民主政治面臨著多數(shù)專制的威脅，就是說資本主義制度面臨著民主政治的威脅。民主，就它的本性而言，就它把權力交給絕大多數(shù)人民因而也是被壓迫的人民而言，是與資本主義不相容的。只有在這點上，自由派知識分子才有了一點老實和科學的態(tài)度。　　

    “市場經(jīng)濟，加上民主政治”，在實踐上這就是向人民許諾資產(chǎn)階級公民權利。確有一些自由派知識分子，他們被新興資本主義赤裸裸的剝削、勞動者的悲慘狀況所震驚。抱著良好的愿望，他們希望這不是出于資本主義的本性，不是資本主義的固有現(xiàn)象，他們希望“使競爭人道化”，他們要為勞動爭得在資產(chǎn)階級社會范圍內盡可能好的交易條件。但是，這些“好心人”沒有看到，勞動和資本的交易條件已經(jīng)越來越不取決于一國無產(chǎn)階級和資本的力量對比，而越來越取決于世界無產(chǎn)階級和世界資本的力量對比。一方面，世界資本已經(jīng)聯(lián)合起來了；另一方面，世界無產(chǎn)階級仍然是各自為戰(zhàn)，因而各個擊破?，F(xiàn)在，歐洲的工人已經(jīng)發(fā)現(xiàn)，要保證他們的“福利國家”已經(jīng)越來越困難了。最近東南亞各國與美國的人權之爭尤其能說明問題：依附性資本主義國家憑著它在人權上的“成本優(yōu)勢”，竟能部分地抵銷發(fā)達資本主義國家的技術優(yōu)勢，而使后者的人權成為問題。當然，我們應當爭取、必須爭取頒布有利于勞動者的法律。但是，這些法律的意義并不在于它能“使競爭人道化”，而在于它有助于揭露以下事實：第一，如果這些法律沒有得到貫徹，這些法律就是一堆廢紙；第二，如果這些法律得到了貫徹，那么中國在世界市場上就難以立足，資本就要外逃，資本積累的源泉就要枯竭，資本主義就要出問題?！　?/p>

    具體的解決問題的辦法只有在具體的歷史條件中尋找。那種憑空杜撰出來的社會改造方案是一文不值的。但是，對于城市工人階級來說，要保全他們在社會主義革命中贏得的權利，難道不是只有不滿足于這些權利本身，只有不再依靠統(tǒng)治階級恩賜這些權利嗎？那么，如果不把國有制－即統(tǒng)治階級所有制變?yōu)楣と穗A級所有制，這又怎么可能呢？對于新無產(chǎn)階級來說，哪怕是要實現(xiàn)八小時工作日，要實現(xiàn)節(jié)假日休息的權利，要避免以犧牲他們的生命為代價來謀取利潤，不也要把資本嚇跑嗎？那么，哪怕是為了實現(xiàn)這些起碼的資產(chǎn)階級權利，不觸犯資本主義所有權又怎么可能呢？對于農民階級來說，他們的收入要有任何根本的改善，都會對資本積累構成威脅，那么，如果不把積累的權力從資本那里轉到勞動人民那里，改善農民狀況又怎么可能呢？對于最貧困階層來說，不剝奪100萬個百萬富翁，又怎么能解決一億赤貧的問題呢？所以，被壓迫人民解決問題的方案就是－革命。　　

    自由派知識分子說，革命剝奪了“私產(chǎn)與經(jīng)濟自由”。自由派知識分子忘記了，在革命前絕大多數(shù)人民根本沒有什么“私產(chǎn)與經(jīng)濟自由”。自由派知識分子說，革命“帶來了普遍的貧困和落后”。自由派知識分子又忘記了，如果不是因為“普遍的貧困和落后”就根本不會發(fā)生革命。自由派知識分子說，革命“禁錮了創(chuàng)造力”，“使富國發(fā)窮，窮國更窮”。事實如何呢？　　

    世界著名的統(tǒng)計學家和研究經(jīng)濟增長的專家麥迪遜在他的最近一部著作中，按照購買力平價法，計算了全世界199個國家從1820年到1992年一百七十二年間的主要經(jīng)濟指標。這本著作里所提供的有關國際經(jīng)濟發(fā)展比較的數(shù)據(jù)，可以說是目前為止最完備、最可靠的。盡管在麥迪遜的這本著作中，有些社會主義國家的經(jīng)濟增長速度被大大調低了，現(xiàn)有數(shù)據(jù)仍然表明前社會主義國家，盡管有種種的社會的和經(jīng)濟的弊病，確實在經(jīng)濟發(fā)展方面取得了顯著的成就?！　?/p>

　 　

表6.1   人均國內生產(chǎn)總值指數(shù),1950-1989　　

                    1950  1960  1970  1980  1989　　

資本主義國家         100   128   174   208   227　　

欠發(fā)達的資本主義國家  100   127   172   222   240　　

南歐和拉丁美洲       100   128   178   235   233　　

蘇聯(lián)和東歐           100   141   198   238   256　　

中國*               100   143   178   238    /　　

*中國的國內生產(chǎn)總值是按1980年價格計算的.　　

資料來源:Maddison,1995.　　

　 　

    表6.1說明，無論是與整個資本主義世界的平均水平相比，還是與所有欠發(fā)達的資本主義國家的平均水平相比，蘇聯(lián)、中國、和東歐的人均國內生產(chǎn)總值的增長速度都是比較快的。就是拿蘇聯(lián)和東歐與南歐和拉丁美洲相比，這兩組國家在戰(zhàn)后初期經(jīng)濟發(fā)展水平是相當?shù)模彩翘K聯(lián)和東歐的增長速度比較高?！　?/p>

    在壓迫社會中，絕大多數(shù)人民在物質上和精神上處于被壓迫的狀態(tài)，被剝奪了發(fā)揮自己的創(chuàng)造力和享受自己的創(chuàng)造成果的權利，這是社會的創(chuàng)造力被禁錮、被扼殺的最主要、最根本的原因。這當然是資產(chǎn)階級御用學者永遠無法理解的。革命，即使不能完成被壓迫人民爭取解放的全部事業(yè)，但是，它使“扶犁黑手翻持笏”，它使“大地象陶輪一樣翻轉過來”，它使絕大多數(shù)人民有了自己掌握自己命運的機會。僅憑這一點，就足以消除在壓迫社會中彌漫于人民群眾當中的那種麻木不仁、萎靡不振、無所作為的狀態(tài)。這樣的社會，它的生命力、它的創(chuàng)造力當然遠遠勝過那些沒有經(jīng)過革命洗禮的社會，勝過壓迫社會的正常狀態(tài)。　　

    正如阿贊·瑪吉賈尼所指出的：　　

　 　

有一些社會主義成功的原因，是人們向來不理解的。......有充分證據(jù)證明，社會主義實行的（財富）再分配是社會主義經(jīng)濟發(fā)展的源泉之一。......再分配使在貧困煎熬下的億萬人民有了過上好日子的希望，在舊社會中，他們想改善生活的愿望，想在社會產(chǎn)品中多得一點的愿望，一向被壓制。再分配使貧苦人民精神振奮、干勁沖天，這是生產(chǎn)和基本消費增長的重要源泉。(Makhijani,1992,64)　　

　 　

所以，單單革命本身，就可以成為最偉大的生產(chǎn)力?！　?/p>

    但是，生產(chǎn)力的發(fā)展本身并沒有告訴我們這種發(fā)展是不是，以及在多大程度上，是為了絕大多數(shù)人民的利益，并沒有告訴我們這種發(fā)展是建立在犧牲廣大勞動群眾的利益的基礎上，還是為廣大勞動群眾的體力和智力的發(fā)展創(chuàng)造條件。正是在這一方面，社會主義發(fā)展從根本上優(yōu)越于資本主義發(fā)展。正如阿贊·瑪吉賈尼所說，如果我們考察的是絕大多數(shù)人民的體力和智力的發(fā)展，比如考察嬰兒死亡率、人均預期壽命、食品供應、飲用水供應等指標，那么在資本主義和社會主義之間，社會主義是無可爭辯的勝利者。（見表6.2）　　

　 　

表6.2   資本主義和社會主義經(jīng)濟比較(1975年)　　

                         資 本 主 義             社 會 主 義　　

                    發(fā)達國家* 第三世界平均      東歐   中國　　

人均預期壽命(歲)       70        55     60        70     65　　

嬰兒死亡率(千分之)     25       130    100        30     60　　

人均每日卡路里攝取量  3100      2100   2400      3200   2200　　

飲用水人口覆蓋率(%)    90        50     65      80-90   不詳　　

*指經(jīng)濟合作與發(fā)展組織國家.　　

資料來源:Makhijani,1992,75.　　

　 　

    的確，革命向人民許諾解放，結果卻是以一種形式的壓迫代替另一種形式的壓迫。在自由派知識分子看來，革命就是騙局，是一場惡夢，是用千百萬人的性命和信仰去換取少數(shù)人的功名利祿的骯臟游戲。所以，被壓迫人民之所以被壓迫，就是因為他們反抗壓迫，這就是自由派知識分子的邏輯，這就是被壓迫人民應該安于被壓迫命運的理由。在我們看來，革命被革命自身所玷污，這一事實不過證明，革命決不應滿足于它已經(jīng)取得的成果，它必須超越自身，必須上升到更高的階段，否則就不能保住它已有的成就。正如英國歷史學家E.H.卡爾所指出的：　　

　 　

危險并不在于我們去掩蓋革命歷史中的巨大污點，去掩蓋革命帶給人們的痛苦的代價，去掩蓋在革命的名義下犯下的罪行。危險在于我們企圖完全忘卻并在沉默中無視革命所取得的巨大成就。(Meisner,1986,440)　　

　 　

被壓迫人民決沒有理由為曾經(jīng)進行革命而后悔，更沒有理由害怕革命?！　?/p>

    的確，被壓迫人民一而再、再而三地起來反抗，又一而再、再而三的被壓迫者打敗，這就是以往一切時代的歷史。這個歷史現(xiàn)象被有些人拿來做為壓迫永恒、壓迫天然合理的證據(jù)。這些人忘記了，歷史上一切實際的斗爭，其勝負都不是在書房里論證出來的，而是由實際斗爭本身來決定的。壓迫社會的矛盾在于，它永遠不能避免產(chǎn)生自己的對立面，永遠不能避免絕大多數(shù)人反抗自己，永遠要使自己成為問題，因而也就永遠證明不了自己的永恒性、天然合理性。　　

　 　

〔1〕馬克思主義的利潤率下降趨勢的規(guī)律是建立在資本有機構成在長期趨于上升的假設的基礎上的，或者在資產(chǎn)階級統(tǒng)計中，則表現(xiàn)為資本－產(chǎn)出率，即固定資本（機器設備、廠房等）對于產(chǎn)出的比率在長期趨于上升。根據(jù)麥迪遜的最新研究，資本－產(chǎn)出率上升確實是世界各國資本主義經(jīng)濟發(fā)展過程中的一個長期趨勢。就幾個主要資本主義國家來說，它們的非住房資本存量對國內生產(chǎn)總值的比率，英國從1820年的0.68上升到1913年的0.84，又上升到1992年的1.82；美國從1820年的0.95上升到1913年的3.30，到1973年下降到2.12，此后又開始趨于上升，到1992年為2.43；日本從1890年的0.71上升到1950年的1.77，又上升到1992年的3.02。法國、德國、荷蘭沒有第二次世界大戰(zhàn)以前的數(shù)據(jù)，但是這些國家在戰(zhàn)后都表現(xiàn)出明顯的資本－產(chǎn)出率上升的趨勢。(Maddison,1995,36)所以，資本－產(chǎn)出率上升確實是資本主義技術進步的一個長期趨勢。問題是，怎樣從理論上來說明這一趨勢呢？從技術上說，生產(chǎn)資料和活勞動共同構成生產(chǎn)過程的要素。因此，技術進步既可以是以節(jié)約生產(chǎn)資料為目的，也可以是以節(jié)約活勞動為目的。以節(jié)約生產(chǎn)資料為目的的技術進步通常導致資本－產(chǎn)出率上升，而以節(jié)約活勞動為目的的技術進步，通常則要求以比較復雜的機器設備代替比較簡單的機器設備，因而導致資本－產(chǎn)出率上升。問題是，哪一種技術進步是資本主義技術進步的主要趨勢呢？很顯然，由于技術進步，單位生產(chǎn)資料的價值（不是價格）必然隨著時間推移不斷下降。如果生產(chǎn)消費品的部門與生產(chǎn)生產(chǎn)資料的部門的技術進步的速度一樣，那么單位消費品的價值將與單位生產(chǎn)資料的價值按同一速度下降。另一方面，一單位勞動力的價值等于維持一單位勞動力的再生產(chǎn)所需的消費品價值之和。由于在資本主義社會中，一方面，社會勞動生產(chǎn)率不斷提高，因而勞動力價值所包含的“歷史的、道德的”內容不斷增加；另一方面，隨著資本主義經(jīng)濟發(fā)展，工人階級在量上和質上也不斷發(fā)展壯大，因而與資本家階級斗爭的力量不斷增強，伴隨著資本主義發(fā)展，工人的實際工資有不斷增長的趨勢，也就是維持一單位勞動力所需要的消費品趨于不斷增加。這樣，單位勞動力的價值相對于單位生產(chǎn)資料的價值必然趨于不斷增加。因此，在其它一切條件相等的情況下，在全部生產(chǎn)要素價值中，生產(chǎn)資料所占比例越小，活勞動所占比例越大，資本家的實際生產(chǎn)成本增加得就越快，對資本家就越不利。反之反是。這就要求資本家在技術進步過程中盡可能地以（物化在生產(chǎn)資料中的）死勞動來代替活勞動，以減少活勞動在全部生產(chǎn)要素價值中所占的比重。以節(jié)約活勞動為目的的技術進步顯然比以節(jié)約生產(chǎn)資料為目的的技術進步更符合資本家的這一要求。因此，資本主義技術進步的主流必然是以節(jié)約活勞動為目的的技術進步，進而決定了資本－產(chǎn)出率上升是資本主義技術進步的一個內在趨勢?！　?/p>

〔2〕根據(jù)曼德爾的意見，1873－1893年的大蕭條是由于1893年以后利潤率顯著上升才得以結束的，而19世紀末帝國主義對世界的征服在這次利潤率上升中起著決定性作用。由于非洲、中東、東亞和中國被納入了（帝國主義國家的）殖民帝國或勢力范圍，（帝國主義國家）對不發(fā)達國家的資本輸出出現(xiàn)了質的飛躍，同時原材料價格也大大下降，從而使（帝國主義國家）的利潤率得以顯著回升。但是，各帝國主義國家之間的對抗最終導致了第一次世界大戰(zhàn)和俄國革命的勝利。三十年代的大蕭條則是以法西斯主義的興起和第二次世界大戰(zhàn)而告終的，并最終導致了中國革命的勝利和在東歐一些國家建立了社會主義政權。但是，由于在戰(zhàn)后利潤率大幅度上升，世界資本主義體系得以進入一個新的長期擴張階段。曼德爾認為，這次利潤率上升，主要是由于發(fā)達資本主義國家的工人階級在法西斯主義和冷戰(zhàn)體制統(tǒng)治下遭到了歷史性的失敗。在西歐和日本，剩余價值率從100％增加到300％，在美國，剩余價值率也有比較顯著的增加。(Mandel,1995,17-18)七十年代以來，世界資本主義經(jīng)濟又一次進入了長期衰退。這次長期衰退已經(jīng)給各資本主義國家的勞動人民帶來了巨大的痛苦。美國的非農產(chǎn)業(yè)私人部門每周平均工資從1969年的300美元下降到了1990年的264.22美元（1982年美元）。(Monthly Review,December 1994,5)西歐勞動人民則面臨著持久的大規(guī)模失業(yè)。在拉丁美洲一些國家，工業(yè)工人的實際工資在八十年代下降了20－60％。(Mandel,1995,159)　　

　 　

第七章 市場，計劃，和社會主義革命　　

　 　

    社會主義計劃經(jīng)濟可行嗎？這對于馬克思主義是一個至關重要的問題。我們知道，對馬克思來說，一個社會主義社會必須建立在計劃經(jīng)濟以及為使用價值而生產(chǎn)而不是為交換價值而生產(chǎn)的基礎上。這是因為，在現(xiàn)代社會化大生產(chǎn)條件下，只有通過計劃經(jīng)濟，人才能夠自覺地控制生產(chǎn)力，控制社會關系，因而自覺地控制自己的生活，才能從一切形式的壓迫、剝削和異化中解放出來?！　?/p>

    這個問題表面上是一個技術問題。也就是說，對這個問題的回答取決于我們是否能夠設計出一種技術模型，來說明社會主義計劃經(jīng)濟具有解決現(xiàn)代經(jīng)濟問題的能力，并且還有一定的經(jīng)濟效率。事實上，無論是資產(chǎn)階級經(jīng)濟學家，還是市場社會主義者，甚至還有不少馬克思主義者，正是認為這個問題無非是一個技術問題?！　?/p>

    另一方面，如果我們接受了資產(chǎn)階級經(jīng)濟學家和市場社會主義者的觀點，即市場經(jīng)濟是現(xiàn)代社會條件下唯一可行的經(jīng)濟制度，那么，我們就不得不同意，某種形式的壓迫和剝削也是人類文明所不可避免的，不僅僅是在一定的歷史階段，而是在人類文明存在的整個時期。而由于市場，按照其自身的邏輯，必然要發(fā)展為資本主義，這就無異于說，現(xiàn)行的資本主義制度，盡管有著種種的不合理和不公正，仍然是一切可能的制度中最好的制度?！　?/p>

    但是，既然是這樣，既然“社會主義計劃經(jīng)濟可行嗎”這個問題包含著如此重大的社會和政治含義，它也就不僅僅是一個技術問題。就它的本質來說，與其說這是一個技術問題，不如說這是一個社會－歷史問題。所以，要真正地回答這個問題，也就不能僅僅從技術上來回答，而必須首先從社會上、從歷史上來回答?！　?/p>

    與這個問題相聯(lián)系的一個問題，是社會主義革命為什么在前蘇聯(lián)、中國和東歐遭到了失敗。據(jù)說，20世紀的這些社會主義革命失敗了，是因為它們的經(jīng)濟失敗了，而這一失敗說明，社會主義計劃經(jīng)濟不可行。的確，這些前社會主義國家的經(jīng)濟制度沒有能夠保存下來；的確，這些國家的經(jīng)濟制度或多或少帶有社會主義計劃經(jīng)濟的特點。但是，這一事實本身并沒有告訴我們這些國家的革命為什么失敗、這些國家的經(jīng)濟制度為什么沒有能夠保存下來。我們更不能由此就得出結論，說社會主義計劃經(jīng)濟不可行。事實上，說前社會主義國家在經(jīng)濟上完全是一個失敗，根本就不符合歷史事實。根據(jù)麥迪遜對國際收入和財富比較所做的最新研究（這項研究只會低估前社會主義國家的經(jīng)濟成就），1950－1980年，東歐（包括前蘇聯(lián)）的人均國內生產(chǎn)總值增長了138％。在同一時期，中國的人均國內生產(chǎn)總值也以同樣的幅度增加。按照這個速度，前社會主義國家的人均收入每隔四分之一個世紀就翻一番。這當然不是一個奇跡般的速度，但這也決不是什么經(jīng)濟失敗。相比之下，在同一時期，世界上所有其它國家的人均國內生產(chǎn)總值增長了108％。其中，與東歐在1950年時發(fā)展水平相當?shù)哪蠚W和拉丁美洲的人均國內生產(chǎn)總值增長了135％，而與中國在1950年時發(fā)展水平相當?shù)膩喼?、非洲和大洋洲的發(fā)展中國家的人均國內生產(chǎn)總值增長了112％。（見表7.1）所以，前社會主義國家在經(jīng)濟發(fā)展方面至少不比資本主義國家差。那么，我們怎么能夠一邊說資本主義制度是世界上最合理、最有效率的經(jīng)濟制度，一邊又說前社會主義國家的經(jīng)濟制度不可行呢？　　

　 　

表7.1   人均國內生產(chǎn)總值指數(shù),1950-1989　　

                1950  1960  1970  1980  1989  年平均增長率(%)　　

                                              1950-80 1950-89　　

1950=100:　　

東歐             100   141   198   238   256    2.93    2.44　　

中國             100   143   178   238    /     2.93      /　　

世界上其它國家    100   128   174   208   227    2.47    2.13　　

南歐和拉丁美洲    100   128   178   235   233    2.88    2.19　　

亞洲.非洲和　　

大洋洲*          100   125   166   212   248    2.53    2.35　　

南歐和拉丁美洲=100:　　

東歐             112   123   124   114   123　　

亞洲.非洲和大洋洲=100:　　

中國              80    91    85    90    /　　

*不包括中國.日本.澳大利亞和新西蘭.　　

資料來源:Maddison,1995,表A-3(a),A-3(e),B-10(a),B-10(e),F-5,F-6,F-7.　　

　 　

    如果說前社會主義國家的經(jīng)濟制度確實是可行的，并且其經(jīng)濟成就不亞于資本主義制度，那么，“社會主義計劃經(jīng)濟是否可行”這一問題立刻就有了不同的性質?？磥恚瑔栴}并不是真的在于我們缺少一套在現(xiàn)實世界中可行的技術模型。歷史已經(jīng)提供了一個，就是前社會主義國家的經(jīng)濟模型，雖然這決不是一個完美無缺的模型。另一方面，整個的經(jīng)院經(jīng)濟學界，按照其目前的思維方式，看來根本就不能夠理解和解釋前社會主義經(jīng)濟在早期的相對成功，因而也就不能夠真正理解它們后來的失敗。如果我們用一點馬克思主義的直覺，就不難看出，這個問題同樣不能單純從技術上和經(jīng)濟上來解決。只有對前社會主義國家的社會關系的演變做一番歷史的分析，我們才能夠真正認識這個問題?！　?/p>

　 　

（一）對市場社會主義的批判　　

    在馬克思看來，市場本身并不等于就是資本主義，但是，只是在資本主義社會中市場關系才成為占統(tǒng)治地位的經(jīng)濟關系。馬克思認為，在最純粹的市場經(jīng)濟－簡單商品生產(chǎn)中，就已經(jīng)包含著資本主義異化的一切要素的萌芽。在市場經(jīng)濟中，社會的生產(chǎn)力在人們看來“不是他們自身的聯(lián)合力量，而是某種異己的、在他們之外的權力。關于這種權力的起源和發(fā)展趨向，他們一點也不了解；因而他們就不再能駕馭這種力量，相反地，這種力量現(xiàn)在卻經(jīng)歷著一系列獨特的、不僅不以人們的意志和行為為轉移，反而支配著人們的意志和行為的發(fā)展階段。”(Marx,1978a,161)這一事實本身，就已經(jīng)包含著從“勞動的分工”演變?yōu)椤皠趧雍唾Y本的分工”，即勞動者與生產(chǎn)資料相分離的可能性。所以，怎樣才能夠一方面消除或至少是有效地遏制市場經(jīng)濟內在的向資本主義發(fā)展的傾向，另一方面又不嚴重破壞那些在市場經(jīng)濟條件下生產(chǎn)力賴以發(fā)展的經(jīng)濟機制，是市場社會主義所面臨的一個關鍵的矛盾。要防止市場社會主義蛻變?yōu)橘Y本主義，主要有三種辦法：（1）禁止買賣資本和勞動；（2）對收入和財富征收累進稅以限制社會不平等的發(fā)展；（3）全部或大部分生產(chǎn)資料歸國家所有?！　?/p>

　 　

（1）禁止買賣資本和勞動　　

    任何現(xiàn)代經(jīng)濟制度要正常運轉，都必須根據(jù)供求變化經(jīng)常地調節(jié)社會勞動（活勞動和物化勞動，或者用資本主義的術語說，勞動和資本）在各生產(chǎn)部門之間的分配。但是在市場經(jīng)濟中，除非生產(chǎn)資料歸國家所有，要將社會勞動從一個生產(chǎn)部門轉移到另一個生產(chǎn)部門，唯一的辦法就是通過買賣資本和勞動。既然這樣，如果禁止買賣資本和勞動，市場經(jīng)濟還怎么運轉呢？　　

　 　

（2）對收入和財富征收累進稅以限制社會不平等的發(fā)展　　

    在這種情況下，資本和勞動倒是可以自由買賣了。但是，在市場經(jīng)濟中，人們投資是為了謀取利潤，而人們能夠出賣自己的勞動力是因為這些勞動力能為他人帶來利潤。所以，在市場經(jīng)濟中，買賣資本和勞動的機制要發(fā)揮作用，其條件與資本主義經(jīng)濟中沒什么兩樣。也就是，必須保證一定的利潤率，以鼓勵人們投資；同時，社會福利制度也不能給予失業(yè)人口過多的保障，要不然就沒有人愿意按照允許投資者獲取相當利潤的工資水平來出賣自己的勞動力了。在這種情況下，看不出在市場社會主義條件下累進稅所能夠起的作用與資本主義條件下有什么不同。如果沒有什么不同，累進稅又怎么能夠有效地防止市場社會主義蛻變?yōu)橘Y本主義呢？　　

　 　

（3）全部或大部分生產(chǎn)資料歸國家所有　　

    如果全部或大部分生產(chǎn)資料歸國家所有，在各生產(chǎn)部門中分配社會勞動的任務就可以通過國家投資來完成，這就避免了買賣資本和勞動的問題。在國家所有制下，企業(yè)可以由國家任命的經(jīng)理來經(jīng)營，也可以由工人集體來經(jīng)營。無論是采用哪種方式，正如布魯斯和拉斯基所指出的，都面臨著委托－代理問題：國家把企業(yè)委托給國家任命的經(jīng)理或工人集體來經(jīng)營，但是如果企業(yè)經(jīng)營不善，誰來承擔國家財產(chǎn)的損失呢？有一個解決這個問題的辦法。如果說，在社會主義條件下，社會的利益不再與勞動人民的共同利益相背離，那么為什么勞動者不以負責的態(tài)度使用國家財產(chǎn)呢？這樣做不是能夠增進他們自己的共同利益嗎？關于這一點，下面還要詳細討論。這里，我們只是指出，要讓人們以負責的態(tài)度對待社會財產(chǎn)，前提是為了社會而生產(chǎn)。怎么能夠設想，在人們?yōu)榱怂饺苏加卸a(chǎn)，在生產(chǎn)以私人生產(chǎn)者之間的相互競爭為基礎的情況下，人們能夠以負責的態(tài)度對待社會所有的生產(chǎn)資料呢？　　

    約翰·E·羅默也提出了解決市場社會主義矛盾的辦法。他的辦法就是使市場社會主義更象資本主義。在他的“股票社會主義”中，每一個公民都可以得到一定數(shù)量的股票。股票價值的總和等于全社會生產(chǎn)資料價值的總和。人們可以用他們的股票來購買企業(yè)股份，但股票不得買賣。股票持有者死后，股票由社會收回，然后在全體公民中平均分配?！肮善鄙鐣髁x”的企業(yè)據(jù)說是與資本主義企業(yè)同樣有效率，因為它們與資本主義企業(yè)在經(jīng)營上沒什么兩樣，也是以雇傭勞動為基礎，以利潤最大化為目的。(Roemer,1994)“股票社會主義”企圖通過禁止股票買賣來防止社會兩極分化。但是，在競爭中，總有一些企業(yè)要破產(chǎn)的。如果有些企業(yè)破產(chǎn)了，那么那些用他們的股票購買了這些企業(yè)股份的人們就會失去他們的股票。這些破產(chǎn)企業(yè)會被另外一些企業(yè)兼并，而那些購買了后一類企業(yè)的股份的人們就會有更多的股票。所以，光憑禁止買賣股票本身，即使真能禁止得了，也是防止不了兩極分化的。讓我們看看“股票社會主義”的另一個防止兩極分化的辦法－股票不得繼承，在股票持有者死后必須歸還社會，并由社會在全體公民中平均分配。首先，資本主義的經(jīng)濟效率是靠將資本主義紀律強加在工人頭上來維持的。資本主義企業(yè)能夠強迫工人接受這套紀律，是因為工人沒有任何生產(chǎn)資料，不得不出賣勞動力為生。一方面，“股票社會主義”在經(jīng)營上與資本主義別無二致。另一方面，在“股票社會主義”中，工人有可能擁有一些生產(chǎn)資料。比如，失業(yè)工人可以用他們所有的股票購買一家企業(yè)來雇傭他們自己。既然是這樣，“股票社會主義”怎能迫使工人接受資本主義紀律呢？如果不能的話，它在經(jīng)濟上又如何運轉？其次，如果唯一能夠防止“股票社會主義”蛻變?yōu)橘Y本主義的不過是禁止繼承股票的一條法律，那么那些擁有大多數(shù)股票的少數(shù)富有者為什么不能夠利用他們所擁有的經(jīng)濟力量來影響立法機關，把這條法律廢除掉呢？而且，如果股票不能繼承的話，股票持有者到了晚年又何必在用股票投資時認真負責呢？如何防止他們將股票用于不合理的、風險過高的投資呢？“股票社會主義”同樣沒有逃脫市場社會主義的困境，盡管它已經(jīng)和資本主義沒有什么差別了。　　

　 　

（二）信息問題，激勵問題，和社會主義社會關系　　

    資產(chǎn)階級經(jīng)濟學家和市場社會主義者認為，社會主義計劃經(jīng)濟不可行，因為它解決不了信息問題。什么是信息問題？任何現(xiàn)代經(jīng)濟要運行，都必須能夠收集和處理數(shù)量龐大的信息。在市場經(jīng)濟中，這些數(shù)量龐大的信息是由幾百萬個私人生產(chǎn)者同時處理的。資產(chǎn)階級經(jīng)濟學家和市場社會主義者認為，如果要以計劃經(jīng)濟來代替市場經(jīng)濟，中央計劃當局就必須有能力收集和處理原來是由幾百萬個私人生產(chǎn)者收集和處理的巨大數(shù)量的信息。問題不僅在于中央計劃當局的計算能力。更主要的是，很大一部分經(jīng)濟信息是以零碎的和分散的形式存在的。這些信息只有由數(shù)以百萬計的人同時處理才能夠加以收集和利用。由于中央計劃當局不能夠收集和利用這樣很大一部分經(jīng)濟信息，它也就無法進行理性的經(jīng)濟計算，計劃經(jīng)濟也就無法合理運行了?！?〕　　

    在我們分析信息問題以前，讓我們先說明一下什么是計劃經(jīng)濟。計劃經(jīng)濟并不等于說每一件事情都納入計劃或者每一件事情都由中央計劃當局來決定。在計劃經(jīng)濟中，全部（或大部分）生產(chǎn)資料都由社會所有，全部（或大部分）社會產(chǎn)品都直接為了社會需要而生產(chǎn)，而不是為了私人占有或謀取交換價值而生產(chǎn)。由于實行了社會所有制和為直接為社會需要而生產(chǎn)，在計劃經(jīng)濟中，生產(chǎn)者就有可能相互積極合作，并利用一切的現(xiàn)有技術，通過不同層次的經(jīng)濟計劃，來協(xié)調他們相互之間的經(jīng)濟活動。　　

    如果是這樣的話，計劃經(jīng)濟為什么解決不了信息問題呢？如果中央計劃當局，或者說，最高的生產(chǎn)者聯(lián)合體，不能夠處理所有有用的經(jīng)濟信息，它只須處理它能夠收集和處理的信息就可以了，然后把其余信息交給下級生產(chǎn)者聯(lián)合體去處理。不過在這樣做時，要與降低協(xié)調層次所造成的不利的方面相權衡。至于下級生產(chǎn)者聯(lián)合體，他們可以根據(jù)他們所掌握的信息來做出相應層次上的經(jīng)濟決策，而把他們處理不了的問題交給更下級的生產(chǎn)者聯(lián)合體或基層生產(chǎn)者－勞動者集體。數(shù)以百萬計的下級生產(chǎn)者聯(lián)合體和勞動者集體，就象市場經(jīng)濟中數(shù)以百萬計的企業(yè)一樣，可以處理數(shù)量龐大的零碎的和分散的信息。這樣，計劃經(jīng)濟至少可以收集和處理與市場經(jīng)濟同樣多的經(jīng)濟信息。　　

    不僅如此，在計劃經(jīng)濟條件下，有可能以更優(yōu)越的方式利用經(jīng)濟信息?，F(xiàn)代社會化大生產(chǎn)客觀上要求許多生產(chǎn)者之間相互合作、相互協(xié)調。但是在市場經(jīng)濟中，各個私人生產(chǎn)者各自獨立地、分散地作出經(jīng)濟決策，不能夠事先對經(jīng)濟活動進行協(xié)調，經(jīng)濟均衡只能在事后以經(jīng)濟危機的形式，通過對生產(chǎn)力的巨大破壞來實現(xiàn)。〔2〕另一方面，在計劃經(jīng)濟中，只要能夠掌握相應的經(jīng)濟信息，就有可能通過統(tǒng)一的經(jīng)濟計劃來協(xié)調許多生產(chǎn)者的經(jīng)濟活動，因而避免或減少由于沒有事先協(xié)調而造成的對經(jīng)濟資源的浪費。這當然不是說，在計劃經(jīng)濟中，中央計劃當局可以把每一件事情都納入計劃，而是說，在計劃經(jīng)濟條件下，社會可以利用一切可以利用的技術手段來盡可能地協(xié)調各種經(jīng)濟活動，只要這種協(xié)調的收益大于收集和處理相應信息所需要的成本。這就為極大地提高整個經(jīng)濟的合理化水平提供了可能。而這個可能是市場經(jīng)濟條件下根本沒有的。所以，計劃經(jīng)濟不僅能夠收集和處理與市場經(jīng)濟同樣多的經(jīng)濟信息，而且還可以以比市場經(jīng)濟更合理的方式來利用這些信息?！　?/p>

    但是，問題還沒有解決呢。資產(chǎn)階級經(jīng)濟學家和市場社會主義者問道：那些下級生產(chǎn)者聯(lián)合體和勞動者集體為什么要積極地收集經(jīng)濟信息并且按照經(jīng)濟上合理的方式來利用這些信息呢？這就是所謂“激勵問題”。顯然，如果我們不能夠解決激勵問題，信息問題是不能夠真正解決的?！　?/p>

    在社會主義計劃經(jīng)濟中，所有生產(chǎn)者都直接為社會生產(chǎn)，社會總產(chǎn)品則按照民主決定的原則分配以滿足人們的物質和精神需要。這就提出了一個問題：如果在社會主義社會中，社會利益－社會總產(chǎn)品－是一切個人的物質利益和精神利益的源泉，為什么不能用社會利益本身來有效地激勵人們，為了他們自己的物質利益和精神利益，來追求經(jīng)濟合理性呢，也就是說，積極地收集和合理地利用經(jīng)濟信息呢？　　

    為什么社會主義計劃經(jīng)濟要建立在為社會利益而生產(chǎn)的基礎上呢？現(xiàn)代社會化大生產(chǎn)客觀上要求許多生產(chǎn)者之間相互合作、相互協(xié)調。但是，在市場經(jīng)濟中，每一個生產(chǎn)者都追求自己的私利。他們有足夠的激勵在彼此之間相互競爭、傾軋，卻沒有什么東西激勵他們相互合作。市場所給予的激勵因而是與現(xiàn)代社會化大生產(chǎn)的邏輯相違背的。這個矛盾只有通過生產(chǎn)者直接為社會利益而不是為私人占有而生產(chǎn)來解決。所以，在現(xiàn)代社會化大生產(chǎn)條件下，就幫助人們追求和實現(xiàn)一定的物質利益和精神利益而言，為社會利益而生產(chǎn)（與為私人占有和交換價值而生產(chǎn)相比）是在經(jīng)濟上合理得多的一種方式。在這個意義上，社會利益本身就是一種實際的物質利益。正如馬克思所說：“這種共同的利益不是僅僅作為一種‘普遍的東西’存在于觀念之中，而且首先是作為彼此分工的個人之間的相互關系存在于現(xiàn)實之中?！?Marx,1978a,160)在《政治經(jīng)濟學批判大綱》中，馬克思又說，在現(xiàn)代社會化大生產(chǎn)條件下，“私人利益本身已經(jīng)是社會地決定了的利益。這個利益，只有根據(jù)社會所確立的條件、通過社會所提供的手段才能得以實現(xiàn)。”(Marx,1971,65)　　

    如果說，在現(xiàn)代社會化大生產(chǎn)條件下，社會利益本身就是實際的物質利益，并且是實現(xiàn)一切個人利益的前提，那么人們?yōu)槭裁床豢梢詾榱俗非笊鐣娑a(chǎn)和勞動呢？為什么不可以用社會利益來有效地激勵人們追求經(jīng)濟合理性呢？　　

    當然，這并不能說服資產(chǎn)階級經(jīng)濟學家和市場社會主義者。他們認為，為社會利益而生產(chǎn)是行不通的，因為它解決不了搭便車問題。就是說，在任何建立在社會所有制或集體所有制基礎上的生產(chǎn)制度中，勞動者的個人收益不直接取決于他本人的努力程度，而是取決于整個集體或全社會所有工人共同的努力，因而，按照資產(chǎn)階級經(jīng)濟學家和市場社會主義者的意見，也就沒有什么東西能夠激勵每一個勞動者有效地工作和合理地工作。但是，搭便車的邏輯是站不住腳的。正是由于勞動者的收益不取決于他本人的努力，而是取決于整個集體或全社會所有勞動者共同的努力，對于每一個勞動者來說，要增進其個人利益，合理的策略就不應當建立在個人抉擇的基礎上，而應當建立在集體抉擇的基礎上。問題不在于對于每一個個人來說，什么是他增進其個人利益的最好策略，而在于對于整個集體或全社會的所有勞動者來說，什么是他們增進他們的共同利益的最好策略。顯然，如果每一個勞動者都采用搭便車的策略，據(jù)認為是最優(yōu)的個人策略，每一個人都會蒙受損失。因此，搭便車的策略實際上是與增進個人利益的目的相違背的。既然是這樣，并且人據(jù)說是有理性的，是追求個人利益的，那么為什么人們要采用搭便車的策略而不去采用對于集體來說或對于社會來說是最優(yōu)的策略呢？　　

    在資本主義市場制度下?lián)f是不存在搭便車問題的。當然，資本主義制度在激勵資本家追求私人利潤方面是很有效的。但是，資本主義制度能夠給受資本家壓迫和剝削的廣大工人什么激勵呢？實際從事生產(chǎn)過程的是工人，不是資本家，可是資本主義制度用什么激勵來使工人積極地收集經(jīng)濟信息并加以合理的利用呢？沒有有效的激勵，在資本主義制度下，所有的工人都是潛在的搭便車者。資本主義經(jīng)濟要運轉，就必須花費一大筆交易費用來對付搭便車問題。比如，很大一部分社會勞動力必須處于失業(yè)狀態(tài)，以對在業(yè)工人施加競爭壓力，否則后者就會變得非?！皯卸琛?。而在在業(yè)工人當中，又必須要有很大一部分工人充當監(jiān)督工人，幫助資本家執(zhí)行勞動紀律而不能參加生產(chǎn)。　　

    這說明，搭便車問題，與其說是產(chǎn)生于集體所有制或社會所有制，倒不如說是產(chǎn)生于壓迫性的和剝削性的社會關系。在被壓迫和被剝削的狀況下，勞動者對于追求經(jīng)濟合理性沒有任何興趣，而搭便車卻是他們爭取改善自身狀況的一種合理的策略。如果是這樣，社會主義制度，通過消滅一切形式的壓迫和剝削，當然能夠比資本主義制度更好地解決搭便車的問題。　　

    同樣的，人們是否愿意為社會利益而勞動呢？要正確地回答這個問題，我們就必須首先搞清楚我們是以什么樣的社會關系為前提。在壓迫性社會中，所謂社會利益無非就是壓迫者階級的利益。在這種情況下，勞動人民當然沒有任何理由去為所謂社會利益而勞動。另一方面，在社會主義社會中，勞動人民掌握了社會權力和經(jīng)濟權力，社會的利益也就無非是全體勞動人民的共同利益，那么，勞動人民為什么不可以為了社會利益，也就是為了他們自己的利益而勞動呢？　　

    所有的爭辯都可以歸結為這樣一個問題：在社會主義社會中，為社會利益而勞動，是不是符合勞動人民自己的利益？如果是的話，那么在社會主義社會中，為什么勞動人民不可以為了社會利益而勞動呢，為什么不可以用社會利益來有效地激勵勞動者追求經(jīng)濟合理性呢？答案是不言而喻的?！　?/p>

    這就提出了一個問題：社會主義計劃經(jīng)濟能不能有效地激勵人們追求經(jīng)濟合理性－這一問題怎么會成為一個問題呢？在現(xiàn)代社會化大生產(chǎn)條件下，人們要實現(xiàn)自己的物質利益和精神利益，最合理的辦法就是直接為社會而生產(chǎn)，這不是一個明顯的事實嗎？在社會主義社會關系中，社會的利益不再與勞動人民的利益相背離，這不也是一個明顯的事實嗎？　　

    在這個問題上，馬克思主義的觀點是從一個不言而喻的事實出發(fā)的：即人們的一定的物質和精神需要是人類一切生產(chǎn)活動和促使人們不斷追求經(jīng)濟合理性的最終的原動力。社會主義社會關系的建立當然沒有廢除這個根本的原動力。正相反，由于廢除了一切形式的壓迫和剝削，社會主義社會使絕大多數(shù)人民能夠為了他們自己的利益，而不是壓迫者和剝削者的利益而生產(chǎn)和勞動。從這個觀點看，就調動絕大多數(shù)人追求經(jīng)濟合理性的積極性而言，社會主義經(jīng)濟制度所提供的激勵要比資本主義制度或其它任何壓迫制度所能提供的強大得多，因而關于社會主義經(jīng)濟能不能有效地激勵人們追求經(jīng)濟合理性的問題就完全不成其為一個問題?！　?/p>

    另一方面，資產(chǎn)階級經(jīng)濟學家和市場社會主義者從下面的假設出發(fā)：人們只有在為私人利益而生產(chǎn)和勞動的時候才追求經(jīng)濟合理性。正是從這個假設出發(fā)，才產(chǎn)生了下面的問題－一個社會，如果是建立在社會而生產(chǎn)，而不是為私人占有而生產(chǎn)的基礎上，怎么能夠有效地激勵人們追求經(jīng)濟合理性呢？但是，如果人們追求經(jīng)濟合理性是為了實現(xiàn)一定的物質利益和精神利益，那么至于這些利益是采取社會利益的形式還是采取私人利益的形式又有什么關系呢？－只要這些利益確實是他們自己的利益。同樣一件產(chǎn)品，它所能給予人們的在物質上和精神上的滿足，當然不會因為它現(xiàn)在是直接為了社會生產(chǎn)出來的而不是為了私人占有而生產(chǎn)出來的而有所減低。所以，與馬克思主義的出發(fā)點不同，資產(chǎn)階級經(jīng)濟學家和市場社會主義者的出發(fā)點不是一個不言而喻的事實，而是一個未經(jīng)證實的假設，這個假設不經(jīng)過證明是站不住腳的。但是，資產(chǎn)階級經(jīng)濟學家和市場社會主義者并沒有為他們的這個基本假設提供一個科學的證明，而是把它當作理所當然的，似乎它就是一個不言而喻的事實，并且自以為是地從這個假設推導出他們的所有論點，包括社會主義計劃經(jīng)濟不能夠提供有效的經(jīng)濟激勵因而不可行的論點。　　

    有必要指出，有不少的馬克思主義者不敢在這個問題上向資產(chǎn)階級經(jīng)濟學家和市場社會主義者挑戰(zhàn)。因此，他們捍衛(wèi)社會主義計劃經(jīng)濟的努力（主要是設計一些五花八門的技術模型）總是難免歸于徒勞。因為，如果我們接受了資產(chǎn)階級經(jīng)濟學家和市場社會主義者的出發(fā)點，并且同意只有用私人利益才能調動人的積極性，那么，解決“激勵問題”的唯一辦法就只有設計一些“監(jiān)督機制”。但是，計劃當局要進行有效的監(jiān)督，就必須掌握足夠的有關信息，而問題恰恰在于計劃當局沒有能力收集和處理足夠的信息。在這種情況下，激勵問題根本就是沒有辦法解決的?！　?/p>

    另一方面，如果我們跳出資產(chǎn)階級經(jīng)濟學家和市場社會主義者的狹隘眼界，我們就會立刻發(fā)現(xiàn)，激勵問題之所以成為一個問題，無非是由于下面這個事實：由于廢除了私有制和市場制度，社會主義社會也就廢除了建立在私人占有制度基礎上的經(jīng)濟激勵機制。但是，正是由于廢除了這些東西，社會主義社會也就廢除了對絕大多數(shù)人民的壓迫和剝削，因而絕大多數(shù)人也就有了比在壓迫制度下大得多的積極性來追求經(jīng)濟合理性。不僅如此，由于把生產(chǎn)交給社會來管理，并且由于直接為社會利益而生產(chǎn)，在社會主義制度下，生產(chǎn)者就能夠積極地相互合作，把增進全社會的利益作為自己的目標，從而最充分地利用現(xiàn)代社會化大生產(chǎn)的巨大生產(chǎn)潛力。所以，一方面，由于建立了社會主義社會關系，激勵問題就不可能按照資本主義的或者任何其它一種壓迫制度的方式來解決了。另一方面，也正是由于建立了社會主義社會關系，這就使問題有可能按照社會主義的方式來解決，按照與絕大多數(shù)人民的解放和自由發(fā)展相一致的方式來解決。激勵問題就這樣解決了。在激勵問題解決以后，信息問題就沒有理由不能解決了。在信息問題和激勵問題都解決了以后，就沒有理由說社會主義計劃經(jīng)濟行不通了。　　

    于是，在邏輯上，問題就已經(jīng)解決了。但是，這個邏輯要成立，社會主義社會關系必須首先建立起來，而社會主義社會關系能不能建立起來，要取決于實際的社會斗爭。正是在實際的社會斗爭中，而不是在經(jīng)院式的爭辯中，才能找到對于“社會主義計劃經(jīng)濟是否可行”這一問題的實際的歷史的解決辦法。　　

　 　

（三）革命中國的經(jīng)驗　　

    人們愿意為社會利益而勞動嗎？社會主義計劃經(jīng)濟可行嗎？在這一節(jié)中，我們將集中討論革命中國的經(jīng)驗，看一看中國的革命社會主義者和中國勞動人民是怎樣為了建設社會主義社會關系和社會主義計劃經(jīng)濟而斗爭的。他們在斗爭中取得了哪些成就？他們的斗爭為什么最后失敗了？我們從他們的失敗中可以汲取哪些教訓？　　

　 　

（1）官僚主義，革命政權，和經(jīng)濟計劃　　

    當中國共產(chǎn)黨在1949年奪取政權的時候，他們從國民黨政權那里繼承下來的是一個半殖民地半封建的、幾乎沒有現(xiàn)代工業(yè)的極端落后的經(jīng)濟。新生的革命政權因而立刻就面臨著恢復和發(fā)展生產(chǎn)力的任務。問題是以什么樣的方式來發(fā)展生產(chǎn)力呢？由于廢除了資本主義生產(chǎn)資料所有制，由于大多數(shù)現(xiàn)代的生產(chǎn)資料都集中在了國家手中，革命政權就有可能通過統(tǒng)一的經(jīng)濟計劃在全社會范圍內合理配置生產(chǎn)資源?！　?/p>

    社會主義經(jīng)濟計劃，按照馬克思的意見，必須是建立在“生產(chǎn)者自治”的基礎上。這就要求勞動人民能夠廣泛地參與各級經(jīng)濟管理，而這又以消滅了腦力勞動和體力勞動的分工為前提。但是當時的中國還不具備這方面的條件。據(jù)估計，在當時中國最發(fā)達的工業(yè)城市－上海，1949年時，有46％的職工是文盲，而在藍領工人中文盲率高達80％。(Andors,1977,48)這就帶來了一系列嚴重的后果。首先，在沒有“生產(chǎn)者自治”的情況下，為了適應計劃經(jīng)濟發(fā)展的需要，就建立起了龐大、復雜的官僚機構，黨和國家的機關因而迅速地官僚化了。其次，為了管理這些官僚機構，大批來自資產(chǎn)階級和知識分子家庭的人被吸收入黨，因為他們擁有必要的經(jīng)濟管理知識和專業(yè)技能。其中很多人加入共產(chǎn)黨不是出于革命理想，而是把黨看做是獲取權力的階梯。第三，官僚主義計劃依靠物質刺激來調動干部和工人的積極性。在1956年工資改革以后，在革命戰(zhàn)爭年代實行的平等主義的供給制被取消了，代之以等級制的工資和獎金制度。所以，到五十年代末，一個擁有一定物質特權的官僚主義者階級已經(jīng)初步形成了。(Meisner,1986,125-130)　　

    另一方面，如果認為中國這一時期的經(jīng)濟計劃就是官僚主義計劃，那也是非常錯誤的。一方面，官僚主義者階級正在形成，另一方面，仍然有數(shù)以百萬計的革命干部在黨和國家機關中工作?！?〕只要很大一部分政權還掌握在這些革命干部手中，這個政權在很大程度上就仍然是革命社會主義政權。這對于中國的經(jīng)濟計劃搞得怎么樣，不能不是一個起決定性作用的因素。從1953－1957年，也就是在第一個五年計劃時期，中國的國民收入年平均增長8.9％，工業(yè)年平均增長18％，農業(yè)年平均增長4.5％。如果按照西方的估計，柏格森估計中國這一時期的國內生產(chǎn)總值年平均增長率是8.3％(Riskin,1987,58)，趙康（音）估計中國這一時期的工業(yè)年平均增長率是14.4％。(Chao,1960)即使按照趙康的估計，中國也是這一時期世界上工業(yè)增長最快的國家之一?！　?/p>

    政權是不是革命的性質為什么會影響經(jīng)濟計劃的好壞呢？我們知道，計劃經(jīng)濟要合理運行，就必須要解決信息問題和激勵問題。如果勞動者自覺地為社會利益而勞動，這兩個問題就都可以得到解決。如果政治權力在很大程度上掌握在革命社會主義者手中，社會的利益也就在很大程度上與勞動人民的利益相一致，這就為勞動者為社會利益而勞動提供了客觀基礎。另一方面，如果有數(shù)以百萬計的革命干部和工人能夠“忠實地執(zhí)行黨的政策，同時還善于獨立思考和富于首創(chuàng)精神(Meisner,1986,129)”，很多需要發(fā)揮基層的積極性和主動性的問題就可以及時得到解決。這些革命干部和工人，同時又是有力的榜樣，鼓舞著許多其他人為社會利益而勞動。所有這些條件，只有在很大一部分政治權力仍然掌握在革命社會主義者手中的情況下，才能夠存在。而革命政權能不能制止住官僚化的趨勢，保持其革命的性質，則是要在實際的斗爭中來決定的?！　?/p>

　 　

（2）毛澤東主義政治經(jīng)濟學和大躍進　　

    從五十年代后期開始，毛澤東逐漸注意到了官僚主義計劃的矛盾。在批評斯大林主義政治經(jīng)濟學時，毛澤東指出：　　

　 　

書中說對勞動的物質刺激“促使生產(chǎn)增加”，“是促使生產(chǎn)發(fā)展的決定因素之一”。但是物質刺激不一定每年都變化。人不一定天天、月月、年年都需要物質刺激。在困難的時候，減少一些物質刺激，人們也要干，而且干得很好。教科書把物質刺激片面化，絕對化，不把提高覺悟放在重要地位，他們不能解釋同級工資中為什么人們的勞動有幾種不同的情況。比如說，都是五級工，可是有一部分人干得很好，有一部分人干得很不好，還有一部分人干得大體上還好。物質刺激都是一樣，為什么有這樣不同呢？照他們的道理是解釋不通的。即使承認物質刺激是一個重要的原則，但總不是唯一的原則，總還要有另一個原則，在政治思想方面的精神鼓勵的原則。同時，物質刺激不能單講個人利益，還應該講集體利益，應該講個人利益服從集體利益，暫時利益服從長遠利益，局部利益服從全局利益。(Mao,1977b,83)　　

　 　

    在毛澤東看來，官僚主義計劃片面地依賴物質刺激調動人的積極性－這行不通。只有靠提高人們的覺悟，從而使人們愿意自覺地為社會利益而不是狹隘的個人利益而勞動，才能夠充分發(fā)揮社會主義計劃經(jīng)濟的生產(chǎn)潛力。毛澤東在這一點上是非常正確的。但是，官僚主義計劃為什么不能夠提高人們的覺悟呢？毛澤東說：　　

　 　

我們的經(jīng)驗－如果干部不放下架子，不同工人打成一片，工人就往往不把工廠看成是自己的，而看成是干部的。干部的老爺態(tài)度使工人不愿意自覺地遵守勞動紀律......既然體力勞動者和企業(yè)領導人員是統(tǒng)一的生產(chǎn)集體的成員，“為什么社會主義企業(yè)必須實行一長制而不能實行集體領導下的首長制”......？政治弱，就只好講物質刺激了......(Mao,1977b,86)　　

　 　

    毛澤東說：“政治弱，就只好講物質刺激了......”這是很對的。但是，“政治”的毛病在哪里呢？毛澤東認識到，要勞動者為社會利益而勞動，就必須有平等的社會關系，工人還必須參加社會、經(jīng)濟管理。另一方面，毛澤東仍然認為，只要在黨內提倡發(fā)揚革命精神，以及依靠黨委來監(jiān)督技術官僚就可以解決問題了（黨委領導下的廠長負責制）。共產(chǎn)黨，在他看來，仍然是一個革命政黨?！　?/p>

    毛澤東的政治經(jīng)濟學思想在大躍進中被付諸實踐。為了解決官僚化的問題，對計劃制度進行了改造，很多權力下放到了地方和企業(yè)；在一些工廠進行了工人參加管理的試驗；物質刺激受到批判，很多工廠廢除了計件工資和獎金。(Andors,1977,68-96)　　

    行政分權本身無助于解決官僚化問題。在沒有建立起新的社會關系和相應的激勵機制的情況下，過多的權力下放只會破壞官僚主義制度原有的協(xié)調和監(jiān)督機制，從而導致經(jīng)濟混亂。至于工人參加管理，在大躍進中還只是限于班組一級，不觸及整個的社會經(jīng)濟關系。　　

    大躍進的嘗試中是有一些合理成份的。比如，在官僚主義計劃中，據(jù)說靠物質刺激就可以鼓勵人們?yōu)樯鐣鎰趧印嶋H上，根本沒有什么“完美的”或“科學的”刺激機制。于是，單純的物質刺激不但不能激勵人們?yōu)樯鐣娑鴦趧樱€往往鼓勵人們做違背社會利益的事。比如說，如果計劃是根據(jù)實物產(chǎn)量制定的，這就鼓勵人們用犧牲質量的辦法來增加產(chǎn)量。顯然，這個問題只有靠人們自覺地追求社會利益才能夠解決。比如，即使沒有計件工資，勞動者也可以努力增加產(chǎn)量，同時自覺地維持一定的質量標準。但是，這只有在社會的利益與勞動人民利益相一致的情況下才是可能的。所以，物質刺激不是問題的原因，而是一定社會條件的產(chǎn)物。這個社會條件就是，有相當一部分社會權力已經(jīng)不是在革命者手中，而是在新生的官僚主義者階級手中了。大躍進并沒有觸及問題的根本－官僚主義者階級的社會權力，而是想靠人為地消除問題所起的一些后果來解決問題本身，這當然行不通?！　?/p>

　 　

（3）文化大革命及其教訓　　

    在大躍進失敗以后，毛澤東開始認識到問題是不能夠在現(xiàn)存權力結構范圍內得到解決的。到1965年，毛澤東認為，在革命后的中國已經(jīng)出現(xiàn)了一個官僚主義者階級：“官僚主義者階級與工人階級和貧下中農是兩個尖銳對立的階級。這些人是已經(jīng)變成或者正在變成吸工人血的資產(chǎn)階級分子。他們怎么會  認識  足呢？這些人是斗爭對象、革命對象。”后來，毛澤東從這里后退了一步，將革命對象定義為“黨內走資本主義道路的當權派”。但是很清楚，對于毛澤東來說，問題已經(jīng)是只有靠向現(xiàn)存權力挑戰(zhàn)才可能得到解決了。1966年，毛澤東親手發(fā)動了文化大革命?！　?/p>

    按照毛澤東和他的同志們的意見，文化大革命的主要目的就是要打倒“黨內走資本主義道路的當權派”。也就是說，很大一部分社會權力已經(jīng)不在革命者手中，而是在“走資派”手中。革命力量因此必須與“走資派”做斗爭，把權力奪回來。毛澤東和他的同志們還正確地指出：“無產(chǎn)階級文化大革命，只能是群眾自己解放自己，不能采用任何包辦代替的辦法?！?CPC,1968,398)所以，文化大革命不僅是要推翻舊的官僚主義權力，而且要代之以新式的人民政權：　　

　 　

文化革命小組、文化革命委員會和文化革命代表大會......是無產(chǎn)階級文化革命的權力機構。......文化革命小組、文化革命委員會的成員和文化革命代表大會的代表的產(chǎn)生，要象巴黎公社那樣，必須實行全面的選舉制。候選名單，要由革命群眾充分醞釀提出來，再經(jīng)過群眾反復討論后，進行選舉。當選的文化革命小組、文化革命委員會的成員和文化革命代表大會的代表，可以由群眾隨時提出批評，如果不稱職，經(jīng)過群眾討論，可以改選、撤換。(CPC,1968,401)　　

　 　

    另一方面，文化大革命在理論上和實踐上都存在著嚴重的缺點。理論上，毛澤東和他的同志們沒有能夠對革命后的中國社會做出一個科學的分析。首先，按照毛澤東和他的同志們的意見，文化大革命的打擊對象不是官僚主義者階級本身，而只是一小撮“走資派”，而“百分之九十五的干部”仍然被認為是“好的和比較好的”。其次，在毛澤東和他的同志們看來，文化大革命之所以必要，是因為：　　

　 　

資產(chǎn)階級雖然已經(jīng)被推翻，但是，他們企圖用剝削階級的舊思想，舊文化，舊風俗，舊習慣，來腐蝕群眾，征服人心，力求達到他們復辟的目的。無產(chǎn)階級恰恰相反，必須迎頭痛擊資產(chǎn)階級在意識形態(tài)領域里的一切挑戰(zhàn)，用無產(chǎn)階級的新思想，新文化，新風俗，新習慣，來改變整個社會的精神面貌。(CPC,1968,395)　　

　 　

毛澤東和他的同志們把黨內出現(xiàn)“走資派”簡單地歸結為是由于資產(chǎn)階級思想的影響，這就完全沒有能夠用歷史唯物主義觀點來科學地解釋官僚主義者階級產(chǎn)生的原因，因而也就不能夠找到正確的解決問題的辦法。　　

    另一方面，盡管革命的正確方法“只能是群眾自己解放自己”，正如列寧所指出的，勞動人民由于處于被壓迫、被剝削的狀況，被剝奪了從事科學探索的權利，完全憑他們自己是不能夠達到對社會的科學認識的。即使在革命后的社會中，只要還存在腦力勞動和體力勞動的分工，這種情況仍然是不能避免的。所以，如果沒有一個由革命知識分子組成的、能夠科學地認識社會發(fā)展進程的革命政黨做領導，勞動人民，僅憑他們自己，是不能夠成功地進行反對官僚主義者階級的革命的。在舊的共產(chǎn)黨已經(jīng)蛻變?yōu)橐患芄倭胖髁x機器的情況下，要成功地進行文化大革命，就必須有一個新的革命政黨。沒有這樣一個黨，文化大革命就不能帶來任何建設性的成果，而只有毀于一片混亂之中?！　?/p>

　 　

（四）社會主義計劃經(jīng)濟可行嗎？　　

    資產(chǎn)階級經(jīng)濟學家和市場社會主義者認為，社會主義計劃經(jīng)濟解決不了信息問題和激勵問題，所以是行不通的。但是，即使是按照資產(chǎn)階級統(tǒng)計，前社會主義國家在按人口平均的經(jīng)濟發(fā)展速度上也并不比資本主義國家慢。（見表7.1）而且，有那么一個時期，這些國家在經(jīng)濟發(fā)展方面還曾經(jīng)明顯優(yōu)越于資本主義國家。如果說社會主義計劃經(jīng)濟解決不了信息問題和激勵問題，那么前社會主義國家在經(jīng)濟發(fā)展上一度取得的成就又怎么解釋呢？　　

    對于這個問題，資產(chǎn)階級經(jīng)濟學家和市場社會主義者有這樣幾種解釋。首先，他們說，在經(jīng)濟發(fā)展的早期階段，經(jīng)濟結構相對簡單，比較容易管理。但是在經(jīng)歷了早期階段以后，經(jīng)濟結構變得越來越復雜，計劃經(jīng)濟要合理運行也就越來越困難了。然而，這個說法與經(jīng)驗事實不相符合。七十年代末的中國經(jīng)濟恐怕還比不上五十年代的東德經(jīng)濟復雜。但是五十年代的東德經(jīng)濟成就卓著，而中國的計劃經(jīng)濟到七十年代末已經(jīng)難以為繼了。另一方面，所謂經(jīng)濟結構越來越復雜，基本上是說，勞動分工越分越細，產(chǎn)品種類越來越多，生產(chǎn)單位之間的相互聯(lián)系因而越來越多。也就是說，這基本上是一個怎樣求解“幾百萬個方程”的問題。這個問題本身，靠著現(xiàn)代計算機的幫助，是并不難解決的。蘇聯(lián)式中央計劃經(jīng)濟的真正的問題在于，中央計劃當局無法收集和處理大量的分散的、零碎的信息。只有身在現(xiàn)場的生產(chǎn)者才能夠了解和處理這些信息，比如，對某種產(chǎn)品的質量和技術性能的詳細描述。這個問題在經(jīng)濟發(fā)展的早期階段實際上與在后來的階段是一樣復雜的?！　?/p>

    資產(chǎn)階級經(jīng)濟學家和市場社會主義者又說，前社會主義國家的經(jīng)濟增長是“粗放式增長”而不是“集約式增長”，靠  得  是大量投入資源而不是技術進步，因此在長期是行不通的。充分利用過去未經(jīng)利用的資源的確對社會主義國家早期的經(jīng)濟發(fā)展起了不小的作用。但是，這當然不是社會主義經(jīng)濟不合理和沒有效率的證據(jù)。只靠投入資源本身是變不出經(jīng)濟增長來的。即使是“粗放式增長”，也要按照經(jīng)濟上合理的方式來配置和使用生產(chǎn)資源，工人也要知道生產(chǎn)什么，怎樣生產(chǎn)，生產(chǎn)多少。而所有這些，只有在工人或多或少按照預期的要求去做的情況下才能轉化為經(jīng)濟增長。就是說，即使是“粗放式增長”，也要解決信息問題和激勵問題。所以，問題仍然是，如果計劃經(jīng)濟解決不了信息問題和激勵問題，又怎么能實現(xiàn)哪怕是“粗放式”的增長呢？其次，資產(chǎn)階級經(jīng)濟學家和市場社會主義者的說法也不符合經(jīng)驗事實。表7.2表明，1950－1973年，17個資本主義國家（包括7個主要的發(fā)達資本主義國家和10個“中等收入國家”）的勞動生產(chǎn)率的算術平均數(shù)是4.4％，其中10個“中等收入國家”的算術平均數(shù)是4.2％。在同一時期，6個社會主義國家的勞動生產(chǎn)率的算術平均數(shù)是4.5％。這些數(shù)字當然不表示社會主義經(jīng)濟在技術進步方面比資本主義經(jīng)濟差?！?〕　　

　 　

表7.2 若干國家勞動生產(chǎn)率(每工時國內生產(chǎn)總值)增長率,1950-73年　　

資本主義國家           %     社會主義國家             %　　

阿根廷                2.4    保加利亞                6.1　　

巴西                  3.7    捷克斯洛伐克            3.4　　

加拿大                3.0    匈牙利                  3.9　　

智利                  2.9    波蘭                   3.8　　

哥倫比亞              3.3    羅馬尼亞                6.2　　

法國                  5.1    蘇聯(lián)                   3.4　　

德國                  6.0    算術平均數(shù)              4.5　　

希臘                  6.4　　

意大利                5.8　　

日本                  7.7　　

墨西哥                4.0　　

秘魯                  3.4　　

葡萄牙                6.0　　

西班牙                6.4　　

英國                  3.1　　

美國                  2.7　　

委內瑞拉              3.4　　

算術平均數(shù)            4.4　　

"中等收入國家"算術平均數(shù)     4.2　　

資料來源:Maddison,1995,79-80.　　

　 　

    我們知道，社會主義計劃經(jīng)濟要合理運行，就必須要解決信息問題和激勵問題。而要解決這兩個問題，就必須建立起社會主義的社會關系。所以，如果不對前社會主義國家的社會關系的歷史演變做一番分析，我們是無法真正理解這些國家一度所取得的經(jīng)濟成就的。一方面，在前蘇聯(lián)、中國和東歐，在革命以后，直接掌握政治權力和社會權力的不是勞動人民自己，而是勞動人民利益在形式上的代表－一個革命先鋒隊政黨。就此而言，這些國家革命后的社會還不是真正意義上的社會主義社會。另一方面，我們也不能否認，這些政黨，在它們的早期階段，確實曾經(jīng)是真正的革命者的黨，曾經(jīng)真誠地為社會主義和勞動人民的解放事業(yè)進行過奮斗。既然是這樣，那么毫不奇怪，這些國家在革命后所產(chǎn)生的政權，在早期必然或多或少是帶有革命性質的政權，因而能夠推行與勞動人民的利益基本一致的政治、經(jīng)濟和社會政策。所以，在這些社會的早期，社會的利益與勞動人民的利益在很大程度上是一致的，這就為勞動人民為社會利益而勞動提供了一定的客觀基礎?！　?/p>

    在那個年代，曾經(jīng)有千千萬萬的人不是為了他們個人的私利，而是為了勞動人民的共同利益，為了革命和社會主義，為了無產(chǎn)階級國際主義，為了建設共產(chǎn)主義而勞動，這是一個歷史事實。這個歷史事實怎么能不對生產(chǎn)力的發(fā)展產(chǎn)生重大的影響呢？正是這一歷史上特定的社會關系才能正確地解釋前社會主義國家一度所取得的經(jīng)濟成就。    如果我們對革命中國整個的歷史時期做一個考察，那么大致可以將其分為兩個階段。第一個階段是1949－1957年。在這個階段，舊的壓迫秩序和剝削秩序已經(jīng)被推翻，勞動人民的政治地位和經(jīng)濟地位都有了極大的改善，而新的官僚主義者階級尚在形成過程中。在這個階段，社會主義中國的經(jīng)濟高速地向前發(fā)展，對資本主義經(jīng)濟表現(xiàn)出明顯的優(yōu)越性。第二個階段是從1957年（“百花齊放、百家爭鳴”，反右，大躍進）到七十年代末。這個階段的特點是官僚主義者階級全面興起和階級斗爭全面激化，在文化大革命中達到了高潮。在這個階段，盡管有巨大的社會動蕩，由于革命社會主義力量仍然掌握一部分社會權力，因而勞動人民的社會主義覺悟仍然在經(jīng)濟發(fā)展中發(fā)揮著一定的作用。因此，在這個階段，中國經(jīng)濟仍然能夠以一定的速度（不低于世界中等水平）向前發(fā)展。只是在文化大革命失敗以后，官僚主義者階級的統(tǒng)治得以鞏固，社會主義計劃經(jīng)濟才在政治的和社會的意義上完全不可行了，資本主義市場化因而也就成了解決中國經(jīng)濟問題的唯一“可行”的辦法（官僚主義者階級當然不可能靠動員勞動人民的社會主義覺悟來解決信息問題和激勵問題）。      　　

    我們從革命中國的經(jīng)驗中可以汲取哪些經(jīng)驗教訓呢？第一，在革命社會主義政權的領導下，計劃經(jīng)濟是完全行得通的，并且其經(jīng)濟成就是完全有可能超過資本主義的。如果是這樣，那么在社會主義社會關系完全建立起來以后，情況會是怎樣呢？答案是不言而喻的：社會主義計劃經(jīng)濟不僅可行，而且無論在經(jīng)濟上還是在社會上都將比資本主義合理得多、有效率得多。第二，社會主義計劃經(jīng)濟是不是可行，首先不是一個理論問題，而是一個實踐問題，其結論要取決于歷史上的實際的爭取社會主義的斗爭。在革命社會主義力量奪取政權以后，爭取社會主義的斗爭還沒有結束。革命社會主義力量在奪取政權以后，必須努力用正確的革命理論教育和組織勞動群眾，采用象巴黎公社那樣的適當?shù)恼谓M織形式，通過積極的斗爭來遏制官僚化的發(fā)展和保障新生政權的革命性質。另一方面，在具備了必要的生產(chǎn)力條件以后，革命社會主義政權應當立即著手對資本主義遺留下來的不合理的經(jīng)濟結構進行徹底的改造，以便伴隨著社會勞動生產(chǎn)率的不斷提高，逐步地縮短勞動人民的一般的勞動時間，從而使所有社會成員都能夠自由地發(fā)展他們在體力和智力方面的潛能，都能夠參與社會管理和經(jīng)濟管理，也就是說，消滅腦力勞動和體力勞動的分工，因而消滅階級統(tǒng)治和階級壓迫的物質基礎。只有到了這個時候，我們才能說爭取社會主義的斗爭已經(jīng)取得了完全的、徹底的勝利?！?〕〔6〕　　

　 　

（五）阿列克·諾夫對馬克思主義的批判；對阿列克·諾夫的批判　　

    照阿列克·諾夫的意見，即使建立起了社會主義社會關系，問題也沒有什么根本的不同。社會分裂為統(tǒng)治者和被統(tǒng)治者，這是在一切歷史時代中都不可避免的。在社會主義社會，人們還是要為他們的私人利益而不是為社會利益而勞動，與資本主義社會沒有什么根本不同?！　?/p>

　 　

馬克思主義“原教旨主義者”爭辯說，（蘇聯(lián)式計劃）的根本問題在于異化，在于勞動者、管理者和中央之間的利益沖突；如果他們都認同一個共同利益，那么一切就都會變得很好。......但是，這樣一種思想方法包含著幾重錯誤......這些人沒有認識到，沒有市場的計劃模式必然是集中式的（一個純粹地方的機關怎么能決定社會的需要并很好地滿足它呢？），而中央計劃經(jīng)濟的龐大的和復雜的活動恰恰是造成異化的一個主要原因。巴蘭指出：“除非我們認識到，要對相互聯(lián)系的生產(chǎn)活動進行調節(jié)，調節(jié)的系統(tǒng)在客觀上只能是等級制的，否則關于社會主義民主的一切討論都不過是煽動人心罷了?！笨上?，巴蘭沒有由此得出應該得出的結論。最后，（馬克思主義“原教旨主義者”）以為，世界上可以有這樣一個社會，在這個社會中，各個部門之間，部門與中央之間，更不必說個人之間，將不會因為資源分配而發(fā)生沖突。馬克思主義傳統(tǒng)中這一基本上是烏托邦的部分，是建立在，只能建立在一種極大豐裕的基礎上。任何唯物主義者都得承認，（關于資源分配的）沖突是不可避免的，除非有足夠的東西來滿足所有的人，也就是說，當機會成本的概念，即在相互排斥的各種要求之間做出選擇，不再有任何意義的時候。(Nove,1980)　　

　 　

    首先，的確，經(jīng)濟計劃，并且事實上任何公共事務的管理，“必然是集中式的”。并且，就這些事務是“公共的”來說，也就是說，就它們超越了狹隘的個人和地方的界限來說，可以說它們“客觀上只能是等級制的”。但是，這些怎么會與“異化”，與社會分裂為統(tǒng)治階級和被壓迫階級聯(lián)系在一起呢？任何社會都要有一些人來管理它的公共事務。這件事本身并沒有告訴我們?yōu)槭裁瓷鐣至褳殡A級。要使社會上的一部分人成為統(tǒng)治階級，這些人就不僅必須是公共事務的管理者，而且還必須獨占公共事務的管理。只有這樣，他們才可能系統(tǒng)地利用他們的權位為他們的私人利益而不是公共利益服務。正如馬克思主義者所知道的，只要還存在腦力勞動和體力勞動的分工，因而絕大多數(shù)人還不能夠參與科學的和藝術的活動，還不能夠參與公共事務的管理，，這種情況（一小部分人獨占公共事務的管理）就有可能發(fā)生。另一方面，社會主義社會，通過合理地利用現(xiàn)代社會的生產(chǎn)力，逐步地消滅腦力勞動和體力勞動的分工，就可以消滅階級壓迫的物質基礎?！　?/p>

    其次，諾夫說：“中央計劃經(jīng)濟的龐大的和復雜的活動恰恰是造成異化的一個主要原因?！钡?，“龐大的和復雜的活動”本身并沒有告訴我們社會是怎樣管理這些活動的。在階級社會里，廣大人民群眾被排斥在公共事務的管理之外，所以，必須要組織一個龐大的和復雜的官僚機構來管理“龐大的和復雜的活動”。另一方面，在社會主義社會中，不需要把人民群眾排斥在公共事務的管理之外。正相反，社會主義的公共事務的管理正是要建立在人民群眾廣泛參與的基礎上。因而，也就沒有必要去建立一個龐大的和復雜的官僚機構。社會主義社會怎樣才能管理“龐大的和復雜的活動”呢？在社會主義社會，公共事務的管理是由馬克思所說的“自由人聯(lián)合體”來進行的。在《法蘭西內戰(zhàn)》中，馬克思具體說明了“自由人聯(lián)合體”是怎樣工作的：　　

　 　

巴黎公社自然應當作為法國一切大工業(yè)中心的榜樣。只要公社制度在巴黎和各個次要的中心確立起來，舊的中央集權政府就得也在外省讓位給生產(chǎn)者的自治機關。在公社還沒有來得及進一步加以發(fā)揮的全國組織綱要上說得十分清楚，公社應該成為甚至最小村落的政治組織形式......設在專區(qū)首府里的代表會議，應當本專區(qū)所有一切農村公社的公共事務，而這些專區(qū)的代表會議則應派代表參加巴黎的全國代表會議；代表必須嚴格遵守選民的mandat imperatif（確切訓令），并且隨時可以撤換。那時還會留給中央政府的為數(shù)不多然而非常重要的職能，則不應該象有人故意捏造的那樣予以廢除，而應該交給公社的官吏，即交給那些嚴格負責的官吏。(Marx,1978b,632)　　

　 　

所以，在社會主義社會里，依靠人民群眾的廣泛參與，就可以通過在各級“生產(chǎn)者的自治機關”之間合理地分工來有效地管理所謂“龐大的和復雜的活動”。通過這種分工，每一級“生產(chǎn)者的自治機關”都只須負責“為數(shù)不多然而非常重要的職能”，因而便于群眾或下級的“生產(chǎn)者的自治機關”對它們進行監(jiān)督和控制，因而所謂“造成異化的一個主要原因”也就無從談起了?！　?/p>

    但是，諾夫說，即使在社會主義社會中，普通人民群眾能夠參與和控制社會的公共事務，人們還是不愿意為社會利益而勞動，因為人們的個人利益總是相互沖突的，“除非有足夠的東西來滿足所有的人，也就是說，當機會成本的概念，即在相互排斥的各種要求之間做出選擇，不再有任何意義的時候?！边@樣一種“極大豐?！北恢Z夫說成是“馬克思主義傳統(tǒng)中這一基本上是烏托邦的部分”。沒有比這更加庸俗的對馬克思主義的歪曲了。社會主義必須建立在高度發(fā)達的生產(chǎn)力的基礎上（這個基礎主要是由資本主義發(fā)展來準備的）。只有有了高度發(fā)達的生產(chǎn)力，才能夠大幅度地減少一般的勞動時間，從而使絕大多數(shù)勞動人民有可能自由地發(fā)展他們在體力和智力方面的潛能，有可能參與公共事務的管理。但是，這與什么“當機會成本的概念......不再有任何意義的時候”或者諾夫所說的那種“極大豐?！焙翢o關系。抽象地說，人們的個人利益總是相互沖突的。已經(jīng)被一個人所消費的東西就不再能被另一個人消費。但是，首先，說人們的個人利益總是相互沖突的，不等于說人們就沒有共同利益，并且這些共同利益當然也是人們的個人利益。如果是這樣，那么，人們的個人利益之間存在著沖突這件事本身為什么會妨礙人們去追求也是他們的個人利益的共同利益呢？其次，在任何東西能被消費以前，這些東西必須先被生產(chǎn)出來。如果說，在現(xiàn)代社會化大生產(chǎn)條件下，任何東西的生產(chǎn)都或多或少有賴于生產(chǎn)者之間的相互合作，因而只有在生產(chǎn)者彼此之間積極合作而不是相互競爭的情況下，現(xiàn)代生產(chǎn)的潛力才能充分發(fā)揮出來－如果是這樣，那么人們的個人利益不是只有在他們相互合作為社會利益而生產(chǎn)而不是為了他們的私人利益而相互傾軋、競爭的情況下才能得到最好的實現(xiàn)嗎？如果情況是這樣，那么，作為理性的存在，人們?yōu)槭裁床辉敢鉃榱松鐣娑鴦趧樱瑥亩畲蟪潭鹊貙崿F(xiàn)他們的個人利益呢？　　

　 　

〔1〕羅默認為，前社會主義經(jīng)濟的失敗主要是因為它們技術進步的速度比資本主義經(jīng)濟慢，而技術進步問題或創(chuàng)新問題是獨立于信息問題（羅默稱之為委托－代理問題）的一個問題。但是筆者認為，創(chuàng)新問題不過是信息問題的一個具體表現(xiàn)形式罷了。如果中央計劃當局知道所有的有關信息，它當然可以命令生產(chǎn)單位用正確的投入、在正確的時間范圍內完成所需要的創(chuàng)新。另一方面，由于創(chuàng)新包含著大量的風險和不確定性，并且需要更多的靈活性，中央計劃當局要收集有關創(chuàng)新活動的信息并做出合理的決策，有可能是非常困難的，因而創(chuàng)新問題可以說是信息問題的一個最突出的例子。(Roemer,1994,44)　　

〔2〕在現(xiàn)代資本主義經(jīng)濟中，為了減少由于私人生產(chǎn)者缺乏協(xié)調所引起的不確定性，私人資本主義公司把越來越多的經(jīng)濟資源投入到各種非生產(chǎn)性的活動中，比如市場營銷、廣告、與市場調查和推銷有關的研究開發(fā)活動等。在現(xiàn)代資本主義社會中，這恐怕是重要性不亞于公開的經(jīng)濟危機的一種經(jīng)濟不合理性。據(jù)賽克和圖納克估計，美國非生產(chǎn)性工人占全部工人的比重，從1948年的43％增加到了1987年的64％。說明有很大一部分社會勞動被浪費掉了。(Shaikh and Tonak, 1994,110)　　

〔3〕邁斯納在他的著作中曾經(jīng)這樣描述毛澤東主義的革命干部：“在理想情況下，干部應當是毫不利己的，是用革命的價值觀武裝起來的，愿意為了實現(xiàn)革命的目標而獻身的......他能夠忠實地執(zhí)行黨的政策，同時還善于獨立思考和富于首創(chuàng)精神；他遵守黨組織的紀律，同時還密切地聯(lián)系群眾......共產(chǎn)黨的革命能夠成功，很大程度上是由于確實有很多黨的干部或多或少符合毛澤東主義的這種革命干部的標準?！?Meisner,1986,129)　　

〔4〕有必要指出，前蘇聯(lián)和其它前社會主義國家不得不把他們的大部分研究和開發(fā)能力用于與帝國主義大國的軍備競賽，這使他們承受了不成比例的沉重負擔，因為他們的絕對經(jīng)濟規(guī)模要比帝國主義大國小得多。他們還受到主要帝國主義國家的技術封鎖和限制，因而不能夠象資本主義的發(fā)展中國家那樣充分利用經(jīng)濟發(fā)展的“后來者”的便利。如果不是因為這些因素，那么前社會主義國家的技術進步速度本來是可以快得多的?！　?/p>

〔5〕道森和福斯特估計，1988年“經(jīng)濟剩余”占美國國民生產(chǎn)總值的55％，其中絕大部分是通過各種形式的浪費“吸收”掉的，比如市場營銷、廣告、金融活動、軍火生產(chǎn)等。此外，很大一部分被浪費掉的社會勞動并不直接表現(xiàn)為“經(jīng)濟剩余”，而是成為生產(chǎn)成本的一部分，比如，華麗的包裝，頻繁的更換產(chǎn)品形式，人為地造成產(chǎn)品過時等。(Dawson and Foster,1992)在欠發(fā)達的資本主義國家，最主要的浪費是大量的失業(yè)和半失業(yè)人口，這部分人口經(jīng)常占勞動力總數(shù)的三分之一。這就意味著，在革命社會主義力量奪取政權以后，只要立即著手消除資本主義對社會勞動的巨大浪費，就可以在比較短的時間內為大幅度地縮短一般勞動時間準備好條件?！　?/p>

〔6〕拉坦西認為，只要有“稀缺性”存在，要普遍減少勞動時間就是不可能的，而要消滅“稀缺性”又是不可能的，因為“生產(chǎn)力的發(fā)展不斷產(chǎn)生新的需要。所以，雖然有些稀缺性被消除了，別的稀缺性又不斷產(chǎn)生了......除非一切技術創(chuàng)新和經(jīng)濟增長都停止，很難看出怎么樣能消滅稀缺性本身。考慮到世界自然資源的潛在危機，這種可能性就更加渺茫了?！?Rattansi,1982,185)拉坦西忘掉了一件事，“新的需要”不僅包括對物質產(chǎn)品的需要，也包括對人自身的發(fā)展的需要。在社會主義社會中，完全可以想象，社會勞動生產(chǎn)率的增長可以一部分轉化為人民物質消費的改善，一部分轉化為人們的自由時間的增長（通過縮短勞動時間）。如果社會勞動生產(chǎn)率不斷增長，那么人們的自由時間就可以不斷增加。事實上，假設相反的情形，即在社會主義社會中，人們將要求把全部社會勞動生產(chǎn)率的增長都轉化為物質消費的改善，倒是極不合乎情理的?！　?/p>

　 　

附錄一 我怎樣成為一個馬克思主義者　　

　 　

    我的父母都是高級知識分子。我的青少年時代從家庭獲得的認識是極其狹隘的。但是，象所有的知識分子家庭一樣，我的家庭也自認為屬于一個比體力勞動者更高貴的社會階層。我的父母希望我明白，我必須進入名牌中學和名牌大學，只有在升學競爭中把別人擠掉，我才能保住自己的高貴身份，或許還有希望在社會地位和名望上超過父母?！　?/p>

    我自幼好讀歷史。歷史故事傾力描繪的英雄人物成了我最早的模仿對象和個人理想。我發(fā)現(xiàn)，社會中有一些人，他們生來與眾不同，他們高貴的形象淹沒了無知的蕓蕓眾生，歷史僅僅是由他們寫的并且僅僅記住了他們。我強烈地希望自己成為“偉人”、“超人”。主宰歷史命運的領袖，其他的生存方式似乎都是毫無意義、不值一提的?！　?/p>

    歷史也教會了我另外一些東西。在歷史中，我看到了人民群眾為了擺脫壓迫的枷鎖所進行的不屈不撓的斗爭，我從中看到了一種理想，一種真正有價值的東西。我開始有了追求社會正義的愿望，并且開始把這種追求當作自己生活的目的?！　?/p>

    我?guī)е@兩種矛盾的心態(tài)開始了我的大學時代。一種心態(tài)是英雄史觀、精英統(tǒng)治論和個人奮斗，我幻想成為一個名垂青史的開明政治領袖。另一種心態(tài)是人道主義以及對真理和社會正義的追求，當時我自稱是共產(chǎn)主義者。入學不久，現(xiàn)實就給了我一個沉痛的教訓。我幻想能夠通過官僚政治的渠道爬到上流社會中去。但是，我對官僚政治的技巧顯然一竅不通，我沒有來得及學會這些技巧，我的“領袖夢”很快被擊得粉碎。在官僚政治中出人頭地的幻想一旦破滅，我的共產(chǎn)主義者的假面也就戳穿了。我真正渴望的是爬入上流社會，而不是為理想獻身。社會正義、追求真理現(xiàn)在對我毫無價值，被擠出官場在我看來似乎就是失去了一切。人生從此不再有任何意義。極度灰心中，我百無聊賴，每日到圖書館偷書填補空虛的生活?！　?/p>

    一九八八年六月，北京大學學生在校園內展開了要求民主的斗爭。一些學生組織了“行動委員會”，準備發(fā)起政治性示威游行。在最后幾天，我參加了游行的準備工作。我參加學運的思想基礎是非常復雜的。這里決不能排除個人失意、生活空虛、喜歡出風頭的因素。但是，也決不僅僅是這些，而且主要不是這些。一些學運活動家的勇氣和膽識（當時給我深刻印象的有劉剛、蕭旭）喚起了我原有的良知和熱忱，我從中又找到了生活的目的和意義，不能夠再無動于衷了。無論如何，從此我從頹廢萎靡中爬了起來?！　?/p>

    這期間我的政治信仰急劇轉變，我不再自稱為共產(chǎn)主義者。參加學運以后，我在思想上和政治上日益成為自由主義者。八十年代后期，資產(chǎn)階級新古典經(jīng)濟學事實上已經(jīng)在中國經(jīng)濟學界占統(tǒng)治地位。我所在的北京大學經(jīng)濟管理系由主張激進的市場導向經(jīng)濟改革的厲以寧教授領導，事實上是當時中國傳播資產(chǎn)階級經(jīng)濟學的中心。資產(chǎn)階級經(jīng)濟學在中國的迅速普及反映了知識分子在意識形態(tài)上與統(tǒng)治階級相一致的方面。當時，集權計劃經(jīng)濟日益暴露出自己不再是合適的統(tǒng)治方式，官僚統(tǒng)治階級迫切需要新的更加強有力的統(tǒng)治手段。象所有同學一樣，我剛入學時無形中已經(jīng)接受了統(tǒng)治階級的如下觀念：生產(chǎn)率、經(jīng)濟增長是社會發(fā)展的唯一目標和衡量標準，勞動者不是被看做人而只是被視為應該盡量削減的一項成本要素，雖然自己有強烈的精神生活要求卻有意無意的認為勞動者生活的意義僅僅是物質消費的增長，國民福利似乎僅僅是更多的彩電、冰箱、汽車......這些觀念是通過無數(shù)的廣播節(jié)目、電視節(jié)目、文學作品、學術著作和家庭教育灌輸進來的。按照這種灌輸好的觀念，我站在與勞動者對立的立場上，把勞動者視為天生是懶惰的、唯利是圖的。既然資本主義早已被經(jīng)驗證明是制服勞動者的行之有效的手段，我就把私有化看做中國經(jīng)濟的唯一出路，主張全面拍賣國有資產(chǎn)。這一時期是我系統(tǒng)研究并接受資產(chǎn)階級經(jīng)濟學的時期。一九八八年和一九八九年初，中國知識界的自由思想運動達到高峰，北京大學在運動中處于中心和領袖的地位，我個人的批判意識也進入了一個新的階段。我寫了一篇論文，駁斥專制政府和國有制可以與市場經(jīng)濟相容的理論觀點（即所謂“硬政府、軟經(jīng)濟”）。這是概括我當時思想狀況的代表作，可惜現(xiàn)已遺失（這篇論文曾與蕭旭、王丹交流過）?！　?/p>

    一九八九年四月中旬，全國性民主革命運動爆發(fā)。在運動期間，我始終與核心學生領袖保持密切來往。我對運動的認識最初也十分模糊，將它限定為單純的學生運動，對它的意義估計不足。五月中旬以前，我一直傾向于選擇適當時機收尾。后來事實證明，這個判斷是過于保守了。在自由思想運動的高潮時期，波及的也僅僅是少數(shù)知識分子和大學生這樣一個極其狹隘的范圍。表面的思想活躍掩蓋了反對派對人民群眾的極端無知。沒有人了解勞動人民的社會心理狀況，對社會革命的成熟程度沒有什么科學估計，斗爭行動往往帶有賭博的性質。但是，天安門廣場的絕食斗爭是一次中了巨獎的賭博。在實際斗爭中，人民群眾比反對派領袖們要先進得多、英明得多。五月十八日至二十日，斗爭進入了全新階段。一方面，運動已經(jīng)超出了狹隘的學生運動范圍，一舉上升為全民性的民主革命運動；另一方面，以發(fā)布戒嚴令為標志。官僚統(tǒng)治集團悍然向人民宣戰(zhàn)。斗爭進入決戰(zhàn)階段，革命和反革命都再無退路可言。但是，并不是每一個反對派分子都認識到這一點。當時的反對派領導集團或者幻想與統(tǒng)治集團取得妥協(xié)，或者寄希望于上層宮廷政變。五月中旬以后，我對運動的認識一天天明確起來，堅決主張采取斷然的革命手段反擊反革命的進攻，爭取決定性的勝利。但是，我的主張沒有形成居于領導地位的意見。由于我對運動的認識和判斷始終與當時的學生運動領袖們相左，至運動最后失敗時，我始終沒有正式加入反對派組織和承擔起領導責任?！　?/p>

    對一九八九年民主革命運動的反思促成了我的思想的第二次重大轉變。首先，反對派沒有任何成熟的革命理論。他們迷戀民主，卻不懂得民主為什么能夠戰(zhàn)勝獨裁；他們認為自己受到人民擁護，卻找不到自己可以依靠的力量。在刺刀臨頭的時候，“和平、理性、非暴力”的口號除了剝奪人民反抗的權利還有什么其他作用呢？（有些患了革命恐懼癥的反對派迄今不敢提“革命”二字）其次，反對派嚴重脫離廣大勞動群眾。在民主革命運動的高潮階段，人民群眾用他們的集體的偉大力量廢除了統(tǒng)治秩序平時加于他們的束縛，首都的警察和官僚機構完全癱瘓，人民在當時實際上爭得了言論、出版、集會、結社、游行示威的自由權利。但是，反對派由于對群眾的無知和不信任，看不到群眾的偉大歷史創(chuàng)造力，在關鍵時刻不敢發(fā)動群眾?！　?/p>

    這種對群眾的恐懼和不信任心理，這種革命理論的貧乏，是不能在自由主義政治思想范圍內解決的。因為它表面上以全民代表自居，實際上排斥了對革命動力源泉的分析。這種排斥，是為了掩蓋它事實上把知識分子精英看做特殊公民的實質。我的疑問恰恰在馬克思主義當中獲得了回答。社會分裂為統(tǒng)治者和被統(tǒng)治者，被統(tǒng)治者要獲得解放只有以革命推翻統(tǒng)治者，這是我們社會的真實情況。真正的革命者從反對一切壓迫和統(tǒng)治出發(fā)，只有完全站在被壓迫者的立場上，而決不能以高人一等的領袖自居，認為民主不過是用開明的統(tǒng)治代替暴政，更不能認為人民大眾只是自己實現(xiàn)“民主”的工具。開明的統(tǒng)治還是統(tǒng)治，凡統(tǒng)治未有不以暴政告終的。而民主如果只是少數(shù)知識分子精英壟斷政治的一種形式又哪里是什么民主？（有的反對派分子認為，人民大眾的民主權利僅限于投票挑選由哪些精英來代表他們。殊不知，如果精英總是高高在上，他就只能代表他自己。）　　

    在民主運動發(fā)展過程中，發(fā)生了革命領導機關的迅速官僚化。革命領導機關一產(chǎn)生，馬上就脫離了基本的革命群眾，領導成員成為某種難以接近的特殊人物。另一方面，爭權奪利消耗了領導機關的大部分精力，在后期，相當一部分領導成員追求個人的物質生活特權。表面上，這是由于運動中一些投機分子竊據(jù)了領導地位，革命組織成份復雜所致。但是，某種“領袖欲”、個人投機心理難道不是每一個反對派活動家或多或少沾染的問題嗎？歸根到底，這與實現(xiàn)人人自由平等的革命理想如何相容呢？既然自認為是自己是特殊的高級人物，又怎么能建設平等的新社會呢？“六·四”之后，我隱約感覺到了這些問題，但是當時并沒有深入地思考下去?！　?/p>

    為了建立新的革命理論，我的學習重點從資產(chǎn)階級經(jīng)濟學轉到了馬克思主義經(jīng)濟學。在原來是均衡的、合理的、自由平等的地方，現(xiàn)在我看到了矛盾、不合理、專制和壓迫。我剛剛開始產(chǎn)生一種前所未有的認識社會的方法，一次突發(fā)事件就打斷了我的學習，也結束了我的大學生涯。一九九零年六月三日夜，北京大學學生在校園內自發(fā)集會紀念一九八九年民主革命運動。反動學校當局公然對集會學生威脅恫嚇。集會者由于群龍無首，有自行瓦解的可能。在緊要關頭，我在十分倉促的情況下挺身而出，發(fā)表反政府演說。演說本身并不精彩，可以說拙劣，但它客觀上表現(xiàn)了革命者不屈服于反動派高壓統(tǒng)治的大無畏斗爭意志。另一方面，這次斗爭是全國革命低潮中的一次孤立行動，沒有引起任何反響。六月十五日，我被學校開除學籍，同日入獄。　　

    中國的刑事司法制度與一切壓迫社會的刑事司法制度一樣，建立在懲罰和報復原則的基礎上。犯人一入獄，立即就失去了全部人的尊嚴?？词厝藛T對犯人任意打罵，預審人員經(jīng)常濫用逼供、誘供手段。管理制度禁止犯人閱讀書刊，要求犯人全天靜坐反省，實際是變相體罰。另一方面，刑法強調使用重刑、死刑，認為法律的主要作用在于威懾。但是，我與犯人的實際接觸讓我看到這種刑事司法制度不是在消滅犯罪而是在不斷再生產(chǎn)著犯罪。那種認為人天生就有邪惡心理，只是由于對刑罰的害怕才不去犯罪的說法純屬一派謊言。我們的社會既然到處是不公正和壓抑，就難免有些人產(chǎn)生病態(tài)的心理結構，因而隨時可能產(chǎn)生破壞性行為。但是，社會不是把這種破壞性行為看做由它自己造成的病態(tài)去醫(yī)治，而是采取把破壞者排斥在社會之外的做法。很多初次犯罪的人仍然有不少天真善良純樸的品質，在監(jiān)獄的環(huán)境中生活幾年以后心理徹底扭曲，成為惡性犯罪分子。至于死刑，不過是社會無力解決自身問題的標志。隨著越來越多的犯罪適用死刑，惡性犯罪也有愈演愈烈之勢。　　

    在監(jiān)獄中，依靠牢頭管理監(jiān)號。牢頭是犯人中的統(tǒng)治者和壓迫者。他們在監(jiān)號中占據(jù)最寬敞的床位（想象一下，在人均只有半平方米的監(jiān)號中，一個人睡兩三米寬的地方是怎樣一種特權）、掌管食物分配、支使他人為自己勞動（捶背、洗衣等），還可以打罵其他犯人、從中取樂，有的還占有同性戀伙伴。所有的革命者都會承認，牢頭現(xiàn)象是一種必須根除的壓迫現(xiàn)象。在監(jiān)號中，牢頭們散布這樣一些言論：“人到哪里都分三六九等”；“在什么地方都有柳爺（特權階層），也有鼠蔑（奴隸階層）”；“牢頭也是從擦地擦板兒一點點熬上來的”。每一個革命者都清楚，這無非是說壓迫有理、被壓迫活該。但是，這些話難道不是壓迫社會（包括“民主”社會）中流行觀念的表現(xiàn)嗎？比如：任何社會都有上中下之分；國家只能交給精英、優(yōu)秀人物來管理；管理者和被管理者的對立是永恒的；資本家也是從洗盤子開始辛辛苦苦奮斗起家的......為什么大多數(shù)反對派分子遇到這些問題就失去了批判性呢？反對派的絕大多數(shù)本身就是知識分子精英，或者接受了知識分子精英灌輸?shù)挠^念，認為只有自己才代表社會價值，而勞動者大眾實際上沒有社會價值。在監(jiān)獄中，被牢頭壓迫的人也往往認為這種壓迫結構既然約定俗成就沒有什么不合理，他一旦當上牢頭又反過來壓迫別人。在社會中，壓迫結構看起來似乎也是天經(jīng)地義的，以至于被壓迫者都認為它是正常的，似乎自己天生該受別人支配，公共管理永遠是少數(shù)人的事。但是，社會中的壓迫與監(jiān)獄中的壓迫一樣不合理，也一樣可以根絕。任何社會關系，都是人自己創(chuàng)造出來的，因而也是人自己可以改變的。到底是根據(jù)哪條生物學原理，一些人要奴役另一些人，壓迫和被壓迫、奴役和被奴役要支配人與人之間的關系？　　

    在監(jiān)獄中，我常常意識到，在那樣特殊的環(huán)境中，隨時可以以自我生存為借口，在道德上墮落下去。如果你介入了牢頭壓迫、奴役他人的行為，如果你對此習以為常，如果你自己管理監(jiān)號的時候沿襲牢頭那一套做法、克扣他人飯菜、對別人肆意凌辱打罵，你還算什么革命者?。ㄓ性S多“政治犯”在監(jiān)獄中正是如此表現(xiàn)的）鐵窗生涯沒有挫折我的良心和意志，反而使我在思想上和道德上都進入了一個新層次?！　?/p>

    剛剛入獄時，我為海外傳媒有關我的報道沾沾自喜。隨著時間推移，我才有了一些較為清醒的認識。是什么在支配我的行為？是個人名利還是爭取被壓迫者解放的理想？如果是后者，我有什么可以引為驕傲的呢？這種學生自發(fā)集會和反政府演說難道不是眾多的脫離群眾的孤立反抗行動之一嗎？我這才發(fā)現(xiàn)自己遠不是真正的徹底的革命者，除非我把這個骯臟社會加于我心靈上的一切污垢都剔除干凈?！　?/p>

    革命者離不開對全部現(xiàn)存社會結構的徹底批判，這種批判也必須深入自己的心靈。革命者的心靈必須完全浸沐在對人、對被壓迫者的普遍的愛中。既然是真誠的愛，就不是高人一等，不是特殊的優(yōu)秀人物，不是主宰歷史的英雄。只有這樣，才能認識群眾，進入群眾，與群眾一起而不是利用群眾去戰(zhàn)斗，與群眾一起爭取自己的解放而不是替他們爭取解放。我是一個馬克思主義者，僅僅因為馬克思主義是徹底解放、徹底人道的革命學說?！　?/p>

　 　

                                      1992年12月于北京　　

　 　

附錄二 大學生與革命　　

　 　

    “六四”失敗以后，一個突出的現(xiàn)象就是革命的主觀和客觀方面的不平衡發(fā)展。在革命的客觀方面，由于鄧氏南巡，官方意識形態(tài)已經(jīng)完全破產(chǎn)了，資本主義的發(fā)展要求同時強化原始積累和資本主義積累，因此，“六四”以后當局舉行了向城市工人階級和勞動農民全面進攻的“改革”戰(zhàn)略，社會對抗程度超過了“改革”以來的任何時期。但是，在革命的主觀方面，不僅不存在一個比較完整、有力的革命黨，而且反對派在組織上被打垮，數(shù)量上在減少，精神狀態(tài)上陷于普遍動搖。革命主觀方面的無能，決定了在目前社會危機進一步深化的條件下，現(xiàn)存秩序尚能保持其相對穩(wěn)定?！　?/p>

    如何理解革命的主觀方面這種落后狀態(tài)呢？首先，我們必須明確一點，即當我們談論主觀方面時，并不是抽象地、一般地談論社會一起方面的主觀方面。我們必須了解，現(xiàn)在的革命的主觀方面，首先是，甚至完全是一九八九年人民民主運動的遺產(chǎn)。因此，它也就不可避免地帶有那次革命的一切弱點?！　?/p>

    一九八九年人民民主運動，盡管冠以“人民”、冠以“民主”，但決非象有些人所迷信的那樣是“全民性”的。它的特點，也是其不可克服的局限性，恰恰在于絕大多數(shù)人民僅僅是自發(fā)的，因而也是無意識的，因而也是比較被動的參加了運動。唯一有意識地、自覺地參加運動并因而領導運動的社會集團是自由派知識分子。所以，那次革命深深打上了這個集團的烙印?！　?/p>

    自由派知識分子所以被傳呼為自由派，正是因為他們用“自由”這個詞作為“平等”的對立面，正是因為他們決不相信社會除了精英統(tǒng)治還能有其他任何形式。所以，他們自命為精英，并且認為自己理所當然的是一般人民利益的代表?；谶@樣的前提，自由派知識分子決不可能有認真在政治上發(fā)動廣大人民群眾這樣的要求。他們不相信人民能普遍覺悟，而寧愿相信群眾是天生愚昧的，因此寧愿以少數(shù)精英的特殊覺悟代替絕大多數(shù)人民的普遍覺悟，甚至為此斷送了自身的政治前途。　　

    因此，自由派知識分子的真實社會基礎，由這樣的自由派知識分子為未來革命所準備的主觀條件，從來沒有越出大學校墻之外。所謂革命的主觀方面，現(xiàn)在無非是指有革命傾向的大學生的主觀方面?！　?/p>

    所以不理解大學生，不理解大學生在現(xiàn)代社會中的特殊功能，也就不能理解目前階段革命的主觀方面發(fā)展的特殊規(guī)律。大學，不是一個一般的教育機關，也不是專門未來學術自由開辟的伊甸園，而是特殊的社會關系和階級關系綜合作用的產(chǎn)物。在現(xiàn)代社會中，大學既是把被統(tǒng)治階級中的優(yōu)秀分子選拔到統(tǒng)治階級中來的高級教育機關，又是各種野心勃勃的下層人士進入上流社會的捷徑。最形象地說明這一點的，是八十年代在大學生中流行的所謂“紅道”、“黃道”、“黑道”三條人生道路。所謂“紅道”，就是爭取進入上層官僚統(tǒng)治集團；所謂“黃道”，就是爭取成為正在興起的資產(chǎn)階級新貴；所謂“黑道”，就是爭取成為上層知識分子或者技術官僚。每個大學生為考大學而奮斗，都是為了擺脫勞動人民的身份，至少能永遠逃避體力勞動。在考大學的競爭中，他們?yōu)榱俗陨淼膭倮裣玻瑸樽陨淼氖《诡^喪氣；對別人的成功耿耿于懷，對別人的失敗幸災樂禍。在他們看來，成功僅僅歸功于自己，別人的失敗也完全由他們自己負責，生活無非是一切人對一切人的戰(zhàn)爭?，F(xiàn)代大學從一開始，從每個人入學的時候，就把他們變成了真正徹底的、最狹隘的個人主義者?！　?/p>

    為什么統(tǒng)治階級要從被統(tǒng)治階級中選拔優(yōu)秀分子來變成自己的隊伍呢？這固然是因為，使被統(tǒng)治階級在思想、意志、體力等方面的優(yōu)秀分子同被統(tǒng)治階級隔離開來，就使后者失去了自己的領袖，從而大大增加了他們覺醒和反抗的難度。但是，更主要的，是因為統(tǒng)治階級本身是一個寄生階級，一個脫離生產(chǎn)勞動的階級。這種寄生性使它智力退化、道德墮落，如果不經(jīng)常從外面補充優(yōu)秀分子，它的生機很快就要喪盡。所以，統(tǒng)治階級必須盡可能地從被統(tǒng)治階級中網(wǎng)羅一切優(yōu)秀分子。但是，統(tǒng)治階級的內部矛盾又使它不能接納一切從被統(tǒng)治階級中隔離出來的優(yōu)秀分子。這正是現(xiàn)代大學自身的矛盾?！　?/p>

    大學生考入大學是為了能進入統(tǒng)治階級。但是，考入大學并不等于自動地成為統(tǒng)治階級的一員，毋寧說真正殘酷的個人競爭剛剛開始。有限的人口僅向其中一小部分人敞開。這種矛盾由于現(xiàn)代統(tǒng)治階級承擔的現(xiàn)代化使命而進一步加劇?，F(xiàn)代化，要求大學成為一個特殊的工業(yè)部門，生產(chǎn)中下級專門技術人才的工業(yè)部門。因此，大學生面臨著兩種前途，或者是上升為統(tǒng)治階級，或者是充當現(xiàn)代化所必需的中下級專門技術人才，后者不得不接受被統(tǒng)治階級的社會經(jīng)濟地位。這兩種前途的存在，導致現(xiàn)代大學內部矛盾尖銳化，其結果就是使大學校園中充斥了各種各樣的競爭失敗者。這些失敗者，對現(xiàn)實強烈地怨恨不滿。在這種不滿的基礎上，他們成為各種批判思想的接受者?！　?/p>

    但是，正是因為他們對現(xiàn)狀的不滿的真正的心理根源，既不是抽象的信仰，也不是對社會結構的科學認識，恰恰是個人野心的破產(chǎn)。他們對現(xiàn)狀的批判也就不可能是真正科學的、真正革命的，實際上僅僅是表達他們在競爭中被淘汰的滿腔怨恨。他們特別害怕回到勞動人民中去，他們對此越是恐懼就越要標榜自己蔑視世俗，越要千方百計證明精神貴族之優(yōu)越。所謂有革命傾向的大學生，他們的社會基礎，他們的個人出身，無非是這批在競爭中被淘汰了的大學生?！　?/p>

    由此，決定了目前革命的主觀方面的落后性。它有兩個致命的弱點：（1）脫離勞動人民。大學生在思想上、心理上、生活方式上都不同于勞動人民并且以高于勞動人民自居。現(xiàn)代大學既然以培養(yǎng)統(tǒng)治階級后備軍為己任，它也就努力灌輸精英意識和腦力勞動優(yōu)越于體力勞動的迷信。在這種大學中教育出來的大學生，即使是革命者，也不能擺脫無視勞動人民偉大歷史創(chuàng)造作用的偏見。這些有革命傾向的大學生，奉行英雄史觀，賦予自己特殊的歷史使命，群眾僅僅是聽候領袖的召喚并在關鍵時刻為領袖增添光彩的配角?！　?/p>

    （2）投機性。大學生參加革命，既然是為競爭失敗所迫，那么，他并沒有放棄個人的野心，并沒有忘記自己日夜夢想的衣錦還鄉(xiāng)。由于革命意味著改天換地，今天的革命者明天可能就是統(tǒng)治者。所以，大學生參加革命，往往帶有強烈的投機性。這種賭徒心理說明了在一九八九年人民民主運動中，學生領袖們在個人意志上為什么如此脆弱而在個人品質上為什么如此敗壞?！　?/p>

    “六四”以后，最初流行的主要斗爭形式是秘密小組織、秘密煽動性刊物。當時，幾乎所有“六四”以后幸存的有革命傾向的大學生都投入了這種形式的斗爭。但是，這些秘密組織、秘密刊物大多不能存活一年以上，這種形式本身也很快走向失敗。為什么呢？因為這些革命者并不把自己的斗爭建立在堅實的群眾基礎上，并不致力于解決現(xiàn)實生活中群眾自身的問題從而啟發(fā)群眾自己的覺悟，而是把群眾當作被動的聽從召喚的人，幻想自己登高一呼，群眾就群起響應。他們建立秘密組織，發(fā)行秘密刊物，都是從這種冒險的心理出發(fā)，結果在國家警察機器的進攻面前不堪一擊?！　?/p>

    革命者們付出了慘重的代價，才放棄了這種自殺式的斗爭策略。但是，由于他們無視廣大勞動人民的存在，因而反倒找不到任何策略。鄧氏南巡以后，自由派知識分子與當局在理論上幾乎已經(jīng)是統(tǒng)一戰(zhàn)線了。在這種情況下，自由派的革命理論完全破產(chǎn)。自由派既不能解釋一九八九年人民民主運動的起源，也不懂得它為什么失敗，更不能指出未來革命的前途。這種理論困境，導致自由派知識分子影響下的革命者陷入不能思考的境地?！　?/p>

    正是在這種思想上異?？仗摰那闆r下，這些有革命傾向的大學生并不明白自己過去為什么失敗。秘密組織的失敗，在他們看來，只是一種投機形式的失敗，而不是一切投機的失敗。由于他們找不到真正的群眾基礎，他們不知道除了投機以外還有別的什么斗爭手段。思想上的空虛，使他們更加不能冷靜下來，而急于以任何可以采取的行動顯示自己的存在。他們知道，由于自己沒有群眾基礎，只有不斷暴露自己，才能存在下去，才能生存下去。銷聲匿跡就等于自甘滅亡?！　?/p>

    于是，“運動就是一切，目的是無關緊要的”成了新的格言，革命者們尋找一切機會表明自己的存在。利用一切紀念日來調動幻想中的心理激情。這種斗爭形式運用到了荒謬的地步，以至于不惜為了不符合本身利益的政治目的而活動（如對日索賠）?！　?/p>

    但是，這樣就充分把自己暴露在國家警察機器面前。于是，當局便以革命者們個人的學業(yè)和前途相威脅。這時，革命者們的投機性就暴露出來了。他們?yōu)榇嘶炭植话?、手足無措。他們決定讓自己收斂一些，希望能保住學籍，希望能不讓父母知道。于是，頗有諷刺意味的是，革命者們越是要顯示自己的存在，他們的存在就越不可靠，就越是時時處在風雨飄搖之中。　　

    沒有絕大多數(shù)人民的支持，不扎根于勞動人民，不依靠群眾自己的主動性，少數(shù)大學生的所謂革命活動，就是毫無意義的冒險和自殺。但是，由自由派知識分子提供的革命理論是不能完成革命者與勞動人民相結合的任務的。因為那種理論是建立在承認精英、承認壓迫、承認統(tǒng)治的基礎上的，是從統(tǒng)治者的眼光看問題，不是從勞動人民的眼光看問題。從這種理論出發(fā)，決不可能真正與勞動人民團結在一起，充其量是蠱惑于一時，也決不可能長久。這一切說明，自由派知識分子在主觀上對革命的統(tǒng)治已經(jīng)到了應當終結的時候了。　　

　 　

                                    1993年5月于西安　　

　 　

　 　

　 　

　 　

　 　

　 　

　 　

　 　

參考文獻　　

　 　

中文參考文獻　　

　 　

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《邊緣》。由北京大學的一個學生社團－讀書社編輯和發(fā)行的非正式刊物，撰稿人主要是一些著名的自由派知識分子?！　?/p>

蔡方?！妒致房诘木駬瘢荷罨r業(yè)經(jīng)濟改革的思考》（注：作者姓名的名字部分實際上應為“日”字旁加一個“方”字。）　　

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社科院經(jīng)濟所。中國社會科學院經(jīng)濟研究所編。《中國鄉(xiāng)鎮(zhèn)企業(yè)的經(jīng)濟發(fā)展與經(jīng)濟體制》　　

方原。《倒懸的金字塔－中國農業(yè)現(xiàn)代化的幾個問題》　　

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高皋和嚴家其。《文化大革命十年史》　　

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韓明希編?！吨袊敶綘I經(jīng)濟的現(xiàn)狀和發(fā)展》　　

何汝璧和伊承哲?！段鞣秸嗡枷胧贰贰　?/p>

李強?！懂敶袊鐣謱优c流動》　　

厲以寧等。厲以寧、孟曉蘇、李源潮、李克強。《走向繁榮的戰(zhàn)略選擇》　　

林毅夫?！吨贫?、技術與中國農業(yè)發(fā)展》　　

劉世錦和江小娟?！逗髞砭由希袊I(yè)發(fā)展新時期展望》　　

劉志庚編?！渡钲诮?jīng)濟發(fā)展探秘》　　

劉宗緒編?！妒澜缃贰贰　?/p>

《綠皮書》。中國社會科學院農村發(fā)展研究所農村經(jīng)濟年度分析課題組。《1993年中國農村經(jīng)濟發(fā)展年度報告－兼析1994年發(fā)展趨勢》　　

馬賓?！栋l(fā)展、改革的兩個關鍵－高技術產(chǎn)業(yè)與反腐敗》　　

馬賓和孫尚清?！吨袊?jīng)濟形勢與展望（一九九三－一九九四）》　　

孟繁琪?！冬F(xiàn)代化農業(yè)的模式選擇》　　

宋源和龔金國?！侗容^經(jīng)濟體制》　　

汪海波?！栋l(fā)展的效益型和改革的市場型》　　

威爾伯，查里斯 K. 編?！栋l(fā)達與不發(fā)達問題的政治經(jīng)濟學》　　

吳敬璉?！队媱澖?jīng)濟還是市場經(jīng)濟》　　

許良英?！皼]有政治民主，改革不可能成功”?！段磥砼c發(fā)展》1993年第1期　　

楊祖功和顧俊禮?！段鞣秸沃贫缺容^》　　

詹宏松?！渡鐣髁x價格問題研究》　　

趙效民和賈履讓?！渡鐣髁x市場模式研究》　　

鐘朋容?！妒杲?jīng)濟改革－歷程·現(xiàn)狀·出路》　　

　 　

　 　

　 　

　 　

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　英文版　

　

INTRODUCTION　　

　 　

　 　

       According to the prevailing bourgeois liberal ideology, capitalism and democracy always go hand in hand. But the triumph of Chinese capitalism is exactly based on the failure of democracy. In the 1989 revolution, it was not only the democracy or dictatorship that was at stake, but also the fate of Chinese capitalism that was at stake. On 4 June 1989, not only was the democratic movement defeated, but also was the Chinese working class defeated. The Chinese working class was defeated because they had failed to make of themselves an independent political force capable of fighting for their own liberation. Instead, they followed the political leadership of the liberal intellectuals and thus served the political interest of the liberal intellectuals rather than that of their own. 　　

       On 20 May 1989 when the ruling class declared its war against people by sending army into 　　Beijing　　 city to enforce the notorious “martial law,” the democratic force was left no choice but either surrender or an open call for people’s uprising. A call for uprising would be responded by the working class. On the other hand, the ruling class was deeply divided, caught up in panic. The chance of success was pretty large. But the liberal intellectuals refused to take this chance. The revolution thus failed. 　　

　 　

       I began to participate in the democratic movement in 1988. At that time, like most Chinese university students, I embraced bourgeois liberal ideology. That is, on the one hand, I agreed with western-style multi-party democracy, and on the other hand, I was in favor of full-scale marketization and privatization, and the establishment of the capitalist economic system. But I began to change my mind in the 1989 revolution. At the critical time of the revolution, it was very clear that whether the revolution would end with victory or failure depended on whether the opposition would and was able to fully mobilize the entire urban working class to fight for democracy. Here we were immediately met with a problem. Anyone who had a clear mind could not fail to see that the ideology that the liberal opposition held was in sharp conflict with the interest of the working class. People like me who were in favor of privatization and capitalism knew very well that the working class would suffer a lot if the economic policy that we upheld was put into practice. In the “normal” time, this could simply be left aside as the unavoidable cost of social progress. But at the time of revolution, it was completely a different matter. On the one hand, you were to ask the working class to fight for your ascendancy to power with blood and life. On the other hand, if you and your kind of people were in power, in return to what the working class had done for you, you would impose the social and economic policies that would be nothing short of a disaster for the working class. How could a revolutionary who thought himself or herself to be someone struggling for social justice, freedom and the liberation of ordinary people, not to put a question mark on the ideology that he or she held in this case?　　

       Shortly after the failure of the 1989 revolution, I began to reject bourgeois liberalism and convert to Marxism. Like all Marxists in today’s world, I was faced with a series of questions. Why did the socialist revolutions in the 20th century fail to establish a genuine socialist society? How do we evaluate the historical merit of these revolutions? Why did the failure of the socialist revolutions lead to capitalist development? Is it possible for us to have a society without any exploitation, oppression, and alienation? Is there such an economic system which is not only economically productive and efficient, but also satisfies the requirement of a socialist society? At the beginning, I either failed to answer these questions or did not have clear ideas on them. I was not yet completely freed from the influence of bourgeois liberalism. And as a member of the middle class intellectuals, my perception of society was still to a large extent limited by the narrow scope of the social group from which I came. For a long time, like the liberal intellectuals, I viewed Maoist China as no more than a “totalitarian society” with little contribution to 　　China　　’s social progress. Also for a long time, I had tried to find a market socialist solution to the economic problems of a socialist society. But overtime, as I gradually went beyond the narrow scope of the middle class intellectuals and bourgeois liberalism, I was able to answer the above questions much more clearly and confidently.　　

       Here we have a problem of the relationship between the revolutionary social theory and the scientific social theory. In an oppressive society which is divided into the oppressor class and the oppressed class, it is impossible to make an objective, scientific analysis of society if we perceive society from the standing point of the oppressor class and other more or less privileged classes and social groups (for example, the intellectuals). For the oppressor class and other privileged classes and social groups have established interest in the existing society. In an oppressive society, only from the perspective of the oppressed people who do not have any interest in the existing society, can we reach a scientific understanding of the society. Thus, as long as the society is divided into the oppressors and the oppressed, a scientific social theory must be at the same time a theory that perceives society from the standing point of the oppressed people. That is, it must be at the same time a revolutionary social theory. 　　

　 　

       While the Chinese socialist revolution failed to establish a genuine socialist society (for objective as well as subjective reasons), the revolution did bring about tremendous improvement of the material and spiritual conditions of life of Chinese working people. In revolutionary China, which, in the opinion of the liberal intellectuals and bourgeois ideologues, was a “totalitarian society” in which people did not have any freedom and rights, working people were guaranteed extensive social rights (such as the right to employment-- “iron rice bowl,” to free health care, to cheap housing, and to other basic needs) that are unimaginable for the workers in capitalist societies.　　

       The new society was thus faced with a fundamental contradiction. On the one hand, since the revolution had overthrown the old oppressive and exploitative system, and guaranteed working people extensive social rights, it was no longer possible to develop productive forces in the way in which productive forces were developed in “normal” oppressive societies. On the other hand, the revolution failed to establish a genuine socialist society in which working people had control over society and economy. Instead, a new ruling class gradually took shape. If this contradiction could not be solved, there was no way to secure the development of productive forces, and consequently, the survival of the new society.　　

       This contradiction could be solved either by further developing the revolution, that is, by destroying the emerging new oppressor class and establishing working people’s control over society and economy, or by returning to the “normal” status of the oppressive society and depriving the working people of their extensive social rights that they won in the revolution. Whether the contradiction was solved in the first way or the second way, depended upon real historical struggles between different classes. In 　　China　　, the struggle was concentratedly expressed by the Cultural Revolution. 　　

       In the official economics, this contradiction was reflected in the controversy on “planning” and “market.” According to the official economics, market is the only rational and viable economic system under the modern conditions and the “market-oriented reform” provides the only solution to the economic contradictions of late Maoism. However, there is not an economic system that operates without being under any social relations. Thus, it makes no sense if we talk about the rationality and viability of an economic system without considering the context of social relations. For example, given the capitalist social relations, productive forces can be developed only if the capitalists are allowed to exploit the workers, and consequently only the economic system that allows the capitalists to exploit the workers can be “rational and viable.” This certainly does not suggest that what is “rational and viable” for capitalism is also “rational and viable” for any other society. On the contrary, capitalist exploitation, by repressing the creativity of working people, is a great obstacle to the development of productive forces.　　

       It was only after the failure of the Cultural Revolution, with the revolutionary socialist political and intellectual force defeated, and the rule of the bureaucratic ruling class consolidated, that the “market-oriented reform” became the only politically and socially viable solution to 　　China　　’s economic problems. While the official economics keeps silence on the issue of social relations, they have implicitly taken for granted the existing social relations, that is, taken for granted the rule of the oppressor class over the oppressed people.　　

       Nonetheless, the class struggle between the ruling class and the oppressed people did not end with the failure of the Cultural Revolution. Instead, it was impossible for the ruling class to impose the capitalist oppressive and exploitative system on working people without serious struggles. These struggles reached one climax in the 1989 revolution.　　

       The failure of the 1989 revolution has proved that the liberal intellectuals are unqualified for the leadership of the Chinese democratic movement. By following them, Chinese working people can achieve only their own expropriation. The Chinese working people must free themselves from the ideological dominance of both the ruling class and the liberal intellectuals, and make of themselves an independent political force, that is, a socialist revolutionary force. In this sense, the fate of Chinese democracy is the same as the fate of Chinese socialism.　　

       On the other hand, the failure of the 1989 revolution paved the way to capitalist development in 　　China　　.  After 1989 Chinese capitalism has entered a new stage of rapid expansion, accompanied by massive inflow of foreign capital.  There is no question that the rule of the ruling class has been consolidated and Chinese capitalism is now in very good shape.  But these by no means suggest that the contradictions of the existing society have disappeared or will not be developed and intensified.  The capitalist system, is a socially as well as economically irrational system, and a system full of contradictions.  The very success of capitalist development prepares the conditions for its failure and demise.　　

       In the context of 　　China　　, capitalist development has taken the particular form of export-oriented dependent development.  That is, on the one hand, the Chinese capitalist economy has become increasingly dependent upon foreign technologies and advanced capital goods, and on the other hand, to finance imported technologies and capital goods, 　　China　　 depends heavily upon the exporting industries which are competitive in the world market only by taking advantage of cheap labor.  Chinese capitalist development is thus based on the cruel exploitation of hundreds of millions of “cheap labor,” or in other words, based on the suffering and the pauperization of the majority people.  But for any social system to be sustained in the long run, it must be accepted or at least tolerated by the majority people.  Chinese capitalism is thus faced with an insolvable contradiction: to maintain its economic rationality, it must undermine its social legitimacy; to preserve its social legitimacy, it cannot maintain its economic rationality.  Unable to maintain both its economic rationality and social legitimacy, Chinese capitalism puts its own survival into question.  　　

       On the other hand, Chinese working people who had made a great socialist revolution, and seen with their own eyes how the world could be changed if the oppressed people would rise up, overthrowing the rule of the oppressors and exploiters, will by no means stand the present oppressive system for a long time.  Sooner or later they will rise up again, not only taking back what they have lost, but starting with a new point of departure, which will lead to the establishment of a brandly new society.　　

　 　

       I was arrested on 15 June 1990 for an anti-government speech and was later sentenced to a two-year imprisonment for “anti-revolutionary propaganda and instigation.” I was set free in June 1992 and have since then committed myself to the revolutionary socialist activities. I began with my work by making propaganda in the oppositionist groups dominated by the liberal intellectuals in 　　Beijing　　 and Xian. Some of them later became my comrades. In the debate with the liberal intellectuals, it became increasingly necessary to make a systematic critique of the ideologies of the ruling class and the liberal intellectuals. 　　

       I began to write this book when I was making a personal investigation of workers’ conditions in Shenzhen in 1993. Later I went to 　　Beijing　　 to collect reference materials from Beijing Library (The National Library of China) and The Library of Beijing University, but then had to move to Xian to avoid being disturbed by the police (I had been arrested three times since June 1992). Thus, most of the Chinese part of the book was written in Xian. In the final version, Chapter I, II, V, and part of Chapter III, IV and VI were first written in Chinese and then translated into English by myself, Chapter VII and part of Chapter III, IV and VI were directly written in English..　　

       In Chapter I, I try to answer the following questions. Has 　　China　　 embarked on the way of capitalist development? If yes, why? I begin with an analysis of the contradictions of the post-revolutionary relations of production in 　　China　　, by comparing the Chinese state-owned enterprises with the capitalist enterprises. I argue that this contradiction could be solved either by the further development of the socialist revolution or by restoring the capitalist oppressive and exploitative system. Given 　　China　　’s concrete historical conditions, capitalist development became the real historical solution to the contradiction. 　　

       While in Chapter I I argue that capitalist development became the real historical solution to the contradiction of teh post-revolutionary relations of production, Chapter II discusses how this solution was determined by real class struggles. I focus on the Cultural Revolution and the 1989 revolution. Besides there is a section on the the bureaucratic and private capialist class and a section on the Chinese middle class. 　　

       Chapter III discusses the evolution of the relations of production in agriculture since the founding of the People’s Republic of China. Although the agricultural cooperatization failed to bring about genuine socialist transformation in China’s countryside, under the cooperative agriculture, China did have made great progress in building the agricultural productive forces. While the Chinese agriculture had grown rapidly in the initial stage of the rural “reform,” as a result of the “reform,” the Chinese agriculture was back to the status of petty peasant economy and has since then entered long-term stagnation. 　　

       In Chapter IV, I try to analyze the conditions for successful capitalist economic development in China.  While the Maoist period had laid down the material foundation for further rapid economic development, rapid economic development is impossible without normal and stable relation of production, either the capitalist or the socialist.  China is able to make a successful transition to capitalism mainly due to China’s relatively backward economic structure, and hence relativly backward class structure.  By developing the capitalist economic sector based on the exploitation of hundreds of millions of the so called “surplus labor force” in the countryside, the Chinese ruling class has actually circumvented the resistance of the working class in the state-owned enterprises and the triumph of the capitalist “reform” is thus guaranteed.  In this chapter, I also argue that given China’s particular context, capitalist development takes the form of export-oriented dependent development and if Chinese capitalism is not able to overcome the status of dependent development, the long-term sustainability of Chinese capitalist development is put into question.　　

       Chapter V discusses the relationship between capitalist development and political democracy. I make a brief introduction of the development of political democracy in developed capitalist countries, arguing that capitalist development will by no means automatically bring about democracy, and instead modern democracy was established only as a result of the struggle by the working class against the capitalist class. Then I argue that in less developed capitalist countries, due to more intensified social and economic contradictions, capitalism and democracy are even more incompatible.  In this chapter, I also make an analysis of the controversy between two groups of the liberal intellectuals--”new authoritarians” and “democrats”, which happened in late 1980s.  I try to show how this controversy reflected the inherent tension between capitalist development and political democracy.　　

       In Chapter VI, I make a summary of the political and social conditions in China after 1989.  I argue that the inherent contradictions of capitalist development sooner or later will lead to great economic and social crisis in which all of the existing social contradictions will be greatly intensified, opening the possibility for a new socialist revolution.  　　

       Chapter VII discusses one of the most important questions for the contemporary world socialist movement--can we have an economic system which is not only economically rational and viable, but also free from all forms of oppression and exploitation? I begin with a critique of various market socialist theories, arguing that market socialism is not able to solve its inherent dilemma--to develop productive forces in a market context as well as prevent the evolution into capitalism. Then I make an analysis of the critiques of the socialist planned economy by bourgeois economists and market socialists, who argue that the planned economy is unable to solve the information problem, the motivation problem, and the innovation problem, and thus cannot become a rational economic system under the modern conditions. I argue that given the socialist social relations, there is no reason why the socialist planned economy cannot solve the information problem, the motivation problem, and the innovation problem, and the arguments of bourgeois economists and market socialists cannot hold water. On the other hand, whether the socialist social relations can be established depends on, on the one hand, the general development of productive forces, and on the other hand, the real historical struggles between different social classes.　　

CHAPTER I 　　

THE DEVELOPMENT OF　　

 THE CAPITALIST RELATIONS OF PRODUCTION IN CHINA　　

　 　

　 　

       Marx (1978a, 172) said: “The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas.” The idea of “reform” is exactly the ruling idea of the contemporary Chinese society. 　　

       What is the “reform?” Why do we have the “reform?” And whose interest does the “reform” serve? According to the official explanation, the “reform” is to build the “socialist market economy,” to be the self-perfection of socialism, rather than the rejection of socialism. According to Deng Xiaoping: 　　

　 　

Having more plan, or more market, is not the essential distinction between socialism and capitalism. The planned economy is not the equivalent of socialism, capitalism also has plan; and the market economy is not the equivalent of capitalism, socialism also has market. Both plan and market are economic instruments (Deng Xiaoping, 373).　　

　 　

And in the official opinion, the “reform” is to replace the planned economy with the market economy which is a more advanced economic instrument, so that the development of productive forces can be promoted.　　

       An instrument is what human beings can use to act upon certain objects so that certain purposes can be realized. But what objects does the market economy act upon? Unlike common technical instruments, market acts upon not things but human beings. Thus, market is not simply a kind of  “economic instrument,” but also a set of relations between people, that is, a set of social relations.　　

       If market is no less than a set of social relations, then (1) for any class or social group, whether it is for or against the market economy, depends not only on whether or not the market economy is an advanced “economic instrument,” or the market economy helps to develop productive forces, but also on whether the market economy is in or against its own interest; (2) only under certain social relations it is right to say that the market economy is a proper instrument for promoting the development of productive forces. 　　

      If market is a set of social relations, then what kind of social relations is it? Briefly speaking, in a market economy, on the one hand, every producer objectively produces for social needs (his or her product can be sold only if the product satisfies certain social needs), and on the other hand, every producer is a private producer, that is, the means of production are his or her private property, the production is his or her private business, and the products are his or her private products. The socialized production is thus in conflict with the system of private production and appropriation. This conflict leads to the following results:　　

       (1) As a result of the conflict, there is the conflict and competition between private producers, and as a result of the conflict and competition between private producers, the poor becomes poorer, while the rich becomes richer, leading to ever-increasing polarization of society. The rich ascends to the capitalist who makes fortune by exploiting other people’s labor, while the poor declines to the proletarian who has to sell labor power to make a living. Thus, the market economy has an inherent tendency to evolve into capitalism.[1]　　

       (2) The socialized production objectively requires the free movement of labor force and means of production. But under the market economy, the movement of labor force can happen only if there is buying and selling of labor power, and the movement of means of production can happen only if there is investment of “capital.” Thus, under the socialized production, a market economy must be a capitalist market economy. There is not and will never be a “socialist market economy.”　　

       Thus, to say that the “reform” is to build “the market economy,” is the same as to say that the “reform” is to develop capitalism.　　

　 　

　 　

What Is the “Capitalist Relations of Production,” and How Is It Different from the Relations of Production in the Chinese State-Owned Enterprises?　　

       What is the “capitalist relations of production?” Under capitalism, those people who work do not own means of production, and those people who own means of production do not work. This is the fundamental dilemma of capitalism. Thus, it is the primary condition for capitalist production that the capitalists buy “l(fā)abor” from the workers.　　

       According to Marxist theory, what the workers sell to the capitalists is not “l(fā)abor,” but “l(fā)abor power.” Is it simply playing with words? It is not. As early as in the 18th century, a student of labor relations pointed out: “you may oblige persons to labour certain hours for certain wage, you cannot oblige them to work properly (see Perelman, 1991, 59).” In the decision on the Holden vs. Harding case, the Supreme Court of the United States concluded: 　　

　 　

That the proprietors of . . . establishments and their operatives do not stand upon an equality, and their interests are, to a certain extent, conflicting. The former naturally desire to obtain as much as labour as possible from their employees, while the latter are often induced by the fear of discharge to conform to the regulations which their judgement, fairly exercised, would pronounce to be detrimental. . . . In other words, the proprietors lay down the rules and the labourers are practically constrained to obey them (see Perelman, 1991, 98).　　

　 　

       If it is “l(fā)abor” that can be bought and sold, why do the capitalists lay down the rules to “obtain as much labour as possible?” Thus, what is bought and sold is not “l(fā)abor,” but “l(fā)abor power.” What the workers earn is not the equivalent of their “l(fā)abor,” but the price of their “l(fā)abor power.” If the workers have to do “as much labour as possible,” then they are exploited by the capitalists. However, whether the capitalists are really able to exploit the workers, and how much they exploit the workers, are determined not only by the buying and selling of “l(fā)abor,” but also by the practical struggles between the workers and the capitalists in the production process. As Marx said:　　

　 　

He [the capitalist] must see to it that the work is performed in an orderly and methodical fashion and that the use-value he has in mind actually emerges successfully at the end of the process. At this point too the capitalist’s ability to supervise and enforce discipline is vital. Lastly, he must also make sure that the process of production is not interrupted or disturbed and that it really does proceed to the creation of the product within the time allowed by the particular labour process and its objective requirements (see Perelman, 1991, 60).　　

　 　

       Thus, for the capitalists, to make sure that the workers work efficiently, responsibly, and properly, they must rely upon a coercive management system. For the workers who are wage laborers exploited by the capitalists will not voluntarily work as expected by the capitalists. As Michael Reich said:　　

　 　

By entering into the employment relation, workers surrender to capitalist not only authority over the tasks they will perform, but also most of the political and civil rights they enjoy as citizens of the state. When they walk into the factory or office, they are on the private property of the capitalists, where the guarantees provided by the Bill of Rights do not apply. Freedom of speech and assembly, the presumption of innocence until proven guilty, due process, equality before the law, and other rights protect citizens from action by the state (see Perelman, 1991, 98).　　

　 　

       Only by coercion can the capitalists have the workers be exploited. But coercion by itself cannot guarantee that the capitalists can effectively exploit the workers. For it is the workers rather than the capitalists who really participate in the production process, and consequently the relevant information (about the production process) is largely held by the workers rather than the capitalists. Without the relevant information, the capitalists are not able to effectively exploit the workers.  Therefore, with the development of the capitalist relations of production, the production process has been constantly reorganized to reflect the needs of the capitalists.  In this way, the capitalists have managed to get more control over the critical information of production, and thus weaken the workers’ control over the production process.　　

　 　

This can be illustrated by the numerical-control machine-tools which are used in the metal-cutting process in the machine-building industry.  The operation of these machine-tools are not manipulated manually by skilled machinists, but are automatically controlled by the program on the tape.  The program can be designed to improve the efficiency without preventing the machinists from exercising their control over the production and practicing their techniques.  For metal-cutting knowledge which is needed for designing the program is a part of the techniques that the machinists hold . . . But under capitalist relations, it provides the opportunity to depress the price of labor power by dividing the work into many simple procedures that require no skills and techniques.  This is exactly what capitalists dream of (Aaronovitch, 397). 　　

　 　

       The process of capitalist technological development is thus at the same time a process in which the workers suffer from spiritual and intelligent degeneration.  The workers who have lost control over the production process, have increasingly become mere auxiliaries of the machine system, performing simple and repetitive work.  While the most advanced scientific and technological knowledge has been embodied in the capitalist machine system, the majority people are deprived of the possibility of mental development.  But in the long run, individuals’ comprehensively developed productive power and their understanding of the world are more important a productive force than the physical wealth in which the advanced technologies have been embodied.　　

      Therefore, the capitalist relations of production are the relations of exploiting and being exploited, dominating and being dominated, and oppressing and being oppressed between the capitalist class and the working class.  The development of productive forces under capitalism is thus based on the alienation of human beings.  But since the workers are human beings, and are living social subjects, when they “feel exploited, they take measures to try to get even.”  According to a study by the U.S. Department of Justice, more than two thirds of American workers engage in counterproductive behavior.  In a sample investigation, one third of the investigated workers admitted stealing from their employers.  “In-depth interviews with a small sample revealed that the workers were responding to a feeling of being exploited rather than direct economic necessity (Perelman, 1991, 114).” 　　

       The capitalist relations of production result in the alienation of the workers, and thus have to try to find ways that can help to alleviate the destructive impact of workers’ alienation on production.  F. M. Scherer found that large plants usually paid the workers higher wage as payment for the higher alienation that workers experience in such environments (Perelman, 1991, 113).  But higher wage alone cannot completely offset the destructive impact of alienation.  To reduce workers’ counterproductive activities, there must a system of coercion.　　

       Under capitalism, there are mainly two types of coercion system.  First there is the internal coercion, meaning the coercion inside the capitalist enterprises.  By imposing labor disciplines, providing relevant punishments, and placing supervisory workers at production site, the capitalists directly force the workers to work in accordance with capitalists’ requirements.  In the U. S. the ratio of supervisory workers to production workers in the non-agricultural workforce rose from 13.7 percent in 1948 to 20.0 percent in 1966, and rose again to 22.4 percent in 1979 (Perelman, 1991, 94).  But there is a limit to the internal coercion.  For the workers can avoid the capitalist coercion by leaving the enterprises where they work.  Therefore, for the internal coercion to work, it must be facilitated by the external coercion.     　　

       What is the external coercion?  First, in a capitalist society there is always a large unemployed population that provides a reserve army of labor for the capitalists.  The workers, fearing unemployment, have to tolerate capitalists’ oppression.  On the other hand, while modern capitalist societies have established social welfare institutions to prevent workers’ rebellion, social welfare must not guarantee the workers a socially recognized normal standard of living, otherwise the workers will not be forced to sell their labor power to the capitalists to earn a normal standard of living.  Thus, both the internal and the external coercion are indispensable for the normal operation of the capitalist relations of production.　　

       Now let us make a comparison between the capitalist relations of production and the relations of production of the (pre-reform) Chinese state-owned enterprises.  In the Chinese state-owned enterprises, did the workers own the means of production?  No.  Did the workers have control over their labor products?  No.  Without punishment and supervision, would the workers self-consciously work efficiently, responsibly, and properly?  No.  Had the Chinese state-owned enterprises developed the technical processes that are qualitatively different from the capitalist technological processes, providing the workers the conditions for free spiritual and intelligent development?  No.  Therefore, like the capitalist enterprises, the Chinese state-owned enterprises were the institutions with oppressive and exploitative relations of production.[2]　　

       But the Chinese state-owned enterprises were not simply the replicate of the capitalist enterprises.  Instead, the Chinese state-owned enterprises were the product of the revolution, born of the struggle of the oppressed people against the oppressors.  Historically, the Chinese state-owned enterprises were on the one hand the negation of capitalism, and on the other hand the affirmation of the historic victory of the working class.  The Chinese state-owned enterprises were thus closely associated with the social and economic rights that the working class won as a result of the victory of the socialist revolution.　　

       First, in the state-owned enterprises, the workers enjoyed inalienable right to employment.  The workers’ labor power was not sold to the state-owned enterprises, but had to be accepted by the state-owned enterprises.　　

       Secondly, the state-owned enterprises must provide the workers cheap housing, free health care, and guarantee their living after retirement.  As long as a worker did not break the law, he or she had the right to enjoy a socially recognized normal standard of living, no matter whether the enterprise where he or she worked made money or not, and no matter how the demand of labor force was compared to the supply.　　

       Thirdly, the revolution had brought about tremendous spiritual liberation to the oppressed people.  The official scholars complained: “In this country it is popular to say: workers are the masters of enterprises, and cadres are the servants of people.  Now there is much misunderstanding of this saying among the workers.  Workers say: how can it be the case that masters are ruled by the servants, and how can it be the case that masters cannot control their servants (Li Qiang, 178)?” It was not so easy for the Chinese state-owned enterprises to have the workers accept exploitation and oppression as the capitalist enterprises.    　　

　 　

　 　

　 　

Why the “Reform?”　　

       Why does the ruling class want the “reform?”  What are the problems that can be solved by the “reform?”  On the one hand, like the capitalist enterprises, the Chinese state-owned enterprises were essentially the institutions that expressed the relations of exploiting and being exploited, dominating and being dominated, and oppressing and being oppressed between the ruling class and the working class, and the institutions in which workers suffered from alienation.  On the other hand, the Chinese state-owned enterprises were very different from the capitalist enterprises.  Given China’s level of economic development, it was impossible for the ruling class to alleviate the resentment of the working class by paying them high wage as in the developed capitalist countries.  In this case, the normal operation of the state-owned enterprises relied even more upon effective coercion than the capitalist enterprises in the developed capitalist countries.  However, given workers’ inalienable right to employment, and given the extensive guarantees to workers’ basic needs, in pre-reform China there was virtually no external coercion as is in capitalist society.  On the other hand, the revolution had brought about great change in the spiritual conditions of working people.  As a result, the internal coercion could not be easily carried out either.     　　

       According to the official scholars:　　

　 　

Our large and medium state-owned enterprises do not run well.  This is mainly a problem of the system . . . This is most obviously reflected by the problem of the “three-irons,” namely, the iron rice bowl, the iron wages, and the iron chairs[3] . . . Apparently, this is a wonderful system which guarantees the living and the employment of staff and workers.  But in fact, under this system, the staff and workers in the state-owned enterprises, being fed by the state, become lazy and sluggish, and depend upon the state for every thing  (Li Qiang, 150).　　

　 　

They suggested a system of “l(fā)imited unemployment and competitive employment” be established:　　

　 　

Limited unemployment and competitive employment guarantee the rational operation of enterprises.  The enterprise can dismiss superfluous persons, and improve production efficiency . . . Under the pressure of unemployment, the laborers have to work hard . . . otherwise they will be regarded as superfluous persons (Zhao Xiaomin and Jia Lurang, 330).   　　

　 　

       What is the “rational operation?”  There has never being an universally “rational operation” which is “rational” everywhere and in every historical era.  What is the most rational within one type of relations of production, can be the least rational within another type of relations of production.  If as the official scholars told us, in the state-owned enterprises, the workers, “being fed by the state, had become lazy and sluggish, and depended upon the state for everything,” the Chinese economy should have stagnated long ago.  But the Chinese economy did not stagnate, and had actually developed rapidly.  From 1952-1978, the per capita national income grew at an average annual rate of 3.9 percent (PRC, 1985).  By comparison, from 1950-1973 when world capitalism was in its expansionary stage, among 85 developing countries with a population more than one million, only 12 countries had a growth rate higher than China.  Four of them ( Libya, Saudi Arab, Iran, and Iraq) were oil exporters, the other four (Israel, Taiwan, Korea, and Greece) were the countries that had received the most U. S. assistance on per capita basis, and Puerto Rico was the U. S. colony.  None of the 12 countries had a population more than thirty million (Wilber, 198).  As American historian Maurice Meisner said: “Beginning with an industrial plant smaller than that of Belgium in the early 1950s, the China that was so long scorned as the ‘sick man of Asia’ emerged at the end of the Mao period among the world’s half-dozen largest industrial producers (Meisner, 1986, 438).”　　

       Is it illogical?  Is it against the principle of economic science?  How can the economy be developed with a system in which people “being fed by the state, become lazy and sluggish?”  Either the “three-irons,” or the guarantee of employment, or the guarantee of basic needs, do not by themselves constitute an obstacle to the development of productive forces.  On the contrary, to make it possible for every one to fully release his or her creative potential, these are the necessary conditions.  The internal and the external coercion are indispensable for the normal operation of the capitalist relations of production, for capitalism is an alienating and oppressive social system.  If this is the case, then in a society without or with much less alienation, such things as unemployment, competition, “supervision,” and “disciplines” which are considered indispensable for the capitalist prosperity and to be the source of the capitalist development of productive forces, are not only unnecessary, but actually fetterings of social progress.　　

       It is not for no reason that the guarantee to employment and the “three-irons” could work effectively in China for a fairly long period.  This was possible only under certain historical conditions.  That is, with the victory of the Chinese revolution, the oppressed people, by overthrowing the domestic and foreign oppressors, for the first time became active historical creators, and were greatly liberated in physical as well as spiritual terms.  Consequently, the Chinese society which was born of the revolution was a more liberating and less alienating society than the capitalist society.  The Chinese working class enjoyed much more extensive social and economic rights than the working class in the capitalist countries.[4]  However, these rights were conditioned by temporary social balance of power that could not sustain in the long run.  Either the working people were able to further expand their social and economic rights, to such an extent that society was really under their control and the development of productive forces was really based on the universal liberation of human beings.  Or the development of productive forces continued to be based on the alienation of human beings, and consequently, like in the capitalist society, the corresponding coercion systems that are indispensable for the development of productive forces in an oppressive context must be established.     The historical condition for the “reform” is as follows: the working people failed to destroy the emerging oppressive system, the oppressive system thus became a fait accompli; on the other hand, compared to the capitalist system, this oppressive system lacked the necessary oppressive mechanisms and could not effectively oppress and exploit working people.  Thus, the “reform” would necessarily lead to the development of the capitalist relations of production.  Only by establishing the capitalist-style oppressive mechanisms, could the existing oppressive system be consolidated and sustained.　　

　 　

　 　

The Development of the Capitalist Relations of Production　　

       The development of the capitalist relations of production is first indicated by the fact that the capitalist and semi-capitalist economic sectors have developed more rapidly than the state economic sector.   First, foreign direct investment directly brings the capitalist relations of production into China.  Secondly, a large number of private and individual enterprises have emerged.  These are also the officially admitted capitalist economic components.  Thirdly, there is the rapid expansion of the so-called rural enterprises.   　　

       Officially the rural enterprises are classified as “collective enterprises.”  But according to one investigation made by the Chinese Academy of Social Science in 1990, half of the registered rural enterprises were virtually private enterprises (Han Mingxi, 97).  Even for those enterprises that are actually owned by the rural town and village governments, “the characteristic method of management is to lease the firm to a director whose compensation is tied primarily to enterprise results (Lippit, 1992, 133).”  This is not really different from the private enterprises.  According to one study of the World Bank, in the rural enterprises investigated, 60 percent of the workers were not entitled to housing and subsidies from the enterprise, 41 percent did not receive financial aid for medical care, 52 percent were not covered by insurance on the job, 60 percent did not get pensions on retirement (see Smith, 1993, 88).  Apparently, the rural enterprises are much more like the capitalist enterprises than the state-owned enterprises.  As is shown by TABLE 1.1, in the “reform” period the capitalist and the semi-capitalist economic sectors have developed much more rapidly than the state economic sector.  By 1991 about half of the total industrial production and three-fifths of the retail trade were contributed by the capitalist and the semi-capitalist economic sectors, in which the capitalist economic sector had developed even more rapidly.　　

　 　

 

　 　

TABLE 1.1　　

The Composition of China’s Total Industrial Product and Retail Trade by Ownership　　

(percent)　　

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------　　

                                          1979                            1991　　

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------　　

Industry:        State                     78.5                      52.9　　

                     Collective*             21.5                      35.8　　

                     Other**            0                       11.3　　

Retail Trade:          State                     54.6                      40.2　　

                     Collective              43.3                      30.0　　

                     Individual and Private   2.1                       29.8　　

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------　　

*In 1990, 93 percent of the “collective” industrial product came from the rural enterprises.　　

** “Other” includes the private enterprises, the individual enterprises, and the foreign-owned enterprises.　　

Source: ZGJJWT, number 1 1993, p.3.　　

　 　

       The development of the capitalist relations of production is also indicated by the capitalistization of the state-owned enterprises.  First, “New workers are usually employed according to the contract system . . . The key of the contract system is to break the system of permanent employment and the ‘iron rice bowl.’  After being employed, staff and workers are still faced with the possibility of unemployment.  Thus, every one is forced to do his or her job and work hard (Zhao Xiaomin and Jia Lurang, 323).”  By September 1991, there were 14.06 million contract staff and workers in the state sector, accounting for about 20 percent of the total staff and workers in the state sector (ZGLDKX, number 1 1992, p.13).　　

       Secondly, there are the “reforms” of the housing system, the medical care system, and the pension system, so that “welfare is to be monetarized and service is to be socialized (Li Qiang, 152).”  The “monetarization of welfare” and the “socialization of service”[5] are actually intended to push the workers in the state-owned enterprises into the labor market to compete with the workers in the rural enterprises and the private enterprises.  If this turns out to be the case, then the workers in the state-owned enterprises will find their price of labor power falling sharply, with their “welfare” and “service” being taken away.  　　

       Thirdly, efforts have been made to intensify the internal coercion.  The official scholars admitted: “Since 1980s our enterprise management has followed a rigorous and punitive system.  Fining is usually considered to be the primary method of management (Li Qiang, 173).”  According to one investigation of the All China Federation of Trade Unions: 　　

　 　

In a factory at Zhengzhou, there are 124 regulations (made by the management), in which only 4 are about rewards, while all the others are on fining.  This factory also requires that in every month, every shop and team chief find three to five events, and every group chief find at least one event, in which the workers break the regulations.  If they cannot find any such events, they will be fined.  If they find less than required, their bonus will be reduced.  In a weaving shop in a factory in Shaanxi, the regulations on fining for all working procedures adds up to more than thirty thousand words (Chinese characters).  According to the staff and workers in some enterprises in Shanxi, Dandong, Shanghai, Nanchang, Zhengzhou, and Zhejiang, their pay will be cut if they take a leave to see doctors, or (if they take a long-term leave) for illness or injuries.  If they take a leave for illness without the approval of the superior, it will be considered to be absence which shall be fined heavily (see Li Qiang, 171).　　

　 　

       According to the official scholars: “the more strict and rigorous management system that has been established since early 1980s did play an important role in restoring the normal order of production (Li Qiang, 171).”  According to the logic of bourgeois economics, workers are born to be lazy.  Workers will not work unless they are threatened by unemployment and punishment, which are said to be able to increase the “cost of laziness.”  However, workers are living human beings.  Consequently, they will not allow others to abuse them at will and will in every possible way manifest their existence as living human beings. 　　

　 　

Some workers say: “you fine me, all right.  I do not have other rights, but I have the right to hold a slow down, and the right to waste . . . you fine me five bugs, I will make you pay me back by ten times, a hundred times.” . . . The workers are depressed and frustrated, working with low spirit.  Some even hold a slow down.  These have adverse impacts on the production.  At a coal mine in the Yangquan city, Shanxi province, the workers’ turn out and the production had always been very well.  But because there was too much fining, for a time, the workers’ turn out fell, more accidents happened, and the output also fell (see Li Qiang, 174).　　

　 　

       Even under the capitalist relations of production, it is still necessary for the workers to have some minimum commitment to production.  If workers do not want to be responsible for their work at all, then no coercive means can have productive forces be developed under capitalism.  However, it is exactly the capitalist relations of production that deny the workers the appropriation of means of production and the products of their labor, and turn the labor process into a process in which labor degenerates.  Under the capitalist relations of production, a worker is simply a passive “thing,” who will not work unless being coerced. In this case, class conflicts are inevitable, and these conflicts certainly have negative impacts on the development of productive forces.     　　

       In the opinion of the official scholars: “sometimes punishment is necessary, because for those people with the lowest moral level or without morality at all, other methods do not work (Li Qiang, 174).  It is the capitalist relations of production that turn people into someone “with the lowest moral level.”  For under this kind of relations of production, human beings are not regarded as human beings, but simply “commodities,” and an item of cost in production that has to be saved as much as possible.  　　

　 　

　 　

On the Problem of Property　　

       The fundamental contradiction of the Chinese society from 1949-1979 was as follows: on the one hand, the socialist revolution failed to abolish all forms of oppression, and instead replaced the old oppressive society with a new oppressive society; on the other hand, the revolution did not simply passed power from one ruling class to another ruling class, but as a result of the revolution, a part of social power temporarily fell into the hands of working people.  Thus, on the one hand, the new society remained an oppressive society, and on the other hand, it lacked the necessary oppressive means for maintaining an oppressive society.  This contradiction is most obviously reflected by the fact that this society had to treat Marxism--the theory for the liberation of the oppressed people, and a theory that endangers the survival of any ruling class--as its official ideology, which was expected to play an apologist role.      　　

       The contradiction of idea would not be fully exposed, be fully intensified, and thus be smashed into pieces, as along as the contradiction of reality had not yet been fully developed.  However, as soon as the capitalist relations of production began to develop, and the contradiction of reality thus began to be exposed, the contradiction of idea could no longer be left unsolved.  How can one on the one hand encourage the development of exploitation, and on the other hand denounce exploitation, while trying to prove exploitation is in the interest of the exploited?  How can one on the one hand flirt with capitalism and on the other hand claim that capitalism is doomed to perish?  Either the reality must deny the idea, or the idea must deny the reality.  The development of the capitalist relations of production objectively demands the apologist theory that serves its interest, demands the “scientific” explanation of the eternity, the rationality, and the indispensability of capitalism, demands “scientifically” explaining that all the social and economic systems opposed to it are ridiculous and irrational systems, and demands “scientifically” explaining that any attempt to overthrow the capitalist system and to go beyond the capitalist economic laws is against human nature and historical trend, and thus must be ephemeral and is doomed to fail.  From the ruling class’s point of view, only with such a “scientific” theory, can the above contradiction be solved.　　

       The development of the official theory is thus always one step behind the development of the practice of the ruling class.  Not until the antagonistic nature of the existing relations of production and the relations between the ruling class and working people had become obvious and undeniable, did the official theory conceded that the “socialist” economy was actually a commodity economy, although this was completely against the logic of the theory to which it claims to adhere.  Not until the antagonism had become so intensified that the contradiction could not be solved if the social and economic rights won by working people in the revolution were not to be completely taken away, did the official theory declared that “the problem of property” was the fundamental problem, although this meant totally rejecting the theory on which it was said to be based.  Nevertheless, with “the problem of property” being put forward, the official economics has finally admitted, more or less honestly, though covered by the last piece of fig leaf, that it is nothing else but bourgeois economics, and the objective of the “reform” is nothing else but developing “the capitalism with Chinese characteristics.”  　　

       According to the official scholars, “the fundamental problem” of public ownership is “the absence of property right.”　　

　 　

First, means of production are given by society to enterprises free of charge.  The enterprise thus treats the means of production as birthday gifts for which it pays nothing.  Society, on the other hand, exercises its property right by doing nothing more than distributing means of production to enterprises for them to use.  Secondly, while the enterprise has the right to use the means of production, it does not have the property right.  But since it is easy to get access to the use right, which is, moreover, separated from the property right, the enterprise has no reason to cherish its use right, nor does it really bear any responsibility for the exercising of its use right.  When workers use the means of production, they use the means of production as if these were their own property.  But on the other hand they do not take care of the means of production, as if these were others’ property.  Thus, there is a problem of ambiguous boundaries of property . . . These dilemmas and problems have concentratedly expressed the problem of ambiguous property right and responsibility.  “Every one is the master of the means of production, but no one is responsible for them.”  This saying gives us a live picture of the problem.  The reason for which the enterprise does not behave properly lies exactly in this problem.  Property right is the foundation of microeconomic operations and thus is a necessary condition for the enterprise to behave rationally.  If this problem is not solved, it is difficult to make further reforms, the enterprise will not behave properly, and economic disorder and inefficiency are thus inevitable (Song Yuan and Gong Jinguo, 95).    　　

　 　

       The official scholars fail to see or have intentionally ignored the fact that the so-called “every one is the master of the means of production” is not more than the official legal language, and in reality workers are separated from the means of production.  Means of production are not used by the workers to realize their own purposes, but used by “society” to oppress the workers.　　

       The “property right” is actually an exclusive right.  That is, the owner of the property has the right to exclude others from using the property for the interest of society. “The property right and the use right must not be separated.”  That is, the owner of the property is allowed to abuse social wealth for his or her private interest.  In the developed capitalist societies, to pursue super profit, monopoly capitalists let a large part of production capacity lying idle, no matter how many people are unemployed and how much social productive forces have been wasted (see TABLE 1.2). 　　

　 　

 

　 　

TABLE 1.2　　

The Waste of Productive Forces under American Monopoly Capitalism　　

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                                   1950-1959      1960-1969      1970-1979      1980-1986　　

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Capacity Utilization Rate of 　　

Manufacture (%)                                    83.6                 84.9                80.8                77.4　　

Unemployment Rate (%)                          4.4                   4.7                  6.1                  7.8　　

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Source: Chen Baosen, 367.　　

　 　

[In Latin America, the] large estates, which encompass most of the arable land, are not farmed efficiently . . . Further more, much of the large estate acreage is allowed to stand idle.  A 1960 study of Colombia showed that . . . the largest farmers, who own 70 percent of the arable land, cultivate only 6 percent of their holdings.  In Latin America as a whole, it is estimated that only 270 million of the 2.2 billion acres of arable land are worked full-time.  This obsolete landholding system together with the extremely high rate of population growth has resulted in declining per-capita agricultural output (Stavrianos, 1981, 681).　　

　 　

In this sense, productive forces can only be freely developed in a society where all the bars of “property right” have been removed.  In this sense, the fact that “means of production are given by society free of charge,” is not a defect, but a virtue of public ownership.　　

       “These dilemmas and problems have concentratedly expressed the problem of ambiguous property right and responsibility.”  How can the “unambiguous property right” be established?  The modern socialized production objectively requires the means of production be used collectively by many workers.  In this case, can we establish a system in which every piece of means of production is used only by its owner, and is owned only by its user?  If not, how can we avoid “ambiguous property right and responsibility?”　　

       According to the official scholars, “the fundamental problem” of public ownership is “the absence of property right.”  The official scholars may think that capitalist private property is very reliable and “unambiguous.”  The capitalist certainly cares much about his or her private property.  However, under the modern socialized production, to make effective and profitable use of his property, he must allow the means of production to be collectively used by many worker.  The question is--why do the workers, who are the actual users of the means of production, care about the private property of the capitalist? Of course, the capitalist can try to supervise the workers.  But are the supervisors also employed workers?  Then why do they care about the private property of the capitalist as much as the capitalist himself or herself?　　

       Capitalist private property is “ambiguous,” but the productive forces that it has released are infinitely greater than that under small private property which is certainly “unambiguous.”  If the modern society satisfies everywhere “the necessary condition for enterprises to behave rationally,” then modern production must have disappeared long ago.  In this sense, under the modern socialized production, “property right” is not much more than a imaginary idea. 　　

　 　

       Jin Liyang, who is a disciple of Li Yining (a leading official economist, and a member of the standing committee of the National People’s Congress, who is famous for his suggestion of the “corporatization” of the state-owned enterprise, which will allow individuals and foreigners to buy and own the assets of the state-owned enterprises) made following arguments in his contribution to a liberal intellectual publication. 　　

　 　

Public property certainly has problems.  First, there is the problem of free rider.  Under public ownership every one eats out of one big pot (Da Guo Fan).  Every one wants others to work, allowing himself or herself to enjoy the fruits without working.  The result is that nobody works.  “One monk carries water to drink.  Three monks have no water to drink.”  To solve the problem, people must try to make an agreement, deciding how to measure every one’s contribution and how to make distribution according to their contribution.  This is a job that costs much time and energy.  And those people who do this job must be supervised by some other people who must spend some more time and energy.  A lot of transaction cost thus arises.  Secondly, under public property, before any external transaction can be made, the internal opinions must be coordinated, involving high cost of coordination (of the short-term and long-term interests).  Thirdly, as Williamson said, private persons pay more attention to the coordination of the short-term and the long-term interests, and never forget to leave some heritage for their descendants.  But under public property, this generation often does not care about the next generation, without long-term horizon.  Fourthly, it results in the exhaustion of resources.  If you do not take publicly-owned goods, others will take them.  If you do not take advantage of public resources, others will do it.  There are fishes in the sea. You do not catch them, others will catch them.  The result is overfishing , with fishery resources exhausted (BIANYUAN, 14).  　　

　 　

       The modern socialized production objectively requires associated labor by many workers.  Only with associated labor, can we have the large-scale modern means of production serve our purposes, can the collective and associated productive forces be fully released, and can the division of social labor be taken of full advantage.  If the modern production is based on collective labor and associated labor, then is it true that no matter it is under “private property” or “public property,” the problem of “how to measure every one’s contribution and how to make distribution according to their contribution” must be solved anyway, and thus some “time and energy” must be spent on supervision anyway?  American economist Samuel Bowles found that the ratio of supervisory workers to productive workers in American non-agriculture sectors was 13.7 percent in 1948, and rose to 20 percent in 1966, and reached 22.4 percent by 1979.  Moreover, under the capitalist system, for supervision to work, there must be a large reserve army of labor, effectively threatening the workers being employed.  In 1950s and 1960s, the unemployment rate in the U. S. was between 4-5 percent.  In 1970s it rose to 6 percent and in 1980s it was between 7-8 percent.  If we only take into account the unemployed labor force and the labor force that is employed as supervisory workers, then one-fourth of the total social labor force is wasted!  Is this “a lot of transaction cost?”　　

       With so much transaction cost paid, has the problem of free rider been solved by capitalism?  An American scholar on labor research told the following story:　　

　 　

From their personal experience workers know that if they show their creativity in raising productivity, it is very likely that they will end up with more work with the same pay, or even less pay.  Thirty five years ago, I once worked in a steel plant.  Most of the machinists there that I knew personally could operate 15-30 percent faster than the speed required by the management.  But they were no fool.  They kept the secret.  They did not help to increase the armament production, but left themselves more leisure time . . . Great intelligence and creativity have been stored in American workers.  But the management of private corporations have no way to exploit this potential ( “Zai Man Chang De Lao Dong Ri Zhong Xiao Mo Yi Sheng (Spend the Life in Endless Working Days),” ZHAIYI, number 22).  　　

       Economists like to criticize the soviet-style centrally planning, arguing that the planning authority is unable to collect adequate and correct information.  But they fail to realize that the capitalist enterprises are faced with exactly the same problem.  The capitalist needs the workers to run production. Thus, to acquire the information on production, the capitalist depends a lot on the workers.  But why do the workers, who are employed by the capitalist, provide adequate and correct information to the capitalist?  Why do not they take advantage of distorted information?  If this is the case, then how can “private property” help to solve the problem of free rider? 　　

       “Secondly, under public property, before any external transaction can be made, the internal opinions must be coordinated, involving high cost of coordination.”  If a private land owner sells his or her land, he or she certainly does not need to “coordinate” with the residents on the land.  If the former residential area is to be rebuilt as business area, and the former residents are forced to leave home and wander about, their losses certainly cost the land owner nothing.  If a capitalist fire some workers, making the life very difficult for them, the capitalist certainly does not need to pay any “cost of coordination.”  By the way, in today’s China, in the craze of estate speculation, who has paid anything to “coordinate” with the local residents?  To say that under private property there is no “cost of coordination” beforehand, is to say that the cost is to be transferred to other people.  That is, the cost appears as social conflicts.     　　

       “Thirdly . . . private persons pay more attention to the coordination of the short-term and the long-term interests, and never forget to leave some heritage for their descendants.  But under public property, this generation often does not care about the next generation, without long-term horizon.”  This really stands facts on their heads.  Why in all capitalist countries, such activities as education, science, and culture must be undertaken by the state?  Besides such enterprises as road, airport, port, communication, water conservancy, and electrical power, the investment of which usually takes a long time, with low rate of return, depends much on the investment by the state.  Is this exactly because of the “short-term horizon” of private enterprises?  While the private property owner may want to leave some heritage to his or her descendants, only society considers what to be left to the decendants of the whole society, taking into account not only the next generation, but also the next several generations. 　　

       “Fourthly, it results in the exhaustion of resources.  If you do not take publicly-owned goods, others will take them.  If you do not take advantage of public resources, others will do it.  There are fishes in the sea. You do not catch them, others will catch them.  This results in overfishing , with fishery resources exhausted.”  This is actually the same problem as that of free rider.  It is unfair to attribute the problem to public property.  Is the exhaustion of “fishery resources” exactly a result of the profit-pursuing activities of the private producers?　　

       In the opinion of Jin Liyang, the Chinese state-owned enterprises did not run well because they failed to solve the principal-agent problem.　　

　 　

Some people think that the defects of the state-owned enterprises are rooted in ambiguous property.  This is not really the case.  The property of the state-owned enterprises belongs to the whole people. Is not the property holder very clear?  The key problem, instead, is the principal-agent problem . . . While all citizens commonly own the state-owned enterprises, they cannot do everything by themselves.  Instead, they can only act as the principals, and entrust the state-owned enterprises to some agents who will actually run these enterprises . . . I think that it is necessary to identify the triple-level principal-agent relations of the state-owned enterprises.  At the first level, the whole people entrust the enterprises to the government, actually, to the government officials.  At the second level, the government entrusts the enterprises to the directors and the managers of the enterprises.  At the third level, the directors and the managers entrust detail works to the workers.  Supervision is required at each level.  For example, at the first level, it is really not clear who is the principal.  There are 1.2 billion people in this country.  Every one of them is a principal, and a holder of the state property.  Thus all of them are entitled to share what is earned on the state property.  Every one of them has the motive to be free rider, expecting others to take care of the state property, so that he himself or she herself can enjoy the fruits without working.  This is actually the common problem of public property . . . Moreover as Buchanan and his “public choice” school point out, the government is not the god.  The government is made up of common people with flesh and blood.  The government officials will not self-consciously and whole-heartedly work for the interest of people.  They are economic men too, and thus must be supervised by some one else.  At the second level of the principal-agent relations, the government officials as principals need to acquire the information about the behavior of the directors and the managers, and make rewards and punishments based on the information that they have acquired.  But the government officials cannot stand besides the directors and the managers all the time, staring at them like a tiger eyeing its prey, to see whether they work hard or not.  There are some obvious criteria of business performance, such as sales value, profitability, that can be used to evaluate the work of the directors and the managers.  But some times falling profitability may be not the fault of the directors and the managers, but due to slumming market condition, or a result of the arbitrary intervention by the government . . . The third level of the principal-agent relations is usually overlooked by some economists, who think it is not more than the internal affairs of the enterprises.  In fact, in the Chinese state-owned enterprises, the directors and the managers are not property owners, and are not subject to effective supervision.  In this case, it is very likely for the directors and the manages to collude with the workers at the expense of the interest of the state.  This is evidenced by the widespread short-sighted behaviors of the state-owned enterprises and the severe loss and erosion of the state property.  The government appears to be very incompetent.  It is too difficult for one government to deal with about one hundred and ten thousand state-owned enterprises.  Whatever the policy the superior has, the inferior always has the countermeasure.　　

　 　

The directors and the managers have to make compromise with the workers in the class struggle.  In the language of the official scholars this is called “to collude with the workers.”  Jin Liyang continued:       　　

　 　

Under the present conditions it is really too difficult to solve the principal-agent problem of the state-owned enterprises.  As a result, the property right of the state-owned enterprises is not effectively protected.  The state-owned enterprises suffer from inefficiency and make enormous losses.  For this reason some people suggest that the share of the state property in the whole economy is too high . . . Whether it is high or not should be judged by market . . . Let the state-owned enterprises and the private enterprises make fair competition in market.  Let all types of enterprises have the same tax burden, the same conditions for loan, and are subject to the same degree of legal protection.　　

　 　

On the one hand, in the state-owned enterprises the workers are still more or less guaranteed the right to employment; on the other hand, in the private enterprises, the workers can be denied their right to employment at any time for any reason.  On the one hand, the state-owned enterprises must take care of the workers’ health care and pay pensions to the retired workers; on the other hand, the private enterprises do not have this kind of “cost” at all.  On the one hand, the state-owned enterprises must practice eight-hour working day and allow the workers to have rest on holidays and Sundays; on the other hand, the private enterprises can extend the working time to the maximum limit and the workers in the private enterprises never have holidays.  On the one hand, the state-owned enterprises must provide the necessary labor protection; on the other hand, the private enterprises have no problem to make profit at the cost of the workers’ life and health . . . Therefore, if judged by market, the system which is more humanitarian, must be the system that has the higher “l(fā)abor cost,” and consequently the system which is less efficient.  Jin Liyang concluded:      　　

　 　

　 　

We should allow the state-owned enterprises to be taken over by the private or the collective enterprises (BIANYUAN, 16-17).　　

　 　

That is, privatization.　　

       According to Jin Liyang, “the key problem is the principal-agent problem.”  However, do the directors and the managers of the state-owned enterprises have the right to run the enterprises because they are entrusted by the workers?  Does the government become the owner of the state-owned enterprises because it is entrusted by the 1.2 billion people?  “While all citizens commonly own the state-owned enterprises, they cannot do everything by themselves.  Instead, they can only act as the principals, and entrust the state-owned enterprises to some agents who will actually run these enterprises.”  That is, the workers, who also act as the collective capitalist, are opposed to themselves.  As the collective capitalist, the workers first appoint “government officials” as their general manager, and then appoint “the directors and the managers” as their department or subsidiary managers, only to exploit the employed workers who are exactly themselves.  On the one hand, the “1.2 billion people” are all capitalists, and only act as capitalists, caring only about their capital and profit.  On the other hand, they are all wage laborers, and only act as wage laboreres, thinking only about working less and earning more money.  Only those people who are filled with too much bourgeois legal ideas to understand the real social relations can imagine this kind of double personality and mental split.  These people, with their poor imagination, cannot think of any type of property other than modern capitalist property, the property under which the people who own means of production and the workers are separated from and opposed to each other, as if the workers must always be alienated from means of production, and even if they were combined in the legal term, they must be separated in reality. 　　

       Either the state is the state as what it has always been, and consequently the problem does not lie in that “every one is a principal, and a holder of the state property,” but lies in that the majority people are not “the holders of the state property” at all.  Or the state is society itself, and the state property is thus the social property, and consequently the principals are also those people to whom the property is entrusted, and thus there is no need for the agents.　　

       Under social property, all workers as a whole actually control and thus “actually run” the means of production that they use.  Of course, when an individual worker is concerned, he or she can only directly control and use a very small part of society’s means of production, and can not have direct control over all of society’s means of production.  This is not more than the “free rider” problem.  Under the modern socialized production, the final result of production depends not on the effort of any individual worker, but on the collective efforts of many workers.  On the other hand, under the small production, the individual worker owns the means of production he or she uses, and the result of production completely depends on his or her own effort.  In this case, the “free rider” problem certainly does not exist.　　

       The official scholars and the liberal intellectuals always follow the following logic.  Workers are necessarily lazy and will by no means take care of the property that they use.  Thus, to prevent the workers from being lazy and abusing the property that they use, there must be supervision.  However, to have effective supervision, there must be adequate information.  But the bureaucracy always find it cannot acquire adquate information.  The official scholars and the liberal intellectuals have thus entered a dead end.　　

       If this is the case, then to replace “publich property” with “private property,” and the bureaucracy with the capitalist, will do no help to solve the problem, although the players of the game are changed.  It is exactly because the “private property” is private, it can by no means solve the antagonistic contradiction between the “enterprise” and the workers, and thus can by no means solve the problem of free rider.  On the other hand, while under the bureaucratic system, one government is deceived by one hundred thousand more enterprises, under the “private property” the one hundred thousand more enterprises will be deceived by one another (motivated by private profit and compelled by market competition).　　

      Therefore, the question is not whether “public property” or “private property” in the abstract, legal term.   Instead, the real point, the whole point is what attitudes that the workers--the eternal subjects of all production activities--have towards production.  If the relations of production are oppressive relations of production, the production process is thus the process in which workers are oppressed and exploited, and the means of production are thus the means of oppression over the workers,  then why is not “working less and earning more money” the most natural and reasonable attitude that the workers should have towards production?  And in this case, why do the workers “cherish,” “take care of,” and make responsible use of the means of production?  If, on the other hand, the production process is not more than the process for the workers to realize their own purposes, and the means of production are thus not more than the means by which the workers can realize their own purposes, the attitudes of the workers towards production and the means of the production will certainly be qualitatively different.  Is this a very logical conclusion?　　

       Only in this way can we understand the “free rider” problem.  Under the capitalist system or the bureaucratic system, acting as the “free rider” is the workers’ completely rational behavior by which they try to protect themselves from being exploited.  Otherwise the “free rider” problem simply does not make sense.   　　

       “Every one wants others to work, allowing himself or herself to enjoy the fruits without working.  The result is that nobody works.”  But if nobody works then nobody enjoys the fruits.  If this is the case, then why do not people “all work hard, and thus all enjoy the fruits?”  “One monk carries water to drink.  Three monks have no water to drink.”  This is, anyway, a parable story.  If the three monks really have no water to drink, they certainly will not fail to find a solution before they are thirsty to death.  Does economics always assume the “rational man?”  The result of acting as the “free rider” is that nobody enjoys the fruits.  This is apparently irrational, why do people fail to behave rationally on this point?　　

       Secondly, under the capitalist system and the bureaucratic system, it is impossible to solve the “free rider” problem, even if the capitalist and the bureaucracy try to solve the problem by exercising supervision.  For without adequate information, there will not be effective supervision.  But a large part of the information has to be offered by the supervised people who certainly do not have the incentive to offer adequate and correct information to their supervisors.  The supervisor thus will never acquire adequate information.  On the other hand, in the case where workers themselves have control over production, the supervised can do little to deceive the supervisor.  For in this case the supervisor is also the supervised.  Every worker has an incentive to oppose others to act as the “free riders,” and thus every worker is also a supervisor.  These supervisors, who have direct access to the information about the protection process, and thus know very well why and how some people act as the “free riders,” will not have much difficulty to establish an effective supervision system.  　　

       What is “the problem of property?”  On the one hand, under the modern socialized production, means of production must be collectively used by many workers, and thus it is no longer possible for a worker to individually own the means of production that he or she uses.  On the other hand, the workers do not collectively own the means of production and thus are alienated from the means of production, and consequently they work for the interest of the oppressors and the exploiters rather than that of their own and thus certainly will not behave properly and responsibly in production.  This is “the problem of property” that makes much trouble for every ruling class of the modern society.　　

　 　

CHAPTER II　　

 SOCIALISM, CAPITALISM, AND CLASS STRUGGLES　　

　 　

　 　

　 　

　 　

　 　

       To understand Maoist China, we must fully realize that it was a society born of a great people"s revolution in which the broad masses of the oppressed people rose up to fight for their own liberation, and thus bore deeply the mark of the revolution.　　

       While under bourgeois liberty individuals are guaranteed a set of formal civil rights, the production activities on which people spend most of their disposable time are regarded as people’s “private” affairs.  Without means of production, the majority people have to allow most of their living activities to be dictated by the minority of property owners.  At this point, civil right is not more than the right to choose between failing to make a living or giving up freedom.  It was one of the greatest achievements of the socialist revolution that as a result of the revolution, the right to employment became an inalienable right of working people.  The right to employment was important not only because it guaranteed workers the “iron rice bowl,” but more importantly it allowed workers to have some control over the labor process.  It was much more difficult for the managers of the Chinese state-owned enterprises than their capitalist counterparts to extend working time and increase working intensity without the cooperation of the workers.  For they could not threaten the workers with firing.  According to one investigation made by the Chinese Center for the Scientific-Technological Research and Development in 1986, the average effective weekly working time of the staff and workers in the state-owned enterprises was only 19.2-28.8 hours, which was only 40-60 percent of the required working time (see Zhong Pengrong, 292).  That is, the workers in the Chinese state-owned enterprises could to a large extent decide by themselves the length and intensity of their work.  This is a kind of freedom which is unimaginable for the working people in capitalist societies.  For working people, the freedom over labor process is much more important and much more practical an freedom than bourgeois civil freedom, such as the freedom of speech, the freedom of press, the freedom of assembly, and the freedom of association, which in capitalist societies only the ruling class and the intellectuals who serve their interest can fully enjoy.  While the socialist revolution failed to realize its original goal, the society born of the revolution was not, as bourgeois scholars said, a totalitarian society without any freedom.  Instead, it had both the oppressive side and the democratic side.  In fact, from working people’s point of view, it was a much more democratic society than the most democratic capitalist society.. 　　

       On the other hand, while the former exploiters and oppressors had been deprived of their ownership of means of production, working people were not yet prepared for the direct control over social production.  The control over society"s means of production thus fell into the hands of the state, the long-standing oppressive institution in human history.  A new ruling class--the state bureaucratic class--thus came into being.  It replaced the old ruling class as the oppressors and the exploiters of working people　　

      Why is society always divided into the ruling class and the ruled class?  Is it a natural law as inalterable as the moon revolving around the earth?  What is the Marxist viewpoint on this question?  Engels said:　　

　 　

The separation of society into an exploiting and an exploited class, a ruling and an oppressed class, was the necessary consequence of the deficient and restricted development of production in former times.  So long as the total social labour only yields a product which but slightly exceeds that barely necessary for the existence of all; so long, therefore, as labour engages all or almost all the time of the great majority of the members of society--so long, of necessity, this society is divided into classes.  Side by side with the great majority, exclusively bond slaves to labour, arises a class freed from directly productive labour, which looks after the general affairs of society: the direction of labour, state business, law, science, art, etc.  It is, therefore, the law of division of labour that lies at the basis of the division into classes . . . It was based upon the insufficiency of production.  It will be swept away by the complete development of modern productive forces (Engels, 1978, 714).　　

　 　

       Thus, according to Engels, only with highly developed productive forces (as a result of capitalist development), can the great majority of people be largely freed from directly productive labor, allowing them to participate in the general affairs of society, and thus abolishing the division of classes.  However, when the Chinese Communist Party came to power, they inherited from the Kuomintang regime an extremely backward semi-feudal, semi-colonial economy with little modern industry.  In this case, there was the objective foundation for the new oppressor class to emerge.  But this by no means suggests that the Chinese socialist revolution was doomed from the very beginning.  Instead, the final fate of the revolution must be decided by real historical struggles.　　

       On the one hand, the state bureaucratic class wanted to consolidate its rule over society, and establish a “normal” oppressive society.  On the other hand, the oppressed people would not allow the oppressive order to be consolidated.  They would not only defend their interest that they had won in the revolution, but also further develop the revolution, overthrowing the new oppressor class.  These two sides were sharply against one another, and could by no means co-exist peacefully.  Their contradiction thus must be solved by real struggles and it was in the Cultural Revolution, the contradiction reached the stage of total explosion, and the struggle between the state bureaucratic class and the oppressed people reached the stage of decisive battle.　　

　 　

　 　

The Cultural Revolution　　

       History is always written by contemporary people.  From the perspectives of different classes, and to serve different political purposes, people can reach totally different explanations of history.  According to the official viewpoint, the Cultural Revolution was “ten years of havoc,” in which the state and people had experienced terrible sufferings.  For the liberal intellectuals, they do not have much common language with the ruling class except on two fundamental issues, one is the “reform,” and the other is the Cultural Revolution. 　　

       According to the liberal intellectuals:　　

　 　

The Cultural Revolution was a wrong movement which had been started for wrong purposes and undertaken with wrong methods . . . The Cultural Revolution could have occurred for it was rooted on the one hand, in the economic and political system that had been established in China before the Cultural Revolution, and on the other hand, in the traditional Chinese culture.　　

As for Mao Zedong himself, why did he initiate the Cultural Revolution in his late years?  This reflects on the one hand, his failure to properly deal with the internal contradictions of the Chinese Communist Party, and on the other hand, his increasingly arbitrary personal style . . . All of those good opinions which were not in the favor of Mao Zedong, were considered by him to be “rightist,” “capitalist roaders,” “anti-party,” and were put under attack, leading to historically unprecedented ten years of havoc.　　

　 　

　 　

When Mao Zedong met with Edgar Snow in 1965, he acknowledged that there was personal cult in China, and said that China needed more personal cult, that is, the cult of Mao Zedong himself . . . When Snow met with Mao Zedong again in 1970, Mao said that when they had their last talk in 1965, he had lost control of much of the power--the provincial and local party organizations, and especially the propaganda work under the Party committee of the Beijing city . . . Mao Zedong decided that Liu Shaoqi must be driven out of office (Gao Gao and Yan Jiaqi, preface, 1-2).　　

　 　

In the opinion of the liberal intellectuals, the Cultural Revolution resulted first of all from Mao’s pursuit of unlimited personal power.  To acquire unlimited despotic power, Mao conceived a great conspiracy.  This conspiracy could be realized for under the despotic system and traditional culture, the prevailing popular psychology were blind loyalty and blind obedience.　　

       Let me first ask two questions.  First, if Mao initiated the Cultural Revolution simply to pursue personal power, why did he mobilize the masses of people to destroy the entire state apparatus?  Without state apparatus, how can we talk about power, and about personal dictatorship?　　

       Second, both the liberal intellectuals and the official historians fail to explain why hundreds of millions of people simply be turned crazy overnight.  Did such a greatly important historical event as the Cultural Revolution occur simply because all people over the country went mad?　　

       In the opinion of the liberal intellectuals, the Cultural Revolution was a tyrannous movement which had been started for tyrannous purposes and undertaken with tyrannous methods, and the masses were simply some ignorant and mindless people that could be made use of by anyone at will.  But if the masses were so ignorant and mindless, why did the ruling elite with the help of the entire state and party bureaucracy fail to make use of them?  For example, there is certainly no difficulty for the party bureaucrats to claim that they are exactly following Chairman Mao’s revolutionary line and all those people against them are against Chairman Mao. 　　

       Of course, Mao, with his personal power, might have no difficulty to remove several high-ranking party cadres from their positions.  But if there had not been any objectively existing contradiction between ordinary people and the bureaucratic class, how could he put the entire ruling class under attack?  For in a world where everyone claims he or she is on the side of Chairman Mao and use all the material and spiritual means at his or her disposal to convince or to force others to believe his or her claim, it is up to people themselves to decide who is “really” on the side of Chairman Mao, who they will fight with, and who they will fight against.  Thus, no matter what Mao’s personal intention was, the very fact that the Cultural Revolution was carried out by mobilizing the broad masses of people, means that it had to reflect the feeling, the desire, and the objective conditions of life of ordinary people.　　

       Referring to traditional culture gives no help to the liberal intellectuals.  First, there was certainly not a single emperor who would tell his subjects “it is right to rebel.”  Secondly, in traditional China people were by no means always blindly loyal and obedient.  They did rebel, and when they rebelled they had good reason to do so.   　　

       What the liberal intellectuals and the official historians declined to say is that on the eve of the Cultural Revolution, a ruling class which was separated from and stood over the masses of people had already taken shape.  This ruling class, like all other ruling classes, was by nature an oppressor class and exploiter class.  All the contradictions in the Chinese society, in the last analysis, derives from this.  Otherwise we would not be able to understand the contemporary Chinese history.  If we keep silence on this fundamental problem, it is inevitable that we would consciously or unconsciously distort the actual history.　　

       In 1965, Mao said:　　

　 　

The bureaucratic class is a class in sharp opposition to the working class and the poor and lower-middle peasants.  How can these people who have become or are in the process of becoming bourgeois elements sucking the blood of the workers be properly recognized?  These people are the objectives of the struggle, the objectives of the revolution (see Meisner, 1986, 271).　　

　 　

When Mao said this, he was not happening to have some fantastic idea, and he was not simply looking for excuses to get rid of dissidents.  There was indeed a “bureaucratic class,” who is indeed “bourgeois elements sucking the blood of the workers.”  Let us see some facts:　　

　 　

[In July 1961,] Liu Shaoqi visited the Jing Bo Lake[6] and squandered four million Yuan only for his personal pleasure . . . Whenever his meal was made, the rice had to be selected piece by piece, the Man Tou[7] had to be even in size, each had a weight of about one liang[8], and the top of the Man Tou must be cut into cross-like flower after it was cooked . . . Fat pigs had to be carried over everyday from Mu Dan River which is two hundred and forty li[9] away [to the Jing Bo Lake], and were immediately killed and cooked.  In every meal, there must be fresh fishes, two or three year old young chickens, camel humps, bear palms, scallops, sea cucumbers, and Mao Tai wine (ZDJS, 15).　　

　 　

To meet their personal desire for pleasure, the bureaucratic gentlemen in the Shaanxi province had spared no human and material resources, especially in the difficult period of our country, squandering a great deal of working people’s blood and sweat . . . The Zhang Ba Gou high-ranking cadre guest house, which is supposed to be a sanatorium, is actually a place for the provincial cadres to have amusement and pleasure.  It has an area of hundreds of mu[10], with western-style houses, kiosks, and pavilions, looking magnificent.  There are also pleasure boats, woods, rockery, restaurants, dance halls, theaters, rare plants, and precious flowers . . . We know that in the Xian area, people can only swim in summer.  But our gentlemen had the spirit to remake nature.  They wanted to swim in winter.  To realize their invention, comrade workers built a “warm water swimming pool” at Zhang Ba Gou.  It uses up ten to twenty tons of coal, costing hundreds of Yuan, every time to heat the water for the swimming pool.  Sometimes even if only one leading cadre came with his wife and children on Sunday, comrade workers would have to heat water specially for his family . . . Last year we students in the Northwest Industrial University took part in the Socialist Education Movement.  There was a poor peasant family, whose total belongings might be less than five Yuan.  This is the life of our poor and lower middle peasants!  But our bureaucratic gentlemen spend hundreds of Yuan just to have a swim!  Is it really water that is in the swimming pool?  I do not think so.  It is not water, not at all.  It is a pool of blood and sweat of working people ! (CLHB, 7-9)   　　

　 　

       If it were in other oppressive societies where people took oppression and exploitation more or less for granted, given the same level of social contradictions, the rulers might be able to continue to rule as they used to and the people might continue to live as they used to.  But for Chinese people, with the victory of the people’s revolution in 1949, the anti-oppression, anti-exploitation, anti-privilege ideas had become popular ideas deeply rooted in their hearts.  The privileges of the ruling class were no longer considered to be society’s normal phenomena, and social inequality could no longer be justified.  People had seen with their own eyes that revolution could change everything.  All of those once “sacred and inviolable” things had been struck to the ground and the heaven did not collapse.  Now the state bureaucratic class, following the steps of the old oppressor classes, again wanted to stand over people, how could people allow them to do so?  People had overthrown an oppressor class, why could not they overthrow another?  Mao (1977,  344) correctly pointed out:　　

　 　

If great democracy is now to be practised again, I am for it . . . the great democracy set in motion by the proletariat is directed against class enemies . . . Great democracy can be directed against bureaucrats too . . . If some people grow tired of life and so become bureaucratic, if, when meeting the masses, they have not a single kind word for them but only take them to task, and if they don’t bother to solve any of the problems the masses may have, they are destined to be overthrown.  Now this danger does exist.  If you alienate yourself from the masses and fail to solve their problems, the peasants will wield their carry-poles, the workers will demonstrate in the streets and the students will create disturbances.  Whenever such things happen, they must in the first place be taken as good things, and that is how I look at the matter.　　

　 　

       The old state apparatus was smashed as soon as the Cultural Revolution began.  From the state president, provincial chiefs, to factory directors, managers, and different levels of party committees, in one word, the entire bureaucratic state institutions were overthrown by the revolutionary masses.  The masses of people saw with their own eyes those once majestic-looking bureaucratic gentlemen now lost all of their power and prestige, how could they not burst with joy?  What a great spiritual liberation it is!　　

　 　

       Meisner (1986, 343) described how the Shanghai party and state bureaucracy was overthrown by the revolutionary masses:　　

　 　

By mid-autumn of 1966 the rebellion against established authority had spread from the schools to the factories, thus making the appearance of the actual proletariat in the drama of the “Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.” . . . The Cultural Revolution, for the first time in the history of the People’s Republic, brought discontented workers and others the freedom to voice their grievances and the freedom to establish their own organizations, unhampered by the organizational and ideological restraints hitherto imposed by the Communist Party.  The result was the spontaneous emergence of a bewildering variety of popular rebel organizations, all proclaiming fidelity to Mao and Maoist principles but interpreting those principles to suit their own particular interests.  At the beginning of November several of the rebel groups formed a loose alliance under the name Headquarters of the Revolutionary Revolt of Shanghai Workers, which came under the leadership of Wang Hung-wen, a young textile worker and mid-level party functionary.  The Workers’ Headquarter was the self-creation of the Shanghai workers, owing nothing to instructions from Peking . . . On November 8 the Workers’ Headquarters presented its demands to the Shanghai Municipal Party Committee, and they clearly portended the replacement of the old bureaucratic administration by new popular organs of government . . . With the victory of the Workers’ Headquarters in mid-November, the power of the Shanghai party and government apparatus rapidly disintegrated as rebel groups freely roamed the city to organize workers and others.  The mass movement grew at a frenetic pace and on a vast scale . . . The overthrow, which would be celebrated as the “January Revolution,” was accomplished during the first week of the new year.  On January 5 a dozen rebel organizations loosely allied with the Workers’ Headquarters (and with the encouragement and assistance of members of the Cultural Revolution Group in Capital) published a “Message to All the People of Shanghai” . . . and called for the unity of workers, students, intellectuals and cadres.  That call for unity received dramatic expression in the next day, January 6, when more than a million citizens gathered to hold a mass meeting in the central city square, with the proceedings observed by millions of others.  Mayor Ts’ao and other high party officials were denounced, removed from their positions, and forced to make public confessions of their political sins.  Over the next few days lesser officials and cadres were similarly humiliated at other public meetings and paraded through the street wearing placards and dunce caps.  The old regime had fallen.　　

　 　

       Who are scared?  The ruling class is scared, and the liberal intellectuals are also scared.  The liberal intellectuals worry about the social order to no less an extent than the ruling class.  They are afraid of the proletarian great democracy.  They keep silence on the abuses that the oppressors had done to people in the entire “normal time,” but cry loudly when they see the violence that people did to the oppressors at the moment of revolution: “the party and state leaders suffered from wrongs, persecutions, and abuses . . . Liu Shaoqi, the President of the Republic, was not protected by the Constitution and laws, was framed as ‘traitor,’ ‘enemy agent,’ and ‘scab,’ and had lost any right to defend himself (Gao Gao and Yan Jiaqi, preface).”  But as was said by the Red Guards, “these bourgeois gentlemen, when seeking their own pleasure, care nothing about the party’s policies, care nothing about the government’s laws, and care nothing about people’s life or death!”  When people want to settle their accounts, what do they want to defend of themselves?　　

       The Cultural Revolution had almost completely destroyed the old relations of production:　　

　 　

In the Cultural Revolution the old cadre system (people who were in authority) had been largely destroyed by the mass movement.  The masses were out of control.  In factories, old regulations and institutions had been overthrown . . . and workers often disobeyed cadres . . . production had gone out of hand, or was even paralyzed.  Since cadres did not have real authority, in many enterprises production and management were out of control (Li Qiang, 162).　　

　 　

       With the old relations of production destroyed, the new relations of production must be established in time, otherwise the development of productive forces would be paralyzed.  In fact, some elements of the new relations of production did begin to emerge in the Cultural Revolution.  Following are some excerpts from an investigation report on the Beijing General Knitwear Factory made by Charles Bettelheim and an investigation report on the Beijing Northern-Suburban Timber Mill included in a then official collection of propaganda materials.　　

       In the Cultural Revolution, workers “demanded participation in management, in keeping with the Anshan Constitution (Bettelheim, 1974, 21).”　　

　 　

Implementing the Anshan Constitution means always to put politics in command, strengthen party leadership, launch vigorous mass movements, systematically promote the participation of cadres in productive labor and of workers in management, reform any unreasonable rules, assure close cooperation among workers, cadres, and technicians, and energetically promote the technical revolution (Bettelheim, 1974, 17).　　

　 　

       What are the unreasonable rules?  The unreasonable rules were “imposed by the old management--regulations concerning work organization, discipline, etc., which reflected a lack of confidence in workers’ initiative and thus tended to preserve capitalist relations (Bettelheim, 1974, 22).”　　

　 　

The old regulations and institutions followed the line of “experts in charge of factory,” and were established to control and to impose restrictions on the workers, providing (many ways to) deduct workers’ pays or to impose fines on workers.  They provided for this right to this principal, and that right to that chief, but not a single right to the workers.  The workers only have the right to be controlled (WANSUI, 675)　　

　 　

       How to reform the unreasonable rules?　　

　 　

Each regulation was subjected to mass discussion . . . a great number of rules have already been abolished, making it possible to effect a substantial reduction in factory administrative personnel (Bettelheim, 1974, 22).　　

　 　

In the past the administrative structure was overexpanded and overstaffed . . . To regulate the interpersonal and interdepartment relations, there were a great number of overelaborated rules and regulations, to have different people and different departments check against each other.  In one department, the rules wrote: “if the chief is absent for business, the vice chief is in charge of all the work; if the vice chief is absent for business, the chief is in charge of all the work.”  Since the revolutionary committee was established, the administrative structure has been simplified . . . If there were not idle staff, there would be no overelaborated rules and regulations.  Now there are fewer people, more work, but problems have been solved faster.  Under the old rules and regulations, workshops served (rather than being served by) administrative departments.  After simplifying the administrative structure, administrative cadres often come to workshops to solve practical problems.  This is deeply welcomed by the masses of workers (WANSUI, 677).　　

　 　

The old quality control system did not trust the masses of workers.  It relied upon a small number of inspection workers to “supervise workers,” resulting in tensions between production workers and inspection workers.  Comrade workers said: “if you do not rely upon the masses, you have no way to improve product quality, even if behind every worker you place an inspector.”  Now the new quality control system has been established.  Under the new system, proletarian politics is in command, every one takes responsibility, and is to help each other, the team chief is to examine (workers’ work), and the group is to evaluate (workers’ work).  The new system guarantees the steady improvement of product quality (WANSUI, 679).　　

　 　

At the General Knitwear Factory, the (workers’ management) teams deal with problems involving the upgrading of product quality.  The system is one of self-control and each work team controls its own work.  The workers make every effort to find collective solutions to whatever problems come up (Bettelheim, 1974, 25).　　

　 　

In the past, plans were made and directed by a handful of people.  These plans were separated from proletarian politics, from the masses, and from reality.  They are metaphysical and mechanistic.  Under these plans, production had to fit quotas and norms, the productive initiatives of the masses of workers were seriously restrained, there were a lot of idleness due to poor organization and a great deal of waste . . . Now production tasks are to be discussed by workers.  A planning system which relies upon the masses and combines the top and the base has been established.  (Under the new system,) plans correspond to reality.  Leaders and the masses have one common goal in their mind, and work together towards that common goal.  The new custom of communist cooperation is emerging everywhere.  Comrade workers say: “in the past everything was determined by the top and workers were only to do their work.  Now planning is everybody’s business, everybody is to find solutions to problems, and production is also everybody’s business.  Thus we can always finish production tasks ahead of time (WANSUI, 679).”　　

　 　

The workers’ management teams are also involved in planning factory output.  The workers are repeatedly consulted before a plan is formally adopted.  The planning project is scrutinized concretely in terms of how it will affect each shop and each work team.  The workers divide into small groups for this purpose, which enables them to express themselves fully on the plan’s significance, it implications for each worker, and on possible improvements in terms of production, quality, product diversification, etc.  This results in numerous exchanges between workers and managerial bodies, with the workers’ management teams acting as go-betweens.  The overall plan is thus scrutinized repeatedly, and its final adoption is the outcome of a common effort by the various work teams and shops (Bettelheim, 1974, 25).　　

　 　

       In his comments on the impact of the Cultural Revolution on the conditions of the Chinese working class, Meisner (1986, 385) said:　　

　 　

Possibly, as the reports of many foreign visitors suggested in the early 1970s, a collectivistic spirit and a degree of workers’ participation in management were characteristic of Chinese factory life . . . administrative and managerial cadres, having gone through the trials and humiliations of the Cultural Revolution, temporarily abandoned their more autocratic practices and bureaucratic habits, and were disposed to consult workers in more meaningful fashion than in the years before the great upheaval.　　

　 　

As Meisner said, in the Cultural Revolution, “mass democracy was the official order of the day.”  This is the germ of the new relations of production.  This is to solve fundamentally the contradiction that all the former relations of production have failed to solve--the contradiction between the oppressors and the oppressed.  While the new relations of production had never moved beyond its embryonic stage, it provided a concrete solution to the contradictions of the Chinese society at that time, the solution which was a working people’s solution, a fundamental solution, and therefore, the only real solution.　　

       However, to build up the new relations of production and to replace the old relations of production with the new relations of production, it was not only necessary to have widespread autonomous mass movements, which were far less than sufficient.  On the basis of mass movements, a new revolutionary party must be established.  This party would take power from the ruling class and thus provide political safeguard for the transformation of the relations of production.  It is the fatal weakness of the Cultural Revolution that there was not a new revolutionary party.  Making revolution without a revolutionary party is just like a man without brain, and revolution is reduced to little more than destruction.　　

       Without a new revolutionary party, working people could not take political power, and the old state apparatus which had been destroyed was soon restored.  After the ruling class took back political power, they immediately made use of this power to take back everything they had lost in the revolution.　　

　 　

Moreover, the drive to reestablish labor discipline in the factories after the disruptions of the Cultural Revolution (particularly aimed at younger workers who had been the most politically radical) was followed in the early 1970s by the gradual revival of many of the old factory rules and regulations previously abolished and by a growing emphasis on specialist administrators and technical criteria . . . The factory director . . . still remained the director.  In the end he was less responsible to the workers he directed than to the state and party apparatus that employed him (Meisner, 1986, 384).　　

　 　

       On the other hand, it was impossible for the ruling class to simply go back to the conditions before the Cultural Revolution.　　

　 　

Like many other problems in China in the 1980s, low efficiency is one of the consequences of the Cultural Revolution.  For more than ten years, Chinese workers have refused to follow the direction of the party committees in factories, refused to take care of machines.  Instead they spend much of time to play cards or leave workshops to play basketball . . . Even two years after Hua Guofeng took power, western companies that have made investment in China find that Chinese workers refuse to follow the directions that they do not like . . . In the last analysis, low efficiency results from the management’s lack of power.  It is almost impossible for a state-owned enterprise to fire a worker . . . A Chinese official, feeling somehow awkward, explained to a journalist: “you must understand that we cannot force workers to work (JLFS, 69-70).”　　

　 　

       They cannot force us to work!  This is the concrete and actual benefit that revolution has brought about to the oppressed people.  When bourgeois scholars denounced “l(fā)ow efficiency,” they did not understand that this is also democracy.  What rights do bourgeois democracy provide to people?  Parliamentary election?  It happens only once for every few years.  Freedom of speech, freedom of press?  To deliver opinion in press, on radio, or on television, or to publish essays and books, are not considered to be the business of ordinary people.  Freedom of association, of organizing political party?  This has always remained a privilege of the elitists.  But labor, is the most important activity that the majority people have to participate everyday.  To be able to control their own labor, is thus the most important freedom and right for the majority people.  The benefit that a revolution can bring about to working people will by no means be overestimated.　　

       The new relations of production failed to be established, but the old one no longer worked.  People did not acquire power, but the old power could no longer rule as it used to.  For the ruling class the only way out was the “reform.”　　

　 　

　 　

Bureaucratic and Private Capitalist Class　　

       The development of the capitalist relations of production is neither a result of people’s free choice, nor a result of the improved scientific understanding of economic laws, but the expression of the will of the ruling class.  The struggle of the oppressed people against the state bureaucratic class was temporarily brought to a close by the end of the Cultural Revolution.  The ruling class had won and people had been defeated.  This result of the struggle allowed the ruling class to transform the relations of production according to its own will.　　

       According to the “reformers” in the ruling class: 　　

　 　

“Objective economic laws,” at least as the reformers divined their meaning, also demanded the operation of economic enterprises on the basis of profit-making criteria; strengthened managerial authority in accordance with the “scientific” methods developed in the advanced capitalist countries (Meisner, 1986, 466).　　

　 　

Without certain historical conditions, the so called “objective economic laws” can be neither “objective” nor “scientific.”  The historical condition for the “reform” was that the ruling class was able to transform the relations of production according to its own will and in accordance with its own interest, and consequently the contradictions of an oppressive system could only be solved by strengthening the oppressive mechanisms.  It is from the oppressors’ perspective, that the capitalist economic management is a more advanced and scientific one than that of the Chinese state-owned enterprises.　　

       With the development of the capitalist relations of production, the rule of the ruling class has been increasingly based on the capitalist type of oppression and exploitation of working people.  Consequently, the state bureaucratic class has been gradually transformed into the bureaucratic capitalist class.　　

　 　

       Due to China’s particular historical conditions, the ruling class’s control over means of production takes the legal form of state property and “collective property.”  As has been suggested by the Chinese experience, state property or collective property in the legal term is by no means incompatible with the development of the capitalist relations of production.  For what really matters is not the legal form of property but the real social relations between different classes on the one hand, and between different groups or individual members of the ruling class on the other hand.  While the development of the capitalist relations of production does not necessarily require the transformation of state property or collective property into explicit private property, this by no means prevents the members of the ruling class from accumulating their private wealth by embezzling state property in the process of capitalist development.　　

       Following are the major methods with which the members of the ruling class have accumulated their private wealth by embezzling state property in the “reform” period:　　

　 　

(1)Bureaucratic Buying and Selling (Guan Dao)　　

       According to the calculation of official scholars, the total “rent” (the non-production profit that can be acquired by monopolistic power) including “price differences,” “interest differences,” “exchange rate differences,” (meaning differences between official and market prices, interest rates, exchange rates) and other items amounts to over 400 billion Yuan every year, “forty percent of which falls into the hands of the rent-seekers who have various relations with power (XHWZ No.2 1992, 56).”　　

　 　

(2)Bureaucratic Speculation (Guan Chao)　　

       In “bureaucratic speculation,” what is bought and sold is not ordinary goods and services, but real estate and stock.  Stock is fictitious capital, the value of which can be several times or even dozens of times higher than the value of the means of production that it represents.  As for the speculation on land, while land does not have value in itself, its market value can be of millions or billions of Yuan.  Thus, the speed and scale of wealth accumulation with bureaucratic speculation are far beyond that with bureaucratic buying and selling.　　

　 　

Mr. Zhang is a son of a deputy mayor.  A few years ago, following the trend at that time, he left the economic committee (a government institution) and “jumped into the sea,” setting up a trade company which was nominally state owned but actually privately owned.  His father was in charge of the construction industry, he, naturally, focused on selling construction materials.  He did not have to tell others, nor did his father.  Those construction companies who “knew the smell” always came to him to buy construction materials and never bargained the prices.  Within two more years, he made almost two million Yuan.  In 1992 “General Manager Zhang” registered a real estate company within one week.  Then he gave (the local branch) of a bank an imported car, asking for a loan of eight million Yuan . . . Mr. Zhang used the eight million Yuan to buy 25 mu of land in the Hainan province and sold it at 19 million Yuan four months later (JJC No. 3, 32).　　

　 　

       In 1992 the total amount of land leased by the government was 220 square kilometers, with a total income of 52.5 billion Yuan, in which the central government had got only 2.6 billion Yuan.  Thus, about 50 billion Yuan had fallen into private hands.  In the Beihai city, even for the best land, the government charged only 97 thousand Yuan per mu, while the highest price in the market was 1.76 million Yuan per mu.  It is said: “buying and selling land is far more profitable than land development, let alone real business.”  In the Haikou city, the government charged 150 Yuan per square meter for the most prosperous area.  But buildings built at the area were sold at 3000-4000 Yuan per square meter.  In some cities, land can be leased with 5 Yuan per square meter, and in some cities the government charges nothing (ZWFDCDB No. 20 1993, 18-20).　　

       We do not know how much of state property has been lost in the speculation on stock, but following examples can tell us something:　　

　 　

In Shanghai there is a Millionaire Yang, who specializes in stock business.  In last March, he once threw out 6800 shares of an electronic factory.  He earned 50 Yuan on every share and gained a total of 340 thousand Yuan (ZGLDKX, No. 2 1992, 15).　　

　 　

A newspaper journalist who knew many useful friends, managed to get some “l(fā)egal person” shares.  He immediately found a buyer and made a “wholesale” deal, making profit at a rate of 100 percent.  For the buyer, although he had paid a high “wholesale” price, since after the shares entered market, the price would always become several times higher, it was still a very profitable business . . . Doing business like this for several times, the journalist soon became a millionaire (JJC No.3, 54).　　

　 　

(3)Business Run by Bureaucratic Institutions　　

       In 1992 the number of companies in the whole country increased by 220 thousand, or a 88.9 percent increase to that in 1991.  “Most of the new companies are run by state institutions.” “More than 60 percent of state institutions run their own business (JJC No. 3, 25).”　　

　 　

Even China’s People’s Liberation Army . . . has opened up a string of luxury hotels, and PLA-owned factories churn out refrigerators, pianos, TV sets and passenger aircraft for the market.  Some 400 army-run factories have sales offices in Shenzhen SEZ (special economic zone) (Smith, 1993, 97).”　　

　 　

       The business run by bureaucratic institutions, with the help of monopolistic power, is able to acquire monopolistic profit far more than normal profit.　　

　 　

A company managed to get some (quota of) rolled steel, and urgently needed 10 million Yuan (to pay for the rolled steel).  It asked for the help of the local branch of the state bank.  The director of the branch said: “recently we are short of capital.  We really want to help you but we have difficulty.  Nevertheless, we just made a loan of 10 million Yuan to the company run by this branch yesterday.  They have not yet taken the money.  I suggest you make contact with them and make this deal together.”  Thus the loan finally goes to the company run by the bank branch itself.  The band branch thus easily got half of the profit (JJC No. 3, 26).　　

　 　

(4)Comprador Capital　　

       Some members of the ruling class directly collude with foreign capital, help foreign capital to exploit Chinese people, and then share part of the super profit acquired by foreign capital.  For foreign capitalists, who want to escape China’s trade control and various restrictions on investment, want to find ways of tax evasion, and want to get cheap or free land or other benefits, they need the help of some members of the ruling class who have access to power, and thus would like to see some members of the ruling class acting as comprador capitalists:　　

　 　

Most shocking are the number of leading revolutionaries’ sons and daughters who have taken positions with the biggest American and European banks and multinational corporations and now represent them in China . . . Some of them may, in spite of all temptation, still serve China’s best interests, but the majority will serve the interests of those who hire them, and unless one is naive enough to believe that there is no conflict of interest here, “comprador” is the word that describes them (Hinton, 1993, 96).　　

Mr. Yuan, a 48-year-old Communist Party member with, according to the AP, a penchant for cellular phones and stock market deals, walks a tight rope between capitalism and communism with business cards for both.  One card introduces him as deputy mayor of Dongguan City, Guangdong Province (Dongguan is one of the hottest centres of foreign investment in Guangdong).  Another says he’s the managing director of Fook Man Development Co., a Hong Kong-based firm with millions in bank.  Yuan also sits on the board of three other companies based in Hong Kong, is part-owner of a 500-room hotel in Los Angeles and has plans to expand his empire to Singapore and Frankfurt.  Chinese call such officials ‘fake foreign devils’ after the 19th-century sobriquet for the Chinese compradors in the opium trade.  Yuan doesn’t object to the appellation.  ‘We’re making money,’ he answers, slapping his thigh and slipping off his loafers (Smith, 1993, 98).　　

　 　

       The large-scale embezzlement of state property by the ruling class has resulted in a great loss of state income and wealth which is in turn one of the major reasons for the state financial crisis (see TABLE 2.1).  To overcome the financial crisis, income must be increased and expenditure must be cut.  How to increase income? By increasing consumer good prices.  How to cut expenditure? By cutting social welfare. 　　

       Under the name of  the “price reform,” consumer prices have risen at an increasingly rapid rate over the past few years (see TABLE 2.1).  According to the official economists, the "reform" is not to be blamed for inflation.  They argue that before the "reform," people suffered from persistent shortage of consumer goods and “shortage” was in fact a kind of “implicit inflation.”  Bourgeois economists are not able to understand any non-capitalist social phenomena unless they treat these phenomena as if they were capitalist phenomena.  A “shortage” economy and an inflationary economy represent two quite different types of social relations.  “Shortage” means that social wealth is distributed according to criterion other than money.  The criterion could be political power, could be social privilege, but could also be social equality, or priority to the disprivileged.  Inflation, on the other hand, is a distinct social phenomenon that can be found in a society where exchange value dominates everything.　　

　 　

TABLE 2.1　　

China’s Financial Deficits and Inflation, 1981-1990　　

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------                                                    1981-1985               1986-1990　　

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------　　

Average Annual Financial Deficits (billions of Yuan)                 12.2                          47.5　　

Financial Deficits as Percentage of National Income                    1.8                            3.5　　

Average Annual Growth Rates of Urban Consumer Prices (%)   4.2                           13.1*　　

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------　　

*1986-1989　　

Source: Ma Bin; JJSHTZBJ No. 4 1992, 21. 　　

       After his visit to China in 1970s Bettelheim (1974, 64) made the following introduction of China’s price system at that time:　　

　 　

The selling price to the consumers is fixed according to a variety of policies.　　

       1.  There is no profit on essential goods; if necessary they are subsidized by the state.  In the case of cereals, for instance, which are under state monopoly, the purchase price from the peasants practically equals the retail price.  This means that the state assumes the cost of marketing, transportation, etc. . . . On the whole, the price  to the consumers of certain essential foods has in recent years been lowered without a decrease in the purchase price from the people’s communes.  The selling price of 50 kg. of rice, for instance, decreased from 17.63 yuan in 1950 to 16.40 yuan in 1970.  Similarly, the purchase price from the people’s communes may be increased without an increase in the selling price to the consumers . . .　　

       2.  Products essential to the health of the people are sold at cost price, which means that no profit is made on their sale.  The price of medicine, for instance, has decreased in keeping with reduced cost price.  Thus the price of 200,000 units of penicillin decreased from 2.10 yuan in 1953 to 1.23 yuan in 1970.  When a social need is given priority, price gives way to free distribution, as in the case of birth-control devices.　　

       3.  Everyday necessities are cheap, although a profit margin is maintained.  The price of 50 kg. of lump coal, for instance, decreased from 2.80 yuan to 2.50 yuan between 1958 and 1970.　　

       4.  In the case of nonessential products (transistor radios, cameras, etc.), the “historically given price” is generally maintained.  Any eventual drop in the cost price of these products serves to increase the social accumulation fund.　　

       The main thing is to understand that China’s approach to prices involve not merely policies, but politics--it rests on political and social choices.　　

　 　

       Therefore, inflation is not simply a result of unbalanced aggregate supply and aggregate demand, but the product of certain state policies.  Under the name of the “price reform,” the prices of more and more goods and services are to be determined by the free market.  By 1991 state regulated prices covered only 22 percent of the total sale of agricultural goods, 21 percent of the total retail transaction, and 36.6 percent of the total sale of means of production (ZGJJWT No. 1 1993, 3).  Thus the prices of most goods and services are now regulated by the free market.  This opens the way to more rapid increase of consumer prices, at the expense of the interest of the masses of the lower classes.  　　

       Cutting social welfare: according to the calculation of the All China Federation of Trade Unions, with the retirement and pension "reform," the health care "reform," and the housing "reform" put into practice, the workers in the state-owned enterprises have to make additional expenditures which amount to 6-7.5 percent of their living expenses (ZGLDKX No. 3 1992, 13).　　

       By embezzling state property, that is, in the last analysis, by plundering the broad masses of working people, a small number people have accumulated enormous amount of wealth.  “About 3 percent of China’s population (or 30 million people) belongs to the rich stratum.  Their private savings account for 40 percent of China’s total residential savings, or they have 150 thousand Yuan of saving per head (BJQNB 28 December 1993).”  In 1992 the total financial assets held by the residents in the whole country was 1,800 billion Yuan.  If the “rich stratum” has the same proportion of the total resident-held financial assets as it has that of the total residential savings, that is 40 percent of the total resident-held financial assets, then their private financial assets should amount to 700 billion Yuan.  If we assume that for every year between 1986 and 1993 100 billion Yuan of state property was turned into the private property of the members of the ruling class (this may well be a conservative estimation, recall how much state income has been lost due to Guan Dao--bureaucratic buying and selling, see the above text), then from 1986-1993 they would have accumulated 800 billion Yuan of private wealth.  Apparently the so-called “rich stratum” is mostly composed of the members of the bureaucratic capitalist class.　　

       With the development of the capitalist relations of production in China, a small private capitalist class began to emerge in China.  The private capitalist class is not a part of the ruling class.  It does not have political power.  It makes its fortune by exploiting employed labor.  Given the contradiction between the bureaucratic capitalist class and the private capitalist class, can the private capitalist class emerge as a democratic social force?  Can it provide leadership for China’s democratic movement?　　

       The following wonderful text appeared in an official academic journal:　　

　 　

The dominant force of a society is not necessarily the class which has the largest number of people.  It is not only the number of people, but also the amount of property that matters.  That is, the number of people must be counted with a weight of property . . . The propertied class who “gets rich first” out of the propertyless class, with its increasing number of people and accumulation of capital, is becoming the main stream of society, the dominant force of society.  This is a good change . . . With the growth of its economic interest, the propertied class will inevitably seek to express its political opinion, to participate in government decision-making through various legislature institutions.  This suggests that the existing constitution is becoming outmoded and the current political structure is to be transformed . . . The propertied class will not disappear again in the Chinese history.  It will influence the coming one thousand years and dominate the coming one hundred years (Gu Wen).　　

　 　

       There is no freedom of speech in China?  Bourgeois democracy--bourgeois dictatorship, is on the author’s lips.  The author is smart enough to invent a conception of “propertied class.”  Who is the “propertied class?”  Is it the bureaucratic capitalist class?  The bureaucratic capitalist class is itself the ruling class, why does it need to “seek to express political opinion?”  The “propertied class,” apparently, refers to the private capitalist class.  Will the private capitalist class “influence the coming one thousand years, and dominate the coming one hundred years?”  This is completely a wishful thinking!　　

       First, the private capitalist class is very weak and small.  According to official statistics, in 1990 there were 98,000 private enterprises in China, whose total registered capital amounted to 4.5 billion Yuan (Han Mingxi, preface).  While the official statistics may have substantially underestimated the economic strength of the private capitalist class, given the fact that the bureaucratic capitalist class, which has accumulated hundreds of billions of Yuan of private wealth and controls all the state property, there is no question the economic power of the private capitalist class can hardly match even an odd part of that of the bureaucratic capitalist class.  A class so weak and small as the private capitalist class, wants to become “the main stream of society,” “the dominant force of society?”  What a nonsense it is!　　

       True, there is some contradiction between the bureaucratic capitalist class and private capitalist class in the sense that the bureaucratic capitalist class uses political power to pursue monopolistic profit and thus hurts the interest of the private capitalist class.  In this sense, the private capitalist class may have some demand for democracy.  However, compared to the benefit that political dictatorship brings to the private capitalist class, the harm it does to the private capitalist class is not more than a little discount.  Both the private capitalist class and bureaucratic capitalist class are exploiter classes and both make their fortune by oppressing working people.  The lower workers’ wages and benefits, and the longer and more intensify is their work, the better for the capitalists.  And the less power the workers have, the less strength they have in their struggle against the capitalists, the lower their wages and benefits, and the longer and more intensify is their work.  The private capitalist class certainly wants to have political power.  However, if for it to acquire political power, it must allow the working class to have political power too.  This is not a good deal.  The private capitalist class thinks: with democracy, can I get a higher profit rate?  If with democracy, there is not any certainty that the situation will be better, and it may well be much worse, why does the private capitalist class bother itself with such a great upheaval, even rendering the risk of a revolution?　　

　 　

　 　

The 1989 Revolution　　

       Without many times of serious struggles, without cruel and bloody fights, no oppressive society is able to impose its oppression upon the majority people.  The capitalist system is no exception to the rule.　　

       While Chinese working people had suffered from a historic defeat in the Cultural Revolution, and the revolutionary socialist solution to China’s social contradictions became an historical impossibility at the time, this by no means suggests that the capitalist “reform” would proceed peacefully and smoothly.  On the contrary, Chinese working people would by no means give up their extensive social and economic rights won by the socialist revolution and allow the ruling class to impose upon them a “normal” oppressive system without serious struggles.  With the progress of the capitalist “reform,” the decade of 1980s saw the continuously growing contradiction between the ruling class and working people, especially, the contradiction between the ruling class and the urban working class, the major beneficiary of the socialist revolution.　　

       This contradiction was further intensified by the approaching capitalist economic crisis.  According to official statistics, in 1988, while the average nominal wage of the staff and workers in the whole country increased by 19.7 percent,  the index of the living expenses for the staff and workers in the whole country increased by 20.7 percent (ZGJJNJ 1988).  That is, for the first time in the “reform” period, there was absolute decline of the living standard of working people.  China was on the verge of revolution.　　

       To make a successful revolution, there must be a correct and mature revolutionary theory and a clear and coherent revolutionary program, which reflect the interest and desire of the majority people, and thus can effectively mobilize the majority people in the revolutionary struggle.  A revolutionary theory and a revolutionary program like this, were exactly what the 1989 revolution did not have.　　

       At the time, the field of ideology was almost completely dominated by the liberal intellectuals.  The leadership of the revolution naturally fell into the hands of the liberal intellectuals.  Why was there not a leftist democratic force composed of revolutionary socialist intellectuals in 1989?　　

       In the “democratic wall” movement in Beijing in 1979, most dissident activists were more or less in favor of socialism.  They believed that the problem did not lie in socialism but in the lack of democracy and the lack of genuine socialism.  This movement was soon repressed.  In 1982, among the social science intellectuals there was a controversy on “the problem of humanitarianism and alienation.”  Some intellectuals, based on Marxist ideas, argued that the contemporary Chinese society remained an alienated society.  This point of view was officially declared a variant of “bourgeois liberalization,” that is, declared illegal.　　

       A country which claims itself to be a socialist country declares Marxist ideas illegal.  While this sounds ununderstandable, it is quite logical.  The development of the capitalist relations of production requires the ruling class establish new dominant ideology and new apologist theory.  The new apologist theory shall not help people to realize the nature of the oppressive society, let alone inspire people to rebel.  Instead, it must be able to prove that it is right to oppress and it is virtue to exploit.  Only the western capitalist society has a ready-made apologist theory that can serve this purpose.  Thus, the ruling class at first approves tacitly, then encourages, and then actively participates in using western bourgeois social sciences to falsify and fabricate Marxism, and then simply replaces Marxism with western bourgeois social sciences.　　

       On the one hand, Marxist ideas are said to be “bourgeois liberalization.”  On the other hand, the official scholars explicitly introduce and advocate bourgeois ideology.  Of course, the ruling class will not accept “total westernization,” but will “discard the dross and select the essence,” based on the consideration of China’s “national circumstances.”  For example, economics is virtually given free hand on its way towards “l(fā)iberalization.”  For economics directly concerns the relations of production, that is, it is a field where the interest of the ruling class is most incompatible with the existence of Marxism, even the existence of not more than paying lip service.  By comparison, political science and jurist study appear to be more “conservative.”  The slower progress of “l(fā)iberalization” in political science and jurist study does not prevent the development of the capitalist relations of production.  On the other hand, if the progress is too fast, it may compromise the system of one-party dictatorship.  However, even political science and jurist study must carry out some “reform.”  If in the field of economics there is no longer the conception of “class,” how can you advocate the conception of “class dictatorship” in political science and jurist study?  On the other hand, if bourgeois social sciences can prove that it is right to oppress and exploit, why cannot it be used to prove that it is right to practicing political dictatorship?  For example, new authoritarianism serves this purpose.  With the encouragement and support of the ruling class, a large number of bourgeois social scientists have emerged in China.  The word of “the liberal intellectuals” refers to these people.  Most of them are also official scholars, occupying key positions in academic institutions and various “thinking tanks,” playing important roles in government decision-making.     　　

       In late 1970s and early 1980s the leftist democratic forces were repressed politically and academically.  To rebuild the revolutionary socialist intellectual force, new revolutionary theories must be developed to reflect the experience of the previous socialist revolutions and to meet the challenge of the liberal intellectuals.  The new revolutionary force also needs new strategies and tactics.  It will take a long time before the new revolutionary socialist force is able to finish these works and to re-emerge as a viable political force.  For China’s revolutionary socialist force, the 1989 revolution came too early, when it was not able to make even the weakest voice.　　

       The liberal intellectuals boast that the 1989 revolution was a result of their “enlightenment” movement, that is, their efforts to introduce various western bourgeois liberal theories into China.  In fact, the so called “enlightenment” movement had never had an impact beyond university campus.  A large part of university students did follow the liberal intellectuals and convert to bourgeois liberalism and student movements had repetitively broken out in China’s major universities since mid-1980s.  However, before 1989 these student movements were never responded by the urban workers.  Thus, the fact that in 1989 the event went beyond the narrow limit of student movement and developed into a popular revolution involving the broad masses of working people, certainly cannot be explained by the so called “enlightenment” movement, but has to be explained by the objective intensification of social contradictions.　　

       The event began with the student demonstration in April 1989.  Through 1980s university students made up a radical social group.  Capitalist development had by far brought about only limited material benefits to the middle class (the intellectuals, technicians, and managerial workers, etc.).  Nor had it opened as many opportunities as expected for the members of the middle class to rise to the ruling class.  The university students were a part of the middle class.  For those students who had failed in social competition, their way towards the upper society had been blocked, nor would they like to go back to the rank of working people.  Seeing no future, these students had accumulated strong resentments against the existing society and later became the main body of the student movement.　　

       In cities, the student movement was immediately supported by the working masses.  But for almost a month it did not become a mass revolutionary movement.  In fact, at a time, it seemed the student movement was coming to an end.  The hunger-strike turned out to be the turning point.  On May 17 millions of people in Beijing came to streets, demonstrating in support of the students in the hunger-strike.  It was by this point the event went beyond the narrow limit of student movement and became a popular revolution involving the broad masses of working people.[11]  While workers had joined the revolution, they did so instinctively and spontaneously, without clear political objectives, without the political leadership of their own, and thus without acting as an unified, organized, and independent political force capable of pursuing their own political interest.　　

       Unlike the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the majority of the Chinese population is not composed of the urban working class, but peasants.  While the peasant class is potentially a revolutionary class, it was nonetheless not a revolutionary class in 1989.　　

       When the Deng Xiaoping regime came to power in 1979, to consolidate its social base, it took the strategy of making some temporary concessions to the peasants.  The Deng Xiaoping regime carried out the agricultural reform and substantially raised the purchasing prices for agricultural goods.  From 1979-1984, the average purchasing prices for 180 agricultural products had been increased by 24.8 percent (Zhan Hongsong, 119).  In this period, peasants’ income had been increased substantially.  The ratio of the per capita consumption of the urban population to that of the rural population decreased from 2.9:1 in 1978 to 2.2:1 in 1985 (Li Qiang, 113).  We know that under capitalist development, in the long run, the discrepancy between the urban area and the rural area tends to be widened rather than narrowed.  And actually the ratio just mentioned did begin to increase after 1985.  However, by 1989 the contradictions of capitalist development, as far as peasants’ conditions are concerned, had been far from fully developed.  Despite the increasing inequality after mid-1980s, the living conditions of the peasants had definitely improved in 1980s in absolute as well as relative terms.  Thus the peasants were neutralized and could not act as a revolutionary force at the critical time of the 1989 revolution.      　　

       Without the support of the peasants, the only force on which the revolution could count was the urban working class.  Only the most extensive and most complete mobilization of the urban working class could save the revolution.  　　

       In some big cities, like Beijing, Shanghai, some workers organized “Workers’ Autonomous Associations (Gong Zi Lian).”  But these associations never gained substantial mass support among workers.  To make things even worse, many so called “Workers’ Autonomous Associations” were soon under the control of the liberal intellectuals, and reduced to bargaining counters in the power struggle in the so called “democratic movement (Min Yun).”　　

       But among the workers there was indeed great revolutionary potential. 　　

       Since the so called “reform” is by nature not more than an effort by the ruling class to consolidate and intensify the oppression and exploitation against the working class by depriving the working class of the extensive social and economic rights it had enjoyed since the victory of the socialist revolution and by establishing “normal” oppressive mechanisms, the “reform” can by no means eliminate the existing social contradictions.  On the contrary it not only intensifies the existing contradictions but also brings about new contradictions.  According to one investigation by the All China Federation of Trade Unions in 1986, with a sample of 450,000 workers, when being asked “how the relationship between the workers and the cadres have changed since the beginning of the reform,” 38.56 percent of the investigated answered “it has become worse,”  31.58 percent answered “there has been no change,” and only 26.37 percent answered “it has become better.”  Some workers said: “what we earn in our work is all taken away by the bureaucrats.  Nowadays the cadre is the cadre and worker is the worker, they are no longer together.”  In a later investigation, some workers said: “in the Maoist era,  the cadres were not to be removed from office (unless they made serious mistakes).  Nevertheless,  they were mostly selfless, were strict with themselves, set themselves as examples, and tried to serve the people.  Nowadays the cadres have a definite term of office and they begin to get money for themselves as soon as they take office.” (Li Qiang, 161, 165, 167)  Thus, the relations between the ruling class and the working class had substantially deteriorated since the beginning of the “reform” and the workers had accumulated enormous resentments against the existing social order.  These resentments could have been translated into great revolutionary energies if there had been a well-prepared political program which was able to express the desire of the working class clearly and powerfully and thus arise extensive and active responses among the masses of workers.        　　

       However, to do so would be against the logic of the liberal intellectuals.  In fact, the liberal intellectuals shared the same standpoint with the ruling class on the question of “reform.”  Many liberal intellectuals had directly participated in making the “reform” strategies and it was the liberal intellectuals who had laid down the theoretical foundation for the “economic reform.”  What the liberal intellectuals wanted was not to deny the “reform,” nor prevent the “reform” from hurting the working class.  Instead, what they wanted was to carry out the “reform” to the very end.　　

       In 1989 most of the liberal intellectuals were explicitly in favor of privatization.  Shi Jie Jing Ji Dao Bao (The World Economic Herald) published many articles advocating thoroughgoing market-oriented reform and privatization.  Some argued for gradual privatization by transforming the state-owned enterprises into “modern” corporations.  Some argued for privatizing the entire state sector at one stroke-- “go over the river at one jump (Yi Tiao Guo He Shi Xian Min Ying Hua).”  Even if these ideas did not immediately arise the suspect and alertness of the working class, they would certainly not be responded by them enthusiastically.　　

       The liberal intellectuals were not only unable to mobilize the working class, but actually afraid of doing so.  While the liberal intellectuals never forgot to boost themselves as “democratic fighters,”  nor did they forget even for an minute to claim that they were not at all intended to overthrow the government.  They admired the “Taiwan model,” hoping that the government would make concessions under the pressure of student demonstrations, first allowing free speech, free press, then allowing organizing the opposition party, and gradually moving towards free election of government.  Most of the liberal intellectuals believed that they must rely upon the existing government to carry out the “reform,” whether it was the “economic reform” or the “political reform.”  Without the support of the peasants, nor would they want to mobilize the working class, the liberal intellectuals had no choice but to rely upon the “reformers” in the ruling class.  In fact, for the liberal intellectuals, if the “reformers” could prevail over the “conservatives” in the intra-party power struggle, there would be no need for any more revolutionary movement.      　　

       In fact none of the “reformist” group or the “conservative” group was more progressive or reactionary than the other.  They were both a part of the ruling class, struggling against each other for power.  Rather than being a progressive group, the “reformers” had closer ties with the parasitic part of the bureaucratic capitalist class, who were the biggest beneficiaries of the capitalist “reform,” enriching themselves by embezzling state property.  Probably for this reason, the “reformers” were more committed to the “reform,” and under some conditions more willing to make compromise with the liberal intellectuals with the expectation of a political alliance with the middle class against the urban working class. 　　

       In the ruling class, the “reformers” were actually stronger than the “conservatives.”  But the “reformers” themselves were divided on the issue of how to deal with the revolution.  The Zhao Ziyang clique, terrified by the turbulent revolutionary waves, prepared to make compromise with the liberal intellectuals.  But Deng Xiaoping, as the leader of the “reformers,” understood that under the revolutionary situation at the time, any concession might undermine the entire existing system.  Moreover, the revolutionary masses had raised the slogan of “down with Guan Dao (bureaucratic buying and selling--a kind of rent-seeking activity),” directly threatening the fundamental interest of the “reformers.”  Deng Xiaoping also knew that repressing the revolution would not break the political alliance of the ruling class and the middle class.  After teaching the liberal intellectuals and the middle class a lesson, they would rely upon the ruling class even more closely.  The subsequent events proved that Deng Xiaoping was correct on this point.  Only two more years later, after Deng’s visit to southern China in spring 1992,  the liberal intellectuals immediately wrote essays and books, such as Li Shi De Chao Liu (The Trend of History), Fang Zuo Bei Wang Lu (A Memorandum against Leftism), Zhong Guo Zuo Huo (China’s Leftist Disasters), cheering enthusiastically for Deng’s attack on “l(fā)eftism” and insistence on “reform,” forgetting everything in 1989.　　

       At the critical moment of the revolution, it was exactly the “reformers” who sold out the liberal intellectuals.  The Zhao Ziyang clique handed out power without making any resistance.  At this moment, both the revolutionary side and the counter-revolutionary side had no room to retreat and must determine their destiny with a decisive battle.  However, even at this moment, the liberal intellectuals still had illusions of the “reformers.”  They insisted on the principle of “peace, rationality, and non-violence,” forbidding the masses of people to rebel.  They only wanted to exercise some “pressure” on the government, throwing all of their hope on the “reformers.”  After May 20, when the Martial Law was declared, the opposition raised the slogan of “down with Li Peng!” but never attacked  Deng Xiaoping.   At the moment when the revolution and the counter-revolution were in a decisive battle, they did not go out to organize the revolutionary force, preparing for the life-and-death struggle, but spent all of their time and energy in collecting the signatures of the members of the standing committee of the National People’s Congress, asking for calling an emergency meeting　　

 

 of the National People’s Congress,[12] as if they were playing children’s games.  The political cowardice and foolishness of the liberal intellectuals were completely exposed in the 1989 revolution.　　

       The 1989 revolution and the repression of the revolution proved that capitalism, as an oppressive social system, is by nature against democracy.  Only with violence and force, after cruel and bloody struggles, could the capitalist oppressive order be imposed upon working people, and was the way towards capitalist development paved.　　

　 　

　 　

The Struggle against “Breaking the Three-Irons”　　

       In the 1989 revolution, the working class was defeated politically.  However, the ruling class had not yet won a complete victory as far as the capitalist “reform” was concerned and the capitalist relations of production had not yet been completely established in the state-owned enterprises.  In 1992 the ruling class tried to complete the capitalist transformation of the state-owned enterprises once-for-all by “breaking the three-irons (the iron rice bowl, the iron wage, and the iron chair of the cadre).”  This effort, nevertheless, was met with the strong resistance of the working class and ended with failure.　　

In early 1992 the idea of “breaking the three-irons” was unanimously supported by the press in this country.  For a time the cry of “breaking the three-irons” and “reforming the system” was heard all over the country.  However, a series of troublesome problems soon emerged.  The most radical reactions came from the fired workers.  The workers in the state-owned factories had got the idea and psychology that they were entitled to rely and depend upon the factories (where they worked), and they were not to be separated from the factories, the idea and psychology that had been established for a long time.  Thus, when they suddenly knew they were fired, they were really shocked.  Some of them made radical reactions.  For instance, in March 1992, a factory in Tianjin, which had suffered heavy losses, dismissed more than one thousand workers.  In response, more than two thousand workers of the factory and their relatives rallied at a highway intersection bridge, and a branch of the round-Tianjin-city highway was totally paralyzed.  In spring 1992, many big and medium-sized state-owned enterprises in Northeast China tried to carry out the policy of “breaking the three-irons.”  Many workers were faced with unemployment.  Many of them were not accustomed to the conditions of being fired, being unemployed, having payment reduced, and living on relieves and had got a great deal of resentments.  Some resorted to extreme and violent measures to retaliate the factory leaders.  In Jinzhou city, Qinhuangdao city, and Hefei city accidents happened one after another, in which workers whose “iron rice bowls” were broken retaliated against the factory directors or managers.  In this case, the movement of “breaking the three-irons” had to end up silently (Li Qiang, 150).              　　

　 　

       The ruling class’s effort of “breaking the three-irons” was thus defeated by the working class.  However, as the experience of the 1989 revolution has suggested, without a mature revolutionary socialist party directed by a scientific revolutionary theory, the working class by itself is not able to act as an independent political force and win the struggle for liberation.  Without such a revolutionary party, the working class has so far only been able to make their struggles against capitalist oppression and exploitation defensively and passively.  Consequently, the ruling class, with all the initiatives in its hand, has been able to keep making progress in the project of the capitalist “reform” and of depriving the working class of the extensive social and economic rights brought about by the socialist revolution, though at a pace much slower than the “reformers” have expected.  To reverse this trend, and to turn the current passive, scattered struggles into an active, unified revolutionary movement with a real positive prospect, a revolutionary socialist party with the direction of a scientific revolutionary theory must be developed as soon as possible.  　　

　 　

The Middle Class　　

       The middle class is an important force in Chinese politics.　　

       Marx (1967, 601) said: “The more a ruling class is able to assimilate the foremost minds of a ruled class, the more stable and dangerous becomes its rule.”  No ruling class in any historical era can be freed from being corrupted by its own way of living.  If the ruling class only recruits its successors from its own descendants, it will not be long before it loses the ability to rule.   For a ruling class to sustain its own rule, it must often recruit the outstanding figures of the oppressed classes into its own rank.　　

       The development of modern education allows the ruling class to systematically select the outstanding figures of the oppressed classes, who make up the modern middle class.  The members of the middle class participate in social administration and are prepared to join the rank of the ruling class. On the one hand, the middle class is a middle step for those from the lower classes who want to get up into the upper class.  On the other hand, it acts as the reserve army of the ruling class.  According to official statistics, in 1990 China had “ordinary cadres” 10.91 million, and in 1987 China had “intellectuals,” referring to the people who had had higher education, 6.59 million (Li Qiang, 231, 279).  The actual scale of the Chinese middle class in late 1980s and early 1990s should be between the two numbers.　　

      The middle class is distinguished from the urban petty bourgeoisie.  The petty bourgeois has his or her own means of production, relying mainly upon family labor or only employing very few workers to make a living or earn a meager profit.  In China the urban petty bourgeoisie is mainly made up of Ge Ti Hu (Individual business or self-employed laborers).  In 1990 there were 6.71 million urban self-employed laborers (Li Qiang, 322).  By comparison, the middle class members do not have means of production.  They belong to the so-called “wage and salary stratum” and make their living by selling their labor power.  However, unlike the working class, the middle class sells a special kind of labor power, the labor power which embodies scientific and technological knowledge.  With their special labor power, the middle class is thus separated from ordinary working people and become a part of the privileged classes.  Some individual members of the petty bourgeoisie may rise to the private capitalist class.  But the petty bourgeoisie as whole cannot act as the reserve army of the ruling class.  For the administration of the modern society requires specialized scientific knowledge which only the members of the middle class who have had regular modern education are equipped with. 　　

       The official scholars do not admit that the middle class is a privileged class.  In 1980s Nao Ti Dao Gua (low pay for mental labor, high pay for physical labor) was once a quite popular topic among the official scholars.  But even according to their calculation, in 1988 in Beijing, the average income of the “mental laborers” was only 5.8 percent lower than that of the “physical laborers (Li Qiang, 261).”  This calculation did not include the peasants, nor did it take into account the various material privileges of the middle class, such as better housing provided by the government and more chances to go abroad and thus earn higher income in foreign countries.　　

       The official scholars explicitly reject Engels’s point of view-- “In a society organized on socialist principles, the expenses that have been spent on training knowledgeable workers are afforded by society.  Thus, the result of the more complicated labor, that is, the larger value created also belongs to society.”[13]  They misrepresent the labor theory of value, saying: “The knowledgeable labor or the complicated labor can create more value than the simple labor.  Therefore, the price of the knowledgeable labor power shall be determined by the (larger) value it creates (Li Qiang, 266).”　　

       The official scholars do not understand that “value” is not something that exists in an abstract world, but always exists in certain concrete social relations and historical conditions.  Without the historical conditions in which “value” arises, the labor theory of value can tell us nothing of the really existing society.  In a capitalist society, the price of labor power is determined by market supply and market demand.  As we have known, the labor power of the members of the middle class, is a special kind of labor power, the labor power that embodies scientific and technological knowledge.  This kind of labor power cannot be produced and reproduced by the families of ordinary working people, but has to be produced by regular educational institutions.  But in a capitalist society, it is actually a social privilege to have higher education.  With this privilege the members of the middle class actually have monopolistic control over society’s science, arts, and culture, and consequently the supply of the special “knowledgeable labor power.”  As the private land owners can charge rent for their land property, the members of the middle class can earn monopolistic income by selling their special labor power.  But all of these depend upon the capitalist social relations, and are by no means naturally “rational and just” arrangements.　　

       In fact, in the “reform” period, with the development of the capitalist relations of production, rather than exploiting the great creative potential of the working masses, the ruling class has increasingly relied upon the middle class to perform specialized administration and promote technological progress.  Consequently, the economic conditions of the members of the middle class have been substantially improved.  By the early 1990s the so-called Nao Ti Dao Gua has been clearly reversed (see TABLE 2.2).　　

　 　

TABLE 2.2　　

Month Income of the Staff and Workers of the State-Owned Enterprises, July 1992 (Yuan)　　

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------　　

Service Personnel                                                                                    193.5　　

Auxiliary Production Workers                                                                 224.5　　

Direct Production Workers                                                                      226.3　　

Ordinary Administrative Cadres                                                               237.3　　

Middle Administrative Cadres                                                                  237.3　　

Higher Administrative Cadres                                                                  278.0　　

Technical Personnel                                                                                 281.0　　

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------　　

Source: Li Qiang, 262　　

　 　

       The middle class is not a part of the ruling class.  However, as the reserve army of the ruling class, the middle class often sees the world as if it were the ruling class of the future, the ruling class in reserve.  This perspective of the world is represented theoretically and politically by the liberal intellectuals.  On the other hand, in a capitalist society, the positions of the members of the middle class are very contradictory and far from being stable.  They can never escape social competition and in competition there must be losers.  Capitalism can never allow all or most of the members of the middle class to realize their “personal value.”  The following paragraph is from a letter written to me by one of my friends in Shenzhen:　　

　 　

Yesterday I met a man who was going to stay in the hotel where I work.  He graduated from the Economic Management Department of the Southern China Scientific and Technological University.  He is now the workshop manager of the Xiwei factory . . . We talked for a couple hours.  He said sometimes he thought of death.  Death is the best way to be released.  He administers over 1,000 workers, with an admirable pay of more than three thousand Yuan a month.   However, he works day after day throughout a year.  He is never allowed to leave work on Sundays.  He works 12 hours a day and after work he has no reliable friends to talk to.  Many of his classmates have got rich.  He does not want to contact them for he will feel embarrassed.  He said he had become apathetic to everything . . . In Shenzhen everyone wears a mask in life.  For example, for business, he has to accompany some people to have Kala OK, so that those people can have fun; and in front of workers, he has to appear to be tough . . .   　　

　 　

    　　

　 　

CHAPTER III 　　

FROM THE COOPERATIVE 　　

AGRICULTURE TO THE PETTY PEASANT ECONOMY　　

　 　

　 　

       In this chapter we will discuss the evolution of the relations of production in the agricultural sector after the founding of the People’s Republic of China.  The post-revolutionary Chinese economy remained a dualistic economy, that is, an economy divided into a modern economic sector and a pre-modern agricultural sector.  Nevertheless, with the accomplishment of the land reform and the elimination of the pre-capitalist exploiter classes, the preconditions for modern economic development in China were prepared and consequently the modern economic sector began to play an increasingly dominant role in the Chinese economy.  On the other hand, any further advance of the agricultural productive forces and relations of production would have to depend upon the material conditions which were to be provided by the modern economic sector.  Thus from then on it is the development of the modern economic sector, and in the term of class struggle, the struggle between the ruling class and the working class in the modern economic sector, that would have a decisive impact on China’s social development.  It is within this context that the evolution of the relations of production in the agricultural sector is to be analyzed and understood.　　

　 　

　 　

The Cooperative Agriculture　　

Why the Cooperative Agriculture?　　

       As early as in 1943 Mao pointed out:　　

　 　

Among the peasant masses for several thousand years the individual economy has prevailed with one family, one household, as the economic unit.  This kind of dispersed individual economy is the basis for feudal control and causes the peasants themselves to succumb to permanent impoverishment.  The only method to overcome such a situation is to gradually collectivize, and the only road to achieve collectivization, as Lenin said, is through cooperatives ( see Selden, 1993, 71). 　　

　 　

       Therefore, in Mao’s opinion, as long as the Chinese agriculture is dominated by the petty peasant economy, there is no way for the peasants to be freed from “permanent impoverishment” and to be really liberated form “feudal control” or other forms of class oppression.　　

       In mid-1950s, in the debate on agricultural cooperatization, Mao made following arguments.  First, Mao argued that only with the cooperative agriculture, could the Chinese agriculture go beyond the small-scale individual farming, effectively fight natural calamities, make full use of modern agricultural technologies, and thus reach a qualitatively higher level of productive forces.　　

　 　

These comrades fail to understand that socialist industrialization cannot be carried out in isolation from the co-operative transformation of agriculture . . . as every one knows, China’s current level of production of commodity grain and raw materials for industry is low, whereas the state’s need for them is growing year by year, and this presents a sharp contradiction.  If we cannot basically solve the problem of agricultural co-operation within roughly three five-year plans, that is to say, if our agriculture cannot make a leap from small-scale farming with animal-drawn farm implements to large-scale mechanized farming, along with extensive state-organized reclamation by settlers using machinery . . . then we shall fail to resolve the contradiction between the ever-increasing need for commodity grain and industrial raw materials and the present generally low output of staple crops, and we shall run into formidable difficulties in our socialist industrialization and be unable to complete it (Mao, 1977a, 196).　　

　 　

       Secondly, Mao argued:　　

　 　

What exists in the countryside today is capitalist ownership by the rich peasants and a vast sea of ownership by individual peasants.  As is clear to everyone, the spontaneous forces of capitalism have been steadily growing in the countryside in recent years, with new peasants springing up everywhere and many well-to-do middle peasants striving to become rich peasants.  On the other hand, many poor peasants are still living in poverty for shortage of the means of production, with some getting into debt and others selling or renting out their land.  If this tendency goes unchecked, it is inevitable that polarization in the countryside will get worse day by day . . . There is no solution to this problem except on a new basis.  And that means to bring about, step by step, the socialist transformation of the whole of agriculture together with socialist industrialization and the socialist transformation of handicrafts and capitalist industry and commerce; in other words, it means to carry out co-operation and eliminate the rich peasant economy and the individual economy in the countryside so that all the rural people will become increasingly well off together (Mao, 1977a, 201).　　

　 　

       Therefore, after the land reform, new contradictions began to arose.  On the one hand, while the socialist industrialization needed more and more agricultural products, any qualitative advance of agricultural production was no longer possible within the limit of the petty peasant economy under its traditional conditions.  On the other hand, the capitalist social relations and social polarization began to develop in the countryside, and these tendencies were inherent in the petty peasant economy.  In this case, agricultural cooperatization became inevitable for it provided the only possible solution to both contradictions.  The question is while agriculture cooperatization was inevitable, whether the historical conditions for the successful development of the socialist cooperative agriculture had been prepared in China at that time. 　　

　 　

The Failure of the Cooperative Agriculture　　

       In the opinion of the official scholars, the cooperative agriculture is a ridiculous system which is against human nature as well as economic science, and thus must be rejected altogether.　　

　 　

“Go to work like a swarm of bees, work together like a tumultuous crowd, and everyone gets the same points.”  This the way in which the production team (of the people’s commune) works.  This way of work and distribution naturally encourages people to be lazy.　　

　 　

Human beings are heterogeneous.  Everyone has a different schedule of time preference and different attitudes towards work.  Even if with some common belief, or in response to some temporary need, people can set up some kind of on-the-same-boat cooperative relations.  This kind of relations will in no way last for a long time.  For collective work requires supervision, and supervision is not costless.  If supervision is too expensive, it becomes a kind of luxury that people cannot afford and some ambiguity of property right has to be allowed to save the cost of supervision.  But giving up supervision will lead to lower incentives of work and the “free rider” behaviors will become a common problem.  This will also lead to less production.  Agricultural work is dispersed in wide-spread area.  The supervision of agricultural work is thus very difficult or very expensive . . . even if there is the potential of economy of scale, it is more than offset by the inadequate incentives (Cai Fang, 14, 97).　　

       True, human beings are “heterogeneous.”  But this is not the point.  The point is that the modern agricultural production objectively requires collective and cooperative work of many workers, whether they are “homogeneous” or “heterogeneous.”  Under the capitalist agriculture, the relations between the workers and the capitalist are not only “heterogeneous” but actually antagonistic.  The capitalist agriculture certainly needs supervision, and the supervision is certainly very expensive, given the fact that the workers, being oppressed and exploited, will by no means self-consciously work for the capitalist enthusiastically and responsibly.  Despite this, and despite the fact that “agricultural work is dispersed in wide-spread area,” there is no question that the capitalist agriculture is qualitatively superior to the petty peasant economy.　　

       A question is thus raised: if under the socialist cooperative agriculture, where the workers have collective control over production, and work for their own collective interest rather than be exploited by the capitalist, and consequently they will certainly work more enthusiastically and responsibly than the workers under the capitalist agriculture, and consequently for the socialist cooperative agriculture to work, it certainly need much less cost of supervision than the capitalist agriculture, and if the capitalist agriculture, despite its very expensive supervision, is qualitatively superior to the petty peasant economy, why cannot the socialist cooperative agriculture work, and work much better than the petty peasant economy?　　

       On the other hand, this suggests that the success of the socialist cooperative agriculture depends on two important conditions.  First, the cooperative agriculture must based on the genuine socialist relations of production, that is, working people’s control over production.  Secondly, it must be based on modern agricultural technologies and equipments, which are the material foundation of the superiority of the cooperative agriculture over the petty peasant economy.　　

       As for the first condition, as we have known, in 1950s China did not yet have the material conditions for the elimination of the division of mental labor and physical labor, and consequently, the material conditions for the establishment of the socialist social relations.  As a result, a new bureaucratic ruling class took shape overtime.  In this case, the agricultural cooperatization, while indispensable for preventing capitalist development and social polarization in the countryside, had to be carried out from up to down, in a largely bureaucratic way, rather than relying upon the initiatives and creativity of the masses of peasants.　　

       On the other hand, while the agricultural cooperatization did open the possibility for qualitative progress of China’s agricultural productive forces, the progress that would never have been achieved under the traditional petty peasant economy, by the end of the Maoist era China did not yet have the material conditions to complete the modernization of the agriculture and the Chinese agriculture remained by and large a pre-modern sector.　　

       In this case, the fate of the cooperative agriculture and the socialist transformation of China’s countryside was not to be determined by the political, economic, and social conditions in the countryside itself, but was to be determined by the general trend of class struggle and the evolution of the relations of production in the entire society, which were in turn determined by the trend of class struggle and the evolution of the relations of production in China’s modern economic sector, the more advanced and increasingly dominant economic sector.  It was not until the failure of the Cultural Revolution, with the rule of the bureaucratic class consolidated and the revolutionary socialist solution to China’s social contradictions excluded, that the possibility of building the genuine socialist cooperative agriculture was completely eliminated.　　

　 　

　 　

The Heritage of the Cooperative Agriculture　　

       In the opinion of the official scholars and bourgeois economists, China’s agriculture cooperative agriculture was a sheer failure and must be completely denied as a strategy of agricultural development.  According to Selden (1993,16):　　

　 　

One vital indicator of the kind of fundamental problem that deepened through the period of collective mobilization is given by aggregate information about foodgrain output and consumption . . . per capita foodgrain production and nutrient availability peaked in 1955-1956, then dropped sharply after 1958 . . . Despite substantial famine-induced deaths, beginning in 1959 and continuing for three years, per capita food production did not regain precollectivization levels until the mid-1970s, and it was not until 1980 that nutrient availability slightly surpassed mid-1950s’ levels . . . at the most basic level of food consumption, twenty-five years of collective agriculture brought no gain.　　

　 　

       While the cooperative agriculture failed to bring about higher per capita food production, it should be pointed out that from 1958-1978 the Chinese population had increased by 300 million, while the arable land decreased by 8 million mu[14] every year.  In this case the very fact that China had managed to feed 22 percent of world’s population with only 7 percent of world’s arable land is a great achievement.  In 1976, China’s food production per mu was 491 jin[15], while the U.S.’s was 417 jin, Canada’s was 303 jin, France’s was 452 jin, Italy’s was 434 jin.  They were all lower than China’s, which was only lower than Japan’s, which was 788.6 jin, No.1 in the world.　　

       Among China’s 1.5 billion mu of arable land, 1.1 billion mu grew food crops, and among the 1.1 billion mu, 500 million mu were marginal land that would not have been cultivated in other countries, including 50 million mu of salinized land, 80 million mu of waterlogged lowland, and 300 million mu of hillside lean land.  Japan’s 788.6 jin was achieved on 44.4 million mu of arable land.  In the same year in China, there were 197 counties, with a total of 68.6 million mu of arable land, that had achieved more than 1,000 jin of food production per mu.  In this respect, China’s cooperative agriculture was not inferior to the agriculture of any other country (Fang Yuan, 52).   　　

       To know whether a kind of relations of production is more advanced or not, we must see not only whether it has brought about quantitative growth of production in the short-period, but more importantly whether it allows the development of qualitatively more advanced productive forces.  Despite the great cost and excesses of the bureaucratic agricultural collectivization, it nonetheless went beyond the narrow limit of the petty peasant economy and brought about fundamental transformation of the Chinese agriculture. 　　

       According to Meng Fanqi (one of the few official agricultural economists who have some sympathy towards the cooperative agriculture), it was in the period between 1958 and 1978 that the Chinese agriculture “entered the stage of being transformed into the modern agriculture.”  It was in this period that the infrastructure and the technological conditions of the Chinese agriculture had experienced unprecedented development:　　

　 　

(1)Substantial progress had been made in agricultural mechanization.  From 1958-1978 the total power of agricultural machinery equipments had increased at an average annual rate of 24.34 percent.  (2)The major rivers were brought under control.  Large-area irrigation networks, well irrigation, machine irrigation, and electronic irrigation were developed.  From 1952-1971 irrigated area increased form 20 percent to 78 percent of the total area of arable land.  And as a result, multiple crop index increased from 130 to 185.　　

(3)Many good varieties of crops were bred and propagated in large area.  A large and complete system to propagate agriculture science and technologies had been established.　　

　 　

According to some western experts who visited China at that time:　　

　 　

[I]t was the firm view of peasants that without this new form of extensive farming [communes] they could never have dealt with the exigencies of the natural disasters (Stavrianos, 607).　　

　 　

Today the Chinese agriculture is much less influenced by the climate than in the past.  This is not because the central government has made large investment in large-scale water conservancy projects and irrigation works, but a result of the many small works built by communes by mobilizing surplus labor force in the idle season of agricultural production (Wilber, 332).     　　

　 　

       Without the construction of infrastructure and the great progress of agricultural technologies under the cooperative agriculture, there would never have been the “agricultural miracle” in the “reform” period.　　

       By late 1970s some successful cooperatives began to embark on the way of agricultural modernization.  When Hinton went back to Long Bow village in Shanxi province in 1978, he found:　　

　 　

In 1978, Long Bow villagers had begun the mechanization of almost 200 acres of corn with a collection of scrounged, tinkered, and homemade equipment that did everything from spreading manure to tilling land, planting seed, killing weeds, picking ears, drying kernels, and augering the kernels into storage.  The twelve members of the machinery team multiplied labor productivity by a factor of fifteen while cutting the cost of raising grain almost in half (Hinton, 1990, 15).　　

　 　

　 　

　 　

Back to the Petty Peasant Economy　　

       In the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the collective agriculture was largely built upon modern agricultural technologies and was apparently superior to the petty peasant economy.  Therefore, in these countries, the agricultural privatization was firmly opposed by the peasants and agricultural workers.　　

       On the other hand, when the Deng Xiaoping regime began the economic “reform,” the Chinese agriculture remained by and large a pre-modern sector.  Given the prevailing pre-modern agricultural technological conditions, and given the consolidation of the rule of the bureaucratic class and the impossibility for working people to exercise control over production, de facto privatization became the only solution to China’s agricultural problems.  　　

       Unlike in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, in China the agricultural privatization was to some extent welcomed by the peasants.  But this fact would not change the fundamental nature of the entire “reform.”  For as a result of the “reform,” the Chinese agriculture was back to the petty peasant economy, the nature and the tendency of development of which, being a backward, pre-modern economic sector, were not determined by itself, but subject to the nature and the tendency of development of the modern economic sector.  In this case, it was the urban “reform” or the industrial “reform” that would determine the fundamental nature of the entire “reform” and consequently the long-term conditions of life (distinguished from the initial and immediate results of the agricultural “reform”) of the peasants.　　

　 　

　 　

The Petty Peasant Economy and Agricultural Stagnation　　

       The performance of the Chinese agriculture was indeed great in the first few years of the agricultural “reform.”  From 1978-1984, China’s total agricultural product increased at an average annual rate of 7.6 percent, and the food production increased at an average annual rate of 5.0 percent.  By 1984 per capita food production reached the record level of 390 kilograms, approaching the world average level, and the long-term food shortage was substantially alleviated (Feng Haifa, 115, 119).   In the opinion of the official scholars, the “unusual growth” of the Chinese agriculture was mainly a result of the “reform.”  “The agricultural reform had made substantial contribution to the growth of (agricultural) output from 1978-1984.  The change of productivity due to various kinds of reform contributed to 48.64 percent of the growth of output (Lin Yifu, 95).”　　

       According to the official scholars, the initial success of the agricultural “reform” demonstrates:　　

　 　

Family farming is the most appropriate form of operation in agriculture which does not have significant economy of scale . . . (Under family farming,) the labor force is mainly composed of the members of a family, land and capital are allocated within the scope of a family, and direct producers are also operators.  This is the typical level of property operation in agriculture.  At this level of property operation, great economic efficiency can be achieved in agriculture.　　

　 　

For the official scholars, “family farming” appears to be the perfect example of “unambiguous property.”  Their worship of “family farming” has become so absolute and blind, that they simply deny there is economy of scale in agriculture:　　

　 　

　 　

In agriculture, land is divisible, various flowing inputs like fertilizers, pesticides, and seeds are divisible, and even tractors are divisible in the sense that we can produce tractors with small-size and smaller horse power . . . Therefore, in agriculture, the factors of production are not really indivisible, and there is not significant economy of scale (Cai Fang, 97, 101, 108). 　　

　 　

The official scholars forget to mention that to make tractors more “divisible,” the cost of production (relative to productive capability) has to be increased.　　

       The official scholars refer to the experience of Japan and Taiwan where agricultural modernization is said to have been achieved on the basis of family farming.  But in fact, the experience of Japan and Taiwan is more an evidence of the failure of family farming, despite using some modern technologies, than that of  its success.  The Japanese and Taiwanese agriculture are so inefficient that they cannot survive without enormous government subsidies.  In Taiwan, before 1970 95 percent of agricultural products were self-sufficient.  After 1970 the self-sufficient ratio dropped to 90 percent.  The Japanese government spends 1,000 billion Yen to subsidize the rice production every year.  However, this cannot prevent the self-sufficiency ratio of agricultural products from dropping from 87 percent in 1955 to 72 percent in 1980 (Fang Yuan, 68; Meng Fanqi, 69) 　　

       According to Meng Fanqi (57):　　

　 　

If we fail to choose the proper form of operation in agriculture, given the ability of the small-scale operation to accommodate certain factors of production and technologies, even with very high level of economic development, it is very difficult to adopt advanced means of production to realize the optimized composition of factors of production, and to achieve the corresponding technical efficiency and economy of scale.  Given the opportunity cost of live labor . . . the total cost of operation per mu decreases with the growth of the scale of operation.  The two are significantly negatively correlated.  In essence it reflects the increasing optimization of the composition of factors of production as a result of the constant upgrading of the means of production.　　

　 　

Therefore, there is significant economy of scale in agriculture, like in other economic sectors.  The petty peasant economy, rather than being “a level of property operation” where “great economic efficiency can be achieved in agriculture,” is subject to great limitations, and unable to “realize the optimal composition of factors of production, and achieve the corresponding technical efficiency and economy of scale.”　　

       We need to make some detail analysis of the reasons for the “unusual growth” of agriculture between 1978-1984, to see whether and to what extent the “reform” had contributed to the agricultural growth in these years.  Without nation-wide materials, we will mainly rely upon some case studies.　　

       Fengyang county, Anhui province, is among the counties that first adopted the family contract system (Bao Chan Dao Hu).  In 1977 the total food production of Fengyang county was 182.9 thousand tons, the highest in the pre-reform years.  In 1979 Fengyang county adopted the group contract system (Bao Chan Dao Zu), and the food production in that year was 223.5 thousand tons.  In 1980 Fengyang county adopted the family contract system and the food production was increased to 255 thousand tons.   　　

　 　

During each crop season after 1979 the peasants got up earlier, worked harder, stayed longer in the fields than before and they accomplished each day much more than they ever had since pooling their land in 1956 . . . “In our cooperative days,” said Yang Chiangli, “we used to work all day, every day, year-in and year-out, but we got almost nothing done--work a little, take a break, work a little more, take another break.  We felt harassed and we produced very little.  What we were doing look like work but in fact we were stalling around.  Now we make every minute count.  Our labor produces results.  We earn a good living and we have time on our hands, lots of time (Hinton, 1990, 53).”　　

　 　

Thus, the family contract system did have released the productive initiatives of peasants.  But to achieve a high level of production, it requires not only certain level of initiatives of producers, but also certain material conditions.  The most important crop of Fengyang county was rice.  Rice requires water.  About half of the water came from the large-scale irrigation works built by the mass movement of 1950s.  If there had not been these irrigation works, the rice field would not have been irrigated, nor could the new hybrid seed, which had played a crucial role in the increase of the food production, have been used (Hinton, 1990, 58).　　

       The case of Fengyang county represents to a large extent the general conditions in the country.  Most of the water conservancy works in the country were built under the cooperative agriculture.  Without the large-scale capital accumulation and the construction of infrastructure under the cooperative agriculture, it is absolutely impossible for the Chinese agriculture in the initial years of the “reform” to have anything like the “unusual growth.”  As a result of the “reform,” peasants were better motivated for production, and the productive potential of the infrastructure built under the cooperative agriculture could be fully released.  In this sense, the “unusual growth,” rather than being the evidence of the efficiency of family farming, was indeed a proof of the superiority of the cooperative agriculture.  If the “unusual growth” was actually a result of the large-scale capital accumulation and the construction of infrastructure under the cooperative agriculture, for the momentum of agricultural growth to be sustained, there must be new large-scale capital accumulation and construction of infrastructure.  However, as a result of the “reform,” the Chinese agriculture was back to the petty peasant economy, which not only cannot make any further large-scale capital accumulation and construction of infrastructure, but actually leads to regression of China’s agricultural productive forces (see TABLE 3.1).     　　

　 　

 

　 　

TABLE 3.1　　

Regression of China’s Agricultural Productive Forces in the “Reform” Period　　

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------　　

                                          1979                            1987　　

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------　　

1,000,000 hectare　　

Areas Under Irrigation                                 45.003                                    44.403                           Areas Under Mechanized Irrigation             25.321                                    24.825         　　

Areas Under Mechanized Ploughing            42.219                                    38.393　　

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------　　

Source: Liu, 1988, 38.　　

　 　

       Since the liquidation of the cooperatives, construction of water conservancy works has almost ceased completely.  The agricultural technology-propagating system has no way to deal with the millions of small-scale, individually operating family farms.  And the petty peasant economy, with its tendency of self-sufficiency, does not have a strong demand for new technologies.  In this case, the agricultural technology-propagating system is paralyzed, the propagation networks have been broken, and the technicians and workers are left idle (Meng Fanqi, 57).　　

       On the other hand, according to William Hinton, “The reforms dealt mechanization a staggering blow.”  In Long Bow village, Shanxi province, under the cooperative agriculture, the villagers had made substantial progress in agricultural mechanization in the late 1970s.　　

But when the reform, offering subsistence plots to all and contract parcels to the land hungry, broke the fields into myriad small pieces, comprehensive mechanization gave way perforce to intermittent plowing and planting.  This left the peasants no alternative but to abandon most of their advanced equipment and reactivate their hoes.  When the bank asked for its loan money back the village head said “take the machinery.”  But the bank never found a buyer, so to this day the manure spreaders, the smoothing harrows, the sprayers, the sprinkle irrigation sets, the corn pickers, and the grain dryers lie rusting in the machinery yard, mute testimony to a bygone--or is it a bypassed?--era (Hinton, 1990, 15).　　

　 　

Of the 10,000 villages in Heilongjiang, only 181 retained collective control over machinery, that is, collective ownership and management.  Twenty percent contracted their machinery to private operators and the rest, over 80 percent sold the machinery outright at sacrifice prices to those with an inside track--such as brigade leaders, their relatives, and friends.  On the average the machinery brought only about one-third of its original price.  If one assumes that depreciation had already exhausted a third of the value then the machinery sold at half price.  However you figure it, it was a great rip-off of collective wealth, a major giveaway, and those who bought the machinery, having got it at such cheap prices, were often unprepared to pay for major repairs when the time came for that.  They used the machinery, mainly tractors, plows, and a few combines, until the time came for repairs, then they abandoned it.　　

　 　

After reform most machinery did only a portion of the work it had done before.  In almost every case the sales broke up implement sets so that the new owners could not contract any whole job, any whole crop sequence.  One operator could plow for a peasant producer, another could harrow or plant, still a third might harvest, but no operator brought a complete set of crop production equipment.  Thus utilization fell off sharply (Hinton, 1990, 103-104).　　

　 　

　 　

       On the other hand, with land contracted to families, and with continuous growth of the rural population, the arable land tends to be unlimitedly divided into increasingly smaller pieces.  In 1986 the arable land per rural family in the country was 9.2 mu, and in average every family had 8.49 pieces of land.  That means in average every piece of land was only 1.02 mu, or 14.23 percent of the arable land per rural family of some selected Asian and African countries in 1960 (Cai Fang, 99, 102).  And in 1991 the arable land per rural family in the country was 13 percent less than in 1986 (ZGNCJJ No.5 1993, 6).  The arable land has been divided into so small pieces, that even the rational operation of the traditional small-scale farming is impossible, not say anything about the large-scale operation of the modern agriculture.　　

       The petty peasant economy is by nature a primitive, backward mode of production.  It can neither carry out large-scale capital accumulation and construction of infrastructure, not accommodate modern productive forces.  In the short run, by providing better motivations than the bureaucratic collective agriculture, it could bring about quantitative increase of agricultural production.  But the quantitative increase was based on the qualitatively more advanced productive forces created under the cooperative agriculture.  In the long run, the petty peasant economy will not only fail to create more advanced productive forces, but be unable to preserve the productive forces left over by the cooperative agriculture.  After the productive capability left over by the cooperative agriculture is exhausted, the Chinese agriculture will be irretrievably on the decline. 　　

        In 1985, China’s food production was 30 million tons less than in the last year.  From 1984-1993 the total food production increased at an average annual rate of only 1.3 percent, and per capita food production dropped from 390 kilograms to 380 kilograms (ZGNYJJTJZL 1991, 32-33; BJRB 7 February 1994).  The “unusual growth” is bygone, and the Chinese agriculture has entered long-term stagnation.　　

　 　

　 　

Capitalism and the Petty Peasant Economy　　

       Unlike the capitalist exploitation of the working class, the capitalist exploitation of peasants, happens not in production but in circulation.　　

       In a society where the capitalist relations of production dominate, but the petty peasant economy prevails in agriculture, there will be the price scissors between agricultural and industrial products.  That is, whenever there is exchange between agricultural and industrial products, the industrial sectors gains at the expense of the agricultural sector.  This is because the industrial products are produced by the capitalist sector and thus sold at prices reflecting their labor value and the agricultural products are produced by the petty peasants and thus can only sold at prices that cover the value of labor power rather than the labor value.  If the petty peasants’ income is higher  than their value of labor power, the labor force will flow from the capitalist sector into the agricultural sector, until the income of the petty peasants is lower than the value of labor power.  Thus, the peasants can never get the full labor value of their products.  Through the price scissors, the capitalist class can not only directly exploit the working class who does not own means of production, but also indirectly exploit the peasants who apparently own some means of production. 　　

       But this mode of exploitation is in contradiction with the requirements of capitalist economic development.  First, capitalist economic development requires constant increase of agricultural labor productivity, which is in contradiction with the petty peasant economy which prevents the adoption of modern agricultural technologies and thus prevents the increase of agricultural labor productivity.　　

       We use the following two formulas to represent the capitalist sector and the petty peasant agricultural sector:　　

　 　

       p = pk + pk" +l　　

       p" = wl"　　

　 　

where p is the price for a unit of capitalist product, k is the means of production produced by the capitalist sector and consumed to produce a unit of capitalist product, k" is the means of production produced by the agricultural sector and consumed to produce a unit of capitalist product, l is the amount of labor consumed to produce a unit of capitalist product, p" is the price for a unit of agricultural product, w is the nominal wage for a unit of labor, and l" is the amount of labor consumed to produce a unit of agricultural product.  Here for simplicity we assume that the production of agricultural goods does not consume any means of production.　　

       If we use r to represent the profit rate of the capitalist sector, and u to represent one, then we have:　　

　 　

                        p　　

       u + r = -----------------　　

                   pk + pk" + wl　　

　 　

 

　 　

                                    wl"k" + l　　

                                    -----------　　

                                         u-k　　

                    = -------------------------------　　

                        (wl"k" + l)k　　

                       --------------- + wl"k" + wl　　

                              u-k　　

　 　

                                       wk" + l / l"　　

                                       ------------　　

　 　

                                            u - k　　

                   = -------------------------------------　　

                       wk"     k + w(u - k)　　

                      ------ + --------------(l / l") + wk"　　

                      u - k          u - k　　

　 　

       If we assume w is constant, that is, constant rate of surplus value, since the labor productivity of the capitalist sector tends to grow much faster than that of the petty peasant agricultural sector, in the long run, with l approaching 0, l / l" will approach 0, and consequently u + r will approach one, that is, r will approach 0.　　

       Therefore, in the long run, if the labor productivity of the agricultural sector grows much slower than the labor productivity of the capitalist sector, the profit rate of the capitalist sector will tend to decrease overtime.   This will seriously undermine the foundation of capitalist accumulation.　　

       Secondly, the constant growth of the absolute need of capitalist economic development for agricultural products is in contradiction with the limited long-term supplying ability of the Chinese agriculture.　　

       The petty peasant economy is a mode of production based on individual family and thus unable to carry out large-scale capital accumulation.  On the other hand, since the value of labor power determines the upper limit of the prices of agricultural products, the investment in agriculture is not profitable for capitalists.  Consequently “the state and collective investment . . . lean towards non-agricultural sectors.”  In 1979 the investment in agricultural capital construction accounted for 11.1 percent of the total state investment in capital construction.  In 1993 it dropped to 2.8 percent.  In 1990, the agricultural fixed investment accounted for 17 percent of the total fixed investment of “rural collectivities.”  In 1993 it accounted for only 6.9 percent. 　　

　 　

According to the calculation based on relevant materials, the share of the investment in agricultural infrastructure (in the total investment) has been lower than the optimal level for all previous periods.  The inadequate supply of capital has been a problem throughout the process of Chinese agricultural development (LUPISHU, 234).　　

　 　

       While capitalist economic development requires unlimited growth of the consumption of natural resources, the capitalist economy cannot produce and reproduce natural resources.  Since the agricultural sector relies heavily upon natural conditions, capitalist economic development, by unlimitedly increasing the consumption of natural resources without reproducing these resources, undermines the foundation of agricultural production.  For example, as a result of the rapid growth of the capitalist economy, China suffers from continuous decrease of arable land.　　

　 　

While the rural enterprises have absorbed more than 90 million of surplus labor, they have occupied 100 million mu of arable land . . . In some more developed areas, the rural enterprises do not care about occupying large area of good arable land (Li Yining, etc., 164).　　

　 　

In the year of 1992 . . . more than 24 million mu of arable land, or about 2 percent of China’s total arable land, had been occupied to build or expand various “developing zone (CKXX 7 January 1993).　　

　 　

      Thus, on the one hand, the agricultural investment has been for a long time and continue to be short of need, and on the other hand, the productive resources for agriculture, such as arable land, are constantly decreasing.  The long-term supplying ability of the Chinese agriculture is thus subject to insurmountable limits.　　

       These contradictions certainly cannot be solved within the limit of the petty peasant economy.  Within the existing social system, the only solution to these contradictions is to transform the Chinese agriculture into a capitalist agriculture within an as short as possible period.  However, first, although as a result of the “reform,” the Chinese agriculture is back to the petty peasant economy and de facto private ownership of land has been established, the legal private ownership of land has not yet been established, nor does China now have the social conditions for the complete legal private ownership of land.  Secondly, even if the complete private ownership of land has been established, as the experience of Japan and Taiwan has shown, under the conditions of petty peasant economy, land will not be completely treated as capital that can be freely bought and sold, but for peasants, will also play the function of saving and insurance.  Even for those peasants who try to find a non-agricultural job, in most cases they prefer to leave the land idle rather than sell it.  In this case, the transfer and concentration of land can only proceed very slowly, constituting a serious obstacle to the development of the capitalist agriculture.　　

CHAPTER IV　　

　 　

CAPITALIST ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT　　

　 　

　 　

　 　

　 　

The Material Conditions for China"s Economic Development　　

　 　

             From 1979-1993 the Chinese economy had grown at an average annual rate of 9.3 percent (PRC 1994). China is now one of the most rapidly growing economies in the world. The World Bank even predicted that China would become the biggest economy in the world by the early 21st century (The Economist October 1994, 4). For the official scholars, China"s rapid economic growth demonstrates the great productive force contained by "the system of socialist market economy."　　

　 　

　 　

Immediately after the founding of the People"s Republic a highly centralized planned economic system directed mainly by administrative commands was established .. . The system had prevented the development of socialist commodity economy and had become increasingly in conflict with the ever growing socialization of production ... It prevented the rapid growth of economic construction, the comprehensive state power, and people"s living standard, and the superiority of the socialist system thus could not manifest fully and effectively. Since the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, comrade Deng Xiaoping has systematically developed the theory of the socialism with Chinese characteristics. Under the direction of this scientific theory, the economic reform of our country has gradually taken the correct path of building the system of socialist market economy... Under the economic reform the economic construction, the comprehensive state power, and people"s living standard of our country have been raised to a new level since 1979... From 1979-1991 the average annual economic growth rate was 8.6 percent, substantially higher than the 6.1 percent for 1953-1978... This preliminarily demonstrates the great productive force contained by the system of socialist market economy (Wang Haibo, 220-223).　　

　 　

　 　

             The argument of the official scholars contains some partial truth. Above all to develop productive forces is the historical raison d"etre of capitalism. It is on this point that capitalism is superior to all previous oppressive societies. On the other hand it must not be denied that the capitalist development of productive forces is always at the expense of the basic interests of the majority people, and under capitalism the material productive forces can be developed only by devastating the most fundamental productive force—the productive force of human beings.　　

　 　

             Moreover. the official scholars have ignored the history. Statistically the economic growth rate between 1979-1993 is three percent higher than that between 1953-1978. But statistics by themselves tell us nothing. According to Hollis Bunnley Chenery, the economic development of the developing countries tends to accelerate as their economies become more developed and begins to slow down only after they have reached a fairly high level of economic development. For economic development brings about not only quantitative increase of national income, but also qualitative progresses including the improvement of the general conditions for economic development. The later stage usually has better conditions for economic development than the previous stage. The economy of the later stage thus can develop more rapidly than that of the previous stage (see Liu Shijing and Jiang Xiaojuan). In 1980 China"s GNP per capita was $304 (ZGTJNJ 1991). In Chenery"s “normal pattern” this corresponds to the stage of $280-560 (see TABLE 4.1). Since China"s GNP per capita in early 1980s was near three times of that in early 1950s, in early 1950s China could be placed in the stage of$100-140 in Chenery"s "normal pattern." It is thus not surprising for the economic growth rate after 1979 to be three percent higher than that before 1979.　　

　 　

TABLE 4.1　　

　 　

The "Normal Pattern" of Economic Development　　

            GNP per capita              Growth Rate of GNP                    Growth Rate of GNP per capita　　

              (1970 U.S. $)                           (percent)                                              (percent)　　

                          100-140                         3.81                                                    1.26　　

                           140-280                         4.80                                                    2.02　　

                           280-560                         5.67                                                    3.17　　

                           560-1120                       6.30                                                    4.10　　

                         1120-2100                       6.58                                                    4.58　　

                         2100-3360                       6.21                                                    4.71　　

                         3360-5040                       5.60                                                    4.60　　

　 　

Source:  Liu Shijin and Jiang Xiaojuan, 74. This table was probably cited from Hollis Burnley Chenery (1975). Patterns of Development, 1950-1970.　　

　 　

             It was the three decades of economic construction under the New China that had laid down the material conditions for the economic development after 1979.　　

             (i) First, as far as the general infrastructure is considered, the 1980s had much better conditions than the 1950s. For example, in 1949 China had only 21,700 kilometers of railways and about 80,000 kilometers of road. By 1980 the total length of railways was increased to 52,00(0 kilometers, or 2.4 times of that ID 1949 and the total length of road was increased to 876,000 kilometers. or 11 times of that in 1949 (SJJJNJ 1981).　　

             (ii)China is a backward developing country where the performance of the whole economy depends a lot on the performance of the agricultural production. TABLE 4.2 shows that before late 1980s China"s economic growth had been closely related to the growth of the agricultural production. The rapid economic growth rate after 1979 was first of all a result of the rapid agricultural growth. If the agricultural production had not reached a level much higher than that in 1950s and thus was able to provide adequate surplus products for industry and cities, it was impossible for the economy to grow as rapidly as it did in 1980s.　　

　 　

TABLE 4.2　　

　 　

Average Annual Growth Rates of China"s Total Agricultural Product and National Income　　

　 　

(percent)　　

                                                Total Agricultural Product                                      National Income　　

          1952- 1958                                        4.19                                                         10.97　　

          1958-1965                                         1.01                                                           0.08　　

          1965- 1978                                        3.05                                                           6.61　　

          1978- 1988                                        6.63                                                           9.23　　

　 　

Source:  PRC 1985; Feng Haifai, 115.　　

　 　

The Chinese agriculture in 1980s had reached a much higher level than that in 1950s. But if we consider the relations of production, as a result of the agricultural reform in early 1980s the Chinese agriculture returned to the status of petty peasant economy and in this sense was not really different from the agriculture in 1950s. Nevertheless the petty peasant economy in 1980s was not simply the replicate of the petty peasant economy in 1950s. After two decades of construction under the cooperative agriculture, in 1980s Chinese peasants were undertaking agricultural production under completely new conditions (see TABLE 4.3). If there had not been the great productive capacity accumulated under the cooperative agriculture, the Chinese agriculture could only remain at the primitive level of 1950s. With that primitive agricultural conditions it is difficult to imagine how the economic miracle in 1980s could be built up.　　

　 　

TABLE 4.3　　

　 　

China"s Agricultural Productive Forces　　

　 　

                                                                                       1952                                      1979　　

　 　

                                                                              　　

　 　

Total Horse Power of Agricultural Machinery　　

(thousand horse power)                                                  250                                       181910　　

　 　

Consumption of Chemical Fertilizer per　　

　 　

Hectare of Sown Area (kg)                                                  0.7                                  109.2 　　

Consumption of Electricity in Rural Area　　

(million kwh)                                                                     50                                  28410 　　

Irrigated Area　　

(Thousand Hectare)                                                       19959                                        45003　　

　 　

Source:  SJJJNJ 1981, 56　　

             　　

            (iii) Before 1979 China had taken a strategy of economic development with great emphasis on the development of heavy industry. While this strategy is now under heavy criticisms, it must not be denied that by late 1970s "the Chinese industry is no longer burdened with the backward and lopsided conditions left over by the history, and an industrial system with a relatively complete range of divisions and an increasingly rational pattern of distribution has been established (SJJJNJ 198 I. 54)." The heavy industry base built in the three decades of New China is indispensable for the rapid economic development after 1979　　

             For example, "the equipments of the rural enterprises are mostly provided by the urban industry." In 1987 the purchase of the products of the state-owned industry accounted for 70 percent of the total investment by the town and village enterprises (Li Yining, etc.. 166). If China had not built up a strong heavy industrial base before 1979, these industrial equipments would have to be imported. In 1988 the total gross fixed assets of the rural enterprises was 360 billion Yuan. Suppose the 360 billion Yuan is distributed evenly between 1980 and 1988, calculated according to the exchange rate in the respective year, then 360 billion Yuan is the equivalent of about 150 billion U.S. dollars. If this amount of foreign exchange is to be financed by additional exports. China"s exports in this period must be 60 percent more than the actual value. If it is to be financed by foreign debt, then China"s long-term debt would have to be increased by three times. These two ways are either unrealistic or very difficult to be realized. Thus if there had not been the heavy industry base built before 1979, it is difficult to imagine that the rural enterprises could have developed so rapidly as it did in 1980s.　　

(iv) But the greatest and most profound achievement of the Chinese revolution was the physical and mental development of the majority people and thus the great development of the productive force of human beings. Life expectancy was increased from 35 before the liberation 68 in late 1970s. Before the liberation more than 80 percent of the population were illiterate and the ratio of the students enrolled in primary schools to the children of the corresponding age group was only 20 percent. By late 1970s the student enrolling ratio for primary schools had reached 93 percent (SJJJNJ l98l, 73) and according to the population census in 1982, the adult literacy rate for male was 81 percent and for female was 55 percent.　　

            The great transformation of the physical and mental conditions of Chinese working people would definitely play a decisive role in the long-term economic development. Its significance was beyond any usual measure.　　

             It is very unlikely that under capitalist development China could have made the same achievements. If there had not been the construction of agricultural infrastructure, the dissemination of agricultural technologies, and the advance of agricultural mechanization under the cooperative agriculture, then how could the material conditions for the agricultural take-off in 1980s be prepared? If there had not been the planned economy which gave the heavy industry the priority of development, then how could the conditions for the subsequent rapid industrial development be prepared?　　

             Moreover, only a country that had experienced a socialist revolution could provide the most favorable conditions for the physical and mental development of the majority people. If we corn pare China with other big developing countries with a population of over 100 million, we find that while China"s GNP per capita was not much more than India"s, but less than Indonesia"s, and was only one­ sixth of Brazil"s, China had the highest life expectancy, while its adult literacy rate was comparable to that of Brazil and Indonesia (see TABLE 4.4).　　

　 　

TABLE 4.4　　

　 　

Comparative Social Development of Major Developing Countries　　

                         Life Expectancy (Year)*               Adult Literacy Rate (%)**           GNP per capita***　　

                         Male                 Female                Male                 Female               (U.S. dollars)　　

China                     66                       69                       81                        55                           304　　

India                      50                     49                                               51                           28       183　　

Indonesia               46                     49                                               77                           57       369　　

Brazil                     60                     64                                               76                           73       1793　　

*China"s figure is for 1981, and the figures of other countries are for 1975-80.　　

**China"s figure is for 1982, and the figures of other countries are for 1980.　　

***China"s figure is for 1980, Indonesia"s figure is for 1978, and the figures of India and Brazil are for 1979.　　

Source:  TJTY 1985; SJJJNJ 1981.　　

　 　

Therefore the three decades of economic construction under the New China had prepared the material conditions for the rapid economic development after 1979. Given these conditions. if there were appropriate relations of production, there would be rapid development of productive forces. Productive forces can be rapidly developed under either the oppressive relations of production or the liberating relations of production. But there is difference between the two ways of development. While in the former case the development of productive forces is always at the expense of the development of human beings (as far as the majority people are concerned), in the latter case the development of productive forces prepare the conditions for the development of human beings and is always conditioned by the development of human beings.　　

　 　

　 　

　 　

The Establishment of the Capitalist Relations of Production　　

　 　

            Whether China would adopt the oppressive relations of production or the socialist non­-oppressive relations of production. is determined not by academic arguments and debates, but by real class struggles. On the one hand, in 1980s Chinese working people had not the necessary material and theoretical force to determine the direction of social development according to their own will. On the other hand, as the experience of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe has suggested. it was not so easy for the ruling class to conquer the resistance of the oppressed people and to make the social development in accordance with its own will either.　　

            Working people would never give up their socialist rights won by the revolution and surrender to the capitalist oppressive system without serious struggles. This is the greatest and decisive obstacle to the development of the capitalist relations of production. On this point China is not really different from the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Yet while the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe have fallen into terrible economic crisis, and indeed whether capitalist restoration can succeed in the former Soviet Union is still open to question, China has apparently made a successful transition to capitalism. From Marxist point of view. this must be explained by the different class structures and thus different conditions of class struggles in China on the one hand, and in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe on the other hand.　　

In China, like in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, there is an urban working class, that is, the working class in the state-owned enterprises, which has played a major role in the struggle against capitalist "reform." But unlike Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, in China the urban working class does not account for the majority of the working people. When China began its transition to capitalism, the Chinese agriculture continued to be based on pre-modern technologies. and there was still a distinguished peasant class accounting for most of the country"s population. Mere we will not discuss the uneven development of the urban and rural areas in the Maoist period. Let us simply notice that on the one hand, with the privatization of the agriculture, the agricultural economy returned to the status of petty-peasant economy and the peasants thus became "free," and on the other hand, the unequal exchange between industry and agriculture not only continued in the Dengist period but became increasingly unfavorable for the peasants after l984. Given all of these conditions, a large "surplus" labor force of over 100 million emerged in the countryside. These "surplus" people were prepared to sell their labor power according to the capitalist standards, and was going to become China"s new proletariat. I call them the "new proletariat" because unlike the working class in the state-owned enterprises, the new proletariat is not protected by such socialist rights as the "iron rice bowl", and instead has to accept the capitalist exploitation in a typically free market capitalist context. The existence of the new proletariat allows the capitalist and semi-capitalist economic sectors (in China, they are made up of the rural enterprises, various "-collective" enterprises. the private enterprises, the Chinese-foreign joint-ventures, and the foreign capitalist enterprises) where the normal capitalist relations of production have been more or less established to develop on a Large scale along side the state-owned enterprises. In this way the Chinese ruling class has virtually circumvented the resistance by the working class in the state-owned enterprises and the capitalist relations of production have been directly established on the basis of the new proletariat. The triumph of the “reform” is thus guaranteed.　　

　 　

　 　

China"s New Proletariat　　

　 　

             In 1978, the agricultural labor force accounted for 71.4 percent of the total Chinese labor force. According to the official scholars, one-third to one-half of the total agricultural labor force was "surplus labor force (Li Yining, etc., 151)." Since 1979, a significant part of the agricultural labor force has moved into manufacturing and service industries. By 1988, the share of the agricultural labor force dropped to 57,9 percent (Li Yining, etc., 155). The labor force that has moved out of agricultural has been mainly absorbed by the rural enterprises, the private enterprises, and the foreign owned enterprises. In 1989, the employees and workers in the rural enterprises amounted to 93.7 million, and those employed by the individual and private enterprises amounted to 7-8 million. Besides. there were about 20 million people working outside their hometown. Among the 20 million. 4 million worked in Cuangdong province. Many of them worked in the foreign-owned enterprises (Li Yining, etc., 98). In 1989, all of these people put together added up to about 120 million. If it is increased by 10 million each year, at present it should have reached about 160 million. These people who have left their land and do not own any means of production, have to sell their labor power to make a living. They are China"s new proletariat.　　

            Following is a short poem written by a worker in Shenzhen, which gives us a living picture of the living and working conditions of China"s new proletarians.[16]　　

　 　

The machines sound again, 　　

which forces me to get up earlier. 　　

While sitting in front of the machine, 　　

I knew my boss is by me.　　

His vicious gaze, just like the brightness of green bills (money), 　　

we lower our head thinking about our own future.　　

Even breaking our hands and feet, we have to smile 　　

in front of money.　　

When we go to get our paycheck, 　　

what we face is a disdainful smile, 　　

because what we got only are the crumbs.　　

　 　

While the new proletarians live in terrible and miserable conditions, from capitalist point of view, it is a wonderful and "efficient" economic system. In the "reform" period, the rural enterprises. the private enterprises, and the foreign-owned enterprises whose development has been largely based on absorbing the labor force transferred from the agricultural sector have developed most rapidly. From 1979-1990, the rural enterprises, the private enterprises, and the foreign-owned enterprises had accounted for 51.9 percent of China"s total growth of industrial production (Guo Kesha, 187). Moreover, these enterprises are particularly concentrated in the exporting sector which plays a crucial role in Chinese economic development. In 1993, the delivery of exporting commodities by the rural enterprises accounted for 45 percent of the total purchase of exporting commodities by China’s foreign trade institutions. In the same year, the foreign-owned enterprises contributed to 27 percent of China"s total exports (RMRB 14 December 1993). Thus, the rural enterprises, the private enterprises, and the foreign-owned enterprises have become the major driving force of China"s economic growth.　　

            Now let us see what wizardry capitalists have used to summon the great productive forces from the underground.　　

　 　

(1)  Prolonging Working Time　　

　 　

             According to an investigation of one hundred private enterprises by the Chinese Academy of Social Science, of the 100 investigated enterprises, in 53 enterprises workers worked more than eight hours a day, and of the 53 enterprises, in 1~ enterprises workers worked more than ten hours a day. In 66 enterprises, the bosses never allowed workers to take holidays (Han Mingxi, 94). In Cuangdong province it is usual for the workers in the foreign-owned enterprises and the private enterprises to work more than ten hours a day. According to an investigation of 27 enterprises by the Federation of Trade Unions of Huicheng district. Huizhou city, Guangdong province. in 26 enterprises the extra working time was more than 48 hours a month. In some enterprises, it was more than 96 hours. In many cases, workers had to work day and night and were unable to have rest on Sundays and holidays (An Zi, 152).[17]　　

　 　

(2)  Increasing Working Intensity　　

　 　

            In this respect there are not direct statistics. However, some indirect methods may give us some help. The gross fixed assets per worker in the urban industrial enterprises in 1987 was about l8800 Yuan, which was five times as that in the rural enterprises in l988 (Li Yining. etc.. 157). The labor productivity in the urban industrial enterprises was three times as that in the rural enterprises. If the urban industrial enterprises were equipped technologically five times as good as the rural enterprises, why was their gap in labor productivity only three times rather than five times? In the official statistics. “l(fā)abor productivity” is calculated on the total number of employees and workers. Thus, if the workers in the rural enterprises work longer, it appears to be higher “l(fā)abor productivity” in the official statistics, though actually the labor efficiency has not been improved. But the longer working time of the rural enterprises cannot explain all of the gap. The remaining gap has to be explained by the higher working intensity in the rural enterprises. For example, the average coal production of a worker of the seven rural coal-mines in the Yuanping county, Shanxi province in l985 was 2.2 tons. while that of the major state coal-mines in l984 was only ().903 ton. The major state coal-mines were equipped much better than the rural coal-mines, but the average production of a worker of the rural coal-mines was more than one time higher than that of the major state coal-mines. suggesting that the working intensity of the rural coal-mines was much higher (EICASS). In Shenzhen, the state-owned enterprises, the Chinese-foreign joint-ventures. and the wholly foreign-­owned enterprises were at roughly the same technological level. However, in l987 the labor productivity of the state-owned enterprises was only 31999 Yuan, while that of the joint-ventures was 87787 Yuan. and that of the wholly foreign-owned enterprises was 9414l Yuan (Liu Zhigeng, 4)). This suggests that the working intensity in the foreign-owned enterprises is much higher than that in the state-owned enterprises.     　　

　 　

(3)  Depressing the Price of Labor Power　　

　 　

            Depressing and embezzling wage have always been capitalists" beloved ways to make their fortunes. In this respect, Shenzhen turns out to be the best in learning the “advanced experience” of capitalism, going in ahead of the age. In Baoan district, Shenzhen City, in the second half year of 1990, there were 19 factories that did not pay workers on time. The total wage that workers did n~)t receive amounted to 720, 000 Yuan (An Zi, 151). In a handbag factory, making one handbag was paid by 0.25 Yuan which was too low for the workers. The workers worked hard and did much extra work, and their average month wage exceeded the standard wage. But the boss thought this suggested that the unit pay was too high and reduced it to 0.085 Yuan. In a salt products factory in the Pinghu town, Shenzhen city, there were thirty four workers working in the package department. Among the thirty four workers, only five had a month wage between 200 and 300 Yuan, none of the other twenty nine workers had a month wage higher or equal to 200 Yuan, and the lowest month wage was only 119.73 Yuan (SZR 3, 25).[18]　　

　 　

(4)  Exploiting Female Workers and Child Workers　　

　 　

            In the industrial campuses of Shenzhen. sometimes you can see huge streamers hung on the factory building saying that “this factory urgently needs hundreds of female workers.” Why do capitalists like employing female workers and child workers. For one thing. it is said that female workers and child workers are obedient and do not make troubles. For another thing, it is cheap to employ female workers and child workers. Many female workers and child workers working in the private enterprises have a month wage of only 40-60 Yuan (Han Mingxi, 94). Business Week reports that in the Shekou district, Shenzhen city, there are 12, 000 workers working for the Kader enterprises Ltd. These workers work fourteen hours everyday, having no rest on Sunday. Most of the workers are young women aged from 17-25. There are also many child workers, the youngest of whom are only 12. The Kader executive says: “we can work these girls all day and all night, while in Hong Kong it would be impossible. We couldn"t get these kind of labor, even if we were willing to meet Hong Kong wage levels (see Smith, 1993, 95).” The newspapers in Hong Kong report that child workers are widely used in the 14, 000 factories in the Pearl River valley. It is common to find that workers work ninety six hours a week. According to one investigation, in the investigated 200 enterprises in Shenzhen, 40 enterprises employ child workers who are girls from 10-12. These girls work fifteen hours a day, earning a wage which is equal to only ten US dollars a month. To save the expenditure in dormitory, the management require that two or three girls share one bed (Smith, 1993, 95).　　

　 　

(5)  Extorting and Racketeering　　

　 　

            in the foreign-owned enterprises in Guangdong province, new workers must pay 100 to 500 Yuan to the management as “deposit.” While it is claimed that the “deposit” will be returned to the workers after they have finished the contracts, the management can find any excuse to dismiss the workers, or bully the workers in many ways so that the workers will give up the job "voluntarily." and in both cases the "deposit" is seized by the capitalists. For example, the Biyuan Shoe-Making Corporation Ltd. in Hainan province fired more than two thousand workers in two years, and had peculated more than 20,000 Yuan of workers" "deposit (CRRB 10 December 1993)."　　

            Imposing fines or fees is another wise way for capitalists to exploit workers. In the Shenzhen Haite clothes-making factory, the workers must pay fee for using the bathroom, 0.1 Yuan for one person one time. For every time the sewer in the bathroom was blocked, every one of the more than 200 workers must pay a fine of 5 Yuan. For the workers sometimes it was so awful that the sewer was blocked twice in a day (An Zi, 153). The Tianli factory in the Nantou town, Shenzhen city. provided a fine of 5 Yuan for workers who talked to fellow workers in the working time. Once a worker who had continuously worked twelve hours and had finished the daily quota left the factory ten minutes before the required time. This was discovered by the management, and as a result, I ~ workers were each fined with 50 Hong Kong dollars. There is a factory in the Pinghu town, Shenzhen city. h April 1990 this factory had 227 employees and workers, among whom 74 were fined in this month. In June of the same year this factory had 215 employees and workers, among whom 124 were fined in the month, and among them the person with the worst luck got fines amounted to 78 Yuan in the month (SZR 3, 25).　　

　 　

(6)  "Saving" Workers" Lives　　

　 　

            Capitalists care about not only the absolute amount of surplus value, but also the ratio of surplus value to capital, that is, the profit rate. The profit rate can be increased by saving means of production. In the developed capitalist countries, technological progress plays a major role in saving means of production. However, for the rural enterprises, the private enterprises, and the foreign owned enterprises in China, with their obsolete equipments and backward technologies, saving those equipments and materials indispensable for workers" security and health plays a important role in their “saving” of means of production.　　

            A reader of Gong Ren Ri Bao (Workers" Daily) wrote to the newspaper: “some rural enterprises pursue economic benefit one-sidedly, overlooking workers" healthy conditions and failing to provide labor protection facilities...In the crushing workshop in a cement plant in the Fengrun county, Hebei province, the dust in the air is four hundred and twenty seven times more than the required level. In this case, the workers" health cannot be guaranteed at all (GRRB 11 December 1993)."　　

            In Baoan district, Shenzhen city, there had been 30 major accidents in the foreign-owned enterprises from 1989-1992, resulting in 25 deaths. An engineer, who was exhausted by extra work. lost his ring finger and little finger when he was checking a machine. Besides, his middle finger was broken, and between his fore finger and middle finger was a crevice of 8 centimeters (more than three inches). But the manager did not bother to care about it and said; "crippling does not count, even death does not count You can sue me in the law-court, I do not care (SZR 4, 20)." In a clothes-making factory in the Changan county, Shaanxi province, the management dismissed a female worker whose right hand was broken by the machine, giving her only 500 Yuan (Han Mingxi, 327). When I was in Shenzhen I heard of a similar incident, the only difference was that the management got rid of the hurt worker with only 20 Yuan.　　

            In 19~6 in Hancheng city, Shaanxi province, there were 212 small coal-mines, in which 66. or 3 1.1 percent of the total number. were private coal-mines. In that year there were 39 accidents. causing 44 deaths and hurting 22 people. For the private coal-mines, there were 23 accidents, causing 23 deaths and hurting 22 people, accounting for 59 percent, 52.3 percent, and 100 percent of the total respectively. From January to July, 1987, there were 16 accidents in the private coal-mines. causing 17 deaths, accounting for 84 percent of the total accidents and 87 percent of the total deaths (Han Mingxi, 327).　　

            On the night of 30 May 199 1, there was a fire accident in the Xingya raincoat factory in Dongguan city, Guangdong province, burning 80 young female workers to death and heavily hurt 40 people. Richard Smith made following comments; “this kind of tragedy is. regrettably, all too common in the export-processing industries of southern China where the capitalists now enjoy extensive power and freedoms--and the Chinese government protects them from the workers.” The fire control bureau of (Guangdong province reported that only in the Pearl River valley, there were 1700 industrial fire accidents and explosions in 1990 (Smith, 1993, 95). In this case it is not surprising at all when Shenzhen was hit heavily by an explosion in 1993 and when on 19 November 1993 the tragedy of burning 82 young female workers to death happened.[19] Even Ren Mm Ri Bao (People"s Daily) commented: “why did the tragedies happen again and again?...this is mainly because some factory owners overlook fire control and the security of production and do not care about the personal security of workers (RMRB 15 December 1993).”　　

            Some people may ask: if workers" rights are violated. why do not workers resort to the protection of law? In China, Shenzhen is a place with the most developed capitalist relations of production. It is also a place with the most complete official laws serving capitalist development. On 28 May 1993 the standing committee of the People"s Congress of Shenzhen city passed the "Regulation on the Labor Services in the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone." The Regulation. following the model of the labor law in developed capitalist countries. provides some articles against the excess exploitation of workers by capitalists. According to the Regulation. employers must make contracts with workers before they employ workers; workers have right to participate and to organize trade union; it is forbidden to employ workers younger than 16; employers are not allowed to charge application fee or pledge when they employ workers; if workers are ill or hurt in work, employers are not allowed to cancel the labor contract medication period; after the medication period, if the worker is not recovered and the employer wants to cancel the labor contract, the employer must inform the worker one month before and must pay the worker with subsidy which is equivalent to the wage of a month; the normal working time shall not exceed 48 hours a week, and the extra working time shall not exceed 48 hours a month; the extra work shall be paid with special wage which shall be 150-200 percent of normal wage.　　

            On the other hand, like all modem capitalist laws, the Regulation which flaunts freedom and equality everywhere, is actually imbued with class prejudice. On the one hand, the Regulation tries to prevent the excess exploitation of workers by capitalists. On the other hand, it safeguards capitalists" privileges and forbids workers" rebellion. According to the Regulation, the worker who wants to resign from the job must inform the employer one month before, otherwise the worker make compensation to the employer with the wage of a month; if the worker is frequently late for work. or frequently leaves early, or misses work. or saboteurs, or deliberately spoils equipments ~)r instruments, or wastes raw materials or energy, it is proper for the employer to dismiss the worker without preconditions. This actually allows capitalists to find any possible excuse to dismiss those workers who dare to make struggles.　　

            If the Regulation at least wants to flaunt some equality on paper, the bureaucratic institution does not need to flaunt anything. I knew six young female workers who worked at the Shenglong Clothes-Making Corporation Ltd. in the Huaqiao town, Shenzhen city. The workers in this enterprise worked fourteen hour every day, often did extra work throughout the night, never had holidays. having no rest even on the most important traditional Chinese festival--Spring Festival, and had never received special wage for their extra work. The six young female workers could no longer stand these conditions and had determined to leave. They informed the management one month before their planned date of leaving. However, after the one month, the management refused to return their pledge and their wage of last month (this enterprise always paid workers one month later than the supposed time). The six workers went to the labor bureau. At first, the bureau official simply did not want to listen to the workers, saying that the workers were making trouble without any justifiable reasons. and demanded them be back. The workers explained and requested repetitively, and only then the bureau official agreed to send a official document to the corporation, asking them to deal with the problem properly. The management of course saw it as nothing. The workers went to the labor bureau again. This time the bureau official was more patient and told workers that they should not think only from their own standing point. Instead, he suggested that the workers should think what kind of loss their quit might bring about to the enterprise, "if every worker quits the job whenever he t)r she wants to, how can the boss run a factory?" Then he scared the workers: "you are all three­ “no”s-people (no civil identity no border region pass, and no temporary resident identity in Shenzhen), and it is proper to get you out of Shenzhen city." He then said that even if the boss had violated the Regulation, workers had no right to violate the labor discipline and their only right was to ask the labor bureau to deal with the problem. The six workers made repetitive requests. The bureau official finally agreed to deal with the problem. He asked the management to send a representative to discuss the problem. The representative came but denied that the workers had informed the management their intention to leave one month ago. The bureau official then asked the workers to provide relevant paper work showing that they did inform the management one month ago. The workers certainly did not have any paper work. No problem was solved again. The six workers went to the labor bureau one more time a few days later. This time they met an office head who was somehow sympathetic to them. After listening to the statement of both sides, the office head demanded the management return the pledge to the workers and pay them their wage of last month.. The management agreed. However, later the management told the workers that it was all right to give them their wage of last month, however, since they had made products of poor quality and they had missed some shifts, they must make compensation to the loss of the enterprise. In the end, every worker got only a few Yuan for their wage of last month. No one went to the labor bureau any more. The Shenglong corporation was located at Huaqiao town, from which it took about one and half hours" ride to get to the center of Shenzhen city. The traffic costed 8 Yuan every one for a round trip. Every worker lost 10-20 Yuan for missing a working day. The six workers went to the labor bureau for five times but had got nothing. This case tells us for ordinary working people to make a lawsuit according to bourgeois laws, how much it costs them that they cannot afford, and how difficult it is for them to get a little justice.　　

            The case also tells us how wrong it is with the blind belief in the “rule of law". Many intellectuals ask for the “rule of law,” thinking that the ugly social phenomena will be eliminated if various “human rights” have been written on laws. In fact, there is no such “rule of law” which is independent of the “rule of people.” and bourgeois “rule of law” is not more than the “rule of rich people." In Shenzhen, there are over one million workers and more than ten thousand enterprises. But in the labor bureau, there are only about a dozen of people dealing with daily labor disputes. As a result, in reality, all those provisions in the Regulation that are in favor of capitalists will be enforced properly, while all those provisions in favor of workers almost have no way to be enforced.　　

             There have never been saviors. nor can we rely on either Caesars or gods. Only we ourselves can bring happiness to this world. There is no way for the Chinese new proletariat to secure their own interest other than to make struggle by themselves. It was estimated that in 1990 only in Shenzhen city, there was 69 strikes, involving 9677 workers (An Zi, 151). However, since there are large numbers of labor force leaving countryside to find a living. and making a large industrial reserve army of labor, capitalists are at upper hand when confronted with labor. I heard that in a factory in the Liantang district, Shenzhen city, all female workers on an assembly line went on strike, and the capitalist fired all of them immediately. Sometimes, capitalists may make some small concession to workers, and dismiss the workers" leaders after workers go back to work. In this way, capitalists not only avoid troubles but also eliminate the organizers of workers" resistance. Therefore, the new proletariat are making their struggles under very unfavorable conditions. They begin with an extremely difficult situation. [n many cases, individual workers have to make their rebellions in such primitive ways as stealing products or destroying means of production. On the other hand, the ruling class spare no energy in poisoning the thinking of ordinary workers. A young female worker once told me that she knew a technician who felt resentment against her boss intentionally made a wrong designing then run away, costing the capitalist tens of thousands of Yuan. The young female worker thought that the technician lacked proper education. She said, “sometimes the boss treats the workers badly because the workers lack proper education...workers" rights shall be secured, but so shall bosses" rights." She also said, "workers are not given proper treatment. This is mainly due to bad management. Actually, we have a good boss, only the managers are unreasonable." Words such as proper “education", "good management", and the idea that "both workers" rights and bosses" rights shall be secured" are daily propagated by televisions, radios, and newspapers.　　

             However, most workers learn from their dally experience of life and do feel that they are terribly exploited. Their autonomous rebellion against the exploitation, no matter the rebellion is “proper" or not. When workers rebel. capitalists are no longer the people with “proper education,” but bite people like mad dogs.　　

             In the Taiwanese-owned Yongqi Shoe-Making Corporation Ltd. in Fuzhou, a female worker stole two pairs of shoes and was discovered. Two Taiwanese, with the help of local security guards. brutally beat her, and then put up the shoes on her neck, showing her before the public. After the Show, she was locked in a doghouse, sharing the "house" with two wolf dogs for two hours. The Taiwanese manager told the workers: "I treat you as dogs." The factory gate was locked immediately after the workers began to work. The workers were not allowed to leave workshop even when electricity run out. Before the workers (most of whom were female) left, they had to accept body search (BKWZ 9 December 1993). The liberal intellectuals say, "capitalism, according to its natural logic, leads to political democracy (BIANYUAN, 5)." The Chinese new proletariat does not have an", civil rights, and even cannot be guaranteed their personal safety, let alone “political democracy.” In fact, direct violence has always been an important capitalist "method of management." In the Haifeng Shoe-Making Corporation. Ltd. in Guangzhou, a male worker, who failed to make qualified shoes. was beaten hard, with bruises all over the body. And this was not the end. The director of the factory ordered the nearly one hundred workers on the assembly line where the male worker worked stood under the noon sun for one hour. Some workers fell in a faint due to sunstroke (An Zi, 153).　　

             This is what capitalists welcome. Capitalists are realistic people. Unlike intellectuals. capitalists do not care so much about those beautiful abstract principles as about profits. With a large industrial reserve army of labor, the new proletariat has to accept terribly low wages and inhuman living and working conditions, and is unable to organize effective struggles to secure Its own interest. allowing themselves to be exploited by capitalists to the utmost. Enormous surplus value is thus created, the machine of capitalist accumulation thus starts to work, and the “economic miracle” of Chinese capitalism is thus made out of the sweat and blood of hundreds of millions of the new proletarians.　　

　 　

　 　

Capitalism and the Pauperization of the Masses of People　　

　 　

             Capitalist development inevitably leads to social polarization and the relative and absolute pauperization of the masses of people.　　

             Under capitalist competition, capitalists are forced to constantly replace labor with capital. raising organical composition of capital (the ratio of constant capital to variable capital, or the ratio of the value of means of production to the value of labor power), to increase labor productivity. This is the absolute law of capitalist accumulation. On the one hand, as a result of the rising organical composition of capital, employed workers are turned into unemployed workers. the industrial reserve army is rebuilt, and the balance of power between capital and labor is changed in favor of capital, and this change helps to depress the society-wide average wage. On the other hand, with increased organical composition of capital, a certain amount of capital needs to employ less workers. Both have the effect to reduce working people"s share of national income. that is, lead to the relative polarization of the majority people.　　

             Take the rural enterprises for example. From 1984-1987, the gross fixed assets per employed person of the rural enterprises increased at an average annual rate of 4.8 percent. From 1988-1992 it grew at an average annual rate of 25 percent. Between 1984 and 1987 to create one job in the rural enterprises, there must be an increase of total output of 6,700 Yuan. Between 1988 and 1992 to create one job in the rural enterprises. there must be an increase of total output of 73,000 Yuan (Ma Bin and Sun Shangqing, 29).　　

             On the one hand, the total social labor force naturally increases year by year. On the other hand, the ability of social capital to absorb the social labor force decreases year by year. The result is the steady growth of the social surplus labor force. Under the current level of productivity, every agricultural laborer can cultivate more than ten mu of arable land. China now has a agricultural labor force of 340 million. and the arable land per agricultural laborer is five mu (Ma Bin and Sun Shangqing, 28). This implies that China has a rural surplus labor force of 170 million.　　

             Under the pressure of the large surplus labor force, the new proletarians are unable to make effective resistance against capitalist exploitation. On the other hand, while in the process of economic development, the relative demand for agricultural goods decreases overtime. as a result of the rising organical composition of capital, the surplus labor force cannot be transferred from the agricultural sector to the industrial or other economic sectors. Both lead to the relative and absolute pauperization of the new proletariat and the peasants, that is, the majority of the Chinese population.　　

             It should be pointed out that the steady growth of the social surplus labor force is by no means an inevitable result of economic development as such. Under socialist conditions, the increase of social productivity of labor will be translated into on the one hand, the increase of people"s material conditions of life, and on the other hand, the increase of people"s disposable time in which ordinary people can freely develop their physical and mental potential and display their all-rounded creativities. It is only under capitalist development that the progress of social productive forces is turned into large-scale unemployment and sufferings of the majority people.　　

             In China, we can use “peasants" per capita net income,” an official statistical item, to roughly represent the conditions of life of the new proletariat and the peasants. In the official statistics, "peasants" refer to all the residents in the countryside, who are roughly composed of the new proletariat and the peasant class. If we take the per capita income of the urban residents as 100. the index of "peasants" per capita net income" dropped from 58.9 in 1984 to 39.4 in 1993. If we take the ratio of "peasants" per capita net income" to per capita national income in 1985 as 100, this ratio dropped to 69.7 in 1992 (Ma Bin and Sun Shangqing, 26).　　

             Capitalist accumulation not only leads to the relative pauperization of the majority people, but under certain conditions also leads to the absolute pauperization of the majority people. In 1989. while the Chinese economy grew by 4 percent, "peasants" per capita net income" decreased by 7.4 percent. In 1993, while the whole economy grew at a miraculous rate of 13.4 percent, peasants" per capita actual consumption expenditure was reduced by 0.9 percent (Ma Bin and Sun Shangqing. 26. 266).　　

             Therefore, capitalist economic development is inevitably at the expense of the interest of the majority people and based on the relative and absolute pauperization of the majority people. But if this kind of economic development is not in the interest of the majority people, why do the majority people need this kind of economic development?　　

　 　

　 　

Dependent Development　　

　 　

             The establishment of the normal capitalist relations of production paves the way to capitalist economic development. From 1979-1993 the Chinese economy had grown at an average annual rate of 9.3 percent. In 1994 and 1995 the Chinese economy continued to grow at a miraculous rate of over 10 percent a year, making China the most rapidly growing capitalist economy in the world.　　

             How can the “Chinese economic miracle” be explained? On the one hand, under political dictatorship, and without organized revolutionary socialist political force, working people are not able to make effective struggle against capitalist exploitation and oppression. In this case, to make a living, hundreds of millions of working people have to sell their labor power to capitalists at a terribly low price. On the other hand, as a late industrializing country, China can directly adopt advanced technologies and capital goods by importing them from the developed capitalist countries. By taking advantage of both advanced technologies and cheap labor, or in Marxist terms. by exploitation both the relative surplus value and the absolute surplus value capitalists are guaranteed super surplus value and thus super profit. This provides a very powerful motive force for capitalist accumulation.　　

             But to import foreign technologies and capital goods, there must be an exporting sector competitive in the world market, which is able to provide the necessary foreign exchange. Indeed. in the "reform" period China"s exports have grown more rapidly than the whole economy. From l980-1994 China"s merchandise trade increased from $18.1 billion to $121 billion, or an increase by sixfold (PRC 1994; RMRB 2 March 1995). At the same time foreign capital has flown into China on a massive scale. By the end of 1995 a total of $133.4 billion of foreign capital has been actually invested in China (RMRB 1 February 1996).　　

             Thus the Chinese economy has been closely integrated into the world capitalist economy. The ratio of China"s merchandise trade to GNP now stands at about 40 percent. At the same time the Chinese economy has been reorganized in accordance with the capitalist international division of labor. On the one hand, the labor-intensive industries and some low-end machinery and electronics industries, where China with its cheap labor, has comparative advantages" in the world market, have expanded rapidly. On the other hand, the Chinese economy has become increasingly dependent upon foreign technologies and capital goods. This pattern of development is reflected by China"s foreign trade in machinery and electronics products. Jin Rong Shi Bao (The Finance Times) which is published in Beijing reported by citing information from the relevant offices of the Chinese Department of Machinery Industry:　　

　 　

The Chinese foreign trade in machinery and electronics products suffers from following problems: First, more imports than exports, so that the trade deficit has increased substantially overtime. In 1980 the trade deficit in machinery and electronics products was $ 4.26 billion. In 1993 it was increased to $ 26.76 billion, in which the trade deficit for machinery products accounted for 90 percent and that for electronics products accounted for 10 percent. Second, high-end imports, low-end exports, and most of the major industrial equipments and key products have to be imported. In 1993 there were twelve products each of which was imported with more than .$ I billion. On the other hand, the Chinese exporting machinery and electronics products were mainly composed of low value-added consumer goods. Third, in market competition, the domestic market share of the Chinese machinery and electronics industries has declined year by year. For example, in 1980 the Chinese machine-tool industry held 95 percent of the domestic market. By 1990 it dropped to 70 percent arid in 1993 further dropped to 44 percent (Shih Chieh Jih Pao--World Daily 14 November 1995).　　

             　　

             For private capital (in China, the foreign-owned enterprises, the private enterprises, the rural enterprises, and the state-owned enterprises are all concrete forms of private capital), the investment in these industries where China has “comparative advantages" in the world market is paid with high profit rate and the sales market is expanding rapidly. On the other hand, if they make investment in advanced capital-good industries or other high-tech industries, they are unable to compete with the capital of the developed capitalist countries, and many of them simply do not have the ability to invest in these industries and to afford the corresponding risks. In this case. why does private capital who always pursues maximum private profit make investment in high-tech industries rather than those industries with a good prospect in the world market? Thus, according to the logic of private capital. it 15 inevitable that China will on the one hand, specialize in labor-intensive industries and low-end machinery and electronics industries, and on the other hand, be highly dependent upon the developed capitalist countries in advanced capital-goods and technologies. In this sense Chinese capitalist economic development is actually dependent development.　　

             The pattern of dependent development can also be illustrated in the case of the computer industry.　　

China"s goal  . . is to become a major supplier to the domestic and world markets of low-end PCS and peripherals, including printers, monitors, and circuit boards. Through mass exports of such products, China will be able to earn foreign exchange to import the higher end systems arid technology needed to sustain the growth of the computer industry.　　

　 　

This low-end production is itself dependent on imported chips:　　

　 　

China"s integrated circuit ("IC") production ability is extremely low and limited to ICs used in consumer goods, such as televisions and refrigerators. As a result, China must import almost all the ICs needed for computer production. Although China is trying to build up its domestic IC production base, international restrictions imposed by the Coordination Committee for Multinational Export Controls (COCONI) prohibit China from gaining the technology needed to produce more complex ICs (Hui and Mckown, 1995, 17).　　

　 　

             Chinese government officials acknowledge that in the technological term, the Chinese integrated circuits industry has fallen fifteen years behind the international level. While it is expected that Chinese integrated circuit production will reach 1 billion pieces in the year 2000, the domestic demand will then rise to 2 or 3 billion pieces. leaving 1 or 2 billion pieces to be imported.　　

             While the Chinese capitalist economy does take much advantage of its current favorable position in the capitalist international division of labor, for China to have successful capitalist economic development, it is no less important for China to be able to undertake independent economic policy, especially effectively protecting the domestic industries that are not quite competitive in the world market. For as an underdeveloped country. if China follows the regime of free trade, allowing its economy completely exposed to international competition. then most Chinese enterprises will simply not be able to survive the competition against developed capitalist countries. This will have devastating impact on the Chinese economy. However, with the Chinese economy being increasingly dependent upon foreign technologies and capital goods, China becomes more and more dependent on the markets of developed capitalist countries for its exports. The developed capitalist countries consequently can use trade protection as an effective weapon to force China to follow the economic policies consistent with the interest of developed capitalist countries. In this case, it will be more and more difficult for China to pursue independent economic policy. In fact, in the negotiation for China"s entry into World Trade Organization, China has been pressured hard by the developed capitalist countries to open its market and has been forced to make some major concessions.　　

             Moreover, the historical tendency of capitalist technological progress is to replace labor with capital, and labor-intensive industries and products with technology and capital intensive industries and products. Therefore in the long run capitalist technological progress tends to increasingly weaken and even eliminate altogether the importance of cheap labor in capitalist production. If China is unable to develop indigenous high-tech industries which can compete effectively with the developed capitalist countries, in the long run the Chinese exporting industries will become increasingly less competitive in the world market. In the case of dependent development, this will put the long-term sustainability of Chinese capitalist economic development into serious questions.[20]　　

　 　

            　　

　 　

State and Chinese Capitalist Economic Development　　

　 　

             As we have seen it is impossible for China to develop its indigenous high-tech industry under the logic of private capitalism. Under capitalist conditions only the state has the potential to go beyond the narrow scope of private capital and undertake economic strategies that reflect the long-­term interest of national development. However, in capitalist societies, the state usually does not play a decisive role in social accumulation which is mainly carried out by private capital. Only under special historical conditions, given unusual balance of power in favor of the state vis-a-vis private capital, the state may play a major role in capitalist accumulation within a certain period.　　

             Thus, to know whether in China the state can play a major role in social accumulation or not. we need to analyze the concrete historical context. At the beginning of the "reform", the ruling class had inherited from revolutionary China a large state economic sector which played a central role in social accumulation. However, the capitalist "reform" was met with strong resistance by the working class in the state-owned enterprises which consequently were not able to make normal capitalist accumulation. On the other hand, the rural enterprises, the private enterprises, and the foreign-owned enterprises (we refer to these enterprises as "the capitalist economic sector") began to prosper by exploiting the "new proletariat" who was composed of the surplus labor force in the countryside and was prepared to be exploited under conditions most favorable to capital. By early 1990s the capitalist economic sector was contributing 50 percent of China"s industrial production.　　

             While the rise of the capitalist economic sector helps the Chinese ruling class to make a successful transition to capitalism. it brings about fundamental change in the relations between different parts of the ruling class. With the development of the capitalist economic sector, the bulk of the social accumulation is no longer carried out by the state, but by various private capitals. The distribution of social resources has in turn been adjusted to reflect the new balance of power in the ruling class. The state income, as a share of GNP, dropped from 31.2 percent in 1978 to 16,3 percent in 1993. In the same period the income of the central government, as a share of the state income, dropped from over 60 percent to 34 percent. TABLE 4.5 shows that by early 1990s the social resources at the disposal of the Chinese state, as a share of GDP, was not only lower than those of the developed capitalist countries, but also lower than those of the less developed capitalist countries. In the gross domestic investment, only a very small part comes from the state direct investment, and the part that the state can effectively control is not large either. The total social investment is mainly composed of the self-financed investment that the central government cannot regulate directly or is very difficult to regulate (Guo Kesha. l73-l74)."[21]　　

             In this case the state cannot play more than a minor role in social accumulation. The logic of private capital thus prevails. TABLE 4.6 shows that China"s R & D expenditure fall far behind developed capitalist countries in the terms of share in GNP as well as absolute amount. As far as the share of R & D expenditure in GNP is concerned, China even fails behind some less developed capitalist countries. This suggests that private capital who pursues maximum private profit is not willing to make investment in the R & D activities and the high-tech industries which are unprofitable. highly risky, and require large capital investment. On the other hand, it tells us that the state, without adequate financial resources, is unable to provide the support indispensable for the development of high-tech industries.　　

　 　

　 　

 

TABLE 4.5　　

　 　

Central Government Revenue as Percentage of Gross Domestic Product　　

　 　

                                                                          Year                                         Percent                                　　

China*                                                             1992                                         17.27　　

United States                                                  1990                                        19.63　　

Japan                                                              1990                                        14.38　　

Germany                                                        1991                                        30.80　　

United Kingdom                                            1991                                        37.05　　

France                                                           1992                                        40.63　　

Canada                                                          1989                                        20.12　　

Australia                                                        1991                                        27.11　　

India                                                              1991                                        14.74　　

Indonesia                                                       1991                                        18.16　　

Thailand                                                        1990                                        20.41　　

Malaysia                                                        1991                                        28.53　　

Singapore                                                      1991                                        32.80　　

Myanmar                                                      1990                                         10.70　　

Korea, Rep.                                                   1992                                        18.45　　

Egypt                                                            1990                                        18.58　　

Mexico                                                         1990                                        14.05　　

Brazil                                                            1991                                        25.92　　

Argentina                                                      1989                                          9.85　　

*the state income as percentage of GNP. 　　

Source: PRC 1994.　　

 

TABLE 4.6　　

　 　

Expenditures on Research & Development for Selected Countries　　

　 　

                                                                              　　

                                                 Year                  R & D expenditures                        As a share of GNP　　

                                                                         (billions of dollars)                                       (percent)　　

　 　

                                                                              　　

China                                         1993                            3.4                                            0.6　　

United States                              1988                            140.0                                          2.9　　

Japan                                         1986                            41.7                                            2.8　　

Germany, Fed.Rep.                     1987                            22.8                                            2.8　　

United Kingdom                          1986                            15.7                                          2.4　　

France                                       1987                            16.4                                          2.4*　　

India                                          1988                            N.A.                                            0.9　　

Singapore                                   1987                            N.A.                                            0.9　　

Turkey                                      1985                            N.A.                                            0.7　　

Korea, Rep.                                1988                            N.A.                                            1.9　　

　 　

　 　

　 　

Source:  PRC 1994; Economic Report of the President 1990, 113.　　

　 　

　 　

　 　

　 　

　 　

Transnational Corporations and Chinese Capitalist Economic Development　　

            Despite the fact that the Chinese private capital is not willing to invest in the high-tech industries and the state does not have the financial ability to support the development of these industries. The Chinese government recently declared an ambitious plan to develop "high and new technology industries." It was projected that by about 2005 the share of the “high and new technology industries” in GNP would have risen from 10 percent in 1993 to 15 percent, the share in total industrial value-added would have risen to 20-25 percent, and the share in manufacturing exports would have risen from 6.3 percent in 1994 to more than 15 percent. It is not clear how the "hi~h and new industry technologies" are defined. But it was said if China could realize the above plan, by early 2000s China would have reached same level of development that East Asian newly industrializing countries had reached by early l990s (RMRB 10 August 1995). Therefore, even if China has realized the above plan, it will still fall behind East Asian newly industrializing countries by about 10 years, let alone developed capitalist countries.　　

             To realize the above plan, the Chinese government has put most of the stake on the investment by transnational corporations. One after another the so-called "high and new technology industrial campuses" have been set up in Shanghai. Tianjin. Shandong, Jiangsu. and Shaanxi. granting foreign-owned enterprises various benefits, with the hope that transnational corporations will make investment in high-tech industries in China.　　

             While enormous foreign capital has been poured into China since 1979, the bulk of the foreign direct investment in China is from East Asian newly industrializing countries, especially Hong Kong. Macau, and Taiwan. rather than from the developed capitalist countries (see TABLE 4.7). In response to the rising labor cost and deepening economic crisis in their own countries. the capitalists in East Asian newly industrializing countries try to survive the crisis by relocating some labor-intensive industries to China to exploit China"s cheap labor. This kind of foreign direct investment makes little contribution to the development of China"s high-tech industries.　　

　 　

　 　

　 　

TABLE 4.7　　

　 　

Foreign Direct Investment in China by Country　　

　 　

(billions of dollars)　　

                                                 1992                             1993                              1994　　

Total                                        11.3                               27.8                               33.8　　

In which:　　

Hong Kong and Macao                7.9                               18.0                               20.2　　

Taiwan                                      1.1                                3.1                                 3.3　　

Japan                                         0.7                                1.4                                 2.1　　

United States                              0.5                                2.1                                 2.5　　

Singapore                                   0.1                                0.5                              1,2　　

Korea. Rep.                                0.1                                0.4                                 0.7　　

　 　

Source: PRC 1994　　

             Nevertheless since 1992 the investment in China by major transnational corporations based on the developed capitalist countries has increased rapidly. The investment by the transnational corporations from the developed capitalist countries has following characteristics. First, their investment projects are large in scale. While the average scale of the projects of foreign direct investment in China is between $ 1-2 million, the average scale of the investment projects by the transnational corporations from the developed capitalist countries is about $ 20 million. Secondly, they make investment in the high-tech industries and the capital-intensive industries rather than the labor-intensive industries, using the current-generation rather than the obsolete technologies (RMRB 18 October 1995; Shaw and Meier, 1994).　　

             Why do major transnational corporations make investment in China, and especially, in the high-tech industries? Given China"s underdeveloped infrastructure and inadequate scientific-technological ability, and that cheap labor provides little advantage in high-tech industries, the transnational corporations make investment in China not because China is an efficient Site of production in high-tech industries. Instead, they make investment to exploit China"s rapidly expanding domestic market (Shaw and Meier, 1994). This pattern of foreign direct investment is not the same type of foreign direct investment in East Asian newly industrializing countries and Southeast Asian countries where foreign capital makes investment to exploit cheap labor and to pursue export­-oriented development. instead, it resembles a lot the foreign direct investment in Latin America after WWII when Latin American countries pursued import-substitution industrialization. In the latter case. foreign direct investment was not targeted at cheap labor but the domestic market of Latin American countries. According to Bornschier and Chase-Dunn (1985), in this case, while in the short run foreign direct investment helped to accelerate economic growth, in the long run it blocked indigenous capitalist development, intensified social inequality. and led to the shrinking of the domestic market and economic stagnation.　　

            The Chinese government has taken a strategy of exchanging the domestic market for foreign investment and technology. The Chinese government hopes that in this way China will be able to develop its high-tech industries. For this strategy to work, effective trade barriers must be established in relevant industries so that transnational corporations cannot get access to China"s domestic market unless they make investment in China. However, while trade barriers may benefit the interest of some transnational corporations which make investment in China, they are against the general interest of the Capitalists in developed capitalist countries. Since China has been increasingly integrated into the world capitalist system, and has become increasingly dependent upon the developed capitalist countries in technology, capital, and exporting market, China has to make more and more concession to developed capitalist countries in trade policy and regime. Recently the Chinese government took a major step in trade liberalization by declaring a reduction of trade tariffs by an average of 3() percent. This, however, has not yet made China qualified for World Trade Organization, the entry" of which is Considered very important for China"s further expansion of exports. In this case, at best China can make only limited success in the "import-substitution" in the high-tech industries and will continue to depend heavily on the import of capital-goods and technologies.　　

            In the short run, the rapidly expanding Chinese market will attract large amount of capital from the transnational corporations, which will further boost China"s economic growth. But in the long run, due to their higher productivity and technological level, the transnational corporations will become dominant producers in the Chinese market in certain industries. Alter they have established monopolistic control in the Chinese market, the transnational corporations will be able to pursue monopolistic profit by setting monopolistic prices. In this case, they can try to meet the increase of demand by raising prices and do not need to make further investment. On the other hand, the Chinese enterprises which fail to compete with the transnational corporations will not be able to make accumulation either. Moreover, the transnational corporations tend to adopt capital-intensive technologies which will increase unemployment and social inequality, and thus reduce working people"s purchasing power. The shrinking domestic market, on the other hand, further discourages investment. Thus, as Bonischier and Chase-Dunn (1985) argued, in the long run, this type of foreign direct investment would lead to economic stagnation in the country where foreign capital had deeply penetrated.　　

CHAPTER V　　

CAPITALISM AND DEMOCRACY　　

　 　

　 　

New Authoritarianism Vs. Democracy　　

       In early 1989 a controversy took place between two groups of liberal intellectuals--the “new authoritarians” and the “democrats.”  In the opinion of the new authoritarians:　　

　 　

Under current conditions it is more practicable to have some powerful leading figures coercively advance the project of modernization than immediately adopting democracy . . . What we immediately need to do is to build up a dual society.  That is, a society with a system of free enterprises in economics and a centralized system in politics.　　

　 　

On the other hand, the democrats argued:　　

　 　

In today’s China we simply do not have the social conditions under which new authoritarianism can work and promote economic liberalization . . . Blind political centralization and intervention will only lead to political corruption and economic decline.　　

　 　

Having been tempered in the economic reform and after several years of democratic enlightenment . . . the cry for democracy is becoming stronger and stronger.　　

Democratization is now an irresistible social trend of the contemporary world (XHWZ No. 4 1989, 1-8).　　

　 　

       Why did the controversy happen at this time?  By 1989 the capitalist “reform” had entered the so called “crisis” stage and a large part of the working masses could hardly stand the situation any further.  The liberal intellectuals realized “the reform is becoming increasingly risky day by day.”  In this case, some liberal intellectuals suggested that what China needed was “a political and military strong man who has certain level of modern consciousness and is able to establish authoritarian politics and stabilize social order form top to bottom with iron hands (XHWZ No. 4 1989, 2).”  In the opinion of the liberal intellectuals:　　

　 　

We must pay cost for historical progress.  In the transition from an agricultural society to an industrial society, something must perish, something must pass away, and something must be born again.  All of the old social elements that are inconsistent with the requirements of modernization ultimately must be thrown away (XHWZ No. 4 1989, 6).　　

　 　

The liberal intellectuals speak as if they were on the side of historical progress, enthusiastically calling for the forces of “modernization” which are full of vigor and vitality and prepared to sweep relentlessly all of those rotting and filthy old influences.　　

       The so called “modernization” is simply another word for “capitalistization,” that is, the transition to the capitalist relations of production.  Only with the “blood legislation” under absolute monarchy, were British working people forced to follow the “requirements of modernization.”  In today’s China, as Richard Smith (1993, 99) said, “[f]or capitalist social-property relations to conquer China today would require the expropriation of workers from their guaranteed jobs, their right to let their children inherit their jobs, their right to housing, medical care, and many subsidies essential to subsistence--in a word, breaking their ‘iron rice bowls’.  These have to be broken in order to be open them up to capitalist exploitation.”  Thus, the development of the capitalist relations of production will necessarily be met with the determined resistance by the working class.  Only with serious and cruel struggles, and only after one side has been completely defeated, is it decided that who is the one that is to be thrown away.    The so called “parliamentary democracy” certainly cannot handle this kind of struggles, as the new authoritarians said, “the democratic system, under the control of the weak and incompetent, is usually unable to guarantee social order, normal life, and economic prosperity (XHWZ No. 4 1989, 2).”  The British bourgeoisie was able to have the British proletariat be subordinated to capitalist exploitation only with the help of the “blood legislation.”  In any country, to make the transition to capitalism, it is necessary to destroy the resistance of the proletariat and other working people by force.  Only in this way can the obstacles to capitalist development be cleared away.  In the opinion of F. Hayek, while the market economy is autonomously created by people, the planned economy is an artificially made institution and thus unnatural.  But this is simply not the case.  The “modern market economy” is artificially established wherever it comes into being and for it to be established, it must always resort to force and violence, and must always tread underfoot the basic rights of the majority people.  The transition to capitalism in which “something must perish, something must pass away, ans something must be born again”, which excites the liberal intellectuals so much, is a historical process in which the majority people are abused and disfranchised.  These are exactly the “progress” and the “freedom” pursued by our gentlemen intellectuals. 　　

       On the one hand, the liberal intellectuals realize that in “the early stage of modernization,” when “the middle class is too weak (the ‘middle class’ should be read as bourgeoisie),” and when people “l(fā)ack democratic consciousness,” “the progress of modernization must rely upon the forces of a strong state.  Only under the strong-man politics, can social development be sustained and consolidated, and can we have a relatively stable social order.”  On the other hand, the liberal intellectuals worry that new authoritarianism may lead “back to traditionalism which is even more conservative and more backward (compared to Maoist socialism?--added by this author).” 　　

　 　

In the respect of ideology, new authoritarianism usually relies upon the traditional value system, which is supposed to provide the spiritual base for social unity.  But the traditional value system has strong despotic implications, both logically and psychologically.  It implies concentration of power and personal cult.  Moreover, new authoritarianism emphasizes strong man politics.  Power is thus personalized and is not subject to effective supervision.  In this case, the corruption of power and politics is inevitable (XHWZ No.4 1989, 2-3).　　

　 　

       The middle class has immediate material interests in the development of the capitalist relations of production, which will bring about “appreciation of knowledge.”  In this sense, the middle class tends to support any kind of political system that is necessary for capitalist development, including the “strong man politics.”  On the other hand, the middle class, as the “reserve army” of the ruling class, asks for more “fair” competition for the entry into the ruling class, giving the members of the middle class more opportunities to get into the ruling class.  They are afraid of “the personalization of power” which may exclude themselves from political power--“the strong man politics has an instinctive apathy and dislike to intellectuals.”  The controversy between the new authoritarians and the democrats reflected the political dilemma that the middle class and its political agent--the liberal intellectuals were faced with when the transition to capitalism had greatly intensified all of the existing social contradictions.　　

　 　

　 　

A Short History of Capitalist Democracy　　

       Bourgeois scholars often tell us that capitalism and democracy are a pair of twins.  “It is the natural logic of capitalism that leads to democracy.  For economic freedom cannot be consolidated without political freedom.  People who have acquired economic freedom soon want political freedom and democracy (BIANYUAN, 5).”　　

       If “political freedom” derives from “economic freedom,” then if social wealth is concentrated in a group of minority people, it must be the logical conclusion that since only the minority have “economic freedom,” while the majority have not, only the minority should have “political freedom,”  while the majority should not.　　

       In fact, as early as in the “enlightenment” era, many bourgeois thinkers had realized that democracy was not the ideal capitalist political system.  According to Montesquieu, the republic system leads to “extreme equality,” where one tyrant is replaced by many “small tyrants.”  In his opinion, political power must be held by aristocracy and bourgeoisie, and lower people should not have the right to vote, for “masses are not suited to discuss important affairs.”  According to American federalist A.  Hamilton, masses “are not able to make judgments,” they are “arbitrary and capricious,” and they are easy to be misled, to make mistakes, and thus unreliable.  On the other hand, in Hamilton’s opinion, the rich and the prestigious, though only a small part of the population, are intelligent and competent, and thus should enjoy permanent political privileges.  He thought that this was the only way to “prevent those rash actions of democracy (see He Rubi and Yi Chengzhe, 207, 231).” 　　

       The 1787 United States Constitution was drafted according to federalist ideas.  According to Charles A.  Beard:　　

　 　

　 　

Their leading idea was to break up the attack forces at the starting point: the source of political authority for the several branches of the government . . . And the crowning counterweight to “an interested and over-bearing majority,” as Madison phrased it, was secured in the peculiar position assigned to the judiciary, and the use of the sanctity and mystery of the law as a foil to democratic attacks.  It will be seen on examination that no two of the leading branches of the government are derived from the same source.  The House of Representatives springs from the mass of the people whom the states may see fit to enfranchise.  The Senate is elected by the legislatures of the states, which were, in 1787, almost uniformly based on property qualifications, sometimes with a differentiation between the sources of the upper and lower houses.  The President is to be chosen by electors selected as the legislatures of the states may determine--at all events by and authority one degree removed from the voters at large.  The judiciary is to be chosen by the President and the Senate, both removed from direct popular control and holding for longer terms than the House.  A sharp differentiation is made in the terms of the several authorities, so that a complete renewal of the government at one stroke is impossible.  The House of Representatives is chosen for two years; the Senators for six, but not at one election, for one-third go out every two years.  The President is chosen for four years.  The Judges of the Supreme Court hold for life.  Thus “popular distempers,” as eighteenth century publicists called them, are not only restrained from working their havoc through direct elections, but they are further checked by the requirement that they must last six years in order to make their effects felt in the political department of the government, providing they can break through the barriers imposed by the indirect election of the Senate and the President.  Finally, there is the check of judicial control that can be overcome only through the manipulation of the appointing power which requires time, or through the operation of a cumbersome amending system.  The keystone of the whole structure is, in fact, the system provided for judicial control--the most unique contribution to the science of government which has been made by American political genius.  It is claimed by some recent writers that it was not the intention of the framers of the Constitution to confer upon the Supreme Court the power of passing upon the constitutionality of statutes enacted by Congress; but in view of the evidence on the other side, it is incumbent upon those who make this assertion to bring forward positive evidence to the effect that judicial control was not a part of the Philadelphia programme.  Certainly, the authors of The Federalist entertained no doubts on the point, and they conceived it to be such an excellent principle that they were careful to explain it to the electors to whom they addressed their arguments (Beard, 1960, 161).　　

　 　

       Whenever the liberal intellectuals talk about “democracy,” they mean American-style democracy.  The division of power between three branches and the two-chamber system are considered to be indispensable principles of democracy.  But in fact, it is by no means for democracy that the United States Constitution provides these principles.  On the contrary these principles are provided exactly to paralyze democracy.  As Beard (1960, 161) said: “[t]he economic corollary of this system is as follows: Property interests may, through their superior weight in power and intelligence, secure advantageous legislation whenever necessary, and they may at the same time obtain immunity from control by parliamentary majorities.”  If all power belongs to people, why must the parliament which is composed of people’s representatives be controlled by other branches of power?  In fact, in 1787 in the United States, there were four major social groups who were disfranchised--”the slaves, the indented servants, the mass of men who could not qualify for voting under the property tests imposed by the state constitution and laws, and women (Beard, 1960, 24).”  And according to Beard (1960, 250), when the Constitution was put to popular vote, only “one in six of the adult males” voted in favor of the Constitution.  The United States Constitution was not at all “an expression of the clear and deliberate will of the whole people” as said by bourgeois scholars.　　

       The natural logic of capitalism by no means leads to democracy.  Under a social system where the majority are oppressed by the minority, how can the oppressors not be scared by the possible rebellion of the oppressed, and if the oppressed do rebel, how can the oppressors not do anything possible to put down their rebellion?  If the logic of capitalism is allowed to be developed freely, without being prevented by any counteracting forces, it will only lead to the explicit dictatorship of  a small group of upper elites over the broad masses of people.　　

       The British bourgeois revolution paved the way for British capitalist development.  But it did not bring democracy to the majority British people.  In the revolution, “egalitarians” who represented the interest of ordinary people, wanted to abolish the upper house which was composed of aristocrats, and establish a single-chamber parliamentary republic which was based on universal suffrage without property restrictions.  But Cromwell suppressed “egalitarians” and established personal dictatorship.  For the two hundred years after the “Glorious Revolution” in 1688, Britain had been a country where a small group of upper elites had monopoly over political power and there was no democracy at all for the majority people.  Before the 1832 parliamentary reform, only one in thirty two of the population had the right to vote.  As a result of the 1832 reform, the people who had the right to vote were increased from 500,000 to 873,000 which only accounted for one-twenty second of the population.　　

       British people had never stopped the struggle for democracy.  In 1819 workers at Manchester held an assembly asking for political reform.  They were suppressed by the government army, with hundreds killed or hurt.  In May 1838 workers all over the country held assemblies and demonstrations, asking for universal suffrage.  This was the beginning of the Chartist Movement.  In July, the parliament rejected the petition of Chartists.  The government banned the assemblies and arrested Chartist leaders.  In May 1841 Chartists again handed in a petition with 3.3 signatures to the parliament and the petition was again rejected.  Workers all over the country were on strike.  The government suppressed the strikes and arrested more than 1,500 people.  In May 1848 Chartists held national assembly at London, and handed in a petition with more than 5 million signatures to the parliament.  The parliament rejected with the excuse that “many signatures are fabricated” and Chartist leaders were arrested by the government.  Only after many years of struggles by the working class, in 1867 Britain made the second parliamentary reform, in which the voters were increased from 1,395,000 to 2,455,000.  At that time there were 16 million adult residents in Britain.  Thus more than 13 million people continued to be disfranchised.  Male universal suffrage was not realized in Britain until 1885 and British women got the right to vote only after 62 more years (Liu Zongxu, 218-219, 299, 333-334).　　

       The British political history shows that capitalism will by no means bring about democracy by itself.  On the contrary, capitalist development requires suppressing the democratic desires of the majority people and maintaining the dictatorship by a small group of upper elites.  Capitalism has to accept and tolerate the modern democratic system only after long-term sustaining struggles by the oppressed people, and especially, the modern working class.  This is also reflected by the political history of other western countries.  In France universal suffrage was declared as early as in 1793 in the peak of the French Revolution.  But after Napoleon came to power, he abolished parliamentary democracy and established military dictatorship.  After the restoration of the monarchy in 1815, political power was in the hands of “financial aristocrats.”  In the whole France only 300,000 people had the right to vote.  After the February Revolution in 1848, under the pressure of the working class, the Second Republic declared universal suffrage.  But in May 1850 to prevent the working class and the petty bourgeoisie from taking power, the constituent assembly abolished universal suffrage.  Male universal suffrage was established in France not until the Third Republic and French women gained the right to vote until 1944.  In Italy constituent monarchy was established in 1870.  But Male universal suffrage was not realized until 1919 and Italian women gained the right to vote in 1945.  Sweden had its first constitution as early as in 1814, but male universal suffrage did not come until the early 20th century (Yang Zugong and Gu Xinli, 58, 66-67).　　

       The political history of western capitalist countries shows that historically modern democracy was not a natural result of capitalist development.  Instead it was achieved by the working class and other oppressed people only after long-term struggles against the capitalist oppressive system.  In this sense, modern democracy is itself a result of class struggles.  Thus, whether democracy can survive, and can be expanded and developed, must also depend on the concrete historical conditions of class struggles.  Modern capitalist democracy, which is not more than an expression of the balance of power between different classes under certain historical conditions, is by no means the highest stage in the progress of democracy that we cannot go beyond.  On the contrary, being the “democracy” which is more or less compatible with an oppressive social order, capitalist democracy can only be, in Lenin’s language, “incomplete and fragmentary democracy.”[22]
　　

Dependent Development and Democracy　　

       Under capitalism which is by nature an oppressive social system, democracy can only exist withing very narrow limits.  On the one hand, the political force of the oppressed people must be strong enough so that the ruling class has to accept some form of democracy.  On the other hand, it must not be so strong that it can no longer be accommodated within the limit of the capitalist system.  If this is the case, then under the conditions of dependent development, the limits within which democracy can exist are even narrower, and capitalist democracy is even more vulnerable. 　　

       We know that dependent development is based on the exploitation of hundreds of millions of cheap labor.  However, if we solely rely upon the autonomous adjustment of free market, it is difficult to keep the price of labor power low enough for dependent development for a long time.  Only with political dictatorship, using coercive forces to systematically destroy the working class’s resistance, is it possible to maintain for a long time a large cheap labor force necessary for dependent development.  As one American radical economist argued:　　

　 　

Both foreign capitalists and domestic capitalists regard strong dictatorship regimes as the best safeguard of political and economic stability.  In many areas in the third world, workers become increasingly militant, and the public increasingly require better distribution of economic interests, and moreover revolutionary movements are taking shape or become more active.  In this case political repression is usually the best way to keep labor docile and willing to work under the wage level which allows high profit for investment.  In core capitalist countries bourgeois democracy plays an important role in legitimacy while does little harm to capitalist economic interests.  But in peripheral capitalist countries democracy usually prevents capitalist accumulation ( Thomas E. Weisskopf, “Di Guo Zhu Yi He Di San Shi Jie De Jing Ji Fa Zhan (Imperialism and Economic Development in the Third World),” in Wilber).　　

　 　

       In late 1980s and early 1990s the wave of the so called “democratization” swept a number of third world countries.  Some liberal intellectuals take this as evidence, arguing: “the strong man politics or new authoritarianism cannot work . . . Time has changed.  Now it is no longer 1930s, nor 1950s.  Now the trend is democracy (JJXDT No.7 1993, 45).”  In their opinion, capitalist development will inevitably bring about to the development of the private capitalist class and the middle class, whose strength will be increased overtime.  After the private capitalist class and the middle class have acquired dominant economic positions, they must not be satisfied with their powerless political positions and will ask for corresponding dominant political positions, leading to democratization.　　

       In a dependent capitalist society, the private capitalist class and the middle class are privileged classes without political power.  On the one hand, they want political positions corresponding to their social and economic positions, and want to share political power with the ruling class.  In this sense, they are democratic forces.  On the other hand, the two classes are privileged classes who have important interests in the existing social system, want to preserve the existing oppressive system, and thus are willing to support the ruling class when it represses the struggle of the oppressed people.  In this sense, they are anti-democratic forces.  Thus, whether capitalist development can lead to democratization depends on much more complicated conditions than the liberal intellectuals have imagined.  Between the private capitalist class and the middle class, apparently the private capitalist class, due to its economic interest, under the conditions of dependent development, has much more stake in political dictatorship than the middle class.  Nevertheless, since in China and in many third world countries, the private capitalist class is not a major political and social force, in the following analysis, we will only discuss how different relations between the ruling class, the middle class, and the oppressed people have different impacts on political conditions in third world countries (see TABLE 5.1).　　

 

TABLE 5.1　　

Political Conditions under Dependent Capitalist Development　　

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------　　

        Oppressed People*      Middle Class**      Ruling Class*** Political Conditions                        Cases　　

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------　　

I              Strong                         Strong                    Weak                      ?****                  Chile under Unidad Popular;　　

                                                                                                                                             Former Soviet Union and                                                                                                                                                           Eastern Europe since late 1980s　　

II            Strong                         Weak                      Strong         Capitalist Dictatorship   China since 1979;　　

                                                                                                                                             Korea and Latin America before                                                                                                                                                mid 1980s　　

III          Strong                          Weak                     Weak           Socialist Revolution       Russian revolution;　　

                                                                                                                                             Chinese revolution 　　

IV         Weak                            Strong                    Strong                     ?****                  China between 1911-1924　　

V          Weak                            Strong                    Weak           Capitalist Democracy     Turkey since 1917;　　

                                                                                                                                              India since 1948;　　

                                                                                                                                              Taiwan, Korea and Latin                                                                                                                                                            America after mid 1980s　　

VI         Weak                            Weak                     Strong          Capitalist Dictatorship   Taiwan before mid 1980s; 　　

                                                                                                                                             Indonesia;　　

                                                                                                                                             Africa(?)　　

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------　　

*The working class and peasants.　　

**Or the alliance of the middle class and the private capitalist class.　　

***Usually the bureaucratic capitalist class, sometimes with the participation of the private capitalist class.　　

****Extreme political instability and chaos.　　

　 　

　 　

       If the forces of the oppressed people are so strong that they threaten the normal progress of dependent capitalist accumulation, then the direction of social development, is primarily determined by the balance of power between the oppressed people and the ruling class.  In this case, either the ruling class, with the aid of political dictatorship, destroys the resistance by the oppressed people (shown by case II in TABLE 5.1), or the oppressed people, by making revolution, overthrow the ruling class (shown by case III in TABLE 5.1).  On the other hand, case I (in TABLE 5.1) must be a transitory situation.  If the force of the oppressed people are so strong that normal capitalist accumulation is no longer possible, but they are not strong enough to determine the direction of social development by themselves, and on the other hand, the ruling class does not have the necessary ability to restore “order,” then we will have case I.  In this case, the middle class will play a decisive role and social development is open to all directions, depending on concrete historical struggles.  In former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the middle class support the transition to capitalism, but without rejecting democracy.  As a result, normal capitalist accumulation cannot be undertaken and the economy collapses.  This kind of situation certainly cannot sustain in the long run.  In Chile in 1973, it was with the acquiescence of the middle class, that Pinochet made the coup d’etat and set up fascist regime.  Thus, in case I, the attitude of the middle class is crucial.  Historically, in this case, it is not unusual for the middle class to reject democracy in order to preserve the capitalist system, or to choose fascism instead of socialism.　　

       If the forces of the oppressed people are not strong enough to threaten dependent capitalist accumulation, the political conditions will be largely determined by the balance of power between the ruling class and the middle class.  When the middle class is relatively stronger, and when the ruling class is no longer able to continue its rule without changing the political system, we will see “democratization” under capitalist conditions (shown by case V in TABLE 5.1).  This is what we have seen in some third world countries in recent few years.  In Taiwan, there has been successful capitalist development for several decades.  The private capitalist class and the middle class become increasingly strong, and finally the ruling class has to accept “democracy,” giving up a part of political power.  This is the classical model of bourgeois political reform.  It is also the model of “democratization” desired by the liberal intellectuals.  But this model does not apply to most countries in case V.  In Latin America, “democratization” is not based on the success of capitalist development.  Instead, Latin American capitalism was caught up in deep crisis in 1980s.  The ruling class was on the verge of bankruptcy, losing much of legitimacy, and in this case, had to make some changes in the political system.  　　

       But why did the crisis in Latin America lead to case V rather than case I or III?  How did the forces of the oppressed people turn from “strong” to “weak”?  If there were not twenty more years of military dictatorship, the forces of the oppressed people would not be substantially weakened.  And if the forces of the oppressed people had not been substantially weakened, capitalism would not be able to overcome the crisis, and there would not be “democratization” within the limit of capitalism.[23]  It is safe to say that in Latin America without the past military dictatorship, there would not be today’s “democratization.”  If this is the case, the newly born “democracy” must be very vulnerable and unreliable.  Its conditions of survival are provided by the past military dictatorship and it cannot reproduce these conditions by itself.  If these conditions have been lost, then what else can be done besides again resorting to military dictatorship?  　　

       Therefore, “democracy” is not, as the liberal intellectuals said, an inherent “trend” of capitalist development.  At best it is one of the six possible “cases.”  Moreover, purely political “democracy” will help to solve none of the fundamental problems of the dependent capitalist society.  Dependent capitalist accumulation must be based on the exploitation of cheap labor.  With every dependent capitalist country competing with one another in the world market, each of them wants to depress the price of labor power in its own country as much as possible.  And political repression provides a much more powerful way than free market to repress the price of labor power.  Thus, “democratization” by itself has not eliminated and will not eliminate the danger of political repression.  Instead, since this kind of “democratization” tries to preserve the capitalist oppressive system, it prepares the conditions for the future political repression and military dictatorship, or by doing so, it prepares the conditions for the future revolution.　　

　 　

The “Corruption” Problem and “Social Chaos”　　

       Some liberal intellectuals believe that without political democracy, China cannot develop capitalism:　　

　 　

The political reform must proceed at the same pace as the economic reform . . . After the economic reform has reached certain stage, the political reform must keep up, otherwise further economic reform will be met with obstacles (JJXDT No.7 1993, 45).　　

　 　

Some people refer to the “four dragons” as examples, thinking that purely economic reform is possible.  But they fail to see that the “four dragons” have always been based on private property and market economy.  Their system does not prevent their economic take-off.  But the mainland China must first reform the economic system.  In the transformation of the economic system, if there is not political democracy, and the government and its officials are not supervised by people and independent opinion, Guan Dao (“official speculation”--meaning rent-seeking activities) will not be checked, corruption will prevail, and social contradictions must be increasingly intensified, until getting out of hands.  As British historian Acton said one hundred years ago: “power leads to corruption; absolute power leads to absolute corruption.”  This is the iron law of history from which nobody can escape.  The government without people’s supervision must be corrupted, and people will not tolerate corruption and Guan Dao.  These are the roots and catalysis of social chaos (Xu Liangying).　　

　 　

       Eliminating corruption does not mean doing away with oppression.  In an oppressive society, corruption is not more than the violation of the rule of oppression.  For the broad masses of the oppressed people, an oppressive society without corruption is no less an oppressive society.  But can we imagine that in a society where the majority people are oppressed and exploited, the government can be effectively supervised by ordinary people?  Can we imagine that a society which allows a group of minority people “l(fā)egally” plunder the majority people, can effectively prevent some people from plundering without following the “l(fā)egal” process of plundering?　　

      What makes our liberal intellectuals so lovely is that on the one hand, they want capitalism, and on the other hand, they do not want those evils necessarily associated with capitalism.  No matter what political forms it takes, an oppressive society has no way to really solve the corruption problem.  This is true not only under political dictatorship, but also under political democracy, as the Italian political scandals in 1993 suggest.  The corruption of Italian politics has been for a long time known to everyone.  But for it has never really hurt the ruling class.  Now we find that actually the whole ruling elite has been deeply corrupted.  We can see from the Italian case how effective “democracy” is in solving the corruption problem.　　

       The new authoritarians criticize the democrats, saying that the democrats are too naive, and premature democracy will lead to unchecked corruption and economic stagnation.  The democrats criticize that the new authoritarians are caught up in illusions, and new authoritarianism will only lead to political corruption and economic decline.  But let us look around the less developed capitalist countries in the world, no matter they are under political dictatorship or democracy, how many of them have successfully solve the corruption problem?　　

       Is there any way to solve the corruption problem?  Yes.  That is the “tyranny of majority” which makes the liberal intellectuals most scared.  Only by resorting to the “majority”, can we really have some hope to solve the problem.  And only by making revolution, overthrowing the oppressor class, and by greatly mobilizing the political enthusiasm of the broad masses of people, can we meaningfully talk about effective supervision of government.　　

       In the opinion of the liberal intellectuals, if the oppressors do not violate the rules of oppression, practicing “fair play,” the oppressed people will peacefully accept oppression, the “reform” thus can proceed smoothly, the social contradictions thus will not be “increasingly intensified,” nor “getting out of hands,” and the oppressive society will have no troubles.　　

       With corruption, or without corruption, capitalist development objectively requires the concentration of great amount of wealth in a small group of people who thus must plunder the majority.  After the Independence War, Thomas Jefferson, seeing that a small group of people made great fortunes, while many petty producers were bankrupted and unemployed, criticize capitalism being “an automatic machine that turns the majority people into the poor (He Rubi and Yi Chengzhe, 207).”  In response to capitalist primitive accumulation, in America there was the struggle between anti-federalists and federalists; and in Britain there was the struggle by “egalitarians” and “diggers” (Jue Di Pai).  Anti-federalists, “egalitarians” and “diggers,” all represented the interest of the majority people, making struggles against capitalist oppression.  For capitalism to develop, it must destroy these resistances.  To do this, it must rely upon force, violence, political dictatorship, rather than democracy.  For China to develop capitalism, it must follow the same logic.  On the one hand, you want to plunder the masses of people.  On the other hand, you want the masses of people to be plundered freely and democratically.  How is this possible? 　　

       The June 4 event, by repressing people’s resistance, prepared the political conditions for capitalist dependent development in China.  However, capitalist dependent development is based on on the one hand, the cruel exploitation of China’s new proletariat, and on the other hand, the pauperization of the peasants.  Thus, it is based on the pauperization of the majority Chinese people.  On the other hand, in a country like China, which had made a socialist revolution, and where egalitarian ideas have been deeply rooted in people’s hearts, and where people no longer believe that exploitation and oppression are something that can be justified, something that are natural, and something that cannot be challenged, there is even less reason why working people shall accept and tolerate their exploited and oppressed conditions, and there is even less reason why they will not make all possible forms of struggles to bring changes to their conditions.  These are the real “roots and catalysis of social chaos.”        　　

       The new authoritarians realize that capitalist development in China, and especially dependent capitalist development, will by no means be like a plain sailing.  Instead, it will inevitably be met with the opposition and resistance of the majority people, the opposition and resistance that have to overcome by force and political dictatorship.  On this point, the new authoritarians have deeper insight than the democrats and they are also more honest.  It is interesting to see that Mr. Du Gangjian,[24] who had always claimed that he had no common ground at all with the new authoritarians , recently wrote an essay arguing: “political reform in China must move forward step by step.  We cannot have too much expectation of a country where even rule of law has not yet been realized.”  In the opinion of Mr. Du Gangjian, it is necessary to “distinguish liberty and democracy,” “the liberty problem should not be confused with the democracy problem.”  In his opinion, new authoritarianism is wrong not because “it rejects democracy,” but because “it rejects not only democracy but also liberty.”  Freedom without democracy!--what kind of freedom is it?[25]  According to Mr. Du Gangjian, the liberal intellectuals are faced with a dilemma.  “Theoretically we have only two alternatives--democracy or dictatorship.  But in reality there is the need for constitutional politics.”  Consequently, “we must choose either democracy or dictatorship.”  However, of democracy, “we cannot have too much expectation;” if we choose dictatorship, “the result is economic backwardness, cultural poverty, and the degeneration of the people.”  “The only way out is the third choice . . . let’s turn to another perspective--the commitment to liberty and human right, and the safeguard for liberty and human right is the core of constitutional politics (BIANYUAN, 10-12).”  “Constitutional politics” without democracy?  “Freedom and human right” without democracy?  Is this anything but the new authoritarian “open-minded dictatorship?”　　

       It is not of Chinese people, but of capitalism, that “we cannot have too much expectation.”  The development of a country, in the last analysis, depends on the enthusiasms and initiatives of the masses of people.  In this respect, only in a democratic society, where the majority people have control over their own fate, can the great creative potential reserved in the masses of people be fully released.  Democracy, as far as it is not used to cover up the contradictions of the oppressive societies, is by no means the obstacle to development, but the most powerful motive for development.　　

　 　

　 　

　 　

　 　

CHAPTER VI  　　

THE FUTURE OF THE CHINESE REVOLUTION　　

　 　

　 　

       What are the lessons that we can draw from the failure of the 1989 revolution?  First, the liberal intellectuals are completely unqualified for the leadership of the democratic struggle.  Following them, Chinese working people would only achieve their own appropriation.　　

       Secondly, capitalism, as an oppressive social and economic system which is against the basic interest of the majority people, is by nature incompatible with democracy in the sense that democracy means the ordinary people’s power.  In the Chinese context, this was true at the time of the 1989 revolution when the transition to capitalism was met with the tenacious resistance by the working class.  This is also true today when the Chinese capitalist economy has to rely heavily on the “advantage” of cheap labor to compete in the world market, and a repressive political system is indispensable for keeping the labor cheap and docile.  In this case, the struggle for democracy in China, if it is to be carried out to its logical end, must be at the same time the struggle for socialism.　　

       Thirdly, working people, who are oppressed and exploited, and thus cannot go beyond the narrow scope of their personal experience of life and reach a scientific and global view of society, cannot by themselves become an independent political force and win the struggle for liberation.  In this case, to build up a revolutionary socialist intellectual force which is directed by a correct revolutionary theory and is prepared to join the struggle of working people against oppression and exploitation, is the primary condition for the future socialist revolution.　　

       The failure of the 1989 revolution cleared the political obstacle to capitalist development.  The ruling class has passed the crisis stage, consolidated its ruling position, gained the support of international capital, and restored relationship with the major capitalist countries.  The normal capitalist relations of production have been established in China and the economy has again entered a stage of rapid expansion.　　

       On the other hand, the liberal intellectuals have lost most of their political influence that they had before 1989.  Their exiling party abroad has bankrupted and they do not have any organized political force in China.  Without any significant social base, the very existence (or extinguishment) of the liberal opposition now depends much on the diplomatic game between the Chinese and the American ruling class.  　　

       But all the social contradictions remain and are to be developed.  As a social system, capitalism can exist only if it is more or less accepted by the majority people.  However, under the  conditions of dependent development, the Chinese capitalist economy can compete in the world market only by exploiting hundreds of millions of “cheap labor.”  Thus, the Chinese capitalist economy can work only by pauperizing the majority people, that is, only by turning the majority people into the opposition of itself.  To maintain capitalist accumulation, Chinese capitalism must destroy its own social base; and to preserve its own social base, Chinese capitalism cannot make successful capitalist accumulation.  Chinese capitalism, which cannot maintain at the same time its economic rationality and social legitimacy, is thus faced with insolvable contradictions.        　　

       True, Chinese capitalism is now in quite good shape.  Capitalist accumulation has never been so strong, and the vigor of the rising Chinese capitalism may have no match in today’s world.  The economy has rapidly expanded for more than one decade and seems to have no difficulty to expand as rapidly for another decade.  The ruling class is looking forward to the future with confidence and it seems that the century old nationalist dream of “being rich and strong” is being realized.  But all of these by no means suggest that the capitalist system is freed from its inherent contradictions and the capitalist economy can move forward smoothly forever.  On the contrary, “stable economic growth” under capitalism is contradiction in term.　　

       From Marxist point of view, the capitalist economy is by nature irrational and self-contradictory.  The very success of capitalist accumulation prepares the conditions for its collapse.  Here we cannot make detail discussion of the Marxist theory of capitalist accumulation.  Let us simply point out that according to Marxist theory, capitalist accumulation suffers from following inherent contradictions.  　　

       First, under relentless competition, capitalists have to constantly raise labor productivity by replacing labor with capital.  According to Marxist theory, this leads to the rising organic composition of capital (the ratio of constant capital to variable capital, or the ratio of the value of means of production to the value of labor power).  Since surplus value (profit) is created by variable capital rather than constant capital, the rising organic composition of capital sooner or later will lead to the falling profit rate.  In conventional statistics this is reflected by the long-term tendency of rising capital-output ratio (for detail discussions of the tendency of rising capital-output ratio under capitalist technological progress, see appendix of this chapter).[26]  In Marx’s words, if the profit rate falls below certain point, “the vital flame of production would be altogether extinguished.”　　

　 　

　 　

It would die out.  The rate of profit is the motive power of capitalist production.  Things are produced only so long as they can be produced with a profit . . . What worries Ricardo is the fact that the rate of profit, the stimulating principle of capitalist production, the fundamental premise and driving force of accumulation, should be endangered by the development of production itself (Marx, 1967, 259).　　

　 　

       To reverse the trend of falling rate of profit, the capitalist class must manage to substantially increase the rate of surplus value.  However, it is exactly as a result of the rapid expansion of the capitalist economy, the strength of the working class is increased not only quantitatively but also qualitatively.  By absorbing an increasingly large number of labor force, capitalist accumulation gradually exhausts the reserve army of labor composed of unemployed population.  The shrinking of the reserve army of labor intensifies the competition between the capitalists and reduce the pressure of competition on the workers.  The balance of power is thus changed in favor of the working class and against the capitalist class.  At the same time, capitalist development leads to increasing concentration of capital, and consequently, the workers become more concentrated and organized and their class consciousness and militancy are developed proportionately.  The increase of the strength of the working class effectively prevents the increase of the rate of surplus value. 　　

       It is exactly because the capitalist system has no way to free itself from these contradictions, any long-term expansion of the capitalist economy sooner or later will be replaced by long-term depressions.  The world capitalist economy has repetitively fallen into long-term depressions for every few decades.  In the long-term depression, all of the economic and social contradictions of the capitalist system are greatly intensified, opening the possibility of fundamental social changes.  According to Mandel (1995) there is no way for the capitalist economy, with its purely “economic” mechanisms, to move out of the long-term depression automatically.  For the capitalist system to survive the long-term depression, there must be a substantial increase of the profit rate, which requires a substantial increase of the rate of surplus value.  But a fundament change in the rate of surplus value involves major political and social struggles, and there is no ex ante guarantee whether the capitalist system can survive these struggles or not.[27]　　

      What are the implications for Chinese capitalist development?  From Marxist point of view, the current rapid expansion of the Chinese capitalist economy must be explained by the exceptionally high profit rate which is based on the one hand on the exploitation of hundreds of millions of “cheap labor,” and on the other hand on the imports of advanced technologies and capital goods.  However, as we have seen, capitalist accumulation, under its own inherent logic, leads to the falling rate of profit.  Sooner or later the profit rate will fall to a level where capitalist accumulation can no longer be normally carried out.　　

       Besides the contradictions from which all capitalist economies suffer, Chinese capitalism is also burdened with the contradictions which are particular to Chinese capitalism.  First, as what is argued in Chapter IV, Chinese capitalist economic development is by nature dependent development which is based on the imports of foreign technologies and capital goods.  China is able to finance these imports for China has a competitive exporting sector which is largely based on the advantage  of cheap labor.  Nevertheless, the historical tendency of capitalist technological progress is to replace labor with capital, and thus increasingly weakens and even eliminates the importance of cheap labor, put the long-term sustainability of dependent development into serious question.  　　

       Secondly, for capitalist accumulation to be undertaken, surplus value must not only be produced, but also be realized.  However, dependent capitalist development is based on the exploitation of hundred of millions of cheap labor, and is thus based on the pauperization of the majority people.  The increase of the purchasing power of the majority people thus cannot keep up with the expansion of the economy.  As long as China is able to rapidly expand its exports in the world market, a relatively narrow domestic market will not set a serious limit to capitalist accumulation.  But given a slowly growing world economy, China’s rapid growth of exports sooner or later will come to an end, and the Chinese capitalist economy will be faced with an increasingly serious “realization” problem which may become an insurmountable obstacle to further capitalist accumulation. 　　

       All of these contradictions set an absolute limit to Chinese capitalist development.  While we cannot predict accurately the date on which Chinese capitalism will fall into a major crisis, based on the historical experience of world capitalism, it is safe to say that it will not take more than two or three decades before the turning point comes.  After this point, Chinese capitalism will enter a stage of long-term decline, in which all of the social and economic contradictions will be greatly intensified.  Whether Chinese capitalism can survive the long-term decline depends on the concrete result of major political and social struggles.　　

       In this respect following elements will have decisive impacts on the final outcome  of the struggles.  First, unlike the developed capitalist societies, Chinese capitalism is supported by an explicitly repressive political system.  In this case, the Chinese ruling class cannot claim as strong a legitimacy as the ruling classes in the developed capitalist countries, leaving itself extremely vulnerable when there are major political and social crises.　　

       Secondly, unlike the developed capitalist societies, Chinese capitalism which is based on the exploitation of hundred of millions of cheap labor, does not have much space to make class compromise and to alleviate class contradictions, for example, by introducing some kind of welfare state.  In this case, the contradictions between the ruling class and the oppressed people will be manifested at its full scale, and thus must be solved throughly and completely, leaving little space for the reformist solution.　　

       Thirdly, different from most of the less developed capitalist countries, China is a country that has experienced a socialist revolution.  The consciousness and the spiritual conditions of Chinese working people are thus incomparable to those of the working people in the countries that have not experienced such a revolution.  For Chinese working people, exploitation, oppression, and domination are no longer unalterable principles.  Instead they have seen with their own eyes how the world could be changed if the oppressed people would rise up, making rebellion and striking the oppressors down to the ground.  The rights that working people have won by the revolution, must not be taken away by the ruling class without serious struggles.  If these rights have been lost, as soon as the working people have gained the necessary force, they will not hesitate at all before rising up and striking the ruling class again down to the ground, and will not hesitate at all to restore, expand, and develop these rights.    　　

       When we consider the future of the Chinese revolution, there is no reason for pessimism.  The capitalist social system which is based on the exploitation and oppression of the majority people, is by nature irrational and full of contradictions.  It is capitalist development itself, under its own inherent logic, that paves the way for social crisis and social revolution.  On the other hand, Chinese working people, who had made a great socialist revolution, will by no means stand the present oppressive system for a long time.  We have reason to believe that the next Chinese socialist revolution will not be a matter of distant future and it is the duty of our generation to make the coming great struggle.  We can confidently predict, as Marx predicted after the failure of the 1848 revolution, “[a] new revolution is possible only in consequence of a new crisis.  It is, however, just as certain as this crisis . . . (Marx, 1977, 297)”   　　

　 　

　 　

The Liberal Intellectuals on Market, Democracy, and Revolution　　

       Who are qualified to solve the problems of the Chinese society? It seems that the liberal intellectuals are the first to be qualified. For they are the “official opposition (in the sense that it is recognized by all the western ruling classes),” the “only” opposition, the symbol of democracy, and the successor of the Crown. So what is the liberal intellectuals’ programme for social transformation?　　

       The liberal intellectuals said:　　

With the deprivation of private property and economic freedom, market is closed, privileges are established, laziness is protected, and creativity is suppressed, bringing about universal poverty and backwardness. The rich countries are turned into poor countries, and the poor countries are even poorer. There is only one way out: market economy, plus democratic politics (BIANYUAN, 5).　　

　 　

       Why do people live in poverty? According to the liberal intellectuals, this is not a result of class oppression, but a result of the revolution. The revolution takes away “private property and economic freedom,” and thus brings about “universal poverty and backwardness.” The remedy to this problem is “market economy, plus democratic politics.”　　

       For the liberal intellectuals, nothing is wrong with the “market economy” (capitalism) itself, and the problem lies in the lack of “democratic politics.” As long as there is “democratic politics,” even if not all the problems of a capitalist society can be easily solved, these problems in no case go out of hand. Can democratic politics help to solve the contradictions of a capitalist society? If democratic politics is turned into a weapon in the hands of the oppressed people, who in turn use this weapon to overthrow the entire capitalist social order, then democratic politics is certainly a solution to the contradictions of a capitalist society. But I guess this is not what is intended by the liberal intellectuals.　　

       Why is “democratic politics” to be added to the “market economy?” The liberal intellectuals said: “it is the natural logic of capitalism that leads to political democracy, for economic freedom cannot be consolidated without political freedom . . . property right and free market needs political safeguards, otherwise they may be trodden underfoot by the rulers who abuse power (BIANYUAN, 4-5).” Thus, for the liberal intellectuals, “democratic politics” is not more than the “political safeguard” of “property right and free market.” But is not it true that the “property right” of the capitalist class is exactly based on the pauperization of the majority people? If this is the case, is not it true that to safeguard “property right” is no less than to exercise political oppression over the majority people?　　

       This contradiction is sensed by the liberal intellectuals, who perceive that the complete development of democratic politics would inevitably endanger “property right.” For this reason, they worry that “democratic politics may set free the desire of mobs, degenerate into anarchy, and finally end with tyranny.  Therefore, after prevailing over the tyranny of single person, the democratic politics is faced with the threat of a new type of tyranny, the tyranny of the majority, especially the tyranny of the moral majority (BIANYUAN, 6).”  What is the “tyranny of the majority?”  It does not make any sense by abstractly talking about the “tyranny of the majority.” To understand the nature of the “tyranny of the majority,” we must understand who is the “majority,” who is the “minority,” and what is the relationship between the “majority” and the “minority.”  When the majority is being oppressed by the minority, and when the minority is exercising the “tyranny of the minority,” the “tyranny of the majority” could be nothing more than the rebellion of the oppressed people against the rule of the oppressors. To call it “tyranny,” is to say that it is against the will of the oppressors; to call it the “tyranny of the majority,” is to say that it is in the will of the oppressed people.　　

       Thus, to say that democratic politics is faced with the threat of the tyranny of the majority, is to say that the capitalist system is faced with the threat of democratic politics. For democracy, when its essence is concerned, and when it means giving power to the majority people who are under oppression, is incompatible with capitalism. It is on this point that the liberal intellectuals have shown some honest and scientific attitudes. 　　

       “Market economy, plus democratic politics,” in practice, means promising people bourgeois civil rights.  There are some liberal intellectuals who are concerned with the undisguised exploitation of the rising capitalism and the miserable conditions of working people.  However, they cannot believe that this derives from the nature of the capitalist system and is indispensable for capitalist development. Instead, with good wishes, they want “humanization of competition,” and think that within the limit of a bourgeois society, workers can strive for a better term of bargaining.  However, these “kind people” fail to see that the term of bargaining between capital and labor is determined not only by the balance of power between the proletariat and the capital within a particular nation, but increasingly by the balance of power between the world proletariat and the world capital. On the one hand, capital all over the world has been united. On the other hand, the proletarians of different nations continue to fight for their interest separately and thus defeated separately.  Now European workers have found that it is increasingly difficult for them to preserve the “welfare state.”  The recent debate on the “human right” problem between Southeast Asian countries and the U.S. also tells us what is going on: less developed capitalist countries, by exploiting their “cost advantage” in poor labor right, are able to somehow offset the technological advantage of developed capitalist countries, and thus put the labor right in developed capitalist countries into question.  Of course we should and must struggle for establishing laws more favorable to working people.  We cannot hope that these laws can do much in the “humanization of competition.”  Nevertheless, these laws will help us to understand following facts.  First, if these laws are not implemented, then these laws are not more than a heap of waste paper.  Second, if these laws are really implemented, then China will be faced with great difficulty in the competition in the world market, capital will flow out, capitalist accumulation will stop, and the capitalist system will be faced with serious problems　　

       The solution to concrete problems must be found in concrete, historical conditions. Those social programmes that simply come out of imagination serves no use.  For the urban working class, to preserve the social rights that they won by revolution, they must not be satisfied with these rights themselves.  They can no longer expect the ruling class to grant them these rights.  Consequently, they must grant themselves these rights by themselves.  If the state ownership, i.e. the ruling class ownership, is not turned into the working class ownership, how is this possible?  For the new proletariat, even the guarantee of eight-hour working day, the guarantee of the right to rest in holidays, and the guarantee that profit is no longer made at the cost of their lives, in the eyes of capital, are seen as terrible threats, and thus even these minimum bourgeois civil rights, cannot be achieved without endangering the capitalist property system.  For the peasant class, any fundamental improvement of their standard of living, threatens to paralyze capitalist accumulation which is based on the pauperization of the majority people.  Then if the power over social accumulation is not transferred from capital to working people, how can the condition of the peasants be fundamentally improved?  Finally, for the utterly destitute, if we do not expropriate the one million millionaires, how can we save the one hundred million people from the abject poverty?  Therefore, for the oppressed people there is only one solution to these problems. That is, revolution. 　　

       The liberal intellectuals say that the revolution deprived people of their “private property and economic freedom.”  The liberal intellectuals forget that before the revolution the majority people did not have any “private property and economic freedom.”  They also forget that if there had not been “universal poverty and backwardness,” then there would not have been any revolution.  The liberal intellectuals say that as a result of the revolution, “creativity is suppressed . . . The rich countries are turned into poor countries, and the poor countries are even poorer.”  But the fact is exactly the contrary.  　　

       In his most recent work which is considered to have provided “the most comprehensive database available for comparative, quantitative analysis of the economic performance of nations,” Maddison (1995) provided the latest measures of real gross domestic product (GDP) based on purchasing power parity for 199 countries between 1820 and 1992. Although in Maddison’s book, the economic growth rates of some former socialist countries are substantially underestimated, his data provides strong proof that the former socialist countries, despite the many social and economic defects from which they suffered, did have made great achievements in economic development.　　

　 　

TABLE 6.1　　

Index of GDP per capita, 1950-1989　　

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------　　

                            1950        1960        1970        1980        1989    Growth rates (%)*　　

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------　　

All Capitalist Countries   100          128           174         208          227               2.13　　

All Capitalist LDCs                 100          127           172         222          240               2.27　　

Southern Europe and 　　

Latin America                          100          128           178         235          233               2.20　　

Eastern Europe                        100          141           198         238          256               2.44　　

China                                       100          143           178         238           ----              2.93　　

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------　　

*Referring to average annual growth rates from 1950-1989, for China it is from 1950-1980.　　

Source: Calculated on the data from Maddison (1985). “All Capitalist Countries” includes all 199 countries except “Eastern Europe” and “China.” “All Capitalist LDCs” includes all countries of “Southern Europe,” “Latin America,” “Asia & Oceania,” and “Africa” except China and Japan. “Eastern Europe” includes USSR. 　　

　 　

       TABLE 6.1 shows that even if we include the period of 1980-1989 when Eastern European socialism was in the stage of final collapse, both Eastern Europe and China had higher growth rates of GDP per capita than either the average of all capitalist countries or the average of all capitalist less developed countries. Moreover, Eastern Europe had higher growth rates than the average of Southern Europe and Latin America, the two regions that had a level of development similar to Eastern Europe in 1950.　　

       In oppressive societies, the majority people are oppressed physically and spiritually, being deprived of the right to manifest their creative potential and to enjoy the fruits of their creation. This is the most important and most fundamental reason for which social creativity is suppressed.  Bourgeois scholars certainly cannot understand this.  Even when a revolution is not able to complete the entire cause of the struggle for the liberation of the oppressed people, it nonetheless makes “the black hands that used to hold a plough now holding a tablet,”[28] it turns “the earth up-side-down,” and it provides the majority people the chance to have control over their own fate. By doing this, it is enough to wipe out the dejected and apathetic mood that prevails among the people in oppressive societies.  Such a society will certainly have the vitality and creativity far greater than those societies that have not experienced revolution, and have remained “normal” oppressive societies.　　

        As Arjun Makhijani argued:　　

　 　

Thus, some of the reasons for the success of socialism were never appreciated. For example, there is considerable evidence that the economic development under socialism derived partly from their redistributive aspects . . . Redistribution gave that hope of better living conditions to hundreds of millions of people living in grinding poverty who were suppressed under prior regimes whenever they tried to get ahead or get a bigger share of society’s production. A substantial portion of the growth that occurred in production and consumption of essentials derived basically from the energy which redistribution gave to the poor and the investment of labor time which they made as a result (Makhijani, 1992, 64).　　

　 　

Thus, the revolution alone could be turned into the greatest productive forces. 　　

       But the development of productive forces, by itself, does not tell us whether and to what extent it serves the interest of the majority people, whether the development of productive forces is at the expense of or provides conditions for the physical and mental development of the ordinary working people. It is in this respect that socialist development proves to be by nature superior to capitalist development. When the conditions of physical and mental development of the majority people are concerned, as Arjun Makhijani said, “on the basis of infant mortality, life expectancy, food supply and safer water the ‘winner’ between capitalism and socialism seems clear--socialism (Makhijani, 1992, 76).” See TABLE 6.2.　　

　 　

 

TABLE 6.2　　

A Comparison of Capitalist and Socialist Economies, 1975　　

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------　　

                                   Capitalist                      Socialist　　

                            -------------------------------------            -------------------------------　　

                             OECD   Third World    Total                   Eastern Europe    China　　

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------　　

Life Expectancy　　

(in Years)                                70                 55            60                                 70               65　　

Infant Mortality　　

(Deaths per 1,000)                  25               130           100                                30               60　　

Daily Supply of 　　

Food Calories per Person   3,100            2,100        2,400                           3,200          2,200　　

Safe Water Supply　　

(Percent of People)                 90                 50             65                           80-90             N/A　　

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------　　

Source: Makhijani (1992, 75).　　

　 　

       True, the revolution, which has promised people liberation, ends with the substitution of one form of oppression for another.  For the liberal intellectuals, the revolution is thus not more than a fraud, a nightmare, a dirty game in which the commitment and the lives of millions of people are sacrificed for the private power and glory of a few people.  Therefore, the oppressed people are oppressed because they rebel against the oppression.  This is the logic of the liberal intellectuals and this the reason for which the oppressed people must accept their fate of being oppressed.  But for us, the fact that the revolution is stained by the revolution itself, simply means that the revolution must not be satisfied with the achievements that have already been made, and must go beyond itself, to reach a higher a stage.  Otherwise it will not be able to preserve the achievements that it has already made.  As British historian E. H. Carl said:　　

　 　

The danger is not that we shall draw a veil over the enormous blots on the record of the Revolution, over its cost in human suffering, over the crimes committed in its name. The danger is that we shall be tempted to forget altogether, and to pass over in silence, its immense achievement (taken from Meisner, 1986, 440).　　

　 　

The oppressed people have no reason to regret for having made a revolution, and have even less reason to fear a revolution. 　　

       True, the oppressed people repetitively rise up, only to be repetitively repressed by the oppressors.  This is the history for all previous time.  This historical phenomena has been referred to by some people as evidence that oppression is naturally rational and will always exist.  These people have ignored that the result of all practical struggles, are determined not by academic debates and arguments, but by these struggles themselves.  The dilemma of the oppressive society is that it can never free itself from its opposite, from the rebellion of the majority people against itself, and thus has to always put itself into question, and consequently can never prove itself to be naturally rational and to be able to exist forever. 　　

CHAPTER VII　　

MARKET, PLANNING, AND SOCIALIST REVOLUTION　　

　 　

　 　

       Can a socialist planned economy work?  For Marxism there is too much stake in this question.  It is well known that for Marx a socialist society must be based on a planned economy with production for social use value rather than exchange value.  For under the modern socialized production, only with a planned economy, can human beings have conscious control over productive forces, social relations, and thus their own lives, and consequently can they be liberated from any form of oppression, exploitation, and alienation. 　　

       The question appears to be a technical problem.  That is, the answer to the question depends on whether we are able to conceive some kind of technical model which shows that the socialist planned economy has the technical ability to solve modern economic problems with a reasonable efficiency.  In fact, it has been treated as no more than a technical problem not only by bourgeois economists and market socialists but also by many Marxists who have involved in the controversy.　　

       On the other hand, if we accept the conclusion of bourgeois economists and market socialists that a market economy is indispensable for any modern society, we would have to agree that some form of oppression and exploitation is indispensable for human civilization, not historically, but as long as human civilization exists.  In fact, in the sense that the market, according to its own inherent logic, leads to capitalist development, this is no less than saying that the prevailing capitalist system, with all of its illness and injustice, is the best of all possible worlds that we can have.  Thus, the question--can a socialist planned economy work--which has so much social and political implications, is certainly much more than a technical problem.  In its essence, it is more a “socio-historic” problem than a technical problem.  Therefore, if the question is to be answered, it must not be answered simply in a “technical” way, but has to be answered socially and historically.　　

       Related to this question, is the question why the socialist revolutions failed in the former Soviet Union, China, and Eastern Europe.  We are told that the 20th century socialist revolutions failed because the socialist planned economies had failed.  And their failure suggests that the socialist planned economy cannot work.  It is true that the economic system of the former socialist countries failed to survive.  It is also true that their economies were more or less “socialist” planned economies.  But these facts by themselves do not tell us why the socialist revolutions failed and the former socialist economies failed to survive.  Nor can we draw any conclusion simply from these facts on whether the socialist planned economy can work or not.  Indeed to say that the economic performance of the former socialist countries was a sheer failure simply contradicts historical fact.  According to a latest study on the international comparison of income and wealth (Maddison, 1995), in which the economic performance of the former socialist countries could only be underestimated, from 1950-1980, the GDP per capita in Eastern Europe (including the Soviet Union) had increased by 138 percent.  In the same period it had increased in China by the same degree.  This means that per capita income in the former socialist countries had grown at a rate of doubling for every quarter of century.  While this is by no means a miraculous speed, it is anything but an economic failure.  By comparison, in the same period, the GDP per capita for all other countries in the world had increased by 108 percent.  Also in the same period, the GDP per capita of South European and Latin American countries which had roughly the same level of development as Eastern Europe in 1950 had in average increased by 135 percent, and that of Asian and African countries which had similar level of development to that of China in 1950 had in average increased by 112 percent (see TABLE 7.1).  How can we maintain that an economic system that had in average made at least no less rapid economic development than the capitalist system does not work while arguing that the capitalist system is the most efficient and rational economic system in this world? 　　

　 　

 

TABLE 7.1　　

Index of GDP per Capita, 1950-1989　　

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------　　

                            1950  1960  1970  1980  1989    Average Annual Growth Rates(%)　　

                                                                                                     1950-1980           1950-1989　　

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------　　

1950 = 100:　　

Eastern Europe                       100    141    198    238    256              2.93                     2.44　　

China                                      100    143    178    238      /                 2.93                        /　　

All Other Countries　　

in the World                           100    128    174    208    227              2.47                     2.13　　

in which:　　

Southern Europe and　　

Latin America                         100    128    178    235    233              2.88                     2.19　　

Asia, Africa, and Oceania*      100    125    166    212    248              2.53                     2.35　　

Southern Europe and Latin America = 100:　　

Eastern Europe                       112    123    124    114    123　　

Asia, Africa, and Oceania* = 100:　　

China                                        80      91      85      90      /　　

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------　　

*Including all Asian, African, and Oceanian countries except China, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand.　　

Source: Calculated on the data from Table A-3(a), A-3(e), B-10(a), B-10(e), F-5, F-6, F-7 in Maddison (1995).　　

　 　

       If the economic system of the former socialist countries did work, and had made no less respectable economic performance than the capitalist system, the question whether the socialist planned economy can work has immediately got a different nature.  It seems that the problem does not really lie in the lack of a technical model that can work in the real world.  History has provided one as we have seen in the former socialist countries, though by no means a perfect one.  Moreover it seems that the entire academic economics world, according to its presently dominant way of thinking, simply cannot understand and explain the relative success of the former socialist economies.  Consequently nor can they really understand the subsequent failure of these economies.  On the other hand, if we use some Marxist intuition, it is not difficult to see that the problem cannot be solved simply in a “technical” or “economic” way, and it cannot be really understood without analyzing the historically changing social relations in the former socialist countries.     　　

　 　

A Critique of Market Socialism　　

       While for Marx market is by no means identical with capitalism, he did maintain that market relations prevail only in capitalist society.[29] In fact, in Marx"s opinion, the embryo of all elements of capitalist alienation can be found in the most “pure” market economy--simple commodity production. The very fact that under the market system, social productive forces appear to people "not as their own united power, but as an alien force existing outside them, of the origin and goal of which they are ignorant, which they thus cannot control..." (Marx, 1978a, 161) implies the possibility for the "division of labor" to evolve into "the division of capital and labor", i.e., the separation of labor from means of production. Therefore, a crucial dilemma of market socialism is how one can remove or at least effectively check market"s inherent tendency to evolve into capitalism without substantially weakening the economic mechanism upon which the development of productive forces relies in the context of market system. To prevent a market socialist society from evolving into capitalism, there are mainly three methods: (1)forbidding the buying and selling of capital and labor; (2)levying progressive taxes on income and wealth to restrict social inequality within certain limit; and (3)state ownership of all or most means of production. 　　

　 　

Forbidding the Buying and Selling of Capital and Labor　　

       Any modern economic system that is able to work must be capable of constantly reallocating social labor (live labor and materialized labor, i.e., in capitalist terms, labor and capital) so that supply and demand are kept in balance in each branch of production. Under the market system, however, except when means of production are owned by the state, as will be discussed below, the only way in which social labor can be transferred from one branch of production to another is by buying and selling capital and labor. Thus, how can a market economy work if buying and selling capital and labor has been forbidden?　　

　 　

Levying Progressive Taxes on Income and Wealth to Restrict Social Inequality within Certain Limit　　

       In this case, buying and selling capital and labor is allowed. In a market economy, however, one makes investment only to make profit, and one can sell his or her labor to others only when it produces profit for others. Thus, under a market economy, for buying and selling labor to work, the conditions are virtually the same as that in a capitalist society. That is, a certain level of profit rate must be secured to encourage investment, and the social welfare system must not give the unemployed population so much security that they are not willing to sell their labor power at a “reasonable” wage rate that allows investors to make profit. In this case, it is difficult to see how progressive taxes under market socialism can play a significantly different role than under capitalism. If it can not, then how can it effectively prevent market socialism from turning into capitalism?　　

　 　

State Ownership of All or Most Means of Production　　

       If all or most means of production are owned by the state, the problem of reallocating social labor can simply be solved by state investment, and thus the problem of buying and selling capital and labor is avoided. Under the state ownership, enterprises can be run by either state-appointed managers[30] or workers" collectivities.[31] In both cases, as Brus and Laski (1989) argued, this model is faced with the principal-agent problem--while state-appointed managers or workers" collectivities are entrusted by the state to run enterprises, if enterprises fail, who bears the responsibility for the loss of the state property? There is a solution to the problem. If under socialism, the interest of the society is no longer at odds with the common interest of working people, then why do not workers make responsible use of the state property if they know this will improve their common interest? We will make detail discussions on this point below. Here let us simply point out that for people to make responsible use of social property, it presupposes the production for society. How can people make responsible use of socially owned means of production when they produce for private appropriation and when the production is based on antagonistic competition between private producers?　　

       John E.Roemer (1994), on the other hand, tried to solve the dilemma of market socialism by making it more like capitalism. In his "coupon socialism", every citizen is given a certain amount of coupons. The total value of coupons is equal to the total value of means of production in the society. People can use their coupons to buy corporation shares. But they are not allowed to exchange coupons for money, and after their death their coupons must be returned to the society to be equally distributed among all citizens. "Coupon socialist" enterprises are believed to be able to run efficiently for they run exactly like capitalist corporations, based on wage labor and pursuing maximum profit. It is supposed that social polarization could be prevented by forbidding people from exchanging money for coupons. However, the corporations, the shares of which people use their coupons to buy, may fail in competition. If some corporations fail, then some people would lose their coupons, while some others, who own the corporations that take over the failed corporations, would have more coupons. Thus, forbidding the exchange between money and coupons by itself cannot prevent social polarization, even if it would work. How about another check against the tendency of social polarization--coupons cannot be inherited and must be returned to society after the death of coupons" owners to be equally distributed among all social members? First, capitalist economic efficiency is based on its ability to impose capitalist work discipline on workers. Capitalist enterprises are able to impose this discipline only because workers who have lost any access to means of production have to sell their labor power. While "coupon socialist" enterprises run exactly like capitalist enterprises, workers in "coupon socialism" are guaranteed some access to means of production. For example, unemployed workers can use their coupons to buy a company to employ themselves. Then, how can "coupon socialist" enterprises impose capitalist-style work discipline on workers? If it cannot, how can it work? Second, if the only thing that prevents "coupon socialism" from evolving into capitalism is simply an article of law that denies the right to inherit coupons, why cannot the rich minority who have controlled the most of the coupons, use their economic power to influence the legislation process, abolishing this article. Furthermore, if coupons cannot be inherited, why do coupon owners make responsible use of their coupons in their late years? What prevent them from making over-risky and irrational investments? "Coupon socialism" cannot escape the dilemma of market socialism, though it is almost indistinguishable from capitalism.　　

　 　

　 　

The Information Problem, the Motivation Problem, and the Socialist Social Relations　　

       According to bourgeois economists and market socialists the socialist planned economy cannot work because it is not able to solve the information problem.  What is the information problem?  For any modern economy to work, it must be able to collect and process enormous amount of information.  In a market economy, this enormous amount of information is dealt with simultaneously by millions of individual producers.  It is argued that if a market economy is to be replaced by a planned economy, the central planning authority must have the ability to collect and process this enormous amount of information which is previously collected and processed by millions of individual producers.  The problem is not only with the “calculating” ability of the central planning authority.  More importantly a large part of economic information exists in a fragmented and disperse way and can be collected and utilized only if it is simultaneously dealt with by large number of individuals.  Unable to collect and utilize a large part of the economic information, the central planning authority cannot make rational economic calculations, and the planned economy thus cannot work.[32]　　

       Before we analyze the information problem, let us first explain what is a planned economy.  A planned economy is not an economy where everything is planned or everything is determined by the central planning authority.  A planned economy is an economy in which all (or most) of the means of production are socially owned and all (or most) of the social products are directly produced for social needs rather than for exchange value and private appropriation.  Given social property and the direct production for social needs, in a planned economy, it is possible for the producers to actively cooperate with one another and make use of all available techniques to coordinate their economic activities with different levels of economic planning.　　

       If this is the case, why cannot the planned economy solve the information problem?  If the central planning authority, or the highest level of producers’ association, is not able to handle all relevant economic information.  It can simply deal with the information that it is able to collect and process and let lower levels of producers’ associations to deal with other information, while balancing against the possible disadvantages of lowering the level of coordination.  For the lower levels of producers’ associations, they can make lower levels of economic decisions based on the information available to them, and leave the economic problems they are not able to handle to the producers’ associations at lower levels or to producers--workers’ collectivities.  And large number of lower levels of producers’ associations and workers’ collectivities, just like large number of enterprises in the market economy, are able to deal with enormous amount of fragmented and disperse economic information.  In this way, a planned economy is able to collect and process at least no less information than a market economy.　　

       But the planned economy provides a superior way to utilize economic information.  The modern socialized production objectively requires cooperation and coordination between many different producers.  But in a market economy where private producers make economic decisions independently and separately, there is no ex ante coordination of economic activities and the coordination is realized afterwards through economic crises involving great losses of productive forces.[33]  On the other hand, in a planned economy, as far as the relevant information is available, it is possible to coordinate the economic activities of many different producers under unified economic planning, and thus avoid or reduce the waste of economic resources associated with the lack of ex ante coordination.  This certainly does not mean that under a planned economy, the central planning authority is able to plan everything.  But it does mean that with a planned economy, society will be able to make use of all available techniques to realize as much economic coordination as possible, while balancing against the cost of collecting and processing information.  This provides the potential to greatly improve the overall rationality of the economy, the potential that a market economy is unable to exploit.  Thus, a planned economy is able to not only handle as much information as a market economy, but also utilize the available information in a much more rational way than a market economy.　　

       However, the problem is not yet solved.  Bourgeois economists and market socialists ask: why do the lower levels of producers’ associations and workers’ collectivities actively collect economic information and use it in a economically rational way, what is the motivation for them to do so?  This is the motivation problem.  Apparently, the information problem cannot be really solved if we are unable to solve the motivation problem.　　

       Under a socialist planned economy, all producers directly produce for society, and the total social products are distributed to satisfy people’s material and spiritual needs according to democratically determined rules.  This raises a question: if in a socialist society, it is from the “social interest”--the total social products--that derive people’s individual material and spiritual interests, why cannot the social interest serve as an effective motivation for people, who pursue their individual material and spiritual interests, to pursue economic rationality, that is, to actively collect economic information and make rational use of it?　　

       Why is the socialist planned economy based on the production for the social interest?  While the modern socialized production objectively requires cooperation and coordination between many different producers, in a market economy where every producer pursues his or her own interest, they are motivated to compete and struggle against rather than cooperate with one another.  The motivation provided by the market is thus against the logic of the modern socialized production.  This problem can be solved only if producers directly produce for the interest of society rather than private appropriation.  Thus, under the modern socialized production, the production for the social interest is an economically much more rational way for people to pursue their material and spiritual interests.  In this sense, the social interest is by itself a real material interest, as Marx (1978, 160) said: “this common interest does not exist merely in the imagination, as the ‘general interest,’ but first of all in reality, as the mutual interdependence of the individuals among whom the labour is divided.”  In Grundrisse Marx (1971, 65) also argued that under the modern socialized production, “private interest is itself already a socially determined interest, which can only be achieved within the conditions established by society and through the means that society affords.”　　

       If under the modern socialized production, the social interest is by itself a real material interest, and is the precondition for the realization of all kinds of individual interests, why do not people work and produce for the social interest, and why cannot the social interest be an effective motivation for people to pursue economic rationality?　　

       For bourgeois economists and market socialists this is certainly not the end of the debate.  In their opinion, the production for the social interest will fail due to the “free rider” problem.  That is, for any production based on social or collective property, since an individual’s well-being depends not directly on the particular effort of his or her own effort, but on the combined effort of all the workers in the collectivity or society, there is no incentive for any particular individual to work effectively and rationally.  But the logic of the “free rider” argument is self-defeating.  It is exactly because an individual’s well being depends not on his or her own effort, but on the combined effort of all the workers in the collectivity or society, for individuals to improve their well-being, the proper strategy is a strategy based not on individual choice, but on collective choice.  The question is not for any particular individual what is the best strategy for him or her to improve his or her own interest, for whether his or her strategy works depends on the behavior of other individuals, but for all the workers in the collectivity or society, what is the best strategy for them to improve their combined interest.  Apparently, if everyone adopts the “free rider” strategy, which is supposed to be the individually optimal strategy, everyone will suffer.  The “free rider” strategy is thus against the interest of individuals.  If this is the case, why do people who are supposed to be rational beings pursuing their individual interests, adopt the “free rider” strategy rather than a collectively or socially optimal strategy?　　

       The capitalist market system is supposed to be freed from the “free rider” problem.  Of course, the capitalist system provides effective motivation for the capitalists to pursue their private profits.  But what motivation does the capitalist system provide to the workers who have no control over the production and are exploited and oppressed by the capitalists?  What is the motivation for the workers who actually carry out the production, to actively collect economic information and make rational use of it?  Without effective motivation, all the workers in the capitalist economy are potential “free riders” and for the capitalist economy to work, a great deal of “transaction cost” has to be paid to deal with the “free rider” problem.  For example, a significant part of the social labor force has to be unemployed to exercise competitive pressure on the employed workers who otherwise will be too “l(fā)azy.”  Moreover, a significant part of the employed workers must serve as supervisory workers to enforce labor discipline rather than participate in production.[34]　　

       This suggests that the “free rider” problem, rather than being associated with collective or social property, is actually rooted in the oppressive and exploitative social relations.  Being oppressed and exploited, working people do not have incentive to pursue economic rationality and to be “free riders” provides a rational choice for them to improve their living conditions.  If this is the case, the socialist system, by abolishing all kinds of oppression and exploitation, certainly provides a much better way than the capitalist system to solve the “free rider” problem.　　

       For the same reason, the question whether people will work for the social interest cannot be correctly answered unless we first consider what kind of social relations is under concern.  Under the oppressive society, the interest of the society is not more than the interest of the oppressor class.  In this case, working people certainly have no reason to work for the so called “social interest.”  On the other hand, in a socialist society where working people have control over social and economic power, and the interest of the society is not more than the common interest of working people, why do not working people work for the social interest, which is also their own interest?　　

       The whole argument now boils down to the following points: is it true that in a socialist society, to work for the social interest is in the interest of working people?  If yes, why do not working people work for the social interest in a socialist society, and therefore, why cannot the social interest be an effective motivation for working people to pursue economic rationality?  The anwers to these questions are quite obvious.　　

       A question is thus raised:  how can the question whether a socialist planned economy can provide effective motivation for people to pursue economic rationality become a question in the first place, given the obvious fact that under the modern socialized production the most rational way for people to realize their material and spiritual interests is to produce directly for society, and that under the socialist social relations, the interest of society is no longer at odds with the interest of working people?　　

       On this question the Marxist point of view starts from a self-evident fact that people’s material and spiritual needs provide the ultimate motivation for productive activities and the pursuit of economic rationality throughout the entire human history.  The establishment of the socialist social relations certainly will not abolish this ultimate motivation.  On the contrary, by abolishing all kinds of oppression and exploitation, the socialist society opens the way for the majority people to work and produce for the interest of their own rather than that of the oppressors and exploiters.  From this point of view, the socialist economic system certainly provides a much stronger motivation for the majority people to pursue economic rationality than the capitalist system and any other oppressive systems, and whether a socialist economy can provide effective motivation for people to pursue economic rationality is simply out of question.　　

       On the other hand, bourgeois economists and market socialists start from the assumption that people pursue economic rationality only when they work and produce for their private interests.  It is from this assumption that the question derives--how can a society which is based on the production for society rather than private appropriation provides effective motivation for people to pursue economic rationality?  But if people pursue economic rationality because they want to realize their material and spiritual interests, why does it matter that these interests take the form of the social interest or their private interests, as long as these interests are indeed their own interests?  The goods and services produced directly for society certainly provide no less satisfaction of people’s material and spirtitual needs than the goods and services produced for private appropriation.  Thus, unlike Marxist point of departure, the point of departure of bourgeois economists and market socialists is not a self-evident fact, but a problematic assumption that cannot hold water without being proved.  However, rather than providing scientific proofs for their assumption,  bourgeois economists and market socialists treat their assumption as if it were indeed a self-evident fact, take it for granted, and confidently draw all of their arguments from this assumption, including the argument that the socialist planned economy cannot provide effective economic motivation and thus cannot work.　　

       It should be pointed out that not few Marxists have failed to challenge bourgeois economists and market socialists on this point.  Consequently their efforts to defend the socialist planned economy (usually by inventing various technical models) have always ended in vain.  For if we accept the point of departure of bourgeois economists and market socialists and agree that people can only be motivated by their private interests, the only way to solve the motivation problem is to set up various “supervisory mechnisms.”  But for the planning authority to be able to exercise effective supervision, it must be able to collect and process enough relevant information and as we know, the planning authority is not able to do this by itself, and instead, it has to rely upon producers and other institutions who are under its supervision to provide the necessary information, who certainly have an incentive to distort the information.  In this case, the motivation problem simply has no way to be solved.    　　

       On the other hand, if we go beyond the narrow scope of bourgeois economists and market socialists, we will immediately find that what makes the motivation problem a problem is not more than the following fact: by abolishing private property and the market system, the socialist system also abolishes the economic motivation based on the pursuit of private appropriation.  However, it is exactly by doing so, the socialist system also abolishes the oppression and exploitation of the majority people, and thus provides a much stronger motivation for the majority people to pursue economic rationality than the oppressive systems.  Moreover, by establishing society’s control over production, and by producing directly for the social interest, the socialist system opens the way for people to actively cooperate with each other and to pursue the social interest, allowing making full use of the great productive potential of the modern socialized production.  Thus, on the one hand, the establishment of the socialist social relations makes it impossible for the motivatin problem to be solved in a way compatible with the capitalist or any other forms of oppression and exploitation, and on the other hand, it is exactly for this reason that it opens the possibility for the problem to be solved in a socialist way, in a way consistent with the liberation and free development of the majority people.  The motivation problem is thus solved.  And with the motivation problem solved, there is no reason why the information problem cannot be solved.  With both the information problem and the motivation problem solved, there is no reason why the socialist planned economy cannot work.  　　

       Thus, the problem has been logically solved.  But for the logic to work, the socialist social relations must be established.  However, the establishment of the socialist social relations depends on real historical struggles.  It is these struggles rather than academic arguments that will provide the real historical solution to the question whether a socialist planned economy can work.　　

　 　

　 　

A Note on Alec Nove’s Critique of the Socialist Planned Economy　　

       In the opinion of Alec Nove, however, the establishment of the socialist social relations does not make much difference. The division between the rulers and the ruled is inevitable in every society. In socialist society, people will still work for their private interests rather than the social interest, not really different from that in capitalist society. 　　

It is sometimes argued by Marxist `fundamentalists" that the basic problem [of Soviet planning] lie in alienation, in the conflicts of interest between workers, management and centre; all would be well if they all identified with a common interest...Yet this line of thought contains or implies several fallacies...[It is not appreciated] that the marketless planning model is of necessity centralized (how can a purely local body decide what society needs and how best to provide it?), and it is precisely the vast and complex scale of operations of central planning which is a major cause of this very alienation. `Unless one is prepared to accept that the structure of regulation in interconnected production is objectively hierarchical, then the whole problem of socialist democracy can only be raised in an agitational way", wrote Baran, without, unfortunately, drawing from this the conclusions that suggest themselves. Finally, it is implied that a society can or could exist in which there would be no conflict between sectors, and between sectors and centre, not to mention individuals, over the allocation of resources. This essentially utopian part of the Marxist tradition rests, and can only rest, on a vision of abundance. There must surely be conflicts, as any materialist would here to admit, unless there is plenty for all, i.e. when the concept of opportunity-cost, of choice between mutually exclusive alternatives, loses its meaning (Nove, 1980).　　

　 　

       First, it is true that economic planning, and in fact, any administration of public affairs, is "of necessity centralized. And in the sense that these affairs are "public", that is, they go beyond the narrow individual or local visions, they can be regarded as "objectively hierarchical". But how is this related to "alienation", to the division of society into the ruling class and the oppressed class? Any society must have some people managing its public affairs. This, by itself, tells us nothing why society is divided into classes. For a group of people to become a ruling class, it is not only necessary for the public affairs to be managed by them, but also necessary for the management of the public affairs to be exclusively controlled by them, allowing them to systematically make use of their positions to serve their private interests rather than the public interest. This is possible, as is well known by Marxists, as long as there is the division of mental labor and physical labor, which excludes the majority of the population from participating in scientific and artistic activities, and from participating in the management of public affairs. The socialist society, on the other hand, by rationally making use of modern productive forces, will be able to gradually abolish the division of mental labor and physical labor, eliminating the material foundation of the class oppression. 　　

       Second, Nove argued that "it is precisely the vast and complex scale of operations of central planning which is a major cause of this alienation." But the "vast and complex scale of operations", does not tell us how these operations are organized. In class societies, the administration of public affairs must be kept out of the control of people. As a result, it is organized as a large, complex bureaucratic structure that can make "vast and complex scale of operations" without involving people"s participation. In a socialist society, on the other hand, there is no need to keep the public affairs out of people"s control. Instead, the socialist management of public affairs is based on the extensive participation of ordinary people. Consequently, there is no need to set up a large, complex bureaucratic structure. How will "the vast and complex scale of operations" be organized in a socialist society? As Marx told us, they will be organized by "free association of individuals". In The Civil War in France, Marx, based on the experience of Paris Commune, made a concrete explanation of how the "free association of individuals" would work.　　

　 　

The Paris Commune was, of course, to serve a model to all the great industrial centres of France. The communal regime once established in Paris and the secondary centres, the old centralized Government would in the provinces, too, have to give way to the self-government of the producers. In a rough sketch of national organization which the commune had no time to develop, it states clearly that the commune was to be the political form of even the smallest country hamlet...The rural communes of every district were to administer their common affairs by an assembly of delegates in the central town, and these district assemblies were again to send deputies to the National Delegation in Paris, each delegate to be at any time revocable and bound by the mandat imperatif (formal instructions) of his constituents. The few but important functions which still would remain for a central government were not to be suppressed...but were to be discharged by communal, and therefore strictly responsible agents (Marx, 1978b, 632).　　

　 　

       Thus, socialist society will be based on the extensive participation of ordinary people in public affairs. As a result, the problem of "the vast and complex scale of operations" can simply be solved by a kind of division of labor. All local affairs will be subjected to the direct self-government of local people. A dozen of such localities will freely form an association in which an administration which is composed of delegates of these localities, who are subjected to the recall and formal instructions of their constituents, will be set up to administer their common affairs. A dozen of such associations of localities will in turn freely form a larger association organized in the same way to administer their common affairs at a higher level...so and so forth. As a result, every level of administration (including the central government) will be left with "few but important functions" corresponding to its level rather than "the vast and complex scale of operations" and thus every level of administration can be effectively controlled by the people whose common affairs it administers. 　　

       Nove, however, told us that even if in a socialist society, people could have effective control over their public affairs, it would still be impossible for people to work for the social interest. For people"s individual interests are always in conflict with one another "unless there is plenty for all, i.e. when the concept of opportunity-cost, of choice between mutually exclusive alternatives, loses its meaning." This "vision of abundance" was called by Nove as an "utopian part of the Marxist tradition". There can be no more vulgar distortion of Marxism. Socialism must be based on highly developed productive forces (which are prepared by capitalist development). Only with highly developed productive forces, is it possible to substantially reduce general working time, preparing the material condition for working people to freely develop their physical and mental potential and to participate in administering public affairs. But this has nothing to do with that "the concept of opportunity-cost...loses its meaning" or the so called "abundance" as understood by Nove.[35] Abstractly speaking, people"s individual interests are always in conflict with one another. What is consumed by one cannot be consumed by the other. However, before anything can be consumed, it must be produced. But under modern conditions, is it true that virtually everything has to be produced by more or less social cooperation? If this is the case, then is it true that modern production will be most productive when people actively cooperate with rather than compete against one another? If this is the case, is it true that people"s individual interests will be best satisfied if they cooperatively produce for the social interest rather than compete with one another for their private interests? If all of these are true, then why do not people who are supposed to be rational beings pursuing the maximization of their individual interests work for the social interest?　　

　 　

　 　

On Innovation　　

       While the innovation problem is in essence not more than the information problem and the motivation problem, it deserves particular consideration due to its importance. In fact, Roemer (1994, 37-45) argued that it was the innovation problem that had played a decisive role in the failure of centrally planned economies. Why cannot the planned economy make enough innovation? In the first place, there is the motivation problem--why do people innovate? In a capitalist society, how is the motivation problem solved? On the one hand, capitalists innovate in order to acquire super profit. On the other hand, under the pressure of competition, capitalists have to innovate to avoid failure. Thus, in a capitalist society, there are both "positive" and "negative" incentives for capitalist to innovate.　　

       To say that in a capitalist society, capitalists have incentives to innovate in no way means that capitalism is a system that is most conducive to social innovation. First, due to the antagonistic nature of the capitalist production, capitalist technological progress, rather than bringing benefit to workers, usually intensifies their sufferings and alienation. Thus, while capitalists do have incentives to innovate, their projects of innovations are often met with the resistance of workers, and there is no way for capitalists to introduce innovation without first overcoming workers" resistance. Second, while capitalists do have incentives to innovate, it is exactly the same incentives that prevents the socially rational use of innovation. From society"s point of view, technological knowledge can be most rationally used only if all social members have free access to the knowledge. In the capitalist society, however, capitalists make innovation to serve their private interests. Thus, they have incentives to innovate exactly because other people do not have free access to their innovation which is regarded as their private property. Otherwise, how can capitalists make super profit? Third, to say that capitalists have incentives to innovate, tells nothing about what kind of innovation capitalists are interested in. Capitalists innovate for private profits rather than social interests. Capitalists do not have incentives to make socially useful innovation if it does not bring about profit, e.g. the innovation that improves ecological conditions, or the innovation that can make labor process less alienating and more interesting. On the other hand, capitalists do have incentives to make the innovation that is socially harmful but can bring about profit, e.g. the transportation system based on private cars, which is perhaps the most expensive as well as the most ecologically harmful modern transportation system, is one of the most important innovations of the 20th century capitalism. Fourth, for a society to make full use of its innovative potential, it must allow all social members to freely develop their mental potential and participate in all kinds of innovation. But in the capitalist society the majority of the population--working people have no chance to develop their mental potential and participate in innovation due to the capitalist exploitation and oppression. Instead, innovation is restricted to be the affairs of a small group of "entrepreneurs”. Thus, under capitalism, the greatest part of the society"s innovative potential is wasted.　　

       How can a socialist planned economy solve the motivation problem? In Roemer"s opinion, "without the competition that is provided by markets--both domestic and international--no business enterprise is forced to innovate, and without the motivation of competition, innovation, at least at the rate that market economies engender, does not occur (Roemer, 1994, 44).” But does the society need innovation? If it does, why must it be forced to innovate? Why cannot this social need itself be a motivation for the society to innovate? Of course, by abolishing the capitalist economic system, the socialist planned economy also abolishes the capitalist motivation for innovation. But by abolishing the capitalist motivation for innovation--the pursuit of private profit, the socialist planned economy also abolishes capitalist motivation to exploit and oppress working people, liberating the greatest innovative potential in the society; by abolishing the capitalist motivation for innovation, the socialist planned economy also abolishes those innovations that, while bringing profit to capitalists, will not do any good to society, and  opens the way to all socially useful innovations; by abolishing the capitalist motivation for innovation, the socialist planned economy also abolishes the capitalist motivation to prevent the free access of all social members to all technological knowledge. While the socialist planned economy abolishes the capitalist motivation for innovation, by establishing the social ownership of means of production, and by abolishing the class oppression, it also provides the socialist motivation for innovation. If in a socialist society, people will self-consciously work for the social interest, and innovation does bring about social benefit, why do not people actively make innovation? Moreover, in a socialist society, it is not a small group of "entrepreneurs” but all working people who will actively innovate.　　

       The motivation problem, however, is not the only problem that, in the opinion of bourgeois economists and market socialists, leads to the failure of the planned economy in the field of innovation. There is also the principal-agent problem (Brus and Laski, 1989, 132-149; Stiglitz, 1994). Innovation is by nature risky and associated with many uncertainties. In a planned economy, anyone who makes innovation does not risk his own property. On the other hand, it is exactly because there are many uncertainties associated with the innovation, it is virtually impossible for the planning authority to distinguish objectively unavoidable losses from those losses brought about by bad decision-making. Thus, it is not able to use punishment to effectively prevent bad mistakes. This argument presupposes that in the planned economy people will not self-consciously make responsible use of social resources invested for innovation for there is not their own property at stake. But if in a socialist society, the interest of the society is not more than the common interest of all individuals, and thus social property is not more than the material condition for people to promote their individual interests, why do not people make responsible use of social property? 　　

       Brus and Laski (1989, 142), however, argued that "even with the appropriate socialist motivation the problem of entrepreneurship may remain unresolvable without anchoring responsibility for losses in personal stakes...it is not so much the degree of personal competence, dedication, motivation, and taste for innovations, as the conditions forcing a principal to weigh the risks against responsibilities in a real world of uncertainty." Brus and Laski seemed to argue that "anchoring responsibility for losses in personal stakes", as the condition "forcing a principal to weigh the risks against responsibilities", is an indispensable condition for the rational decision-making on risky investment. 　　

       What does risky investment (innovation is a kind of risky investment) mean? While in all cases rational investment means making full use of available knowledge to make maximum output out of minimum input, "risk" or "uncertainty" means that certain knowledge is not available. How can one make rational decision if certain knowledge is not available? In this case, to make rational decision is not more than to make a good guess. Apparently, whether one can make a good guess does not depend at all on whether his or her personal property is at stake (this, on the contrary, will lead him to make decisions on "emotional" basis rather than rational basis), but on one"s experience, good intuition, the knowledge that one can make use of but cannot tell, etc. In this respect, a socialist planned economy is most likely to ensure that the responsibilities of decision-making on risky investment are entrusted to those who are most likely to make a good guess.　　

       It is in the capitalist society where risky investment is made of private property, the ability of which to make risky investment, is limited by its scale, that investors have to weigh the risk against their property. This, rather than being indispensable for the rational decision-making on risky investment, set a limit to the possibility of applying economically rational principles in risky investment. The socialist planned economy, by abolishing capitalist private property, also abolishes this limit. Of course, in a socialist planned economy, some risky projects of great importance should still be subjected to society"s consideration which weighs the risks against possible losses of social property. In this case, the fact that these projects are of great importance itself means that it will not be difficult for the planning authority to evaluate the impact on society if these projects fail. 　　

　 　

　 　

The Experience of Revolutionary China　　

       Will people work for the social interest? Can the socialist economy work? In this section, I will focus on the experience of revolutionary China to see how Chinese revolutionary socialists and the Chinese working people had made practical struggles to build socialist social relations and the socialist planned economy. What achievements had they made in their struggles? Why did their struggles fail in the end? What lessons can we draw from their failure?　　

　 　

Bureaucratization, Revolutionary Politics, and Economic Planning　　

       When Chinese Communist Party came to power in 1949, what they inherited from Kuomintang regime was an extremely backward, "semi-colonial, semi-feudal" economy with very limited modern industry. Thus, the new revolutionary regime was immediately faced with the task to restore and develop productive forces as soon as possible. The question is how to develop productive forces. By abolishing capitalist ownership of means of production, and by concentrating most modern means of production in the hands of the state, it was possible for the revolutionary regime to pursue the rational allocation of productive resources in the society-wide by undertaking economic planning. 　　

       Socialist economic planning, as we have seen, must be based on "the self-government of producers", which requires extensive participation of ordinary working people in economic management, and thus presupposes the elimination of the division of physical labor and mental labor. China, however, was not yet prepared in this respect for socialist economic planning. It was estimated that in Shanghai, the most advanced industrial city in China, immediately after it was taken over by communists, the illiteracy rate of all employees (including clerks and white collar workers) was 46 percent, and that of blue-collar workers was 80 percent (Andors, 1977, 48). This had some important consequences. First, without "the self-government of producers", large, complex bureaucratic structures were set up in response to the expansion of economic planning, and the state and party administration were quickly bureaucratized. Second, to administer these bureaucratic structures, many people who came from bourgeois or intellectual families but had the knowledge and expertise indispensable for economic management were recruited into the party. These people, however, joined the party not because they had revolutionary ideals, but because the party was an access to power. Third, bureaucratic planning relied upon material incentives to motivate cadres and workers. After the wage reform in 1956, the egalitarian "supply system" practiced in the era of revolutionary war was replaced by hierarchical wage and bonus system. Thus, in late 1950s, a bureaucratic class enjoying certain material privileges gradually took shape. [36]　　

       On the other hand, it is very wrong to regard China"s economic planning in this period simply as bureaucratic planning. While the bureaucratic class was taking shape, there were still millions of revolutionary cadres working in the state and party administration.[37] As long as a large part of the regime"s power remained in the hands of these revolutionary cadres, the regime would remain largely a revolutionary socialist regime. This would inevitably have a decisive impact on the performance of economic planning. From 1953-1957, that is, in the period of first five-year plan, China"s national income grew at an average annual rate of 8.9 percent, with industry and agriculture growing annually at 18 percent and 4.5 percent accordingly. Western estimation gave a bit lower rates. Bergerson estimated that the growth rate of China"s GDP in this period was 8.3 percent, and Chao estimated that China"s industrial growth rate in this period was 14.4 percent, still placing China one of the countries that had the highest industrial growth rate in the world (Riskin, 1987, 58; Chao, 1960).　　

       How could the revolutionary nature of the political power influence the performance of economic planning? As we have known, for a planned economy to work rationally, it must be able to solve the information problem and the motivation problem. Both problems can be solved if people will self-consciously work for the social interest. If the political power was to a large extent in the hands of revolutionary socialists, then the interest of the society would be in large measure consistent with the interest of working people, thus providing certain objective foundation for people to work for the social interest. On the other hand, if there were millions of revolutionary cadres and workers "who faithfully [carry] out party policy yet does so with independence and initiative" (see footnote 27), many practical problems in planned economy requiring decentralized initiatives could be easily solved. Moreover, these revolutionary cadres and workers would act as powerful models inspiring many other people to work for the social interest. All of these would remain the case only if the political power remained in large measure a revolutionary socialist power. This, however, as we have seen, was threatened by the rising bureaucratic class. Whether the revolutionary regime was able to resist the tendency of bureaucratization and retain its revolutionary nature would depend on practical struggles.　　

　 　

Maoist Political Economy and the Great Leap Forward　　

       In late 1950s, Mao began to pay attention to the contradictions of bureaucratic planning. In his critique of Stalinist political economy, he argued that:　　

　 　

The book says that material incentive to labor "spurs increases in production" and "is one of the decisive factors in stimulating the development of production"...By making material incentive a onesided absolute the text fails to give due importance to raising consciousness, and can not explain why there are differences among the labor of people in the same pay scale. For example, in scale no.5, one group may carry on very well, another rather poorly, and a third tolerably well on the whole. Why, with similar material incentive, such differences occur is inexplicable according to their way of reasoning. Even if the importance of material incentive is recognized, it is never the sole principle. There is always another principle, namely, spiritual inspiration from political ideology. And, while we are on the subject, material incentive can not simply be discussed as individual interest. There is also the collective interest to which individual interest should be subordinated, long-term interests to which temporary interests should be subordinated, and the interests of the whole to which the partial interests should be subordinated (Mao, 1977b, 83).　　

　 　

       In Mao"s opinion, bureaucratic planning onesidedly depends on material incentive to motivate people--it does not work. The potential of the socialist planned economy can be fully released only if we are able to raise people"s consciousness, and if people will self-consciously work for the social interest rather than their narrow individual interests. Mao was very correct on these points. Yet why does bureaucratic planning fail to raise people"s consciousness? Mao said:　　

　 　

In our experience, if cadres do not set aside their pretensions and identify with the workers, the workers will never look on the factory as their own but as the cadres...If manual workers and enterprise leaders are both members of a unified production collective then "why do socialist enterprises have to put `single leadership" into effect rather than leadership under collective guidance" i.e., the system of factory head responsibility under party committee guidance? It is when politics is weakened that there is no choice but to talk about material incentive (Mao, 1977b, 86)　　

　 　

       It was very correct for Mao to point out that "It is when politics is weakened that there is no choice but to talk about material incentive". But what was wrong with the "politics"? Mao recognized that for workers to work for the social interest, there must be egalitarian social relations and workers" participation in management. On the other hand, Mao still thought that the problem could be solved by reviving revolutionary spirit in the party and by putting technocrats under the supervision of the communist party which was still regarded as a revolutionary party. 　　

       The ideas of Maoist political economy were put into effect in the Great Leap Forward. First, to solve the problem of bureaucratization, the planning system was substantially decentralized. Second, material incentive was criticized and in many factories, piece-rate wage and bonuses were abolished. Third, workers were encouraged to participate in factory management (Andors, 1977, 68-96).　　

       There were some merits in the efforts of the Great Leap Forward. For example, under bureaucratic planning, material incentive is supposed to encourage people to work for the social interest. In reality, however, there cannot be "perfect" or "scientific" incentive systems. As a result, rather than encouraging people to work for the social interest, material incentive often encourages people to act against the social interest. Say, a plan based on physical output encourages people to maximize cost to maximize output. Obviously, this problem can be solved only if material incentive itself has been abolished. To abolish material incentive, however, presupposes that people will self-consciously work for social interest. This, as has been argued, is possible only if the interest of the society is no longer at odds with the interest of working people. The existence of material incentive, thus, was not the cause of the problem, but the result of real social conditions. That is, a significant part of social power was not in the hands of revolutionaries but in the hands of newly shaped bureaucratic class. The Great Leap Forward, however, tried to solve the problem not by dealing with the cause of the problem--the social power of the bureaucratic class, but by abolishing the result of the problem. Of course, it could not work.[38]　　

The Cultural Revolution and Its Lessons　　

       After the failure of the Great Leap Forward, Mao recognized that the problem could no longer be solved within existing power structures. In 1965, he thought that a bureaucratic class had already taken shape in post-revolutionary China. "The bureaucratic class is a class in sharp opposition to the working class and the poor and lower-middle peasants. How can these people have become or in the process of becoming bourgeois elements sucking the blood of the workers be properly recognized? These people are the objectives of the struggle, the objectives of the revolution (taken from Meisner, 1986, 271)." While he later retreated from this point, arguing that the objective of the revolution was "those people in position of authority within the party who take the capitalist road", it is clear that for Mao at this time the problem could only be solved by a struggle over political power. In 1966, Mao launched the Cultural Revolution. 　　

       In the opinion of Mao and his comrades, the main target of the Cultural Revolution was "those within the party who are in authority and are taking the capitalist road (CCP, 1968, 395-405).” That is, a large part of social power was no longer in the hands of revolutionaries, but in the hands of "capitalist roaders". The revolutionary force, thus, must struggle with the "capitalist roaders", seizing back power. Mao and his comrades also correctly pointed out that "[i]n the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, the only method is for the masses to liberate themselves, and any method of doing things in their stead must not be used (CCP, 1968, 398)." Moreover, the Cultural Revolution would not only overthrow the old bureaucratic power, but also replace it with a new people"s power.　　

　 　

[The] cultural revolutionary groups, committees and congresses...are organs of power of the proletarian cultural revolution...It is necessary to institute a system of general elections, like that of the Paris Commune, for electing members to cultural revolutionary groups and committees and delegates to the cultural revolutionary congresses. The lists of candidates should be put forward by the revolutionary masses after full discussion, and the elections should be held after the masses have discussed the lists over and over again. The masses are entitled at any time to criticize members of the cultural revolutionary groups and committees and delegates elected to the cultural revolutionary congresses. If these members or delegates prove incompetence, they can be replaced through election or recalled by the masses after discussion (CCP, 1968, 401).　　

　 　

       On the other hand, the Cultural Revolution suffered form serious theoretical and practical weaknesses. Theoretically, Mao and his comrades failed to make a scientific analysis of the post-revolutionary Chinese society. First, rather than pointing out that the whole bureaucratic class was the target of the revolution (though Mao once thought so on the eve of the Cultural Revolution), the Cultural Revolution was targeted at a small group of "capitalist roaders", while "95 percent of the cadres" were still regarded as good or comparatively good. Second, in Mao and his comrades" opinion, what made the Cultural Revolution necessary was that "[a]lthough the bourgeoisie has been overthrown, it is still trying to use the old ideas, culture, customs and habits of the exploiting classes to corrupt the masses, capture their minds and endeavour to stage a come-back. The proletariat must do the exact opposite: it must meet head-on every challenge of the bourgeoisie in the ideological field and use the new ideas, culture, customs and habits of the proletariat to change the mental outlook of the whole of the society (CCP, 1968, 395)." By attributing the emergence of "capitalist roaders" in the party to the influence of bourgeois ideas, Mao and his comrades totally failed to use historical materialism to scientifically explain the rise of the bureaucratic class, and thus were unable to find the correct solution to the problem. On the other hand, while the only correct method of revolution is "for the masses to liberate themselves", as Lenin argued, it is impossible for working people who are oppressed, exploited, and deprived of their right to participate in scientific activities, to reach a scientific understanding of the society completely by themselves. In the post-revolutionary society, this is still the case as long as the division of physical labor and mental labor remains. Thus, masses cannot by themselves make a successful revolution against the bureaucratic class without the leadership of a revolutionary party which is composed of revolutionary intellectuals who are able to provide the scientific analysis of the society. With the old communist party degenerating into bureaucratic apparatus, a new revolutionary party was indispensable for the success of the Cultural Revolution. Without such a party, the Cultural Revolution could not result in any constructive outcomes and could only end in chaos.　　

　 　

　 　

　 　

Can the Socialist Planned Economy Work?　　

       Bourgeois economists and market socialists argue that the socialist planned economy is not able to solve the information problem and the motivation problem and it is not going to work.  But even according to bourgeois statistics, the former socialist economies had, on per capita basis, developed no less rapid than the capitalist economies.  Moreover, TABLE 7.1 shows that in their early stage, the former socialist economies had clearly demonstrated some superiority over the capitalist economies.  If the socialist planned economy is unable to solve the information problem and the motivation problem, how can the early success of the former socialist economies be explained?　　

  This kind of problem is virtually as "complex" in the early stage of economic development as in the later stage. 　　

       Secondly, it is argued that in the initial stage of the former socialist economies, economic growth rate was accelerated by mobilizing unutilized resources.  But in the long run, failing to solve the information problem, the motivation problem, and to make technological progress as rapidly as the capitalist economies, after unutilized resources had been used up, the former socialist economies would inevitably fall into economic stagnation.  It is true that making more effective use of unutilized resources contributed a lot to the early economic development of the former socialist economies.  But this is certainly not a proof that these economies were irrational or inefficient.  Moreover, unutilized resources by themselves cannot make economic growth.  To turn unutilized resources into productive resources, there must be other production inputs, and these inputs must be organized and used in a economically rational way.  The workers must know what to produce, how to produce, and how many to produce.  And all of these will be turned into economic growth only if the workers more or less do what they are expected to do.  Thus, to mobilize unutilized resources and to make rapid economic growth out of these resources require exactly the same thing as is required by making efficient use of the resources presently being utilized.  That is, the ability to solve the information problem and the motivation problem.  Thus, the question remains--if the planned economy is not able to solve the information problem and the motivation problem, how can the early economic success of the former socialist countries be explained? 　　

       Thirdly it is argued that the economic growth of the former socialist countries was based on “extensive growth” rather than “intensive growth.”  The “extensive growth” is supported by massive inputs of resources rather than technological progress and thus cannot sustain in the long run.  Is this argument supported by empirical evidence?  TABLE 7.2 shows that from 1950-1973, the arithmetic average of the growth rates of labor productivity for 17 capitalist countries (7 major developed capitalist countries and 10 “middle income” countries) is 4.4 percent, for 10 “middle income” countries is 4.2 percent, and for 6 socialist countries is 4.5 percent.  These figures certainly do not suggest the former socialist economies were inferior to the capitalist economies in the respect of technological progress.　　

 

TABLE 7.2　　

Growth Rates of Labor Productivity (GDP per Hour Worked), Selected Countries, 1950-1973   　　

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------　　

Capitalist Countries   Growth Rates (%)                Socialist Countries       Growth Rates (%)　　

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------　　

Argentina                               2.4                                  Bulgaria                                6.1　　

Brazil                                     3.7                                  Czechoslovakia                     3.4　　

Canada                                   3.0                                  Hungary                                3.9                Chile                                      2.9                                  Poland                                   3.8　　

Colombia                               3.3                                  Romania                                6.2　　

France                                    5.1                                 USSR                                    3.4　　

Germany                                6.0                                  Arithmetic Average               4.5　　

Greece                                   6.4　　

Italy                                       5.8　　

Japan                                     7.7　　

Mexico                                  4.0　　

Peru                                       3.4　　

Portugal                                 6.0　　

Spain                                     6.4　　

United Kingdom                    3.1　　

United States                         2.7　　

Venezuela                              3.4　　

Arithmetic Average                4.4　　

Arithmetic Average for　　

“Middle Income” Countries    4.2　　

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------　　

Source: Maddison (1995, 79-80).　　

　 　

       Moreover, the Soviet Union and other former socialist countries had to spend most of their R & D efforts in the military field to meet the military competition against major imperialist powers.  This threw an unproportionately heavy burden on their economies whose absolute scales were much smaller than those of the major imperialist powers.  They also suffered from technological blockade and restriction by major capitalist countries, and thus could not take the full advantage of “l(fā)ater comers” as some capitalist developing countries did.  If this had not been the case, the rate of technological progress in the former socialist countries would certainly have been much higher.　　

       We know that for the socialist planned economy to work, it must be able to solve the information problem and the motivation problem and the two problems can be solved only if the socialist social relations have been established.  The early economic success of the former socialist countries thus cannot be really understood without an analysis of the historically changing social relations in these countries.  While it is true that the post-revolutionary societies in the Soviet Union, China, and Eastern Europe were not genuine socialist societies in the sense that the political and social power were not directly under the control of working people, but actually controlled by a vanguard revolutionary party which is supposed to represent the interest of working people.  Nevertheless, we must not deny that these revolutionary parties, in their early stage, were indeed largely composed of genuine revolutionaries who sincerely pursued socialism and the liberation of working people (this is especially true for pre-Stalinist Soviet Union, China, Cuba, and Yugoslavia).  In this case, it is not surprising that the social regimes that appeared after the revolution must be more or less revolutionary regimes pursuing the political, economic, and social policies by and large in the interest of working people.  Thus, in the early stage of these societies, the interest of society was largely consistent with the interest of working people.  This provided the objective foundation for the working people in these countries to work for the social interest.　　

       It was a historical fact that in those years we saw hundreds of millions of people working not for their private interests, but for the common interest of people, for revolution and socialism, for proletarian internationalism, and for building communism.  How could this important historical fact not have a significant impact on the development of productive forces?  It is this distinct set of social relations that can help to explain the early success of the former socialist economies.　　

       If we consider the whole historical period of revolutionary China, then this period can be divided into two stages. In the first stage which was from 1949 to 1957, the old oppressive and exploitative social order had been overthrown, the political and economic status of working people had been greatly improved, and the new bureaucratic class was only beginning to take shape. In this stage, the socialist Chinese economy developed rapidly, demonstrating a clear superiority over capitalist economies. The second stage which was from 1957 (the year of the “hundreds of flowers” movement and a year before the Great Leap Forward) to late 1970s was characterized by the ascendancy of the bureaucratic class and intensified class struggles, that were climaxed in the Cultural Revolution. Despite the tremendous social turbulence in this stage, the revolutionary socialist force still held a large part of the social power, and consequently, the socialist consciousness of working people continued to play an important role in economic development. As a result, in this stage, the Chinese economy continued to grow at a respectable rate. It was only after the failure of the Cultural Revolution and the rule of the bureaucratic class was thus consolidated, that the socialist planned economy became politically and socially invalid and capitalist marketization became the only “viable” solution to China’s economic problems (the bureaucratic class certainly cannot solve the information problem and the motivation problem by mobilizing working people’s socialist consciousness).　　

       What lessons can we learn from the experience of revolutionary China? First, under a revolutionary socialist regime, the Planned economy did work, and it worked better than most capitalist economies. Then what will be the case if socialist social relations have been fully built up? The answer is self-evident: a socialist planned economy will not only work, but will work much more rationally and efficiently than the capitalist market economy in both social and economic terms. Second, whether a socialist planned economy is viable or not, is first of all, not a theoretical question, but a practical question, depending on the real historical struggle for socialism. After the revolutionary socialist force takes over the political power, the struggle for socialism has not yet ended. Instead, the revolutionary socialist force must apply correct revolutionary theories to educate and mobilize working masses, and to organize them in proper political organizations, like that of Paris Commune, to make active struggle against the tendency of bureaucratization and to secure the revolutionary nature of the new regime.[39] In the long run, the revolutionary socialist regime must make a through transformation of the irrational economic structure left over by capitalism so that with the continuous improvement of social labor productivity, the general working time of working people will be gradually reduced to a level that allows all social members to freely develop their physical and mental potential.[40] As a result, the division of mental labor and physical labor will be eliminated, that is, the material foundation of class domination and oppression will be done away with. Only then can we say that the struggle for socialism has ended with victory.　　

　 　

　 　

　 　

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