喬姆斯基：“阿拉伯世界失火了”--論埃及危機(jī)

提交者: 人文與社會(huì) 日期: 2011/02/09 閱讀: 125

來(lái)源:NYT2011.1.19

摘要:喬姆斯基認(rèn)為，埃及事件與1989年的俄羅斯有重大差異。華盛頓和它的同盟奉行著一個(gè)源遠(yuǎn)流長(zhǎng)的原則--民主只有在符合策略與經(jīng)濟(jì)追求時(shí)才是可行的：在敵人的領(lǐng)地，某種程度的民主一點(diǎn)沒(méi)問(wèn)題，不過(guò)在自家后院，那還是先讓民主乖乖聽話再說(shuō)。

Tag: 喬姆斯基 埃及 美國(guó) 自由主義 民主 顏色革命

人文與社會(huì)編輯小組譯 http://wen.org.cn/ 

2011年1月27日半島電視臺(tái)稱，“阿拉伯世界失火了，”此時(shí)，在這整個(gè)區(qū)域，西方力量“正在迅速失去影響力?！?/p>

 這場(chǎng)浪潮的發(fā)源地是突尼斯，那里的一次戲劇性暴動(dòng)趕跑了西方支持的獨(dú)裁者，它在埃及的號(hào)召力尤其強(qiáng)大，那里的示威者們威懾了一個(gè)獨(dú)裁者的殘暴警察力量。

 觀察者們把這個(gè)事件與1989年俄羅斯政權(quán)更替相提并論，但兩者間其實(shí)有重大差異。

 一個(gè)關(guān)鍵問(wèn)題是，在支持阿拉伯獨(dú)裁者們的各種強(qiáng)大力量中，不存在一個(gè)戈?duì)柊蛦谭?。華盛頓和它的同盟奉行著一個(gè)源遠(yuǎn)流長(zhǎng)的原則--民主只有在符合策略與經(jīng)濟(jì)追求時(shí)才是可行的：在敵人的領(lǐng)地，某種程度的民主一點(diǎn)沒(méi)問(wèn)題，不過(guò)在自家后院，那還是先讓民主乖乖聽話再說(shuō)。

 有一個(gè)把1989年與當(dāng)下相比的例子更有效：當(dāng)時(shí)在羅馬尼亞，一直到美國(guó)與羅馬尼亞的聯(lián)盟崩潰前，美國(guó)都支持著東歐地區(qū)最兇殘的獨(dú)裁者齊奧賽斯庫(kù)。兩國(guó)鬧翻后，華盛頓對(duì)推翻齊奧賽斯庫(kù)表示慶祝，并把歷史一筆勾銷。

 這是一個(gè)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的模式：包括馬科斯，杜瓦利埃，全斗煥，蘇哈托和其他有用的黑道大哥們。穆巴拉克也許也要成為其中一員，同時(shí)美國(guó)也會(huì)照舊試圖保證繼承者不會(huì)偏離軌道太遠(yuǎn)。

目前看來(lái)希望被寄托在忠實(shí)于穆巴拉克的奧瑪·蘇萊曼（Omar Suleiman）將軍,他剛成為埃及副總統(tǒng)。示威群眾對(duì)這個(gè)有史以來(lái)在情報(bào)總局任職最久的局長(zhǎng)的敵視幾乎跟穆巴拉克差不多。

 權(quán)威們有一個(gè)老生常談的論調(diào)：在實(shí)際的層面上，對(duì)激進(jìn)伊斯蘭主義的防備需要對(duì)民主勉為其難的反對(duì)。雖然這說(shuō)法不是一無(wú)可取，但這種表達(dá)方式是誤導(dǎo)性的。普遍存在的威脅事實(shí)上是獨(dú)立。在阿拉伯世界，美國(guó)及其聯(lián)盟一直在支持激進(jìn)伊斯蘭分子，有時(shí)這樣做是為了防止世俗民族主義的威脅。

 沙特阿拉伯--激進(jìn)伊斯蘭主義意識(shí)形態(tài)（以及伊斯蘭恐怖主義）的中心，是一個(gè)熟悉的例子。一個(gè)冗長(zhǎng)名單中的另一例是巴基斯坦獨(dú)裁者中最殘忍的齊亞·哈克，他也是里根總統(tǒng)的最愛(ài)，用沙特阿拉伯提供的資金開展了一系列激進(jìn)伊斯蘭化運(yùn)動(dòng)。

“阿拉伯世界內(nèi)外的一個(gè)傳統(tǒng)論調(diào)是天下太平，萬(wàn)事皆在掌握之中，”前約旦官員、現(xiàn)任卡耐基基金會(huì)中東研究主任的馬爾旺·姆阿舍說(shuō)，“延續(xù)這種觀點(diǎn)，滲透很深的力量辯稱那些呼喚改革的對(duì)手和外部力量是在夸大事態(tài)。”

因此大眾可以被忽略。這個(gè)教條歷史悠久，普適整個(gè)世界，在美國(guó)領(lǐng)土也是這樣。如果發(fā)生動(dòng)亂，策略變動(dòng)可能是必須的，不過(guò)總是需要保證控制力。

突尼斯的活躍民主運(yùn)動(dòng)針對(duì)一個(gè)“缺乏言論和集會(huì)自由、人權(quán)問(wèn)題嚴(yán)重的警察國(guó)家”，統(tǒng)治者家族貪腐，為人民憎惡。這是維基泄密中一份2009年7月美國(guó)大使羅伯特·戈代克所發(fā)電報(bào)中的評(píng)價(jià)。

因此對(duì)有些觀察者來(lái)說(shuō)維基泄密的“文件應(yīng)該讓美國(guó)人民能舒心地感到官員們沒(méi)有玩忽職守”--確實(shí)，那些電報(bào)支持美國(guó)政策的程度讓人覺(jué)得好像奧巴馬本人泄露了它們（雅各布·海爾布魯恩在《國(guó)家利益》中這樣說(shuō)）。

《金融時(shí)報(bào)》的一篇報(bào)道標(biāo)題為“美國(guó)應(yīng)給阿桑吉頒發(fā)獎(jiǎng)?wù)隆?。首席外交政策分析人吉迪恩·拉赫曼寫到：“美?guó)的外交政策看來(lái)是有原則的、智慧的、實(shí)際的--美國(guó)在任何狀況中采用的公開姿態(tài)通常和私下態(tài)度吻合?！?/p>

按這種觀點(diǎn)，維基泄密削弱了“合謀論”的可信度，合謀論質(zhì)疑的是華盛頓一貫宣布的高貴動(dòng)機(jī)。

戈代克的電報(bào)也支持這些判斷--如果我們不深究的話。假如深究，就像外交政策分析者斯蒂芬·祖恩斯在《聚焦外交政策》中的報(bào)道，我們會(huì)發(fā)現(xiàn)華盛頓得到戈代克的信息之后，向突尼斯提供了1千2百萬(wàn)美元軍事援助。突尼斯恰恰是僅有的五個(gè)得到軍事援金的國(guó)家之一：還有以色列（常規(guī)提供），兩個(gè)中東獨(dú)裁國(guó)家--埃及和約旦，加上哥倫比亞--全世界人權(quán)狀況最糟糕、南半球接受美國(guó)軍援最多的國(guó)家。

海爾布魯恩的第一條證據(jù)是維基泄密電報(bào)中提到阿拉伯世界對(duì)美國(guó)的伊朗政策的支持。拉赫曼和很多媒體也用了這個(gè)例子，贊美這些鼓舞人心的發(fā)現(xiàn)。這些反應(yīng)說(shuō)明了在有教養(yǎng)的文化中，對(duì)民主的蔑視多么根深蒂固。

被忽略的是廣大人民怎么想--這是很容易發(fā)現(xiàn)的。布魯金斯八月公布的民調(diào)結(jié)果顯示，有些阿拉伯人同意華盛頓和西方評(píng)論員的觀點(diǎn)，認(rèn)為伊朗是一個(gè)威脅：這些人數(shù)量為10%。相反，認(rèn)為美國(guó)和以色列是主要威脅的：各為77%和88%。

阿拉伯人對(duì)美國(guó)政策的敵視之深已到了大部分（55%）認(rèn)為如果伊朗有核武器地區(qū)安全能增強(qiáng)的地步?？墒?，“天下太平，萬(wàn)事皆在掌握之中”（馬爾旺·姆阿舍就是這樣描寫這種盛行的幻想）。獨(dú)裁者們支持我們。他們的臣民可以被忽略--除非他們掙脫了鎖鏈，那時(shí)政策就不得不調(diào)整。

維基泄密的其他內(nèi)容看來(lái)也支持對(duì)華盛頓之高貴的熱情贊頌。2009年7月美國(guó)駐洪都拉斯大使雨果·羅倫斯通知華盛頓“對(duì)6月28日塞拉亞總統(tǒng)被迫離職的法律和憲法問(wèn)題”的使館調(diào)查結(jié)果。

使館的結(jié)論是：“軍隊(duì)、最高法院、國(guó)會(huì)無(wú)疑在六月28日合謀進(jìn)行了一次針對(duì)行政部門的不合法和違憲的政變。”非常令人敬佩的調(diào)查。不過(guò)奧巴馬總統(tǒng)馬上與南美和歐洲差不多全部國(guó)家逆道而行，支持政變政府，無(wú)視其后的暴行。

維基泄密中最了不得的發(fā)現(xiàn)也許是與巴基斯坦有關(guān)的那些文件，外交政策分析家弗雷德·布蘭夫曼在Truthdig(時(shí)政網(wǎng)站)評(píng)論了相關(guān)內(nèi)容。

電報(bào)顯示美國(guó)使館非常了解華盛頓在阿富汗和巴基斯坦的軍事行動(dòng)不但強(qiáng)化了泛濫的反美主義而且“有動(dòng)搖巴基斯坦國(guó)家的危險(xiǎn)”，甚至引發(fā)了最終噩夢(mèng)的威脅：核武器有可能落入伊斯蘭恐怖主義分子手中。

再說(shuō)一遍，這些文件“應(yīng)該讓美國(guó)人民能舒心地感到官員們沒(méi)有玩忽職守”（海爾布魯恩語(yǔ)）--同時(shí)，華盛頓正堅(jiān)定地向著災(zāi)難前進(jìn)。

 “The Arab world is on fire,” al-Jazeera reported on January 27, while throughout the region, Western allies “are quickly losing their influence.”

The shock wave was set in motion by the dramatic uprising in Tunisia that drove out a Western-backed dictator, with reverberations especially in Egypt, where demonstrators overwhelmed a dictator’s brutal police.

Observers compared the events to the toppling of Russian domains in 1989, but there are important differences.

Crucially, no Mikhail Gorbachev exists among the great powers that support the Arab dictators. Rather, Washington and its allies keep to the well-established principle that democracy is acceptable only insofar as it conforms to strategic and economic objectives: fine in enemy territory (up to a point), but not in our backyard, please, unless it is properly tamed.

One 1989 comparison has some validity: Romania, where Washington maintained its support for Nicolae Ceausescu, the most vicious of the East European dictators, until the allegiance became untenable. Then Washington hailed his overthrow while the past was erased.

That is a standard pattern: Ferdinand Marcos, Jean-Claude Duvalier, Chun Doo Hwan, Suharto and many other useful gangsters. It may be under way in the case of Hosni Mubarak, along with routine efforts to try to ensure that a successor regime will not veer far from the approved path.

The current hope appears to be Mubarak loyalist Gen. Omar Suleiman, just named Egypt’s vice president. Suleiman, the longtime head of the intelligence services, is despised by the rebelling public almost as much as the dictator himself.

A common refrain among pundits is that fear of radical Islam requires (reluctant) opposition to democracy on pragmatic grounds. While not without some merit, the formulation is misleading. The general threat has always been independence. In the Arab world, the United States and its allies have regularly supported radical Islamists, sometimes to prevent the threat of secular nationalism.

A familiar example is Saudi Arabia, the ideological center of radical Islam (and of Islamic terror). Another in a long list is Zia ul-Haq, the most brutal of Pakistan’s dictators and President Reagan’s favorite, who carried out a program of radical Islamization (with Saudi funding).

“The traditional argument put forward in and out of the Arab world is that there is nothing wrong, everything is under control,” says Marwan Muasher, former Jordanian official and now director of Middle East research for the Carnegie Endowment. “With this line of thinking, entrenched forces argue that opponents and outsiders calling for reform are exaggerating the conditions on the ground.”

Therefore the public can be dismissed. The doctrine traces far back and generalizes worldwide, to U.S. home territory as well. In the event of unrest, tactical shifts may be necessary, but always with an eye to reasserting control.

The vibrant democracy movement in Tunisia was directed against “a police state, with little freedom of expression or association, and serious human rights problems,” ruled by a dictator whose family was hated for their venality. This was the assessment by U.S. Ambassador Robert Godec in a July 2009 cable released by WikiLeaks.

Therefore to some observers the WikiLeaks “documents should create a comforting feeling among the American public that officials aren’t asleep at the switch”—indeed, that the cables are so supportive of U.S. policies that it is almost as if Obama is leaking them himself (or so Jacob Heilbrunn writes in The National Interest.)

“America should give Assange a medal,” says a headline in the Financial Times. Chief foreign-policy analyst Gideon Rachman writes that “America’s foreign policy comes across as principled, intelligent and pragmatic—the public position taken by the U.S. on any given issue is usually the private position as well.”

In this view, WikiLeaks undermines the “conspiracy theorists” who question the noble motives that Washington regularly proclaims.

Godec’s cable supports these judgments—at least if we look no further. If we do, as foreign policy analyst Stephen Zunes reports in Foreign Policy in Focus, we find that, with Godec’s information in hand, Washington provided $12 million in military aid to Tunisia. As it happens, Tunisia was one of only five foreign beneficiaries: Israel (routinely); the two Middle East dictatorships Egypt and Jordan; and Colombia, which has long had the worst human-rights record and the most U.S. military aid in the hemisphere.

Heilbrunn’s Exhibit A is Arab support for U.S. policies targeting Iran, revealed by leaked cables. Rachman too seizes on this example, as did the media generally, hailing these encouraging revelations. The reactions illustrate how profound is the contempt for democracy in the educated culture.

Unmentioned is what the population thinks—easily discovered. According to polls released by the Brookings Institution in August, some Arabs agree with Washington and Western commentators that Iran is a threat: 10 percent. In contrast, they regard the U.S. and Israel as the major threats (77 percent; 88 percent).

Arab opinion is so hostile to Washington’s policies that a majority (57 percent) think regional security would be enhanced if Iran had nuclear weapons. Still, “there is nothing wrong, everything is under control” (as Marwan Muasher describes the prevailing fantasy). The dictators support us. Their subjects can be ignored—unless they break their chains, and then policy must be adjusted.

Other leaks also appear to lend support to the enthusiastic judgments about Washington’s nobility. In July 2009, Hugo Llorens, U.S. ambassador to Honduras, informed Washington of an embassy investigation of “l(fā)egal and constitutional issues surrounding the June 28 forced removal of President Manuel `Mel’ Zelaya.”

The embassy concluded that “there is no doubt that the military, Supreme Court and National Congress conspired on June 28 in what constituted an illegal and unconstitutional coup against the Executive Branch.” Very admirable, except that President Obama proceeded to break with almost all of Latin America and Europe by supporting the coup regime and dismissing subsequent atrocities.

Perhaps the most remarkable WikiLeaks revelations have to do with Pakistan, reviewed by foreign policy analyst Fred Branfman in Truthdig.

The cables reveal that the U.S. embassy is well aware that Washington’s war in Afghanistan and Pakistan not only intensifies rampant anti-Americanism but also “risks destabilizing the Pakistani state” and even raises a threat of the ultimate nightmare: that nuclear weapons might fall into the hands of Islamic terrorists.

Again, the revelations “should create a comforting feeling—that officials are not asleep at the switch” (Heilbrunn’s words)—while Washington marches stalwartly toward disaster.

資料來(lái)源：http://wen.org.cn/modules/article/view.article.php/2370

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